FRENCH  POLICY  AND  THE 
AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

OF  1778 


By 

EDWARD  S.  CORWIN 


"La  Diplomatic  .  .  .  re  peut,  elle  re  doit 
avoir  quun  but,  la  force  et  la  grandeur 
du  pays  qiielle  represented  -  Capefigue 


ARCHON  BOOKS 
HAMDEN,  CONNECTICUT 

1962 


Copyright,  1916,  by 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

Reprinted  1962  with  permission 

Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


TO 

MY  SISTERS 

"BELOVED  ALLIES" 

THIS  BOOK  IS  AFFECTIONATELY 

INSCRIBED 


PREFACE 

The  materials  for  the  following  study  were 
assembled  more  than  ten  years  ago  as  a  part  of 
work  done  for  the  doctorate,  at  the  Universities 
of  Michigan  and  Pennsylvania.  About  two 
years  ago  I  had  prepared  for  publication  the  por- 
tion of  the  present  volume  comprising,  essen- 
tially, chapters  I,  V,  and  VIII-XV,  when  Mr. 
P.  C.  Phillips'  The  West  in  the  Diplomacy  of 
the  American  Revolution  appeared,  covering 
much  of  the  ground  of  several  of  these  chapters. 
I  then  decided  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  the  volume 
to  that  of  a  general  history  of  the  one  entangling 
alliance  to  which  the  United  States  has  been 
party. 

I  have  been  particularly  interested  in  these 
pages  in  emphasizing  the  idea  that  France's  in- 
tervention in  the  American  Revolution  was  moti- 
vated primarily  by  her  desire  to  recover  her  lost 
preeminence  on  the  Continent  of  Europe.  Writ- 
ers have  sometimes  made  verbal  recognition  of 
this  fact,  but  in  the  case  of  American  writers  at 
least,  they  have  generally  failed  to  appreciate  its 
really  controlling  importance  for  the  subject, 
and  in  the  end  have  usually  contrived — thanks, 


vi  PREFACE 

no  doubt,  to  Professor  Seeley's  famous  dictum — 
to  present  French  intervention  as  an  episode 
in  the  British-French  struggle  for  colonial  do- 
minion in  the  Western  Hemisphere  rather  than 
for  what  it  really  was,  an  episode  in  the  Euro- 
pean policy  of  the  Ancien  Regime.  A  second 
phase  of  the  general  subject  to  which  I  have 
given  prominence  is  the  embarrassment  which 
resulted  to  France  from  the  conflict  of  interest 
between  her  new  ally,  America,  and  her  heredi- 
tary ally,  Spain,  a  conflict  which  greatly  en- 
hanced the  difficulty  of  getting  Spain  into  the 
war  in  the  first  place ;  which  subsequently  forced 
France  to  make  a  very  restrictive  interpretation 
of  certain  of  her  engagements  with  the  United 
States;  and  which  finally  eventuated  in  the 
breach  of  their  instructions  by  the  American 
commissioners  at  the  negotiations  of  1782.  Last- 
ly, I  have  felt  that  it  would  be  a  service  to 
American  students  to  make  the  materials  in 
Doniol's  monumental  work  more  available. 
These  materials,  supplemented  by  the  other 
sources  that  I  have  used,  will  be  found,  I  think, 
to  furnish  adequate  basis  for  judgment  with  ref- 
erence to  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  more  important 
questions  likely  to  suggest  themselves  to  an 
American  student  of  the  Alliance  of  1778. 

In  gathering  my  materials  I  have  incurred  ob- 
ligations to  several  libraries,  which  I  gladly  take 
this  opportunity  to  acknowledge:  to  the  Penn- 


PREFACE 


VII 


sylvania  Historical  Society,  the  American  Philo- 
sophical Society,  and  the  Ridgeway  Branch  Li- 
braries of  Philadelphia,  for  the  use  of  numerous 
eighteenth  century  publications,  both  French 
and  English;  to  the  University  of  Pennsylvania 
Library,  for  the  use  of  its  extensive  collection  of 
materials  on  the  Mercantile  System;  to  the  Har- 
vard University  Library,  for  the  use  of  the  Jared 
Sparks  Manuscripts ;  to  the  American  Antiquar- 
ian Society  Library  at  Worcester,  for  the  use  of 
newspapers  of  the  Revolutionary  period;  to  the 
Library  of  Congress  for  numerous  services.  I 
should  also  note  a  more  special  obligation  to  the 
staffs  of  the  University  of  Michigan  and  the  Uni- 
versity of  Pennsylvania  Libraries  and  of  the 
Princeton  University  Library,  for  many 
courtesies. 

My  other  indebtednesses  are  not  extensive,  but 
they  are  deep.  I  wish  especially  to  record  my 
grateful  recognition  of  the  aid  which  I  received 
from  my  teachers,  Professors  A.  C.  McLaughlin 
and  W.  E.  Lingelbach,  in  the  early  stages  of  my 
labors. 

E.  S.  C. 

May  25,  1916. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I — The  Question  of  Motive 1 

II — The  Classical  System  and  British  Sea-Power     23 

III — Vergennes  Discovers  the  American  Revolt     54 

IV — The  Portuguese  and  Corsair  Questions ...      80 

V — Florida  Blanca  Defines  Spam's  Position.  .    105 

VI — Vergennes,  Alarmist  and  Propagandist.  .  .    121 

VII — The  Treaty  of  Alliance  and  Outbreak  of 

War   149 

VIII — Spanish  Mediation  and  the  Convention  of 

Aranjuez    173 

IX — The  Two  Alliances  Compared 195 

X — The  Mississippi  and  Western  Land  Ques- 
tion        217 

XI — Sieur  Gerard  and  the  Continental  Congress  243 

XII — The  Mission  of  La  Luzerne 263 

XIII — The  Crisis  of  the  Revolution 284 

XIV— Jay's  Mission  to  Spain 318 

XV — Jay  and  the  Negotiations  of  1782 329 

XVI— Profit  and  Loss 361 

Bibliographical  Note    379 

Appendices    385 

Index  .  .    415 


ix 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  QUESTION  OF  MOTIVE 

The  great  majority  of  students  today  would, 
I  suppose,  concede  that  but  for  our  alliance  with 
France,  the  War  of  Independence  would  have 
ended  without  independence,  and  that  but  for  the 
aid  which  France  lent  us  secretly  in  the  months 
preceding  Burgoyne's  surrender  at  Saratoga,  we 
should  hardly  have  become  allies  of  His  most 
Christian  Majesty,  at  least  on  anything  like 
terms  of  equality.  To  emphasize  the  efficacy  and 
indispensability  of  French  aid  in  the  Revolution 
is,  however,  only  to  throw  into  higher  light  its 
aspects  of  paradox :  the  oldest  and  most  despotic 
monarchy  of  Europe  making  common  cause 
with  rebels  against  a  sister  monarchy;  a  govern- 
ment on  the  verge  of  bankruptcy  deliberately 
provoking  a  war  that,  to  all  appearances  cer- 
tainly, it  might  have  easily  avoided.  Ignorance 
of  the  dangers  it  invited  might  conceivably  afford 
a  partial  explanation  of  the  course  taken  by  the 
French  government  in  the  years  between  1776 
and  1783,  but  in  fact  the  explanation  is  available 
in  only  slight  measure.  The  risk  to  a  monarch  in 


2  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

promoting  rebellion,  albeit  in  another's  domin- 
ions, was  clearly  present  to  Louis'  mind,  while 
the  unfitness  of  the  royal  exchequer  for  the  bur- 
dens of  war  was  pressed  upon  him  by  Turgot 
with  all  possible  insistence. 

Bancroft  explains  France's  championship  of 
American  independence  thus:  "Many  causes 
combined  to  produce  the  alliance  of  France  and 
the  American  republic,  but  the  forces  which 
brought  all  influences  harmoniously  together, 
over-ruling  the  timorous  levity  of  Maurepas  and 
the  dull  reluctance  of  Louis  XVI  was  the  move- 
ment of  intellectual  freedom."1 

The  important  element  of  truth  in  this  theory 
is  unquestionable.  The  direction  and  momentum 
of  French  popular  sentiment  established,  to  some 
extent  certainly,  the  possibilities  and  limitations 
of  French  official  action,  and  this  sentiment  was 
in  turn  to  no  inconsiderable  extent  the  product 
of  the  liberalism  of  the  age.  Nevertheless,  the 
idea  that  France  ought  to  intervene,  if  chance 
offered,  between  England  and  her  North  Ameri- 
can colonies  in  behalf  of  the  latter,  came  in  the 
first  instance,  not  from  the  salon  but  the  Foreign 
Office.  And  it  is  not  less  clear  that  the  precise 
policy  pursued  by  the  French  government  toward 
the  United  States  from  1776  on  was  shaped,  not 
by  philosophers  but  by  professional  diplomatists. 

1  History  of  the  United  States  (Author's  last  revision),  V.  256. 
See  also  ib.,  264  ff. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  3 

Confining  then  our  attention  from  the  outset 
to  the  question  of  what  were  the  official  motives 
of  French  intervention,  we  have  naturally  to  con- 
sider in  the  first  instance  the  Count  de  Vergen- 
nes'  argument  in  behalf  of  his  program,  which 
eventually  became  that  of  the  French  govern- 
ment, that  however  the  American  situation  even- 
tuated, it  carried  with  it  the  substantial  risk  for 
France  of  having  to  come  finally  to  the  defense  of 
her  Caribbean  possessions  against  an  English  at- 
tack; since  if  England  subjugated  America  she 
would  be  tempted  to  turn  the  large  forces  she 
would  have  on  hand  to  some  profitable  employ- 
ment, whereas  if  she  did  not,  she  would  make 
allies  of  those  whom  she  had  lost  as  subjects  in 
an  endeavor  to  compensate  herself  at  the  ex- 
pense of  France.2 

It  was  a  theory  calculated  to  appeal  strongly 
to  the  French  mind  of  that  day  and  generation. 
The  Seven  Years  War  had  been  begun  by  the 
British  government  in  the  midst  of  negotiations 
without  a  word  of  warning.  It  had  been  con- 
ducted by  Chatham  in  a  spirit  of  ferocious  anti- 
pathy toward  France  and  her  ruling  House.3  It 
had  been  concluded  by  a  peace  which  had  been 

2  Henri  Doniol,  Histoire  de  la  Participation  de  la  France  a 
I'fitablissement  des  titats-Unis  d'Amerique  (Paris,  1886-99), 
I.  273-5;  II.  460,  462-3.  Cited  hereafter  as  "Doniol." 

'Expressions  of  Vergennes'  distrust  of  Chatham  will  be  found 
in  Doniol  I.  61-2,  67-72.  At  the  same  time  he  admits  in  effect  the 
unlikelihood  of  George  Ill's  calling  him  to  power,  ib.,  62. 


4  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

roundly  denounced  by  an  influential  section  of 
the  English  public  for  restoring  to  France  Eng- 
lish conquests  in  the  Caribbean.  Moreover,  the 
violence  of  English  party  contests  was  notorious ; 
and  to  men  to  whom  it  had  not  yet  become  evident 
in  what  a  powerful  leash  George  III  held  Parlia- 
ment it  was  natural  to  suppose  that,  rather  than 
incur  the  penalty  of  a  too  long  delayed  triumph 
in  America,  the  North  ministry  would  be  ready, 
if  worse  came  to  worst,  to  resort  to  the  most 
desperate  expedients. 

And  not  only  did  the  argument  in  question 
strike  hands  with  the  popular  French  estimate  of 
British  policy;  it  also  countered  admirably  the 
strongest  argument  against  French  intervention 
in  America,  namely,  that  it  meant  war  with  Eng- 
land. Yet  these  very  considerations  should 
perhaps  put  us  on  our  guard  against  too  spon- 
taneously crediting  Vergennes  with  complete 
sincerity  in  this  matter;  or  if  we  decide  to  ac- 
cord him  that,  we  should  at  least  remember  his 
own  warning,  that  "it  is  human  nature  to 
believe  readily  that  which  one  desires  most 
ardently."4 

The  evidence  presented  by  Vergennes  to  sup- 
port a  plea  of  self-defense  in  behalf  of  France's 
action  in  America  we  shall  pass  upon  later. 
Here  we  need  only  weigh  some  more  general  con- 
siderations militating  against  that  plea:  To 

4  Ib.,  II.  790. 


THE   AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  5 

begin  with,  the  risks  involved  in  attempting  to  aid 
the  Colonies  secretly  were  obvious  from  the  first; 
yet  it  is  on  the  increment  of  danger  resulting  from 
his  own  policy  at  this  point  that  Vergennes  based 
in  part  his  argument  for  an  open  alliance  with 
the  Colonies.5  Again,  by  his  own  argument,  the 
danger  that  confronted  France  arose  alike  from 
the  prospect  of  English  victory  and  of  English 
defeat  in  America;  yet  it  will  be  found  that  he 
was  quite  ready  to  retreat  from  his  program  of 
alliance  with  America  whenever  English  victory 
seemed  seriously  to  impend.6  In  other  words,  it 
would  seem  that,  while  the  danger  menacing 
France  from  the  prospect  of  an  immediate  Eng- 
lish triumph  in  America  was  one  to  be  awaited 
in  calm — the  calm  of  despair,  forsooth — the  dan- 
ger which  threatened  from  the  opposite  contin- 
gency was  one  that  must  be  met  half-way.  Yet 
it  was  the  latter  contingency  precisely  which  the 
policy  of  secret  aid  was  designed  to  make  sure!7 
But,  again,  while  a  British  attack  upon  her  Carib- 
bean possessions  would,  of  course,  have  forced 
France  to  come  to  their  defense,  it  may  be  ser- 
iously doubted  whether  French  official  opinion 
held  these  possessions  after  1763  in  sufficient  es- 
teem to  have  warranted  a  policy  that  materially 
increased  the  likelihood  of  a  serious  war  of  which 

5  76  .,724. 

6  Ib.,  I.  567-75  and  613-21 ;  also  II.  526-9,  534-6,  539,  and  551-5. 

7  lb.,  I.  247-8. 


6  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

their  security  would  be  the  main  objective.8  In- 
deed Vergennes  himself  declared  more  than  once 
that  the  French  West  Indies  could  offer  but 
slight  temptation  to  English  cupidity,  that  Eng- 
land already  had  enough  of  that  sort  of  thing;9 
and  it  is  significant  that  during  the  negotiations 
of  1782  he  stood  ready  to  surrender  some  of  the 
most  valuable  items  of  these  possessions  if  he 
could  thereby  procure  Gibraltar  for  Spain.10 
Finally,  there  is  good  reason  for  believing  that 
France  could,  at  any  time  before  1778,  have  ob- 
tained from  England  a  specific  guaranty  of  her 
American  holdings — a  guaranty  which  Spain 
would  have  been  glad  to  sanction,  and  which  Eng- 
land would  have  been  slow  to  violate,  so  long  at 
any  rate  as  peace  continued  on  the  Continent.11 

8  See  the  remarks  of  M.  Abeille,  quoted  infra.  In  the  same 
connection  one  should  also  recall  the  pacifist  attitude  of  the 
French  government  early  in  1777  toward  the  question  of  defending 
Santo  Domingo,  the  obvious  explanation  of  it  being  the  fear  of 
arousing  suspicion  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  that  would  pre- 
judice the  policy  of  secret  aid:  Doniol,  II.  234-41,  253,  264-5,  272-5. 

9 Ib.,  II.  643-4;  III.  50-1.     See  also  Life  of  Arthur  Lee,  I.  361. 

10  Ib.,  V.  220.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  throughout  the  war 
France  definitely  subordinated  obvious  opportunities  to  enlarge 
her  holdings  in  the  West  Indies  to  other  objectives.  "Au  vrai," 
says  Lavisse,  "les  interets  coloniaux  paraissaient  a  Vergennes, 
comme^a  presque  tous  les  hommes  d'Etat  francais,  de  mediocre 
importance,"  Histoire,  IX.1  117. 

"Both  at  the  end  of  1776  and  in  the  spring  of  1777,  the 
British  Government  suggested  a  common  disarmament  on  the 
part  of  England,  France,  and  Spain,  Doniol,  II.  145-54,  232. 
An  earnest  advocate  of  such  a  plan,  which  was  to  be  accompanied 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  7 

The  principal  reason  for  Vergennes'  constant 
employment  of  the  line  of  argument  under  discus- 
sion undoubtedly  lies  in  its  propagandist  use. 
Before,  of  course,  any  diplomatic  program  could 
be  entered  upon  it  had  to  receive  the  assent  of  the 
king.  Had  the  idea  of  an  aggressive  program 
been  unbiased  by  other  considerations  it  would 
probably  have  had  Louis'  assent  from  the  start, 
for  ignorant  as  he  was  of  domestic  affairs,  he  was 
well  versed  in  dynastic  politics  and  jealous  for 
the  honor  of  his  House.  But  unfortunately 
for  such  a  program,  Louis  had  ascended  the 
throne  promising  reforms  that  forbade  ambitious 
schemes  abroad;  and  besides,  an  endeavor  to 

by  a  joint  guaranty  by  the  parties  to  it — France,  Spain,  England, 
and  Portugal — of  their  possessions  in  America  and  the  two  Indies, 
was  Beaumarchais'  friend  Lord  Rochford,  a  member  of  the 
ministry,  Wharton,  III.  727-8.  Vergennes  however  had  from  the 
first  been  averse  to  seeking  any  sort  of  understanding  with  Eng- 
land, Doniol,  I.  51-2;  P.  C.  Phillips,  The  West  in  the  Diplomacy 
of  the  American  Revolution  (Univ.  of  111.,  1913),  38  fn.  25  and 
54  fn.  74;  B.  F.  Stevens,  Facsimiles  of  Manuscripts  in  European 
Archives  Relating  to  America,  1773-1783  (London,  1889-98,  25, 
vols.,  cited  hereafter  as  SMSS.),  Nos.  1533,  1544,  and  1549.  In 
Aug.,  1777,  we  find  Vergennes  arguing  against  France's  accepting 
a  British  guaranty  of  French  and  Spanish  possessions,  Doniol, 
II.  528-9.  At  the  very  end  of  the  year,  that  is  after  Saratoga,  if 
we  are  to  credit  a  statement  attributed  by  the  Spanish  ambas- 
sador Aranda  to  Vergennes,  the  English  government  was  offer- 
ing France  the  Island  of  Cape  Breton  and  Nova  Scotia,  together 
with  extensive  rights  in  the  Newfoundland  fisheries,  if  France  in 
return  would  close  her  ports  to  the  rebels.  Aranda  to  Florida 
Blanca,  Jan.  31,  1778,  Sparks  MSS.  (Harvard  Univ.  Library), 
CII.  See  also  SMSS.,  No.  1838. 


8  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

strike  at  England  through  America  involved  the 
naturally  unwelcome  idea  of  assisting  rebels."11* 
Nor  could  Vergennes'  calculations  stop  short  with 
his  own  sovereign.  For  the  logic  of  the  Family 
Compact  clearly  exacted  that  the  Spanish  court 
too  should  be  consulted  about  measures  that 
might  involve  it  in  war.  How,  then,  could  the 
Foreign  Office  better  meet  the  twofold  necessity 
before  it  than  by  giving  its  program  as  much  as 
possible  of  the  appearance  of  a  program  of  de- 
fense? With  Louis  the  device  succeeded,  and 
probably  no  other  would  have.  At  Madrid,  on 
the  contrary,  though  the  argument  was  plumed 
especially  for  the  favorite  anxieties  of  that 
court,  it  failed  utterly;  with  the  result  however 
that  the  argument  of  defense  had  to  be  pressed 
upon  Louis  with  fresh  insistence,  in  order  to  in- 
duce him  to  take  a  line  different  from  that  of  his 
uncle  and  ally. 

In  short,  while  the  argument  that  England 
designed  to  attack  her  Caribbean  possessions 
assisted  materially  in  bringing  France  into  the 
Revolution,  especially  by  tending  to  minimize 

Ua  One  of  the  few  literary  remains  of  any  importance  from  the 
hand  of  Louis  XVI  is  a  note  scribbled  on  the  margin  of  a  Projet 
of  the  "Expos6  des  Motifs  de  la  Conduite  de  la  France,"  etc.,  of 
1779,  to  protest  against  Vergennes'  assertion  that  France  had  only 
recognized  a  people  already  free.  "Cette  observation,"  runs  the 
royal  gloss,  "pourrait  autoriser  .  .  .  1'Angleterre  a  aider  ouverte- 
ment  les  mecontents  si  souvent  agites  en  Bretagne,  nos  protestants, 
et  tous  les  Francais  discordants  d'avec  l'«utorit£  royale."  Cape- 
figue,  Louis  XVI  (Paris,  1856),  107-9.  See  also  Appendix  IV. 


THE   AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  9 

with  the  king  the  weightiest  consideration 
against  such  a  project,  it  does  not  follow  that  the 
defense  of  these  possessions  furnished  the  princi- 
pal purpose  of  French  intervention.  The  central 
core  of  Vergennes'  program  from  the  first  was 
aid  to  the  Americans  in  the  achievement  of  their 
independence',  and  the  prospect  of  American  in- 
dependence necessarily  brought  into  view  objec- 
tives which  far  overshadowed  the  security  of  the 
French  West  Indies,  either  momentary  or  per- 
manent. French  intervention  in  the  Revolution 
was,  in  other  words,  determined  by  motives  of 
"aggression"  rather  than  of  "defense";  which  is 
to  say  that  its  real  purpose  was  the  upsetting  of 
the  status  quo  in  certain  particulars  rather  than 
its  preservation  in  certain  others.  But  in  what 
particulars?  Was  France's  objective  territory, 
or  commerce,  or  was  it  something  less  tangible 
than  either  of  these  ? 

The  possibility  that  it  was  territory  is  raised 
by  the  contention  of  Professor  Turner  that 
France  hoped  in  the  Revolution  to  replace  Eng- 
land in  Canada  and  Spain  in  Louisiana.  In  sup- 
port of  this  thesis  Professor  Turner  adduces 
first,  the  testimony  of  Godoy,  "the  Prince  of 
Peace,"  that  after  the  war  was  over,  Vergennes, 
counting  upon  the  close  union  between  France 
and  Spain,  sought  to  induce  the  latter,  "already 
so  rich  in  possessions  beyond  the  sea,  to  give  to 


10  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

France  her  ancient  colony";  secondly,  the  fact 
that  during  the  war  Vergennes  appeared  anxious 
"to  protect  the  interests  of  Spain  in  the  country 
between  the  Alleghenies  and  the  Mississippi"; 
and  thirdly,  a  document  published  in  Paris  in 
1802  under  the  caption  Memoir e  historique  et 
politique  sur  la  Louisiane  par  M.  de  Vergennes.12 
Upon  closer  scrutiny  each  item  of  this  evidence 
must  for  one  reason  or  other  be  disallowed.  The 
reliability  of  the  testimony  of  Godoy,  who  did 
not  come  into  power  until  six  years  after  Ver- 
gennes' death,  is  in  itself  questionable,  but  even 
if  it  be  accepted  at  face  value  it  says  nothing  of 
Vergennes'  intentions  before  and  during  the 
Revolution.  Vergennes'  attitude  during  that 
period  toward  Spain's  claims  to  the  territory  be- 
tween the  Alleghenies  and  the  Mississippi  is 
sufficiently  accounted  for  by  his  feeling  that  it 
was  necessary  to  harmonize  the  conflicting  in- 
terests of  the  United  States  and  Spain,  each  of 
whom  was  in  alliance  with  France  against  Eng- 
land. The  document  published  in  1802,  though 
it  may  possibly  date  from  the  Revolution,  was  not 
the  work  of  Vergennes  nor  yet  of  any  one  who 
spoke  for  him.  Not  only  does  the  program  that 
it  proposes  directly  traverse,  in  its  reference  to 
Canada,  the  pledge  of  His  Most  Christian  Ma- 
jesty in  article  VI  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance,  re- 
nouncing "forever  the  possession  ...  of  any 

u  American  Historical  Review,  X.  249  ff. 


THE  AMERICAN   ALLIANCE  11 

part  of  the  continent"  that  had  lately  belonged 
to  Great  Britain,  but  it  materially  conflicts  with 
the  policy  which  Professor  Turner  himself  ac- 
knowledges that  Vergennes  pursued,  of  support- 
ing Spain's  claims  in  the  region  between  the 
Alleghenies  and  the  Mississippi.  This  policy 
was  clearly  designed  to  allay  Spain's  alarm  at 
the  prospects  of  American  independence.  The 
program  urged  in  the  Memoire  of  1802  proposed, 
on  the  contrary,  the  deliberate  aggravation  of 
this  alarm  as  the  easiest  means  of  inducing  Spain 
to  relinquish  Louisiana  to  the  stronger  hands  of 
France.13 

1JSee  the  Memoire,  pp.  25-30.  Other  considerations  that  forbid 
the  attribution  of  this  document  to  Vergennes  or  official  asso- 
ciates of  his  are  the  following:  It  is  to  be  noted  that  while  the 
anonymous  editor  of  the  Mtmoire  assumes  to  vouch  for  "the  style, 
the  thoughts"  of  the  document  as  being  those  of  the  French  secre- 
tary, he  says  nothing  of  a  signature,  nor  does  any  appear  in  the 
published  form.  The  Memoire  is  also  devoid  of  certain  distinctive 
marks  of  a  French  official  document  addressed  to  royalty.  The 
most  obvious  consisting  in  the  failure  of  the  writer  (or  compiler) 
ever  to  refer  to  France  and  Spain  by  the  titles  of  their  Bourbon 
rulers.  If  we  are  to  rely  upon  the  silence  of  the  Inventaire  Som- 
maire,  no  memoir  on  Louisiana  exists  in  the  French  archives  of  the 
date  to  which  the  Mtmoire  published  in  1802  is  assigned  by  its 
editor,  though  several  are  to  be  found  there  of  an  earlier  date 
from  which  this  one  might  have  been  fabricated,  and  to  one  of 
these  the  editor  makes  specific  reference  in  a  footnote.  Further- 
more, the  fact  that  the  Mtmoire  of  1802  was,  if  at  this  point  we 
are  to  follow  the  editor,  found  among  Vergennes'  own  papers  of 
itself  casts  doubt  on  its  ever  having  been  presented  to  the  king. 
In  connection  with  his  statement  that  "both  French  and  Ameri- 
can bibliographers  have  accepted"  the  "genuineness"  of  the 


12  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

But  if  France's  objective  was  not  territory, 
perhaps  it  was  commerce?  Unquestionably  there 
was  a  widespread  belief  in  France  early  in  the 
Revolution,  which  was  appealed  to  not  only  by 

Mtmoire,  Professor  Turner  cites  only  the  Voyage  a  la  Louisiana 
of  Baudry  des  Lozieres.  Yet  Baudry,  while  praising  the  Memoir* 
for  "plusieurs  des  ses  vues  qui  sont  tres  sages,"  directly  challenges 
the  assertion  that  it  was  the  work  of  Vergennes.  "If,"  says  he, 
"M.  de  Vergennes  has  any  part  in  these  memoirs,  it  is  only  a  very 
small  part."  But  perhaps  the  most  remarkable  feature  of  the 
document  under  consideration  is  (assuming  it  to  date  from  before 
1783)  the  ignorance  it  discloses  on  the  part  of  its  author  that  by 
the  Treaty  of  1763  Florida  belonged  to  Great  Britain  (see  pp.  26 
and  30).  The  Duke  of  Newcastle  is  reported  to  have  once  ad- 
dressed a  despatch  to  "the  Governor  of  the  Island  of  Massachu- 
setts." But  Vergennes  was  neither  a  British  peer  nor  a 
spoilsman  in  office,  but  a  man  noted  among  his  contemporaries  for 
the  range  and  accuracy  of  his  information  in  the  field  of  diplo- 
macy. It  may  be  safely  assumed,  therefore,  that  he  was  fully  aware 
that  France's  closest  ally  had  lost  an  extensive  province  by  the 
Peace  of  Paris  and  had  been  compensated  by  France  herself  with 
a  still  more  extensive  one.  Besides,  as  is  shown  below,  the 
Memoire  of  1802,  considered  as  an  entity,  must  by  any  assumption 
date  from  a  period  later  than  early  January,  1778.  Before  this 
however,  Holker,  in  instructions  dated  Nov.  25,  1777,  was  informed 
by  the  French  Foreign  Office  that  his  government  wished  to  see 
England  left  in  possession  of  Florida,  Nova  Scotia  and  Canada, 
Doniol,  II.  616.  Upon  careful  examination  of  it  I  am  convinced 
that  the  Memoire  of  1802  comprises  two  earlier  documents  loosely 
joined  together  by  the  author  of  the  short  address  "Au  Roi," 
chapter  I,  and  certain  paragraphs  of  chapter  X  of  the  published 
document.  The  first  of  these  two  earlier  documents  comprises 
most  of  chapters  II-X  of  the  Memoire  of  1802  and  was  written 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  Seven  Years  War  to  refute  Great 
Britain's  claim  to  the  region  then  in  dispute  between  France  and 
Great  Britain.  It  closed  with  a  plan  of  compromise  in  the  form 
of  a  proposed  treaty  between  the  two  nations,  which  plan  is 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  18 

the  American  envoys  but  by  Vergennes  himself 
on  occasion,  that  if  France  assisted  the  United 
States  to  their  independence,  American  trade 

touched  up  at  points  by  the  compiler  of  the  1802  document.  The 
second  of  the  earlier  documents  was  written  after  the  events 
described  in  pages  162  to  169  of  the  published  volume — i.e.  about 
1769 — to  protest  against  the  then  recent  cession  of  Louisiana  to 
Spain.  The  entire  separateness  of  the  two  documents  is  attested 
by  the  words  with  which  the  second  one  opens  ("Ce  me*moire  a  pour 
but,"  etc.,  p.  115),  by  the  vastly  different  styles  of  the  two 
documents,  and  by  their  diverse  spelling  of  certain  proper  names. 
(In  the  latter  connection  compare  pp.  57  and  150-1;  also  pp.  61 
and  172.)  When,  then,  was  this  compilation  made?  Dismissing 
the  editor's  assertion  that  the  document  was  the  work  of  Ver- 
gennes, but  taking  the  document  itself  at  face  value,  it  was 
brought  together  after  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of  Independence 
(Chapters  I  and  X),  but  before  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  recogniz- 
ing American  independence  was  known  (the  United  States  are 
always  referred  to  as  "colonies"  and  "provinces"  and  on  p.  180, 
the  compiler  speaks  of  "strengthening  the  peace  "between  France 
and  Great  Britain") ;  also  during  a  warlike  situation  on  the  Conti- 
nent (pp.  27  and  103,  by  the  compiler).  But  this  last  condition 
can  be  satisfied,  for  the  period  between  1775  and  1781,  only  by 
supposing  the  references  just  cited  to  have  been  to  the  events  lead- 
ing up  to  the  so-called  War  of  the  Bavarian  Succession.  If,  then, 
the  M6moire  of  1802  is  to  be  assigned  as  a  whole  to  the  period  of 
the  American  Revolution,  it  must  be  placed  between  late  Jan- 
uary and  the  middle  of  March,  1778.  We  know  that,  in  the 
months  preceding  France's  intervention,  numerous  memoirs  were 
transmitted  to  the  Foreign  Office,  and  the  Memoire  of  1802  may 
therefore  represent  one  from  a  sheaf  of  similar  later  productions. 
Doniol  I.  242  footnote.  Mr.  Paul  C.  Phillips,  on  the  other  hand, 
conjectures  plausibly  that  the  document  published  in  1802  owes 
its  existence  to  an  effort  to  bolster  up  Napoleon's  then  recent 
acquisition  of  Louisiana,  The  West  in  the  Diplomacy  of  th* 
American  Revolution  p.  30  fn.  2. 


14  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

would  turn  forthwith  to  French  ports.14  Yet 
squarely  confronted  with  the  theory  that  this 
belief  had  been  material  in  determining  his  pro- 
gram, Vergennes  unqualifiedly  rejected  the  no- 
tion. "They  perhaps  think  at  Madrid,"  he  wrote 
after  the  alliance  had  been  determined  upon, 
"that  the  interest  of  acquiring  a  new  trade  had 
principally  decided  us."  But  he  repelled  the 
suggestion  thus:  "This  motive,  assessed  at  its 
true  worth,  can  be  only  a  very  feeble  accessory. 
American  trade,  viewed  in  its  entirety  and  sub- 
ject to  the  monopoly  of  the  mother-country,  was 
undoubtedly  a  great  object  of  interest  to  the 
latter  and  an  important  source  of  the  growth  of 
her  industry  and  power.  But  American  trade, 
thrown  open  as  it  is  to  be  henceforth  to  the  avid- 
ity of  all  nations,  will  be  for  France  a  very  petty 
consideration."15 

These  words  of  Vergennes  have,  however,  no 
merely  negative  value ;  they  bring  us  in  fact  to  the 
very  threshold  of  the  object  of  our  quest.  Offi- 
cial thinking  about  trade  was  moulded  in  the 

14  Wharton,  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Revolu- 
tion (Washington,  1889),  II.  79;  Deane  Papers  (N.  Y.  Hist'l  Soc. 
Cols.,   1886),  I.    181,   184   ff.,  207;   Doniol,   I.  244.     Deane  later 
changed  his  views  on  this  as  well  as  certain  other  subjects.     In 
his  letter  of  June  10,  1781,  to  Robert  Morris,  he  says:    "America 
left  at  liberty  will,  I  am  persuaded,  take  at  least  three-fourths 
of  the  European  articles  she  wants  from  Great  Britain,"  Deane 
Papers,  IV.  406. 

15  Doniol  III.  140.    Madrid  received  its  impression  from  Aranda, 
Aranda  to  Florida  Blanca,  Jan.  31,  1778,  Sparks  MSS.,  CII. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  15 

eighteenth  century  in  vast  part  by  the  categories 
of  what  is  called  "the  Mercantile  System,"  and 
it  is  the  significance  of  the  words  just  quoted 
that  they  show  Vergennes  to  have  been  of  this 
school.  The  salient  features  of  Mercantilism 
mark  it  at  once  a  system  of  statecraft  rather 
than  of  economics,  at  least  in  any  modern  sense  of 
these  terms.  Thus  wealth  was  identified  with 
that  form  of  it  in  which,  in  a  period  when  the 
machinery  of  public  credit  was  rudimentary  and 
the  usual  cement  of  international  alliances  was 
provided  by  cash  subsidies,  it  was  most  available 
for  political  purposes.  Again,  the  welfare  of  the 
subject  was  assessed  for  its  contribution  to  the 
power  of  the  state.  Finally,  the  power  of  the 
state  was  evaluated  in  the  terms  furnished  by  the 
doctrine  of  the  Balance  of  Power.  But  granting 
these  premises  and  it  followed,  first,  that  the  prin- 
cipal advantage  to  be  sought  from  trade  was  a 
balance  payable  in  coin  or  bullion,  and  secondly, 
that  the  most  desirable  branch  of  trade  was  that 
which  was  most  susceptible  of  manipulation  to 
produce  such  a  balance,  in  other  words,  colonial 
trade.  For  subject  as  it  was,  within  the  laws  of 
nature,  to  the  unlimited  control  of  the  mother- 
country,  the  colony  could  be  compelled  to  obtain 
all  its  manufactures  from  the  mother-country 
and  to  return  therefor  raw  materials  and  a  cash 
balance.  At  least,  by  furnishing  the  mother- 
country  raw  materials  which  she  would  otherwise 


16  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

have  to  purchase  from  her  political  rivals,  the 
colony  would  contribute  directly  to  the  mainten- 
ance of  a  favorable  balance  of  trade  and,  pro 
tanto,  to  that  of  a  favorable  balance  of  power, 
against  those  rivals.16 

MA  good  general  account  of  the  rise  of  Mercantilism  and  of  its 
principles  is  to  be  found  in  C.  F.  Bastable's  Commerce  of  Nations 
(1899),  ch.  IV.  For  an  admirable  statement  of  the  connection 
which  mercantilist  theory  and  policy  established  between  colonies 
and  commerce,  see  Prof.  C.  M.  Andrews,  American  Historical 
Review,  XX.  43  ff.  "During  the  greater  part  of  our  colonial  period 
commerce  and  colonies  were  correlative  terms,  unthinkable  each 
without  the  other,"  ib.  43.  See  also  the  same  writer's  article, 
ib.,  XX.  589  if.,  entitled  "Anglo-French  Commercial  Rivalry,  1700- 
1750."  "France  and  England  were  fairly  matched  rivals,  in 
that  their  policies  were  the  same,  to  acquire  colonies  in  the  inter- 
est of  trade,  shipping,  and  manufactures,  to  exclude  the  foreigner 
from  the  colonial  market,  and  to  make  the  welfare  and  wealth  of 
the  mother  state  the  first  and  chief  object  of  the  efforts  of  all, 
colonies  and  mother-country  alike,"  ib.,  546.  It  will  be  noted  that 
Professor  Andrews  makes  welfare  the  objective  of  the  mercantile 
policy,  but  power  would  perhaps  be  the  better  word  even  for 
English  mercantilism.  Note  the  following  passage  quoted  by 
Professor  Andrews  from  Otis  Little's  The  State  of  the  Trade  of  the 
Northern  Colonies  Considered  (1748),  pp.  8-9:  "As  every  state  in 
Europe  seems  desirous  of  increasing  its  trade,  and  the  acquisition 
of  wealth  enlarges  the  means  of  power,  it  is  necessary,  in  order 
to  preserve  an  equality  with  them,  that  this  kingdom  extend  its 
commerce  in  proportion;  but  to  acquire  a  superiority  due  en- 
couragement ought  to  be  given  to  such  of  its  branches  as  will 
most  effectually  enrich  its  inhabitants.  As  trade  enables  the 
subject  to  support  the  administration  of  government,  the  lessen- 
ing or  destroying  that  of  a  rival  has  the  same  effect  as  if  this 
kingdom  had  enlarged  the  sources  of  its  own  wealth.  But  as  an 
ascendancy  is  to  be  gained  by  checking  the  growth  of  theirs,  as 
well  as  by  the  increase  of  our  own,  whenever  one  of  these  happens 
to  be  the  consequence  of  the  other  to  this  nation,  it*  figure  and 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  17 

Applying  these  considerations  to  the  case  of 
French  intervention  in  the  American  Revolution, 
we  note  at  once  that  by  the  Treaty  of  Amity  and 
Commerce  all  privileges  of  trade  were  to  be  "mu- 
tual" and  none  given  France  but  what  the  United 

reputation  will  rise  to  a  greater  height  than  ever."  Ib.,  543  foot- 
note. In  other  words,  the  mercantilist  looked  beyond  the  welfare 
of  the  subject  to  the  power  and  reputation  of  the  State,  and  these 
he  measured  by  the  standard  set  by  the  doctrine  of  the  Balance 
of  Power.  The  same  point  is  also  brought  out  by  a  passage  from 
Postlethwayt's  Britain's  Commercial  Interest  Explained  and  Im- 
proved (1757):  "I  next  enter  upon  the  general  principles  whereon 
the  balance  of  trade  is  founded — the  consideration  of  which  is 
earnestly  recommended  to  the  public  regard,  in  order  to  throw 
the  balance  of  trade  so  effectually  into  the  hands  of  Great  Britain 
as  to  put  the  constant  balance  of  power  in  Europe  into  her  hands," 
ib.,  II.  551.  See  also  Gentleman's  Magazine,  XII.  589  (Nov., 
1742):  "Now,  that  Money  is  the  Sinews  of  War,  is  become  a 
proverbial  Expression;  and,  with  Respect  to  Great  Britain,  it  is 
notorious  we  can  do  nothing  without  it.  Almost  all  we  did  in 
the  last  Struggle  with  the  Grand  Monarch,  was  by  the  Dint  of 
Money.  If  we  had  Numbers  of  Allies,  we  were  obliged  to  pay  them 
all;  and  whereas  every  other  Power  in  the  Confederacy  run  into 
Arrears  with  their  Engagements,  we  not  only  made  good  our 
Proportions,  but  often  exceeded  them.  .  .  .  But,  to  suppose  what 
is  impossible,  that  we  still  roll  in  Riches,  who  is  to  join  with  us  in 
this  mighty  Enterprise,  of  wrestling  the  Balance  of  Europe  out 
of  the  strong  Hand  that  hath  lately  held  it?"  See  further  the 
index  of  this  same  periodical  under  titles,  "Balance  of  Power" 
and  "France,"  for  other  instructive  passages  along  the  same 
lines,  especially  in  the  volumes  covering  the  years  from  1737  to 
1742.  Naturally  in  France,  where  the  dynastic  principle  was  the 
exclusive  basis  of  the  state,  the  political  aspect  of  Mercantilism 
was  predominant.  Recall  Colbert's  assertion:  "I  believe  that 
most  people  would  be  agreed  that  the  quantity  of  gold  in  a  state 
alone  determines  the  degree  of  its  greatness  and  power,"  Lettres, 
etc.  (P.  Clement,  ed.)  II.  pt.  2,  ccvii.  See  also  infra. 


18  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

States  were  left  at  liberty  to  grant  to  any  other 
nation,  while  by  the  Treaty  of  Alliance,  its  "es- 
sential and  direct  end"  was  stated  to  be  the 
achievement  of  American  independence  not  only 
in  matters  of  government  but  of  commerce  also.17 
In  other  words,  we  discover  that  the  real  com- 
mercial motive  underlying  the  alliance  was  not 
the  hope  of  building  up  French  trade — which  it 
was  supposed  could  hardly  be  done  effectively  or 
advantageously  without  the  machinery  of  mon- 
opoly— but  that  of  breaking  down  British  trade 
at  the  point  at  which,  by  mercantilist  premises,  it 
most  immediately  supported  British  power.  The 
commercial  motive  merges  itself  with  a  larger 
political  motive:  the  enfeeblement  of  England.™ 
The  lesson  that  Englishmen  themselves  drew 
from  their  magnificent  triumph  in  the  Seven 
Years  War  is  to  be  found  in  the  famous  lament  of 
Chatham  on  the  news  of  Saratoga:  America  "was 

17  Treaty  of  Amity  and  Commerce,  preamble ;  Treaty  of  Alli- 
ance, art.  II. 

"Congress*  original  intention  was  to  throw  open  its  commerce 
to  all  friendly  nations  on  terms  of  equality,  and  the  argument 
was  made  with  France  that  if  she  gave  America  aid  the  grati- 
tude of  the  American  people  would  secure  her  a  preemption  of 
American  trade.  Wharton,  II.  79  and  235.  Later,  December  30, 
1776,  the  instructions  of  Congress  enlarged  the  discretion  of  the 
commissioners  as  to  the  terms  they  might  offer  France  and  Spain 
very  greatly,  ib.,  240-1.  Eventually,  the  commissioners  offered 
France  certain  exclusive  privileges  in  connection  with  American 
trade,  but  these  Vergennes  declined,  in  order  to  remove  every 
temptation  from  the  way  of  the  Americans  that  might  lead  them 
to  a  reconciliation  with  England,  Doniol,  II.  837. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  19 

indeed  the  fountain  of  our  wealth,  the  nerve  of 
our  strength,  the  nursery  and  basis  of  our  naval 
power."19  But  what  should  be  especially  noted 
of  these  words  is  that  they  refer  to  the  part  of 
America  then  in  revolt,  that  is,  to  continental 
America.  Anterior  to  1760  this  could  hardly 
have  been  the  case.  For  then  the  emphasis  was 
still  on  colonies  as  sources  of  supply,  with  the  re- 
sult that  when  British  opinion  appraised  the  two 
parts  of  British  America,  it  gave  the  preference 
to  the  island  and  tropical  portion.  The  Treaty 
of  Paris,  however,  signalizes  a  new  point  of  view. 
Not  only  had  continental  America  made  direct 
contributions  to  the  military  forces  of  the  mother- 
country  in  the  course  of  the  war  just  closed,  but 
its  increasing  importation  of  British  manufac- 
tures in  exchange  for  raw  materials  now  netted  a 
favorable  balance  that  quite  eclipsed  the  calcul- 
able benefits  from  the  West  Indian  trade.  Fur- 
thermore, inasmuch  as  the  colonial  trade  had 
always  been  regarded  as  the  essential  matrix  of 
British  naval  strength,  popular  esteem  naturally 
turned  increasingly  to  that  branch  of  this  trade 
which  promised  a  progressive  extension.  The 
upshot  of  these  developments  is  to  be  seen  in  the 
decision  of  the  British  government,  registered  in 

"Speech  of  Nov.  18,  1777,  Parliamentary  History,  XIX.  col. 
365,  footnote.  See  to  the  same  effect  Burke's  speech  of  Nov.  27, 
1781,  ib.,  cols.  721-2.  See  also  the  opening  paragraph  of  Deane's 
memoir  on  the  "Commerce  of  America  and  its  Importance  to 
Europe,"  cited  above,  Deane  Papers,  I.  184. 


20  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

the  Treaty  of  Paris,  to  retain  Canada  instead  of 
Guadaloupe  and  Martinique  from  its  French 
conquests.  No  doubt  the  decision  was  in  part 
motivated  by  a  desire  to  meet  the  demands  of 
New  England ;  but  the  discussion  that  attended  it 
proves  that  it  is  also  to  be  regarded  as  a  deliberate 
reappraisement  by  England  of  the  relative  value 
of  the  two  sections  of  her  western  empire.20 

The  reaction  of  France,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
the  lesson  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  was  conditioned 
in  the  first  instance  by  the  plain  impossibility  of 
further  competition  with  Great  Britain  in  the 
field  of  colonization,  at  least  so  long  as  British 
naval  strength  remained  predominant.  However, 
the  doctrine  of  the  Balance  of  Power  which,  as  I 
have  already  pointed  out,  was  the  political  ob- 
verse of  Mercantilism,  emphasized  the  notion  that 
the  grand  desideratum  for  a  state  was  not  so  much 
a  certain  absolute  quantum  of  power  as  a  certain 
rank  of  power  in  relation  to  other  rival  states, 
that,  in  short,  power  was  relative.  But  this  prem- 
ise assumed,  the  opportunity  presented  France 
by  the  American  revolt  was  a  deduction  at  once 
inevitable  and  irresistible.  England  was  France's 
ancient  and  hereditary  enemy.  The  essential 
basis  of  English  power  was  English  commerce 
and  English  naval  strength.  The  most  import- 
ant source  of  these,  in  turn,  was  England's  colo- 

20  For   the  matter   of  this   paragraph,  see   George  Louis   Beer, 
British  Colonial  Policy,  1754-1765  (N.  Y.  1907),  ch.  IV. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  21 

nial  empire,  and  especially  her  holdings  in  North 
America.  The  striking  down  once  and  for  all 
time  of  the  connection  between  England  and  her 
rebellious  provinces  would  deprive  her  of  the 
greatest  single  source  of  power  and,  by  the  same 
token,  elevate  the  power  of  the  House  of  Bour- 
bon against  its  most  dangerous  and  unscrupulous 
rival.  To  achieve  that  would  be  worth  a  war 
otherwise  "somewhat  disadvantageous."21 

Nor  was  the  enfeeblement  of  England  the  only 
benefit,  though  the  most  important  one,  to  be 
anticipated  from  American  independence.  For 
one  thing,  from  being  an  ever  available  base  of 
operations  against  the  French  West  Indies,  the 
new  nation  would  be  converted  into  their  joint 
protector  "forever."22  Again,  from  being  a  bene- 
ficiary and  so  a  prop  to  those  rules  of  naval  war- 
fare by  which  Great  Britain  bore  so  hard  upon 
the  commercial  interests  in  wartime  both  of  her 
enemies  and  of  neutrals,  the  new  nation  would  be 
pledged  to  a  more  liberal  system.23  Again,  by 
leaving  England  her  non-rebellious  provinces  in 

"See  especially  the  following  passages:  the  "Reflexions"  of  Dec. 
1775,  Doniol,  I.  243-4;  the  "Considerations"  of  Nov.  5,  1776,  ib., 
686-7;  the  unofficial  "Reflexions"  of  Jan.  7,  1777,  given  in  Appendix 
II;  the  despatch  of  Mar.  11,  1777,  ib.,  II.  239;  the  despatch  of 
May  23,  1777,  ib.,  295;  "M&noire"  of  July  23,  1777,  ib.,  461;  the 
despatch  of  Dec.  13,  1777,  ib.,  643-4;  Broglie's  "Memoire"  of  Jan., 
1778,  ib.,  674  ff.;  the  despatch  of  June  20,  1778,  ib.,  III.  140. 

*  Treaty  of  Alliance,  art.  XI. 

"Treaty  of  Amity  and  Commerce,  arts.  XV.  ffg. 


22  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

North  America,  a  certain  portion  of  England's 
strength  and  attention  would  be  permanently 
diverted  from  the  European  balance  to  the  main- 
tenance of  a  minor  balance  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere.24 Yet  it  is  obvious  that  these  considera- 
tions too  connect  themselves,  and  for  the  most 
part  rather  directly,  with  the  logic  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  Balance  of  Power.  Thus  the  real  question 
raised  by  our  search  for  the  main  objective  of 
French  intervention  in  the  Revolution  becomes 
the  question  of  the  main  objective  in  the  thinking 
of  French  statesmen  of  a  balance  of  power  fa- 
vorable to  France.  The  answer  to  that  question 
reveals  the  third  dimension  of  French  diplomacy 
of  the  Old  Regime — a  certain  dynastic  tradition. 

"Doniol,  III.  156-58,  557;  IV.  74. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE   CLASSICAL,   SYSTEM   AND   BRITISH   SEA   POWER 

"The  diplomatic  object  of  this  crown  has  been 
and  will  always  be  to  enjoy  in  Europe  that  role  of 
leadership  which  accords  with  its  antiquity,  its 
worth,  and  its  greatness;  to  abase  every  power 
which  shall  attempt  to  become  superior  to  it, 
whether  by  endeavoring  to  usurp  its  possessions, 
or  by  arrogating  to  itself  an  unwarranted  pre- 
eminence, or  finally  by  seeking  to  diminish  its 
influence  and  credit  in  the  affairs  of  the  world  at 
large."1 

In  these  words  of  the  French  Foreign  Office, 
penned  in  1756  to  justify  the  Diplomatic 
Revolution,  is  sketched  the  picture  that  domi- 
nated French  diplomacy  throughout  the  declin- 
ing years  of  the  Old  Regime.  In  "the  fair  days 
of  Louis  XIV"  the  picture  had  been  a  reality, 

1  Recueil  des  Instructions  donntes  aux  Ambassadeurs  et  Min- 
istres  de  la  France  depuis  Us  Traites  de  Westphalie  jusqu'a  la 
Revolution  Frangaise  (Ed.  Sorel,  Paris,  1884),  I.  (Autriche),  356; 
see  also  p.  383.  See  also  the  significant  definitions  of  the  function 
of  Diplomacy,  in  Capefifue,  Louis  XVI,  ses  Relations  diplo- 
matiques,  84;  and  in  P.  L.,  Comte  de  SSgur,  ain£,  Politique  de  tout 
les  Cabinets  (2nd  ed.,  1801,  3  vols.),  III.  370.  Both  Capefigue  and 
S6gur  were  of  the  Old  Regime  and  wrote  from  its  point  of  view. 


24  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

which,  alack,  that  monarch's  later  aggressions 
had  gone  far  to  shatter.  Then  Cardinal  Fleury 
had  come  forward  with  his  Systeme  de  Conserva- 
tion by  which  France  pledged  Europe  that  in  re- 
turn for  influence  she  would  forego  extension  of 
dominion  and  that  she  would  devote  the  influence 
vouchsafed  her  on  these  terms  to  the  cause  of 
Europe's  peace.2 

The  success  of  the  System  for  France's  diplo- 
matic position  was  astonishing.  On  the  eve  of  the 
War  of  the  Austrian  Succession  the  elder  branch 
of  the  House  of  Bourbon,  the  protector  of  Chris- 
tion  interests  in  the  East,  of  Poland,  Sweden, 
Turkey,  Saxony,  Sardinia,  the  German  princes, 
of  Don  Carlos  of  Naples,  of  the  emperor  himself, 
and  the  ally  of  the  maritime  powers  and  of  Spain, 
was  the  nodal  point  of  every  combination  of  pow- 
ers in  Europe.  At  the  same  time  His  Most 
Christian  Majesty's  services  as  mediator  were 
sought,  now  by  Austria  and  Spain,  now  by  Rus- 

2  M.  de  Flassan,  Histoire  gtnerale  et  raisonnte  de  la  Diplomatic 
franqaise  depuis  la  Fondation  de  la  Monarchic  jusqu'a  la  Fim 
du  Regne  de  Louis  XVI  (2nd.  ed.,  Paris  1811,  7  vols.),  V.  167  ff. 
On  the  general  principles  and  outlook  of  French  diplomacy  fol- 
lowing the  death  of  Louis  XIV  and  the  orientation  of  Vergennes* 
policy  in  these,  see  Albert  Sorel,  L'Europe  et  la  Revolution  fran- 
gaise,  Pt.  I.  (Les  Meours  politiques  et  les  Traditions)  (3rd  ed., 
Paris,  1893),  331-6,  299-304.  For  some  excellent  eighteenth  century 
expressions  of  the  "Tradition  of  Grandeur,"  dating  from  Louis 
XIV,  see  Abb6  Raynal's  Philosophical  and  Political  History  of 
the  Settlements,  etc.  (Trans,  by  Justament,  London,  1777),  IV. 
560  ff.;  V.  457  ff.;  also  AnquetiPs  Motifs  des  Guerres  et  des 
Traites  de  Paix  de  la  France  (Paris,  1797),  187  ff. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  25 

sia  and  Turkey,  now  by  Austria  and  Russia,  now 
by  Spain  and  Portugal,  now  by  England  and 
Spain.3  "Thanks  to  Cardinal  Fleury,"  ex- 
claimed the  advocate  Barbier,  "the  king  is  the 
master  and  arbiter  of  Europe."4  The  aged 
Fleury  himself  complacently  compared  the  posi- 
tion of  France  to  what  it  had  been  "at  the  most 
brilliant  epoch  of  Louis  XIV's  reign."5  Freder- 
ick II,  just  ascending  the  throne  of  Prussia, 
found  "the  courts  of  Vienna,  Madrid,  and  Stock- 
holm in  a  sort  of  tutelage"  to  Versailles.6  The 
Sultan's  ambassador  at  the  coronation  of  Charles 
VII  apostrophized  Louis  XV  as  "Grand  Mon- 
arque,"  "King  of  Christian  Kings,"  "Emperor 
of  the  Franks."7  The  enemies  of  Walpole,  who 
in  return  for  commercial  favors  to  England  had 
willingly  connived  in  the  extension  of  French  in- 
fluence, declared  that  England  had  been  made  a 
cat's-paw  of,  that  the  House  of  Bourbon  was  at 

3  For  these  data,  see  Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  Historie  GtneraU, 
VII.  119-60. 

*Ib.,  158. 

'Recueil  des  Instructions,  I.  246.  A  pamphlet  of  the  period 
contains  a  squib  entitled  "Jeu  de  Piquet  entre  les  Puissances  de 
I'Europe  en  1730."  "La  France"  heads  the  list,  with  the  motto: 
"C'est  a  moi  a  jouer,  j'ai  la  main."  Far  down  the  list  is  "L'Angle- 
terre,"  who  says:  "Ce  n'est  pas  a  mon  tour  de  jouer."  Cape- 
figue,  Diplomatie  de  la  France  et  de  I'Espagne"  (Paris,  1846),  108. 

•  Posthumous  works  of  Frederick  II  (Trans,  by  Holcroft,  Lon- 
don, 1789),  I.  16. 

1  Gentleman's  Magazine,  XII.  54  (1742). 


26  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

the  summit  of  power,  that  the  balance  of  power 
was  at  an  end.8 

Nor  did  the  war  of  the  Austrian  Succession, 
rising  like  a  drama  to  its  climax  in  the  stage-tri- 
umph of  Fontenoy,9  though  obviously  a  defeat 
for  salient  principles  of  Fleury's  System,10  sig- 
nify any  lessening  of  France's  influence  on  the 
Continent  in  the  estimate  of  those  who  then 
guided  her  destinies.  Foremost  of  these  was  the 
Marquis  d'Argenson,  who  became  in  1744  the 
king's  secretary  of  state  for  Foreign  Affairs  on  a 
platform,  so  to  speak,  interpreting  the  role  of 
France  among  the  nations  in  the  light  of  the  ris- 
ing philosophy  of  the  age.  The  period  of  con- 
quests, Argenson  declared — though  unhappily 
not  of  war — was  at  an  end,  and  France  especially 
had  reason  to  be  content  with  her  greatness. 
Those  therefore  who  spoke  of  perfecting  the 
boundaries  of  France  or  forming  leagues  for  her 

8  See  the  "Debate  in  the  Lords  on  Carteret's  Motion  for  the 
Removal  of  Sir  Robert  Walpole,"  especially  Carteret's  own 
speeches,  Parliamentary  History,  XI.  col.  1047  ff. 

•  See  Voltaire's  description  in  his  "Precis  du  Siecle  de  Louis  XV," 
Oeuvres  Computes  (Paris,  1792),  XXI.  129-48.  Note  especially  his 
words  on  p.  148:  "Ce  qui  est  aussi  remarquable  que  cette  victoire, 
c'est  que  le  premier  soin  du  roi  de  France  fut  de  faire  6crire  le 
jour  m£me  a  Pabbe"  de  la  Ville  .  .  .  ,  qui'l  ne  demandait  pour 
prix  de  ses  conquetes  que  la  pacification  de  1'Europe." 

10  For  the  policy  of  a  friendly  understanding  with  the  maritime 
powers  and  Austria.  In  his  instructions  of  Dec.  11,  1737,  to  the 
Marquis  de  Mirepoix,  Fleury  suggests  definitely  a  rapprochement 
between  the  Houses  of  Bourbon  and  Hapsburg,  Recueil  d99 
Instructions,  I.  245-6. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  27 

defense  were  ill-advised.  "Our  neighbors  have 
everything  to  fear  from  us — we  nothing  from 
them."  The  only  alliances  which  France  should 
form  should  be  "for  the  purpose  of  repressing  the 
ambitious,"  and  should  be  made  only  with  lesser 
states,  "such  as  Portugal,  Sweden,  Denmark, 
Holland,  Venice,  Modena,  Switzerland,  Bavaria, 
Prussia,  Saxony,  etc."  In  brief,  France  was  in 
the  position  to  give  the  law  to  Europe,  so  it  be  a 
just  law.  Let  her,  then,  "sustain  the  feeble  and 
oppressed"  and  in  her  part  as  "paternal  protec- 
tor," "arrest  disorders  for  many  centuries."11  In 
1748  France,  by  the  Treaty  of  Aix-la-Chapelle, 
restored  her  conquests  of  the  war  just  closed. 
Sinful  Paris  pronounced  it  "a  beastly  peace." 
The  royal  ministers,  on  the  other  hand,  contrast- 
ing His  Most  Christian  Majesty  with  those  rulers 
who  were  forced  by  necessity  to  seek  only  their 
own  aggrandizement  and  were  ever  masking  sel- 
fish designs  with  a  pretended  solicitude  for  the 
balance  of  power,  defended  the  treaty  as  marking 
precisely  France's  station  and  magnanimity.12 

u  Journal  et  Memoires  du  Marquis  d' Argenson  (ed.  Ratheray, 
Pairs,  1859),  I.  325-6;  371-2;  IV.  131  ff.  See  also  Saint-Beuve, 
"Argenson,"  Causeries  du  Lundi.  The  idealistic,  not  to  say  senti- 
mental, character  of  Argenson's  point  of  view  is  illustrated  by  his 
"maxim,"  "le  roi  aime  mieux  6tre  trompd  que  de  tromper." 

11  For  the  Parisian  estimate  of  the  Peace,  see  Lavisse  et  Ram- 
baud,  op.  cit.,  VII.  204.  Argenson  testifies  to  the  popular  criticism 
evoked  by  the  Peace,  thus:  "Le  Francais  aime  la  gloire  et  Phon- 
neur,  de  sorte  qu'apres  les  premiers  moments  de  joie  de  la  paix 
conclue,  tout  le  public  est  tomb£  dans  la  consternation  de  la 


28  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

And  thus  much  for  the  successful  aspect  of 
Fleury's  System:  it  gave  France  for  the  time 
being  the  preponderance  in  Europe  and  it  accus- 
tomed her  statesmen  to  claim  for  her  in  relation 
to  the  minor  states  of  the  Continent  in  general 
the  role  which  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia  had  con- 
ferred upon  her  in  terms,  in  relation  to  the  lesser 
members  of  the  Germanic  Body.13  Unfortun- 
ately the  System  had  its  Achilles'  heel,  its  indif- 
ference to  the  decline  of  French  sea-power  and  to 
the  rise  of  English  sea-power.  The  earliest  pro- 
test against  an  attitude  so  obviously  defiant  of 
the  tenets  of  Mercantilism  came  from  Fleury's 
own  associate,  the  young  Count  de  Maurapas, 
who  between  1730  and  1740  headed  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Marine.  Now  in  an  official  report  on 
the  state  of  the  marine,  now  in  a  letter  purporting 
to  emanate  from  the  shade  of  Louis  XIV,  now  in 
a  memoir  on  the  condition  of  French  commerce 
abroad,  Maurepas  reiterated  again  and  again  the 
favorite  premises  of  his  school  and  their  obvious 
deductions  for  France:  Commerce  that  kept 
gold  at  home  and  drew  it  from  abroad  was  a 
source  of  public  greatness.  Foreign  trade  was 
the  essential  root  of  naval  strength.  Against 

m6diocrite  des  conditions."  For  the  ministerial  viewpoint,  see 
Recueil  des  Instructions,  I.  286  ff.,  319  ff.  On  the  preeminence  of 
Louis'  position  in  Europe  after  Aix-la-Chapelle,  see  Wraxall,  His- 
torical Memoirs  (Phila.,  1845),  55. 

18  On  France's  guaranteeship  of  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia,  see 
Recueil  des  Instructions,  I.  208. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  29 

no  two  states  in  the  world  could  France  so  profit- 
ably turn  her  arms  as  against  Holland  and  Eng- 
land. The  latter  moreover  was  an  active  menace 
to  Bourbon  interests  in  all  parts  of  the  world.  It 
behooved  His  Most  Christian  Majesty  "to  put  to 
flight  this  usurping  race"  and  to  curtail  the  com- 
merce which  already  rendered  "these  ancient 
enemies  of  his  crown  almost  the  masters  of  the 
fate  of  Europe."14  It  is  not  impertinent  to  recall 
that  at  the  outbreak  of  the  American  Revolution 
the  author  of  these  words  was  His  Most  Christian 
Majesty's  chief -minister. 

The  warning  thus  sounded  was  soon  reechoed 
by  others.  In  a  council  of  ministers  shortly  be- 
fore France's  entrance  into  the  War  of  the  Aus- 
trian Succession,  the  Duke  de  Noailles  opposed 
this  step  with  vigor  and  insight.  England's  sys- 
tem, said  he,  is  obvious.  "It  is  to  arrive  at  su- 
preme power  by  superiority  of  wealth,  and 
America  alone  can  make  smooth  the  road  for 
her."  It  could  be  predicted  at  the  outset  that  His 
Britannic  Majesty  would  not  waste  his  substance 
in  Germany,  but  would  seize  the  opportunity  af- 
forded by  a  war  on  the  Continent  to  wage  war 
for  his  own  purposes  in  America.  France's  real 
concern  should  be  for  her  colonies,  and  only  mo- 
tives of  vainglory  could  distract  her  attention  to 
the  Empire.15  Two  years  later  Deslandes'  Essai 

"Maurepas,  Memoires   (ed.  Soulavie,  Paris,  1792),  III.   93  ff., 
161  ff.,  194  ff.,  especially  205-6  and  241. 
tt  Anquetil,  Motifs  des  Ouerres,  p.  376. 


30  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

sur  la  Marine  et  le  Commerce  appeared,  ad- 
dressed to  "those  at  the  Helm."  In  these  pages 
one  will  find  proclaimed  the  theory  to  be  made 
familiar  to  us  a  hundred  and  fifty  years  later 
through  Admiral  Mahan's  famous  work,  that 
from  the  beginning  of  history  the  marine  has 
been  a  decisive  factor  in  the  rise  and  fall  of  states. 
And  particularly,  Deslandes  went  on  to  argue, 
had  the  greatness  of  France  always  rested  on  a 
strong  navy.  The  restoration  of  the  marine  was 
therefore  the  first  duty  of  French  statesmen.  Its 
neglect  could  lead  only  to  calamity.16 

The  mercantilist  propaganda,  aptly  confirmed 
as  it  was  by  the  events  of  the  War  of  the  Aus- 
trian Succession,  began  in  time  to  show  promise 
of  fruition.  Even  Argenson,  despite  his  general 
complacency,  yet  gave  warning  that  English  am- 
bition, fraud,  and  aggressiveness  in  the  way  of 
trade,  and  the  prosperity  of  the  English  colonies, 
menaced  Europe  with  the  prospect  of  British 
dominion  "of  the  seas  and  of  all  the  commerce  in 
the  world."17  Saint-Contest,  who  became  secre- 
tary of  state  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  1751,  was  of 
like  opinion,  holding  that,  on  account  of  her  naval 
strength,  England  even  then  exerted  a  greater 
influence  in  European  concerns  than  France.  At 

"Op.  cit.,  passim.  See  also  the  same  writer,  Essai  sur  la 
Marine  des  Ancient  et  particulierement  sur  I  furs  Vaisseaux  de 
Guerre  (Paris,  1748).  Curiously  enough  Admiral  Mahan  does  not 
seem  to  be  aware  of  Deslandes*  works. 

"  Journal  et  Memoires,  I.  372. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  31 

the  same  time,  he  contended  that  naval  strength 
was  a  highly  vulnerable  sort  of  strength,  and  that 
with  prudent  measures,  it  would  be  easy  for 
France  to  reduce  Great  Britain  to  her  proper 
rank.18  Meantime,  in  1749,  Rouille  had  become 
minister  of  the  Marine.  Under  his  administra- 
tion and  that  of  his  successor  Machault  the  navy 
was  brought  to  comparative  efficiency,  as  was  at- 
tested by  the  capture  of  Minorca  in  June,  1756. 

Unfortunately  the  Seven  Years  War,  thus 
auspiciously  begun  for  France,  was  not  long  to 
remain  predominantly  a  war  with  England,  to 
be  waged  on  the  sea  for  commerce  and  colonies. 
The  simple  fact  is  that  with  the  haute  noblesse 
the  army  was  popular  and  the  navy,  for  all  the 
zeal  of  the  mercantilists,  was  not.  The  preju- 
dices of  the  nobles  moreover  fell  in  with  the  pique 
of  the  king  at  what  he  considered  the  ingratitude 
and  faithlessness  of  his  protege,  the  king  of  Prus- 
sia, in  making  a  defensive  alliance  with  England. 
In  vain  was  it  urged  upon  Louis  that  the  Treaty 
of  Westminster,  far  from  implying  hostility  on 
Frederick's  part  toward  His  Most  Christian  Ma- 
jesty, was  really  a  matter  for  thanksgiving,  in 
that  it  guaranteed  peace  on  the  Continent  and, 
by  the  same  sign,  a  free  hand  for  France  in  India 
and  America.  By  the  first  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
of  May  1st,  1756,  the  famous  Diplomatic  Revolu- 

"Flassan,  op.   cit.,  VI.   14-16;  Recueil  de»  Instruction*  XII.8 
(Espagne,  pt.  II),  298  flf. 


32  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

tion  was  effected  by  a  defensive  alliance  between 
France  and  Austria.  .  Even  so,  the  general  opin- 
ion at  first  was  that  this  arrangement  also  was 
calculated  to  conserve  the  peace  of  Europe.  On 
August  29th,  1756,  however,  Frederick  invaded 
Saxony  and  the  war  thus  precipitated  speedily 
became  general.  By  the  second  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, May  1st,  1757,  the  resources  of  France 
were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  House  of 
Austria.19 

The  fortunes  of  the  ensuing  war  it  is,  of  course, 
unnecessary  for  us  to  follow  further  than  to  note 
that  for  France  they  were  misfortunes.  These 
were  the  days  when  Mme.  du  Deffand  rechris- 
tened  France  "Madam  Job."  Cardinal  Bernis, 
minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  so  official  sponsor 
for  the  Austrian  alliance,  was  soon  in  the  depths. 
"Everything  is  going  to  pieces,"  he  wrote.  "No 
sooner  does  one  succeed  in  propping  the  building 
at  one  corner  than  it  crumbles  at  another." 
France  "touches  the  very  last  period  of  decay." 
She  "has  neither  generals  nor  ministers."  "Ah 
that  God  would  send  us  a  directing  will  or  some 
one  who  had  one!  I  would  be  his  valet  if  he 
wished  it,  and  gladly!"20 

"Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  op.  cit.,  VII.  217-20;  Richard  Wadding- 
ton,  Louis  XV  et  le  Renversement  des  Alliances  (Paris,  1896), 
249-62,  358-517. 

"Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  op.  cii.,  VII.  244-5;  Richard  Wadding- 
ton,  La  Guerre  de  Sept  Ans,  II.  432-3;  Sainte-Beuve,  "Bernis," 
Causeries  du  Lundi. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  33 

In  Choiseul,  who  succeeded  Bernis  in  Novem- 
ber, 1758,  the  directing  will  was  found  and  the 
mercantilist  point  of  view  again  assured  utter- 
ance in  the  royal  council.  It  is  true  that  Choi- 
seul's  first  official  act  was  to  renew  with  the 
empress  the  onerous  engagements  of  his  prede- 
cessor, but  to  this  he  was  fairly  committed  by  the 
circumstances  in  which  he  had  taken  office.21 
Presently  we  find  him  declaring  to  the  Austrian 
court  with  entire  candor  that  the  war  with  Eng- 
land involved  French  power  and  honor  more  di- 
rectly than  did  the  struggle  on  the  Continent. 
Indeed,  he  proceeded,  the  interest  of  Austria  her- 
self demanded  the  preservation  of  France's  sea- 
power.  For  "this  it  is,"  said  he,  "which  enables 
His  Majesty  to  sustain  numerous  armies  for  the 
defence  of  his  allies,  as  it  is  the  maritime  power  of 
England  which  today  arms  so  many  enemies 
against  them  and  against  France."22  And  the 
same  point  of  view  again  found  expression  in  his 
despatch  of  March  21st,  1759,  to  Havrincourt, 
the  king's  ambassador  at  Stockholm: 

We  must  not  deceive  ourselves.  The  true  balance  of 
power  really  resides  in  commerce  and  in  America.  The 
war  in  Germany,  even  though  it  should  be  waged  with 
better  success  than  at  present,  will  not  prevent  the  evils 
that  are  to  be  feared  from  the  great  superiority  of  the 
English  on  the  sea.  The  king  will  take  up  arms  in  vain. 

"Waddington,  op.  cit.,  II.  ch.  VIII.  and  III.  452-4. 
28  "Instructions  to  the  Count  de  Choiseul,"  June  1759,  Recueil 
des  Instructions,  I.  386. 


34  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

For  if  he  does  not  have  a  care,  he  will  see  his  allies  forced 
to  become,  not  the  paid  auxiliaries  of  England,  but  her 
tributaries,  and  France  will  need  many  a  Richelieu  and 
Colbert  to  recover,  in  the  face  of  her  enemies,  the 
equality  which  she  is  in  peril  of  losing.23 

In  October  came  the  news  of  the  fall  of  Quebec. 
"The  balance  of  power,"  wrote  Choiseul  to  Ossun, 
the  king's  ambassador  at  Madrid,  "is  destroyed 
in  America,  and  we  shall  presently  possess  there 
only  Santo  Domingo.  France,  in  the  actual  pos- 
ture of  affairs,  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  commer- 
cial power,  which  is  to  say  that  she  cannot  be 
regarded  as  a  power  of  the  first  order."24 

Choiseul  now  set  himself  the  task,  failing  a 
peace  with  England  on  reasonable  terms,  of  re- 
storing to  the  war  its  original  character  of  a  con- 
test with  that  power  for  commerce,  colonies,  and 
naval  supremacy.  Auspiciously  for  his  purpose, 
Don  Carlos,  a  much  better  Bourbon  than  Ferdi- 
nand VI  had  ever  been,  was  now  Charles  III  of 
Spain.  In  the  negotiations  during  the  summer  of 
1761  between  France  and  England  Choiseul 
seized  the  opportunity  of  championing  certain 
claims  of  Spain  against  His  Britannic  Majesty, 
which  however  were  rejected  by  Pitt  in  terms  that 
aroused  not  only  Charles'  indignation  but  posi- 
tive apprehensions  for  his  own  colonial  empire. 


25 


Flassan,  op.  cit.,  VI.  160. 

76.,  279. 

Waddington,  op.  cit.,  III.  427-42,  and  IV,  428-37,  555-72.    See 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  35 

The  result  was  that  on  August  15th,  1761,  the  sec- 
ond Family  Compact,  making  France  and  Spain 
practically  one  power  for  all  warlike  purposes, 
was  signed  at  Paris. 

The  intention  [runs  the  preamble  of  this  document] 
of  His  Most  Christian  Majesty  and  of  His  Catholic 
Majesty,  in  contracting  the  engagements  which  they  as- 
sume by  this  treaty,  is  to  perpetuate  in  their  descen- 
dants the  sentiments  of  Louis  XIV  of  glorious  memory, 
their  common  august  ancestor,  and  to  establish  forever 
a  solemn  monument  of  reciprocal  interest  which  should 
be  the  basis  of  the  desires  of  their  courts  and  of  the 
prosperity  of  their  royal  families. 

The  treaty  itself  announced  its  basic  principle 
to  be  that,  "whoever  attacked  one  crown,  attacked 
the  other."  Thus,  when  at  war  against  the  same 
enemy,  both  crowns  were  to  act  in  concert.  When 
either  was  at  war,  offensively  or  defensively,  it 
was  to  call  upon  the  other  for  certain  forces — 
Spain  upon  France  for  18,000  infantry,  6,000 
cavalry,  20  ships  of  the  line,  and  6  frigates; 
France  upon  Spain,  for  the  same  naval  forces, 
10,000  infantry,  and  2,000  cavalry.  The  Bour- 
bon holdings  in  Italy  were  guaranteed  absolutely. 

also  Recueil  des  Instructions,  XII.3  338.  Of  further  interest  is  Al- 
fred Bourget's  "Le  Due  de  Choiseul  et  1'Angleterre:  la  Mission 
de  M.  de  Bussy,"  Revue  historique,  LXXI.  1-32.  In  a  letter  dated 
Aug.  25,  1761,  Bussy,  who  was  then  acting  as  Choiseul's  special 
envoy  to  England,  wrote:  "M.  Pitt  parait  n'avoir  d'autre  ambi- 
tion que  celle  d'elever  sa  nation  au  plus  haut  point  de  la  gloire 
et  d'abaisser  la  France  au  plus  bas  degr6  de  1'humiliation," 
ib.  12. 


36  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

On  the  other  hand,  Spain  was  excused  from  as- 
sisting France  in  the  guaranty  of  the  Peace  of 
Westphalia  unless  a  maritime  power  should 
take  arms  against  the  latter.  Each  power  ex- 
tended to  the  subjects  of  the  other  the  commercial 
privileges  of  its  own  subjects  in  its  European 
dominions.26 

The  renewal  of  the  Family  Compact  was 
Choiseurs  greatest  achievement  and  is  to  be  re- 
garded as  the  starting  point  of  the  restoration  of 
France's  position  in  Europe;  notwithstanding 
which,  at  the  outset,  it  brought  only  fresh  calami- 
ties and  new  losses.  In  October  Pitt  fell  from 
power  for  urging  a  declaration  of  war  upon 
Spain.  None  the  less,  the  declaration  followed 
in  January.  The  English  and  provincial  forces 
now  turned  from  the  capture  of  France's  West 
Indian  islands  to  that  of  Havana,  which  fell  in 
July.  But  Choiseul,  his  eyes  fixed  on  remoter 
developments,  was  determined  that  Spain  should 
not  suffer  for  her  devotion  to  the  Bourbon 
cause.  On  November  3rd,  1762,  France  agreed  to 
give  Spain  New  Orleans  and  all  of  Louisiana 
west  of  the  Mississippi,  an  arrangement  which 
permitted  the  latter  to  exchange  the  Floridas  for 
Havana.  The  ensuing  February  10th  the  Peace 
of  Paris  was  signed.  By  it  France  ceded  England 

*G.  F.  de  Martens,  Recueil  de  Trails  ...  des  Puissance*  et 
Etats  de  I'Europe  depute  1761  jusqu?  &  pretent  (Gottingen,  1871), 
I.  16-28. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  37 

the  vast  part  territorially  of  what  was  still  left  of 
her  colonies.  Of  the  great  empire  that  had  once 
comprised  half  of  North  America  and  the  richest 
of  the  American  islands,  and  that  had  given  fair 
promise  to  include  eventually  India  and  the  West 
African  coast,  she  retained  Goree  on  the  African 
coast;  Santo  Domingo,  which  thanks  to  the  Eng- 
lish diversion  against  Havana,  her  forces  still  held ; 
Guiana,  Martinique,  Guadeloupe,  Santa  Lucia, 
and  their  dependencies ;  the  small  fishing  islands 
St.  Pierre  and  Miquelon,  off  Newfoundland;  and 
a  few  factories  in  India,  together  with  the  islands 
of  France  and  Bourbon,  which  she  must  not  for- 
tify, as  also  she  must  not  the  fishing  stations.27 
Nevertheless,  we  must  be  on  our  guard  against 
exaggerating  the  merely  material  aspect  of  the 
losses  wrought  France  by  the  Seven  Years  War. 
On  the  map,  no  doubt,  Canada  and  Louisiana 
comprised  an  impressive  domain,  but  regarded 
from  the  point  of  view  of  commerce  and  trade- 
balances  they  were  essentially  worthless,  Louisi- 
ana being  practically  uninhabited  and  Canada 
hardly  returning  the  cost  of  administration.  On 
the  other  hand  Guadeloupe  and  Martinique,  in 
place  of  which  England  had  finally  and  somewhat 
reluctantly  consented  to  take  Canada,  were  com- 
mercially of  great  value.28  France's  real  loss, 
apart  from  the  enormous  outlay  of  the  war,  was 

«Ib.,  104-20;  Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  op.  cit.,  VII.  256-7. 
M  On  these  points,  see  Flassan,  op.  cit.,  VI.  480  if. 


38  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

in  prestige.  Her  armies  had  been  defeated,  her 
fleets  annihilated,  her  allies  disappointed  and  dis- 
gruntled. The  Treaty  of  Peace  itself  signalized 
her  humiliation  most  graphically  by  renewing 
the  defunct  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht 
against  the  fortification  of  Dunkirk,  to  which  was 
later  added  provision  for  an  English  commis- 
sioner at  that  port,  "without  whose  consent  not  a 
pier  could  be  erected,  not  a  stone  turned."  And 
not  less  ominous  was  the  sort  of  demand  that  now 
began  being  made  by  His  Britannic  Majesty's 
diplomatic  representatives  at  various  courts, 
that  in  view  of  the  outcome  of  the  war  they  were 
entitled  to  the  precedence  over  His  Most  Chris- 
tian Majesty's  representatives.  French  pride 
could  not  possibly  have  been  flouted  more 
shrewdly.29 

How,  then,  was  France  to  recover  her  prestige 
and  the  influence  that  this  assured  her  upon  Con- 
tinental affairs?  This  was  the  question  that  ad- 
dressed itself,  and  in  terms  ever  more  poignant, 
to  the  guardians  of  her  diplomacy  in  the  period 
between  the  Treaty  of  Paris  and  the  death  of 
Louis  XV.  And  the  answer  returned  to  this 
question  by  all  schools  of  opinion  on  questions 
diplomatic  carried  with  them  the  implication  at 
least  that,  before  France  could  hope  to  regain  her 
station  in  Europe,  English  power  must  be  dimin- 
ished. The  story  however  is  one  that  should  be 

»/6.,  VI.  183-7;  VII.  26-7. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  39 

told  in  more  detail,  and  in  connection  with  it  I 
desire  to  draw  particular  attention  to  two  highly 
important  documents:  Choiseul's  Memoire  of 
February,  1765,  which  comprises  a  general  de- 
fense of  his  policy,30  and  Broglie's  Conjectures 
Raisonnees  of  1773,  which  voices  the  views  at 
that  date  of  an  adherent  of  the  more  narrowly 
Continental  viewpoint.31 

Choiseul  begins  his  exposition  of  the  fundamen- 
tals of  French  diplomacy  by  tracing  the  calami- 
ties of  the  late  war  to  one  cause :  the  fact  that  the 
Austrian  alliance  was  allowed  to  convert  "the  war 
on  seas  and  in  America,  which  was  the  true  war," 
to  a  purely  land  war.  Also  it  is  admitted  that  the 
Austrian  connection  was  always  bound  to  be  a 
precarious  one.  Nevertheless,  it  is  insisted,  it  was 
of  value  as  tending  to  conserve  the  peace  on  the 
Continent,  for  which  reason  it  should  be  continued 
so  long  as  it  exacted  no  further  material  sacrifices 
by  France.  And  the  historical  connections  with 
the  princes  of  the  Empire  should  be  viewed  in  the 
same  light.  The  old  policy  of  paying  subsidies 
in  advance  should  be  discontinued.  The  English 
system  was  to  pay  for  services  rendered  and  this 

88  Soulange-Bodin,  La  Diplomatie  de  Louis  XV  et  le  Pacte  d* 
Famille  (Paris,  1894),  236-53. 

M  "Conjectures  Raisonnees  sur  la  Situation  actuelle  de  la  France 
dans  le  Systeme  politique,"  etc.:  "Oeuvre  dirige"  par  de  Broglie  et 
execute  par  M.  Favier":  dated  Apr.  16,  1773,  and  comprising  vol. 
I.  p.  211  to  the  end,  all  of  vol.  II,  and  vol.  III.  to  p.  104  of  Se"gur's 
Politique  de  tous  les  Cabinets,  (1801).  Cited  hereafter  as  "Se"gur." 


40  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

had  proved  much  more  effectual.  But  the  one 
indispensable  alliance^  of  His  Most  Christian 
Majesty  was  with  His  Catholic  Majesty.  The 
foremost  precept  of  His  Majesty's  policy  hence- 
forth must  be,  accordingly,  "to  manage  with  the 
most  scrupulous  attention  his  system  of  alliance 
with  Spain,  to  regard  the  Spanish  power  as  a 
power  necessary  to  France."  Nor  would  this  be 
difficult,  for  the  king  of  Spain  was  "just,  firm,  and 
one  upon  whom  you  can  count  even  beyond  the 
point  at  which  France  herself  would  fail  you." 
The  Memoir e  concludes  thus : 

It  remains  for  me  to  speak  to  Your  Majesty  of  the 
maritime  powers.  England  is  the  declared  enemy  of 
your  power  and  of  your  state,  and  she  will  be  so  always. 
Many  ages  must  elapse  before  a  durable  peace  can  be 
established  with  this  state,  which  looks  forward  to  the 
supremacy  in  the  four  quarters  of  the  globe.  Only  the 
revolution  which  will  occur  some  day  in  America,  though 
we  shall  probably  not  see  it,  will  put  England  back  to 
that  state  of  weakness  in  which  Europe  will  have  no 
more  to  fear  of  her. 

Thus  the  Memoire  closed  on  something  like  a 
note  of  despair.  Despair,  however,  was  not 
Choiseurs  normal  attitude.  Even  a  year  before 
this  he  had  sent  an  agent  named  Pontleroy  to 
British  North  America  to  report  upon  its  re- 
sources and  the  strength  of  the  lines  connecting 
it  with  the  mother-country,32  and  now  in  1766, 

82  C.  De  Witt,  Thomas  Jefferson,  Etude  historique  sur  la  D6 


THE   AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  41 

with  the  news  of  the  American  outbreak  against 
the  Stamp  Act  at  hand,  the  results  of  Pontleroy's 
investigation  and  their  significance  for  France  be- 
came the  subject  of  active  correspondence  be- 
tween Choiseul  and  His  Most  Christian  Ma- 
jesty's representatives  at  the  Court  of  St.  James. 

Judging  from  the  small  number  of  arrangements 
with  reference  to  colonial  possessions  in  America  [Du- 
rand  wrote  Choiseul  in  August,  1767]  Europe  has  only 
lately  begun  to  sense  their  importance.  England  herself 
has  discovered  with  surprise  that  they  are  the  sources 
of  the  power  which  she  enjoys  and  that  these  great 
objects  of  power  and  ambition  draw  in  their  wake  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe.  In  brief,  money  has  be- 
come so  necessary  to  the  sustenance  of  a  government 
that  without  commerce  no  state  has  the  wherewithal  to 
uphold  its  dignity  and  independence;  and  commerce 
would  dry  up  if  it  were  not  sustained  by  that  branch  of 
it  which  traffics  in  the  products  of  America.  It  is  there 
that  England  finds  the  outlet  for  her  manufactures,  and 
to  what  dimensions  would  these  be  reduced  if  they  sup- 
plied only  the  market  of  Europe  at  a  time  when  every 
nation  is  endeavoring  to  make  its  own  resources  suffice 
and  to  prevent  the  departure  of  specie  from  its 
territory  ?33 

This,  of  course,  is  all  in  the  best  strain  of  the 
most  rigorous  Mercantilism.  Nevertheless,  pro- 

mocratie  amtricaine  (3rd  ed.,  Paris,  1861),  40T.  Most  of  the 
citations  to  this  work  are  to  the  documents  in  the  Appendices, 
pp.  393-559.  See  also  F.  Kapp,  Life  of  Kalb  (N.  Y.,  1870),  43-4. 

83  De  Witt,  op.  tit.,  I.  420-1.    See  also  to  same  effect  pp.  427-8. 
Choiseul's  viewpoint  was  precisely  the  same:  ib.,  47-51. 


43  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

fessing  to  fear  the  American  colonies  more  than 
England  herself,  Durand  advised  against  foment- 
ing revolution  among  them,  since  to  do  so  "might 
have  the  result  of  handing  over  the  other  colonies 
of  Europe  to  those  who  by  their  excessive  energy 
and  strength  had  detached  themselves  from  the 
parent  stem."34  Durand's  successor  Chatelet,  on 
the  other  hand,  was  strongly  of  the  opinion  that 
France  ought  to  seize  the  first  opportunity  of 
intervening  in  America. 

In  the  case  of  a  rupture  [he  inquired  of  Choiseul  early 
in  December,  1767]  even  were  it  an  open  and  premature 
one,  between  the  colonies  and  Great  Britain,  could 
France  and  Spain  remain  idle  spectators  of  an  oppor- 
tunity which  in  probability  would  never  occur  again? 
.  .  .  Before  six  months  have  elapsed  America  will  be 
on  fire  at  every  point.  The  question  then  is  whether 
the  colonists  have  the  means  of  feeding  it  without  the 
aid  of  a  foreign  war,  and  whether  France  and  Spain 
should  run  the  risk  of  taking  an  active  part  in  foment- 
ing the  conflict  and  making  it  inextinguishable,  or 
whether  it  would  be  more  their  policy  to  leave  it  to 
itself  at  the  risk  of  its  going  out  for  want  of  fuel  and  the 
means  of  spreading.35 

As  a  matter  of  fact  Choiseul  had  already  taken 
a  definite  step  toward  interesting  his  government 
in  the  American  situation.  On  April  22nd,  1767, 

**/6v  52.    See  also,  to  some  effect,  pp.  432-3. 

86  Ib.,  56-7  footnote.  Choiseul  regarded  these  views  as  "pro- 
found": ib.  For  further  correspondence  to  the  same  effect,  see 
ib.,  433-55. 


THE   AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  43 

he  had  despatched  Kalb,  who  was  later  to  distin- 
guish himself  as  a  major-general  in  Washington's 
army,  to  Amsterdam,  there  to  inquire  into  "the 
rumors  in  circulation  about  the  English  colonies" 
and,  should  these  be  well  founded,  to  "make  prep- 
arations for  a  journey  to  America/*  In  con- 
formity with  these  and  further  instructions,  Kalb 
finally  sailed  for  America  from  Gravesend,  on  Oc- 
tober 4th,  and  arrived  in  Philadelphia  January 
2nd.36  In  essence,  the  conclusions  he  drew  from 
his  inquiries  into  the  American  situation  were, 
that  the  moment  had  not  yet  arrived  for  France 
to  embroil  herself  with  her  neighbors;  that  while 
the  remoteness  of  the  American  population  from 
their  central  government  made  them  "free  and 
enterprising,"  at  bottom  they  were  "but  little  in- 
clined to  shake  off  the  English  supremacy  with 
the  aid  of  foreign  powers";  that  "such  an  alliance 
would  appear  to  them  to  be  fraught  with  danger 
to  their  liberties" ;  that  "a  war  with  us  would  only 
hasten  their  reconciliation,"  so  that  "on  the  foot- 
ing of  restored  privileges,  the  English  court  could 
even  direct  all  the  troops,  resources,  and  ships  of 
this  part  of  the  world  against  our  islands  and  the 
Spanish  Main."37 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  these  observa- 
tions, in  the  general  assessment  they  made  of 
American  sentiment,  squared  with  the  facts,  but 

M  F.  Kapp,  Life  of  Kalb,  cited  above,  45-51. 
*  Ib.,  53-7  passim. 


44  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

that  was  small  consolation  to  Choiseul,  who  in  his 
disappointment  petulantly  charged  Kalb  with 
superficiality  and  pronounced  his  labors  useless.38 
The  result  however  was  that  now,  abandoning 
any  idea  of  actually  interfering  in  America,  the 
French  minister  began  to  formulate  a  plan 
whereby  France  and  Spain  should  indirectly  fos- 
ter discontent  in  the  English  colonies  by  throwing 
open  the  ports  of  their  own  colonies  to  the  prod- 
ucts of  North  America.39  This  was  on  the  basis 
of  the  theory,  that  while  the  English  colonies  aug- 
mented the  strength  of  England,  those  of  France 
weakened  her.  "The  thing  to  be  aimed  at,"  there- 
fore, in  the  words  of  M.  Abeille,  Choiseul's  sec- 
retary-general of  Commerce,  was  "to  diminish  the 
artificial  strength  of  England  and  to  relieve 
France  of  the  burdens  that  obstruct  the  develop- 
ment of  her  native  strength."40  Indeed  M. 
Abeille  was  for  granting  the  French  colonies  their 
independence.  But  these  views  naturally  en- 
countered some  opposition  at  Madrid;  and  in 
1770  Choiseul  fell  from  power. 

88  Ib.,  71.  At  this  very  time  Franklin  was  writing,  with  refer- 
ence to  Choiseul's  policy:  "That  intriguing  nation  would  like 
very  well  to  blow  up  the  coals  between  Britain  and  her  colonies, 
but  I  hope  we  shall  give  them  no  opportunity,"  Bancroft,  III.  261. 
As  late  as  Apr.  6,  1773,  Franklin  predicted  that  a  war  with 
France  and  Spain  on  the  part  of  England  would  heal  the  breach 
with  the  colonies,  Complete  Works  (Ed.  Bigelow),  V.  126. 

"  De  Witt,  op.  cit.,  60-3. 
61-2. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  45 

Two  years  later  occurred  the  first  partition  of 
Poland,  all  things  considered,  the  most  humiliat- 
ing episode  from  the  French  point  of  view  in  the 
history  of  French  diplomacy.  Poland  had  been 
for  centuries,  with  a  fair  degree  of  constancy,  the 
ally  and  protege  of  France.  Since  1745,  moreover, 
Louis  himself  had  been  endeavoring,  through  the 
subterranean  channels  of  the  Secret  du  Roi, 
which  indeed  he  had  created  for  the  purpose,  to 
secure  the  succession  of  the  House  of  Conti  to 
the  Polish  throne.41  The  project  of  the  royal 
brigands,  however,  was  never  known  to  His  Most 
Christian  Majesty's  agents  till  it  was  fait  accom- 
pli, and  thus  the  most  important  transfer  of  terri- 
tory since  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  involving 
ultimately  the  extinction  of  the  greatest  state 
territorially  in  western  Europe,  was  effected  not 
only  without  the  consent  but  without  the  knowl- 
edge of  France.  But  worst  of  all,  France's  own 
ally  Austria  was  particeps  criminis  to  the  act, 
even  though  a  reluctant  one  at  first.  "She  wept 
but  she  took,"  was  the  adequate  account  that 
Frederick  gave  of  the  empress'  part  in  the  trans- 
action. Her  course  published  to  the  world  at 
large  in  a  way  that  tears  more  copious  and  more 
sincere  than  hers  could  not  obliterate,  that  the 
desires  of  France  no  longer  greatly  counted  in 
Europe.42 

41Lavisse  et  Rambaud,  op.  cit.,  VII.  212-14. 
o/b.    503-11. 


46  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

"The  Tragedy  of  the  North"  it  was  that  incited 
Broglie,  the  principal  agent  of  the  Secret  du  Roi, 
to  the  composition,  in  collaboration  with  the  ver- 
satile Favier,  of  his  elaborate  Conjectures  Red- 
sonnees,  referred  to  above.  "One  would  wish  in 
vain,"  this  document  begins,  "to  conceal  the  rapid 
degradation  of  the  credit  of  France  in  the  courts 
of  Europe,  not  only  in  consideration  but  even  in 
dignity.  From  the  primacy  among  great  powers 
she  has  been  forced  to  descend  to  a  passive  role 
or  that  of  an  inferior."43  Putting  then  the  ques- 
tion as  to  the  cause  of  this  unhappy  transfor- 
mation, Broglie  first  assailed  "the  change  of  sys- 
tem produced  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles."44  The 
preponderance  in  Europe  was  the  rightful  pat- 
rimony of  the  French  crown:  this  was  a  dogma 
consecrated  by  a  thousand  years.45  But  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  had  accustomed  Europe  "to 
regard  France  as  ...  subject  to  orders  from 
Austria."  To  the  same  cause  was  it  due  that 
France  had  abandoned  her  ancient  allies  Sweden, 
Poland,  Turkey,  and  the  German  princes;  and 
worse  still,  that  she  had  made  to  fill  the  role  of 
dupe  in  the  recent  developments  in  Poland  and 
Turkey,  the  result  of  which  was  her  own  reduc- 
tion to  the  fourth  grade  of  powers.46  The  Family 

"S6gur,  I.  212. 

44  76.,  212-13. 

**/&.,  229. 

*«/&.,  213,  258-64,  303-4;  II.  33-4,  64,  88-92. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  47 

Compact  of  1762,  too,  had  had  the  worst  possible 
effect  upon  European  opinion,  since  by  it  Spain 
was  admitted  to  virtual  equality  with  France. 
"France  for  the  first  time  admitted  the  equality 
of  another  power."47 

Thus  far  spoke  the  critic  and  rival  of  Choiseul. 
The  longest  section  of  the  Conjectures  however 
deals  with  England  and  the  tone  here  is  signifi- 
cantly harmonious  with  that  of  Choiseul's  Me- 
moire.  The  attitude  of  England  toward  France 
was  that  of  ancient  Rome  toward  Carthage. 
England  of  course  did  not  expect  to  wipe  out  the 
French  monarchy ;  her  inferiority  on  land  forbade 
the  idea.  But  she  had  adopted  the  principle  of 
keeping  the  French  marine  reduced,  "of  watching 
our  ports,  of  surveying  our  dockyards  and  arsen- 
als, of  spoiling  our  projects,  our  preparations,  our 
least  movements."  Her  policy  in  this  respect  was 
to  be  explained  in  part  by  that  spirit  of  rapine 
native  to  the  English  people,  but  also  in  part  by 
the  knowledge  of  the  English  ministers  that  the 
edifice  of  English  power  was  still  supported  by 
factitious  resources  and  forced  means  and  that 
its  natural  tendency,  in  face  of  the  approaching 
danger  of  a  schism  between  the  mother-country 
and  her  colonies,  would  be  to  crumble  and  dis- 
solve. In  short,  it  was  fear  that  determined  Eng- 
land's policy  toward  France,  though  a  fear  that 
knew  how  to  choose  its  weapons.  In  view  of  this 

«/&.,  I.  229-30. 


48  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

fact,  France  should  know  her  real  strength, 
should  know  that  her. industry,  resources,  patriot- 
ism, and  intelligence  were  sufficient  to  overturn 
"the  colossus  of  English  power,"  could  she  once 
restore  her  marine.  She  should  know  too  that 
the  feeble  line  of  conduct  taken  with  England  in 
the  immediate  past  had  but  nourished  English 
pride  and  disdain  and  that  what  was  needed  was 
a  firm  line  of  conduct.  France's  military  system 
and  her  diplomatic  policy  must  alike  sustain  the 
dignity  and  preeminence  of  the  crown  of  France 
on  sea  as  well  as  on  land.48 

The  influence  of  the  Conjectures  Raisonnees 
upon  those  who  were  interested  in  France's  diplo- 
matic position  is  beyond  all  question,  and  the 
same  is  true  of  Abbe  Raynal's  contemporaneous 
Histoire  des  Indes.49  "The  marine,"  declared 
this  writer,  "is  a  new  kind  of  power  which  has 
given,  in  some  sort,  the  universe  to  Europe.  This 
part  of  the  globe,  which  is  so  limited,  as  ac- 
quired, by  means  of  its  fleet,  an  unlimited  empire 
over  the  rest,  so  extended."  Yet  the  benefit  of 
this  control  had  passed,  in  effect,  to  one  nation 
alone,  England,  and  with  it  had  passed  the  bal- 
ance of  power.  Such  had  not  always  been  the 
case.  In  the  days  of  Louis  XIV  France  had 

48  76.,  II.  165-97. 

*  Sorel,  op.  tit.,  I.  304-10.  "La  doctrine  de  Favier  se  ramene  a 
une  proposition  essentielle:  1'anlantissement  de  PAngleterre,"  ib., 
306. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  49 

given  the  law  to  Europe,  and  the  basis  of  her 
greatness  had  been  in  her  marine.  Unfortu- 
nately, the  excesses  of  that  monarch,  while 
cementing  the  alliance  of  the  maritime  states 
against  France,  had  also  turned  the  martial  ener- 
gies of  the  latter  from  the  fleet  to  the  army;  and 
so  French  power  had  been  doubly  undermined.50 
The  connection  between  England's  greatness  as 
a  colonial  power  and  her  influence  among  the 
states  of  the  world  and  the  memory  of  France's 
greatness  under  Louis  XIV  are  constantly  re- 
iterated thoughts  in  Raynal's  pages,  and  the 
course  to  which  they  incited  French  sentiment, 
both  official  and  unofficial,*  is  plain.  "Favier," 
writes  Sorel,  "made  disciples  and  Raynal 
proselytes."51 

France's  intervention  in  the  American  Revolu- 
tion is  often  described  as  an  act  of  Revenge.  The 
description  is  less  erroneous  than  incomplete,  for 
while  it  calls  to  mind  the  fact  that  France  had 
humiliations  to  be  redressed,  it  fails  to  indicate 
the  even  more  important  fact  that  she  had  also 
a  role  to  be  retrieved.  Furthermore,  it  leaves  en- 
tirely out  of  account  the  logic  by  which,  in  an 
Age  of  Reason,  the  purpose  of  either  revenge  or 
restoration  was  brought  into  relation  with  a  con- 
crete situation.  This  logic  comprised  the  follow- 

"Histoire  des  Indes  (Paris  edition  of  1781),  V.  203;  VII.  208  ff.; 
IX.  88  ff.,  219  ff.;  and  especially,  X.  136  ff. 
"Sorel,  op.  tit.,  I.  309. 


50  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

ing  ideas:  That  France  was  entitled  by  her 
wealth,  power,  and  history,  to  the  preponderating 
influence  in  Continental  affairs ;  that  she  had  lost 
this  position  of  influence  largely  on  account  of 
Great  Britain's  intermeddling;  that  Great  Bri- 
tain had  been  enabled  to  mingle  in  Continental 
concerns  by  virtue  of  her  great  naval  strength, 
her  commercial  prosperity,  and  her  preparedness 
to  maintain  Continental  subsidiaries;  that  these 
in  turn  were  due  in  great  part  to  her  American 
colonial  empire  and  especially  to  the  policies  con- 
trolling her  trade  therewith;  that  America,  be- 
come independent,  would  be  an  almost  total  loss 
from  the  point  of  view  of  British  interests ;  that 
this  loss  would  mean  a  corresponding  diminution 
of  British  power;  that  since  the  two  were  rivals, 
whatever  abased  the  power  of  Great  Britain 
would  elevate  the  power  of  France.  By  calling 
into  existence  the  New  World,  France  would 
"redress  the  balance  of  the  Old." 

But  while  these  ideas  define  the  principal  ad- 
vantage which  France  hoped  to  obtain  from  the 
course  she  took,  there  were  also  supporting  ideas 
that  should  not  be  lost  to  view.  For  one  thing, 
it  was  by  no  means  impossible  that  whether  she 
intervened  or  not  in  behalf  of  the  American 
rebels,  France  would  find  herself,  sooner  or  later, 
at  war  with  Great  Britain  in  defense  of  the 
French  West  Indies.  Again,  it  had  for  centuries 
been  France's  role  to  back  the  smaller  fry  against 


THE  AMERICAN   ALLIANCE  51 

her  greater  rivals.  Again,  it  was  generally  felt 
that,  formidable  as  it  was  at  the  moment,  British 
power  was  in  reality  more  or  less  spurious.  Fur- 
thermore, recent  diplomatic  developments  had 
most  miraculously  paved  the  way  for  French  in- 
tervention in  North  America.  The  withdrawal  of 
France  from  Canada  had  left  America  no  reason 
to  fear  her;  the  Family  Compact  convenanted  the 
assistance  of  the  Spanish  marine;  the  Austrian 
alliance  constituted  a  reasonable  guaranty  of 
peace  on  the  Continent.  Finally,  it  was  felt  to 
be  not  only  allowable  but  right  for  France  to  seize 
so  favorable  an  opportunity  to  tear  down  a 
power  that  had  been  used  so  outrageously  as  Eng- 
land had  used  her  power  on  the  sea.  In  the  end, 
the  project  did  not  lack  some  of  the  aspects  of  a 
crusade. 

The  primary  requisite,  however,  to  an  under- 
standing of  Louis  XVTs  espousal  of  the  cause 
of  American  independence  is  that  due  weight  be 
given  the  fact  that  Europe  was  still  organized  on 
the  dynastic  principle,  and  to  the  further  fact, 
especially  noteworthy  in  the  case  of  the  elder 
branch  of  the  House  of  Bourbon,  that  position 
and  influence  were  the  essential  objectives  of  di- 
plomacy, even  in  the  age  of  "Benevolent  Mon- 
archy."52 To-day  with  the  voice  of  the  common 

M  Indeed  among  a  people  so  fond  of  glory  as  the  French  the  very 
security  of  the  crown  demanded  that  the  dishonor  it  had  suffered 
abroad  in  the  detested  latter  years  of  Louis  XV  should  be  wiped 


52  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

man  dominant  in  the  direction  of  society,  histori- 
cal investigators  are.  apt  to  give  too  slighting 
attention  to  all  but  bread-and-butter  interests  as 
interpretative  of  the  conduct  of  states.  But  this 
is  plain  anachronism.  The  doctrine  of  the  equal- 
away  as  speedily  as  possible.  "Or  la  France,  passionate  comme 
elle  £tait  pour  la  gloire,  et  qui  aurait  excus£  bien  les  fautes  du 
gouvernement  inte>ieur,  ne  pardonna  pas  au  Roi  .  .  .  son  humilia- 
tion." Lavisse,  Histoire  de  France,  VIII.8  411.  It  is  interesting  to 
note  that  as  early  as  November,  1775,  Burke  had  predicted  French 
intervention.  "He  observed,  that  from  being  the  first,  she  was, 
with  regard  to  effective  military  power,  only  the  fifth  state  in 
Europe.  That  she  was  fallen  below  her  former  rank  solely  from 
the  advantages  we  had  obtained  over  her;  and  that  if  she  could 
humble  us,  she  would  certainly  recover  her  situation."  Part.  Hist., 
XVIII.  967.  Eighteen  months  before  this  Col.  Barr6  in  the  debate 
in  Commons  on  the  "Bill  for  Regulating  the  Government  of 
Massachusett's  Bay,"  had  declared  that  "during  these  troubles 
with  our  colonies,  France  would  not  lie  quiet,"  ib.,  XVII.  1307. 
A  hint  of  foreign  interference  is  conveyed  in  Franklin's  "Rules 
by  Which  a  Great  Empire  May  Be  Reduced  to  a  Small  One," 
Works  (Ed.  Sparks),  IV.  396.  In  a  sermon  delivered  June  6, 
1774,  in  the  Second  Church  of  Boston,  the  Rev.  John  Lathrop 
declared,  "France  and  Spain  will  take  satisfaction  for  their 
losses  in  the  late  War,"  Pennsylvania  Packet,  No.  147.  In  his 
"Farmer  Refuted,"  which  was  published  in  Feb.,  1775,  Hamilton 
put  the  question  whether  "the  ancient  rivals  and  enemies  of  Great 
Britain  would  be  idle,"  in  the  event  of  an  open  breach  between 
Great  Britain  and  her  colonies;  and  answered,  that  ere  this  could 
come  about,  "the  French,  from  being  a  jealous,  politic,  and 
enterprising  people,  must  be  grown  negligent,  stupid,  and  inat- 
tentive to  their  own  interest.  They  could  never  have  a  fairer 
opportunity  or  a  greater  temptation  to  aggrandize  themselves 
and  triumph  over  Great  Britain  than  would  here  be  presented." 
Works  (Constitutional  Ed.),  I.  164-5.  A  year  later  John  Adams 
raised  the  same  question  on  the  floor  of  Congress  (Mar.  1,  1776). 
"Is  it,"  he  inquired,  "the  interest  of  France  to  stand  neuter,  to 


THE   AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  53 

ity  of  man  was  indeed  a  tenet  of  the  schools  in 
1776,  but  it  had  made  little  headway  among  the 
professional  diplomatists,  who  still  assessed  the 
general  welfare  in  terms  furnished  by  the  compe- 
tition for  station  of  rival  reigning  houses.53 

join  with  Britain,  or  to  join  with  the  colonies?  Is  it  not  her 
interest  to  dismember  the  British  empire?  Will  her  dominions  be 
safe  if  Britain  and  America  remain  connected?  Can  she  preserve 
her  possessions  in  the  West  Indies?  ...  In  case  a  reconciliation 
should  take  place  between  Britain  and  America,  and  a  war 
should  break  out  between  Britain  and  France  would  not  all  her 
islands  be  taken  from  her  in  six  months?"  Life  and  Works,  II. 
487-8.  There  was,  of  course,  a  strong  possibility,  even  probability, 
of  such  a  reconciliation  at  this  date.  For  this  and  other  reasons 
the  danger  to  France  cited  by  Adams  was  much  more  real  than 
after  Saratoga.  See  infra.  Adams,  at  this  date,  wished  only  a 
"commercial"  connection  with  France,  and  declared  flatly  against 
a  "political'  or  "military"  connection.  "Receive  no  troops  from 
her,"  he  advised,  ib.  For  some  further  items  on  American  expec- 
tation of  French  aid  because  of  the  rivalry  between  France  and 
England,  see  the  Continental  Journal  and  Weekly  Advertiser 
of  Boston,  issues  of  July  11,  18,  and  25,  and  Oct.  17,  1776. 
53  See  further  the  document  given  in  Appendix  U. 


CHAPTER  III 

VERGENNES  DISCOVERS  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLT 

Louis  XVI  ascended  the  throne  in  May,  1774, 
and  was  at  once  confronted  with  the  task  of  choos- 
ing a  ministry.  The  queen,  anxious  to  see  the 
policy  of  friendship  with  Austria  continued, 
urged  that  Choiseul  be  again  called  to  power. 
The  dull  and  priggish  Louis,  however,  abhorred 
both  the  aggressive  talents  and  tawdry  morals  of 
the  former  minister,  and  his  scruples  carried  the 
day.  When  the  new  cabinet  was  formed  in  the 
course  of  June  and  July  the  post  of  chief -minister 
was  assigned  to  the  old  and  decrepit  Count  de 
Maurepas,  while  that  of  secretary  of  state  for 
Foreign  Affairs  was  bestowed  upon  the  Count 
de  Vergennes.1 

Charles  Gravier,  later  the  Count  de  Vergennes, 
was  born  at  Dijon,  in  1717,  of  one  of  those  fami- 
lies of  the  lesser  noblesse  whose  function  it  was, 
under  the  Old  Regime,  to  replenish  the  ranks  of 
French  officialdom.  He  began  his  diplomatic 
career  in  1740  by  accompanying  his  uncle  Cha- 
vigny  to  the  latter's  post  as  ambassador  at  Libson. 

1Lavisse,  Histoire  de  France,  IX.1  5,  6. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  55 

Six  years  later  he  won  the  praise  of  Argenson  by 
the  clarity  of  his  views  on  questions  then  at  issue 
between  Portugal  and  Spain.  In  1750  he  became 
minister  plenipotentiary  at  Treves,  and  a  little 
later  His  Most  Christian  Majesty's  representa- 
tive at  the  Congress  of  Hanover,  where  he  is  said 
to  have  shown  great  dexterity  in  foiling  the  de- 
signs of  George  H's  representative,  the  Duke  of 
Newcastle.  This  and  other  successes  brought  him 
four  years  later  the  great  post  of  ambassador  to 
Constantinople,  where  for  fourteen  years  he  rep- 
resented both  the  official  diplomacy  and  the  Secret 
du  Roi.  Then  followed  a  short  term  of  retire- 
ment on  account  of  an  altercation  with  Choiseul. 
But  in  1771,  at  the  instance  of  Aiguillon,  he  be- 
came the  king's  ambassador  at  Stockholm;  and 
here  the  year  following  he  successfully  engi- 
neered a  coup  d'etat,  which  by  transferring  the 
governing  power  in  Sweden  from  the  antiquated 
and  corrupt  estates  to  the  king,  saved  that  coun- 
try from  the  fate  which  had  just  overtaken 
Poland  and  was  even  then  overshadowing 
Turkey.2 

2  La  Grande  Encyclopedic,  title  "Vergennes";  Magazine  of  Amer- 
ican History,  XIII.  31  ff.;  Flassan,  op.  tit.,  VI.  12-13,  234-58; 
Arthur  Hassall,  The  Balance  of  Power  (N.  Y.,  1898),  passim; 
Le  Bonneville  de  Marsangy,  Le  Chevalier  de  Vergennes,  son  Am- 
bassade  a  Constantinople  (2  Vols.;  Paris,  1894);  H.  Doniol,  "Le 
Ministere  des  Affaires  etrangeres  de  France  sous  le  Comte  de 
Vergennes,"  Revue  d'Histoire  diplomatique,  VII.  528-60  (1893). 
This  reference  is  chiefly  valuable  for  the  extracts  it  contains  from 
the  "Souvenirs"  of  Vergennes'  friend  Hennin,  written  at  the  time 


56  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Compared  with  the  brilliant  Choiseul,  the  new 
secretary  is  a  somewhat  prosaic  figure,  an  impres- 
sion which  Carlyle  has  recorded  in  the  dictum  that 
"M.  de  Vergennes  was  a  clerk,  a  mere  clerk 
with  his  feet  under  the  table."  The  fact  is  that, 
to  a  taste  for  methodical  employment,  and  to  the 
minute  knowledge  of  the  diplomatic  systems  of 
Europe  that  stirred  the  admiration  of  Segur, 
Vergennes  added  an  ambition  for  patriotic 
achievement  that  was  none  the  less  real  because 
it  was  controlled  by  the  prudence  of  a  man  who 
had  risen  to  station  by  his  own  efforts.  Nor 
is  the  traditional  Vergennes  less  remote  from  fact, 
the  Vergennes  who  is  pictured  to  us  as  "a  difficult 
and  dangerous  man  with  whom  to  have  dealings," 
a  washed-out  version  of  the  legendary  Machia- 
velli.  It  is  certain  that  Vergennes  was  no  senti- 
mentalist, for  which,  however,  he  is  hardly  to  be 
blamed,  since  the  happy  thought  of  blending  sen- 
timentalism  and  diplomacy  had  not  yet  occurred 
to  men.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Machiavellian 
principle  that  self-interest  is  the  only  feasible 
basis  of  a  public  policy  was  applied  by  him  with 
certain  very  essential  qualifications  and  limita- 
tions. England,  it  is  true,  he  treated  from  the 
outset  to  a  policy  of  duplicity  and  falsehood,  but 
that  nation,  he  held,  had  put  herself  beyond  the 

of  the  minister's  death.  See  also  a  eulogy  of  Vergennes*  Conti- 
nental policy  by  Sorel  in  the  Revue  historique,  XV.  273  ff.,  and  a 
criticism  of  the  same  by  Tratchevsky,  ib.,  XVI.  327  ff. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  57 

pale.  On  the  Continent  itself  he  sought  unre- 
mittingly to  bulwark  the  status  quo  behind 
the  maxims  of  the  Systeme  de  Conservation. 
"Force,"  he  wrote,  "can  never  vest  a  title,  nor 
convenience  bestow  a  right";  and  the  partition  of 
Poland  he  denounced  as  "political  brigandage." 
Moreover,  he  regarded  the  honor  of  the  king  as 
setting  very  definite  limits  beyond  which  politi- 
cal advantage  was  not  to  be  sought.  Capable 
himself  of  playing  the  Jesuit  with  most  admired 
skill  when  occasion  required,  yet  once  the  word  of 
His  Majesty  was  distinctly  pledged,  he  deemed 
it  inviolable. 

In  a  word,  expert  that  he  was  in  the  use  of  the 
conventional  weapons  of  eighteenth  century 
French  diplomacy,  Vergennes  had  no  thought  of 
casting  these  aside  or  of  greatly  changing  them. 
And  the  same  is  true  of  his  attitude  toward  the 
accepted  axioms  of  his  profession.  He  believed 
in  the  doctrine  of  the  Balance  of  Power,  and  till 
he  was  disillusioned  by  the  results  of  the  Ameri- 
can Revolution,  in  the  tenets  of  Mercantilism. 
He  adopted  without  reservation  the  fundamental 
postulate  of  the  Classical  System,  that  France 
by  virtue  of  geographical  position,  wealth,  intel- 
ligence, and  military  resources,  was  entitled  to 
the  preponderance  in  Europe.  "France,"  he 
wrote  in  1778,  "placed  in  the  center  of  Europe 
has  the  right  to  influence  all  great  affairs.  Her 
king,  comparable  to  a  supreme  judge,  is  entitled 


58  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

to  regard  his  throne  as  a  tribunal  set  up  by  Provi- 
dence to  make  respected  the  rights  and  properties 
of  sovereigns."3  Alas!  in  1774,  the  age-long 
prerogative  of  France  was  in  eclipse,  her  pres- 
tige dimmed.  "Among  all  nations,"  he  after- 
ward declared  of  this  period, 

the  opinion  prevailed  that  France  no  longer  had  either 
will  or  resources.  The  envy  which  till  then  had  governed 
the  policy  of  other  courts  toward  France  became  con- 
tempt. The  cabinet  of  Versailles  had  neither  influence 
nor  credit  in  any  quarter.  Instead  of  being,  as  formerly, 
the  center  of  all  great  affairs,  it  became  their  idle  spec- 
tator. Everywhere  men  treated  its  approval  and  its 
disapproval  as  alike  negligible.4 

It  was  a  situation  that  touched  him  hardly  less 
acutely  than  if  it  had  been  his  own  personal 
misfortune. 

How,  then,  was  France  to  recover  her  influ- 
ence and  what  use  would  she  make  of  it,  once 
it  was  recovered?  Like  Argenson,  Vergennes 
linked  the  reputation  of  the  House  of  Bour- 
bon with  the  cause  of  Continental  peace. 

•M&noire  of  Apr.  18,  1778,  Flassan  VI.  140  ffg.  See  also 
Recueil  des  Instructions,  I.  (Autriche),  488.  See  SMSS.,  No.  861, 
where  Vergennes  compares  the  wealth  of  France  and  Great  Britain 
favorably  to  France.  At  the  same  time  he  envied  the  British  gov- 
ernment the  facility  with  which  it  commanded  the  resources  of  the 
realm.  "Nous  avons  assurement,"  he  wrote,  "des  resources  plus 
reelles  que  1'Angleterre,  mais  il  s'en  faut  bien  que  le  jeu  en  soit 
aussi  facile.  Cela  tient  a  une  opinion  qui  ne  peut  pas  s'Stablir 
dans  une  monarchic  absolue  comme  dans  une  monarchic  mixte." 
Doniol,  II.  18. 

*Ib.}  I.  3-4.    See  also  Sorel,  op.  cit.}  I.  309. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  59 

Like  Broglie,  he  censured  the  overestimation  of 
the  Austrian  connection  that  had  eventuated  in 
neglect  of  France's  guardianship  of  the  Peace  of 
Westphalia,  "one  of  the  most  beautiful  jewels" 
of  the  Gallic  crown.  On  the  other  hand,  follow- 
ing Choiseul,  he  admitted  that  the  Austrian  al- 
liance, kept  within  due  bounds,  might  yet  prove 
useful  to  France  in  that  its  tendency  was  to  pre- 
vent England  and  Austria  from  striking  hands 
once  more.  It  thus  guaranteed,  he  argued,  the 
peace  of  the  Continent,  where  France  could  de- 
sire only  peace,  and,  by  the  same  sign,  it  left 
France  at  liberty  "to  direct  her  efforts  to  counter- 
balancing the  power  of  England,  whose  naval 
superiority  most  necessarily  enlisted  her  fore- 
sight." Finally,  from  the  same  point  of  view, 
he  acclaimed  the  Family  Compact  as  the  very 
"cornerstone  of  France's  whole  system."  This 
connection,  it  was  true,  required  France  always 
to  stand  ready  to  come  to  the  defense  of  Spain's 
vast  possessions  beyond  the  sea,  but  it  was,  for 
all  that,  more  valuable  to  France  than  to  Spain. 
England  was  loath  to  break  with  Spain  on  ac- 
count of  her  profitable  commerce  there,  from 
which  she  drew  riches  and  employment,  while 
with  France  no  such  motive  held  her  back.  "If 
there  is  anything  capable  of  giving  England 
pause,  it  is  the  thought  of  France  and  Spain 
united;  it  is  the  certainty  that  the  first  cannon- 


60  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

shot  directed  at  the  one  or  the  other  will  be  an- 
swered by  both."5      .kv  . 

None  the  less,  it  would  seem  that  at  the  moment 
of  taking  office  Vergennes'  policy  looked  toward 
an  effort  at  amity  with  England;  and  it  is  cer- 
tain that  he  first  assessed  the  American  revolt  as 
guaranteeing  England's  continued  peaceableness 
rather  than  as  furnishing  a  fulcrum  for  an  ac- 
tively anti-English  policy.6  For  this  there  were 
three  reasons:  In  the  first  place,  the  American 
business  itself  was  still  much  "in  the  vague." 
Again,  Vergennes  was  aware  that  Louis  had 
taken  the  throne  pledged  to  a  program  of  econ- 
omy and  internal  reform  and  to  this  program,  he 
naturally  assumed,  diplomatic  programs  would 
have  to  be  subordinated.7  Finally,  in  July,  1774, 
by  the  Treaty  of  Kutchuk-Kainardji  Russia  had 
established  herself  on  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea 
in  territory  wrested  from  Turkey.  Alarmed  at 
the  prospect  of  a  repetition  of  what  had  just  oc- 
curred in  Poland,  as  well  as  for  France's  monop- 
oly of  the  Levantine  trade,  Vergennes  felt  that 
his  first  attention  must  be  given  to  the  South- 

8  "Instructions  to  the  Baron  de  Breteuil,"  Dec.  28,  1774,  Re- 
cueil  des  Instructions,  I.  478  ffg.;  "ExposS  succinct"  of  Dec.  8, 
1774,  Doniol  I.  14  ff. 

•Ib.,  I.  13,  40. 

7  See  Recueil  des  Instructions,  I.  488:  "La  grandeur  de  la  puis- 
sance du  Roi,  la  position  de  ses  l£tats  et  ses  soins  que  sa  Majeste 
est  resolv£  de  donner  £  leur  administration  inte>ieure,  le  mettront 
en  effet  ...  en  etat  de  choisir  entre  tous  les  systemes  politiques 
celui  qui  conviendra  le  mieux  a  ses  vues  et  a  ses  interets." 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  61 

eastern  situation.  Indeed,  he  seems  at  one 
moment  to  have  considered  the  possibility  of  per- 
suading England  herself  to  join  in  an  effort  to 
curb  Russia's  assaults  upon  the  established 
equilibrium.8 

But  this  attitude  was,  after  all,  weakly  rooted 
in  a  thin  soil.  Moreover,  Turkey's  cession  of  the 
Chersonese  was  soon  seen  to  be  fait  accompli. 
Vergennes'  real  disposition  toward  England 
found  expression  in  connection  with  the  dispute 
which  began  brewing  in  July,  1774,  between  Spain 
and  Portugal  over  some  aggressions  of  the  lat- 
ter in  South  America.  The  possibility  of  war 
between  Portugal  and  Spain  raised  the  possibil- 
ity of  war  between  Spain  and  England  and  that, 
in  turn,  the  possibility  of  war  between  England 
and  France.  Commenting  on  the  report  that 
England  desired  an  amicable  settlement  of  the 
affair,  Vergennes  remarked:  "We  share  the 
wish,  rather  from  necessity  than  inclination."' 
And  equally  illuminative  is  an  episode  which  oc- 
curred early  in  1775  in  connection  with  the  de- 
struction which  the  king  had  just  then  ordered  of 
the  correspondence  of  the  Secret  du  Rot.  Among 
the  papers  about  to  be  consigned  to  the  flames 
was  a  plan  that  had  been  drawn  up  by  Broglie 
in  1766  for  the  invasion  of  England.  Vergennes 

8  See  Hassall,  The  Balance  of  Power,  320;  Recueil  des  Instruc- 
tions, IX.  (Russe),  318-20;  and  Doniol,  I.  15. 
•  Vergennes  to  Ossun,  Oct.  31,  1774,  Doniol,  I.  33. 


62  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

and  his  associate,  the  Count  du  Muy,  at  once  pe- 
titioned Louis  to  be  allowed  to  save  this  docu- 
ment, a  request  which  was  promptly  granted.10 
But  all  other  sources  of  instruction  as  to  the 
new  secretary's  attitude  toward  England  yield 
place  to  a  document  I  have  already  cited  more 
than  once,  his  Expose  Succinct,  which  was  pre- 
pared early  in  December,  1774.  This  was,  in 
brief,  a  plea  for  military  preparation  based  on  a 
survey  of  the  whole  diplomatic  situation  with 
which  France  was  then  confronted.  "People,"  its 
author  wrote,  "respect  a  nation  which  they  see 
prepared  to  make  a  vigorous  resistance  and  which, 
without  abusing  the  superiority  of  its  forces,  de- 
sires only  that  which  is  just  and  useful  for  the 
whole  world,  to  wit,  peace  and  general  tranquil- 
lity." Unfortunately,  however,  while  this  was  the 
objective  of  diplomacy,  diplomacy  itself  was 
unable  "to  fix  conclusively  the  choice  of  route 
thereto."  It  was  a  truth  albeit  a  trite  one, 

that  the  longer  a  peace  has  endured  the  less  likely  is  it 
to  continue.  The  fact  that  the  present  peace  has  lasted 
twelve  years  furnishes  a  strong  prejudgment  against 
its  further  stability.  It  is  then  not  to  transgress  the 
limits  of  allowable  prevision  to  insist  upon  the  necessity 
of  being  ready  for  any  event ;  and  besides,  one  is  never 
better  assured  of  peace  than  when  one  is  in  position 
not  to  fear  war.  Opinion,  'tis  said,  is  queen  of  the 
world.11 

*»S£gur,  I.  104-6;  Doniol,  I.  23-4. 
uS£gur,  I.  169-70;  Doniol,  I.  20. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  63 

Nor  did  Vergennes  leave  those  whom  he  ad- 
dressed in  doubt  as  to  the  practical  bearing  in  the 
main  of  these  generalizations: 

If  [he  wrote]  having  surveyed  the  Continent  we  turn 
our  eyes  coastward,  do  we  find  there  greater  pledges  of 
security?  We  see  lying  alongside  us  a  nation  greedy, 
restless,  more  jealous  of  the  prosperity  of  its  neighbors 
than  awake  to  its  own  happiness,  powerfully  armed  and 
ready  to  strike  on  the  instant.  Let  us  not  deceive  our- 
selves ;  whatever  parade  the  English  ministers  may  make 
of  their  pacific  intentions,  we  cannot  count  upon  this 
disposition  longer  than  their  domestic  difficulties  con- 
tinue. These  however  may  come  to  an  end,  or  indeed 
they  may  increase  to  such  a  point  as  to  cause  the 
government  to  direct  the  general  uneasiness  against  ob- 
jects abroad.  It  is  not  without  precedent  that  the  cry 
of  a  war  against  France  has  become  the  rallying  point 
of  all  parties  in  England.  .  .  .  Having  nothing 
to  gain  with  France  by  the  prosecution  of  a  legitimate 
commerce,  England  looks  with  envy  upon  the  vast  ex- 
tent of  our  plantations  in  America  and  our  industry 
in  Europe.12 

Rarely  has  a  minister  of  state  drawn  a  more 
sinister  picture  of  the  purposes  and  policies  of  an 
ostensibly  friendly  government;  and  to  the  pic- 
ture so  delineated,  rumor  soon  added  the  touch 
of  imminent  menace.  Within  a  few  days  of  the 
preparation  of  the  Expose,  Vergennes  received 

"/&.,  18-9.  Note  the  point  of  view  revealed  by  the  assertion  that 
England  has  nothing  to  gain  from  "a  legitimate  commerce  with 
France." 


64  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

from  Gamier  the  report  then  circulating  about 
London  that  Chatham  had  a  plan  by  which  peace 
could  be  reestablished  in  America  without  offense 
to  the  dignity  of  England.    This  plan,  he  at  once 
inferred,  could  only  be  at  the  expense  of  France. 
True,  he  wrote  Gamier,  England  was  burdened 
with  debts  and  was  the  object  of  universal  enmity. 
True  too,  George  III  has  little  love  for  Chatham. 
But  the  very  extremity  of  the  situation  in  Amer- 
ica might  compel  his  Britannic  Majesty  to  con- 
quer his  prejudices  and  call  this  "enemy  of  peace" 
to  power  once  more.  His  doing  so  would  signal  a 
situation  for  which  desperate  remedies  had  been 
determined  upon  and  France  would  have  need 
to  beware.13    Six  weeks  later  Gamier  wrote  still 
more  alarmingly.    Speaking  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility, he  asserted  very  confidently  that  if  the 
measures  of  the  existing  ministry  "do  not  meet 
with  complete  success,  the  end  of  the  administra- 
tion will  follow  immediately  and  the  king  will  be 
forced  to  yield  to  circumstances  and  place  my  lord 
Chatham  at  the  head  of  affairs.    He  will  come  in 
clothed  with  absolute  power."14 

There  now  ensued  a  considerable  pause ;  and  it 
was  the  end  of  July,  1775,  when  the  Count  de 
Guines  wrote  that  Lord  Rochford,  a  member  of 
the  British  ministry,  had  confided  to  him  the  be- 
lief of  men  in  both  parties,  that  the  only  way 

13Vergennes  to  Gamier,  Dec.  26,  1774,  i&.,  60-2. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  65 

to  end  the  war  in  America  was  to  declare  war 
upon  France,  the  argument  being  that,  if  con- 
fronted with  the  necessity  of  choosing  between 
England  and  France,  the  Americans  in  fear  of 
seeing  the  latter  once  more  in  Canada  would  cer- 
tainly cast  in  their  lot  with  the  former,  even  at 
the  expense  of  liberty.15  A  little  later  advices 
reached  Vergennes  by  way  of  Madrid  that,  even 
though  Chathan  did  not  come  again  to  power — 
which  was  improbable — the  existing  ministers 
seemed  to  wish  to  imitate  his  way  of  thinking, 
from  which  it  resulted  that  war  was  not  unlikely 
to  break  out  at  the  least  expected  moment.16  Fi- 
nally in  the  middle  of  September  Vergennes  sent 
Beaumarchais,  the  famous  author  of  Figaro,  to 
pump  from  Rochford,  who  was  an  old  acquaint- 
ance of  his,  further  information  as  to  British 
intentions.  Beaumarchais,  in  a  letter  which  was 
handed  the  king  September  21st,  summarized  his 
conclusions  thus:  "In  short,  America  is  lost  to 
the  British  in  spite  of  their  efforts.  The  war  is 
waged  more  ferociously  in  London  than  in  Bos- 
ton. The  crisis  will  end  with  war  against  France 
if  the  opposition  comes  in,  whether  it  is  Chatham 
or  Rockingham  who  replaces  Lord  North,"1 

"76.    116-17. 

16  Ib.,  117-19.  See  also  the  letter  of  Aug.  7  from  Louis  to 
Charles  III,  indicating  the  former's  persuasion  of  the  possibility 
of  war  with  England,  ib.,  131-2. 

"John  Durand  (Ed.),  Documents  on  the  American  Revolution 
(N.  Y.,  1889),  53-4 


66  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Already,  however,  the  secretary's  interest  in 
the  American  situation  had  ceased  to  be  exclu- 
sively one  of  alarmed  concern.  Thus,  late  in  Au- 
gust the  ambassador  had  forwarded  from  London 
the  text  of  the  royal  proclamation  pronouncing 
the  Americans  "rebels,"  and  Vergennes  had  con- 
cluded thence  that,  so  long  as  the  existing  min- 
istry remained  in  office,  there  was  little  danger  of 
an  alliance  between  America  reconciled  and  the 
mother-country,  which  would  turn  its  combined 
forces  against  France  and  Spain.18  Further- 
more, the  little  likelihood  there  had  been  at  any 
time  that  the  arch-enemy  of  France  would  come 
again  to  power  was  for  the  time  being  at  an  end. 
This  great  man,  "the  world  forgetting,  by  the 
world  forgot,"  was  now  in  a  mysterious  seclusion 
from  which  he  did  not  emerge  till  the  beginning 
of  1777.  For  many  months  the  name  of  Chat- 
ham, its  magic  in  abeyance,  drops  out  of  the 
despatches  altogether.18* 

A  clue  to  the  new  point  of  view  of  the  Foreign 
Office  is  afforded  by  its  response  to  Guines'  de- 
spatch of  September  8th,  reporting  a  statement 
by  Rochford  that  the  American  Lee,  now  in 
London,  had  sworn  "on  his  honor"  that  the  col- 
onists had  assurance  of  aid  from  France  and 
Spain,  and  his  own  positive  denial  that  this 

"Doniol,  I.  172-4. 

18a  The  Correspondence  of  King  George  the  Third  with  Lord 
North,  from  1768  to  1783.  (Ed.  W.  B.  Donne,  London,  1867, 
2  vols.),  II.  10. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  67 

statement  had  basis  in  fact.  Replying  ten  days 
later  Vergennes  had  commended  the  ambassa- 
dor's method  of  parrying  his  English  interlocutor 
but  at  the  same  time  had  cautioned  him  against 
putting  anything  in  writing.  "The  king,"  said 
he,  "wishes  neither  to  augment  the  difficulties  of 
the  British  government  nor  to  encourage  the 
resistance  of  the  Americans,  but  neither  does  it 
suit  his  interest  to  serve  as  a  means  of  putting 
the  latter  down."19 

Late  in  October  Vergennes  received  the  Brit- 
ish ambassador  Stormont  and  engaged  him  in  an 
extended  conversation  on  the  American  situation 
with  the  aim,  at  once,  of  reassuring  the  English 
government  as  to  French  intentions  and  of  dis- 
covering how  seriously  that  government  regarded 
its  trans- Atlantic  affairs.  That  which  was  now 
happening  in  America,  the  French  secretary  de- 
clared, he  had  himself  foreseen  when  as  ambassa- 
dor at  Constantinople  he  had  learned  of  the 
cession  of  Canada  to  England.  He  then  pro- 
ceeded to  suggest  that  what  the  Americans  were 
plainly  aiming  at  was  independence  and  to  con- 
jecture the  consequences  should  they  attain  their 
object: 

In  that  case  they  would  immediately  set  about  form- 
ing a  great  marine,  and  as  they  have  every  possible  ad- 
vantage for  ship-building,  [it]  would  not  be  long  before 
they  had  such  fleets  as  would  be  an  overmatch  for  the 

"Doniol,  I.  150-1. 


68  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

whole  naval  power  of  Europe,  could  it  be  united  against 
them.  ...  In  the  end, they  would  not  leave  a  foot  of 
that  hemisphere  in  the  possession  of  any  European 
power. 

To  these  speculations  the  Englishman  assented 
eagerly.20  It  is  evident  that  against  the  back- 
ground furnished  by  the  siege  of  Boston,  the  news 
of  which  was  already  producing  an  immense  stir 
in  Paris,  Choiseul's  observation  that  "the  balance 
of  power  lay  in  America"  revealed  a  new 
significance. 

In  the  closing  days  of  1775  the  French  Foreign 
Office  proceeded,  under  Vergennes'  direction,  to 
formulate  the  problem  with  which  the  American 
revolt  confronted  France.  It  had  before  it 
memoirs  and  letters  from  a  variety  of  quarters, 
some  even  from  the  French  West  Indies,  but 
what  is  much  more  to  the  point,  it  had  before 
it  the  plans  and  projects  of  Choiseul,  wherein 
was  clearly  set  forth  the  connection  that  existed 
between  the  American  insurrection  and  the  res- 
toration of  French  power  and  prestige,  and 
wherein  the  large  general  problem  was  reduced  to 
the  more  precise  question  whether  the  Americans 
would  really  proclaim  their  independence,  or  if 
they  once  proclaimed  it,  be  of  a  mind  to  make  a 
persistent  effort  for  it.21 

20  SMSS.,  No.  1306. 

aDoniol,  I.  240-2.     Vergennes  had,  upon  taking  office,  reorgan- 
ized the  archives  of  the  Foreign  Office,  and  had  had  his  secretaries 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  69 

The  answer  that  the  Foreign  Office  returned  to 
this  question  and  the  consequences  that  it  deduced 
from  its  answer  are  set  forth  in  the  Reflexions, 
which  was  penned  by  Vergennes'  secretary,  Ger- 
ard de  Rayneval,  probably  early  in  November, 
1775.22  "There  is  reason  to  believe,"  this  most  im- 
portant document  begins,  "that  the  colonies  are 
not  in  quest  simply  of  a  redress  of  grievances,  but 
that  they  are  resolved  to  throw  off  the  yoke  of 
the  mother-country  altogether."  Yet,  it  con- 
tinues, "if  the  colonies  are  left  to  themselves,  it 
is  probable  that  Great  Britain  will  succeed  in 
subjugating  them."  What  then  is  the  course 
that  France  should  pursue  at  this  juncture?  "If 
England  subjugates  the  colonies  she  will  at  least 
retain  the  commercial  benefits  that  she  has  always 
drawn  thence  and  which  will  accordingly  continue 
to  sustain  both  her  manufactures  and  her  marine. 
She  will,  moreover,  prevent  the  colonies  from  be- 
coming what  they  would  be  if  independent,  a  con- 
siderable weight  in  the  balance  of  power  in  favor 
of  some  other  state."  France's  interest  was  there- 
fore plain.  "England  is  the  natural  enemy  of 
France,  and  a  greedy,  ambitious,  unjust,  and 

prepare  elaborate  summaries  of  French  foreign  policy  in  all  di- 
rections from  the  time  of  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  Revue 
d'Histoire  diplomatique,  VII.  540. 

**Ib.,  243-9;  SMSS.,  No.  1310.  The  conjecture  as  to  date  is 
based  on  M.  Doniol's  very  probable  theory  that  Beaumarchais'  ac- 
tivities in  behalf  of  the  idea  of  secret  aid  came  after  the  secretary 
had  formulated  his  program  in  the  "Reflexions":  see  Doniol  I.  251. 


70  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

treacherous  enemy,  the  constant  and  cherished 
object  of  whose  system  is,  if  not  the  destruction 
of  France,  at  least  her  abasement,  humiliation, 
and  ruin."  But  now  at  this  moment,  England's 
"colonies  are  in  open  war  against  her,  their  pur- 
pose is  to  cast  off  her  yoke,  they  ask  us  to  furnish 
them  aid  and  supplies."  Suppose  then  we  meet 
their  desires  and  our  assistance  proves  effective, 
what  advantages  will  result  to  us? 

1.  The  power  of  England  will  shrink  and  ours  will  ex- 
pand correspondingly;  2.  Her  commerce  will  suffer  an 
irreparable  loss  while  ours  will  increase;  3.  It  is  very 
probable  that  in  the  course  of  events  we  may  be  able 
to  recover  some  of  the  possessions  that  the  English 
ridded  us  of  in  America,  as  for  instance,  the  Newfound- 
land fisheries,  those  of  the  gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  the  Isle 
Royal,  etc.  I  do  not  speak  of  Canada.23 

But  if  these  were  the  premises  upon  which 
France  should  base  her  course,  what  precisely 
should  that  course  be?  Of  men  capable  and  will- 
ing to  bear  arms  the  colonies  had  a  great  suffi- 
ciency, but  they  lacked:  "first,  provisions  of  war; 
secondly,  currency;  thirdly,  a  good  navy."  To 
obtain  the  first  it  would  only  be  necessary  for 
them  to  send  their  vessels  to  French  ports  laden 
with  produce  which  they  should  there  exchange 
for  arms  and  munitions.  This  commerce  could 
easily  proceed  without  the  government  having 
any  visible  hand  in  it:  "it  would  only  be  necessary 

.,  243-4. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  71 

to  have  at  each  of  the  ports  to  which  the  American 
vessels  resorted  an  intelligent  merchant  whose 
loyalty  and  discretion  could  be  relied  upon."  The 
demand  for  money  was  somewhat  more  difficult, 
but  given  legitimate  dimensions,  it  could  be  met 
in  the  same  way  as  the  demand  for  munitions. 
Most  difficult  of  all  would  it  be  to  furnish  the 
insurgents  vessels  of  war  without  declaring 
openly  for  them  and  so  "precipitating  war  with 
Great  Britain."  Still  it  would  perhaps  be  feasi- 
ble to  send  some  merchant  vessels  adapted  to  the 
uses  of  war  to  Santo  Domingo,  where  they  could 
pass  to  the  Americans  by  a  simulated  purchase. 
But  the  essential  thing  was  that  France  should 
lose  no  time  in  reinforcing  the  courage  of  the 
Americans,  and  by  doing  it  secretly  she  would 
avoid  compromising  herself  either  with  the  insur- 
gents or  the  court  of  London,  while  at  the  same 
time  "she  would  be  putting  herself  in  shape  to 
strike  decisive  blows"  when  the  time  was  ripe.24 
Thus,  it  was  admitted,  that  secret  aid  looked 
forward  to  possible  war.  But  then,  it  was  argued, 
a  policy  of  inaction  would  be  no  guaranty  of 
peace  either,  whether  England  triumphed  or 
the  insurgents.  For  in  the  one  case  as  in  the 
other  the  court  of  London  would  believe  itself 
warranted  in  attacking  France's  colonies.  Pru- 
dence therefore  dictated  that  the  means  of  waging 
war  with  success  should  be  prepared  beforehand, 

*Ib.,  246-8. 


72  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

and  one  of  the  most  essential  of  such  means  was 
"to  make  sure"  of  the  Americans.25 

With  the  appearance  of  the  Refleacions  be- 
gan in  good  earnest  the  contest  for  the  support  of 
the  king,  earlier  alluded  to,  between  those  who 
wished  to  see  a  brilliant  diplomatic  program 
adopted  and  those  who,  headed  by  Turgot,  urged 
domestic  reform  and  economy.26  At  the  outset 
the  royal  conscience  was  in  the  possession  of  the 
reformers.  Happily  for  the  program  of  the 
Foreign  Office,  in  the  lively  and  inventive  Beau- 
marchais, a  veritable  Cagliostro  in  the  blend  he 
presents  of  interested  calculation  and  generous 
enthusiasm,  Vergennes  had  a  zealous  missionary 
of  his  cause  and  one  who,  moreover,  stood  high  in 
the  favor  of  the  royal  family.  On  December  7th 
Beaumarchais  handed  Vergennes  a  letter  ad- 
dressed "to  the  king  alone,  very  important"  and 
headed  with  the  motto  summum  jus  summa  in- 
juria.  In  this  extraordinary  document  the  author 
of  Figaro  proceeded  to  attack  with  vigor  the 
conscientious  scruples  which  he  thought  stood  in 
the  way  of  the  king's  adopting  the  plan  of  secret 
aid:  "The  national  policy  which  preserves 

25  76.,  249. 

*  See  Lavisse,  op.  cit.,  46-51. 

*T  On  Beaumarchais'  part  in  the  American  Revolution  see  Whar- 
ton,  I.  §§  56-75;  John  Durand,  op.  cit.,  38-159;  Louis  de  Lomenie, 
Beaumarchais  and  his  Times  (Trans,  by  H.  S.  Edwards,  N.  Y., 
1857),  Chs.  XVII-XX;  Blanche  E.  Hazard,  Beaumarchais  and  the 
American  Revolution  (Boston,  1910). 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  73 

states,"  he  argued,  "differs  in  every  respect 
almost  entirely  from  the  civil  morality  which  gov- 
erns individuals."  "Solus  populi  suprema  lex" 
But  even  if  this  were  not  the  case  good  faith 
would  not  be  due  England,  "that  natural  enemy, 
that  jealous  rival  of  your  success,  that  people 
always  systematically  unjust  to  you." 

Indeed  not  even  a  treaty  would  have  justly  restrained 
you  on  this  occasion.  For  when  have  the  usurpations 
and  outrages  of  this  people  ever  had  any  limit  but  that 
of  its  strength?  Has  it  not  always  waged  war  against 
you  without  declaring  it?  Did  it  not  begin  the  last  one, 
in  a  time  of  peace,  by  the  sudden  capture  of  five  hundred 
of  your  vessels  ?  Did  it  not  humble  you  by  forcing  you 
to  destroy  your  finest  seaport?  Has  it  not  recently 
subjected  your  merchant  vessels  to  inspection  on  the 
northern  seas? — a  humiliation  which  would  have  made 
Louis  XIV  rather  eat  his  hands  than  not  atone  for  it? 

Finally,  Beaumarchais  again  invoked  general 
principles.  Tranquillity  is  most  safely  based  on 
the  division  of  one's  enemies,  the  way  to  conquer 
iniquity  is  to  arm  it  against  itself.  And  if,  he 
concluded,  there  is  anyone  who  does  not  agree 
with  me,  "beginning  with  M.  de  Vergennes,"  "I 
close  my  mouth,  I  cast  into  the  fire  Scaliger,  Gro- 
tius,  Puffendorf,  Gravina,  Montesquieu,  every 
writer  on  public  rights,  and  admit  that  the  study 
of  a  lifetime  has  been  only  a  waste  of  effort."28 
Meantime,  in  August,  1775,  the  Count  de 

»  Durand,  op.  cit.,  59-73. 


74  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Guines,  acting  under  instructions  from  Ver- 
gennes,  had  despatched  a  certain  Bonvouloir  to 
America  to  travel  in  a  private  capacity,  to  gather 
impressions,  and  to  insinuate  to  such  influential 
Americans  as  he  met  the  admiration  felt  in 
France  for  their  noble  efforts  after  liberty,  the 
entire  disinterestedness  of  the  French  govern- 
ment so  far  as  Canada  was  concerned,  and  the 
welcome  which  American  merchantmen  would 
receive  in  French  harbors.  Early  in  March,  1776, 
Bonvouloir's  first  report,  which  was  highly  san- 
guine of  American  prospects,  reached  Paris.29 
Thus  confirmed  in  his  idea  of  the  military  compe- 
tence of  the  Colonies,  Vergennes  proceeded  at 
once  to  shape  up  his  plan  of  secretly  aiding  them, 
for  discussion  by  his  associates  in  office.  At  the 
same  time  he  still  had  before  him  the  certainty 
of  Turgot's  opposition,  with  the  result  that  there 
is  a  marked  difference  in  tone  between  the  M e- 
moire  de  Considerations™  and  the  earlier  Reflex- 
ions.  Thus  at  the  outset  of  the  Considerations, 
in  an  effort  to  supersede  the  language  of 
advocacy  with  that  of  scientific  detachment,  Ver- 
gennes concedes  ostensibly  that  whether  France 
and  Spain  should  desire  the  subjection  or  the 
independence  of  the  English  colonies  was  "per- 
haps problematical,"  that  either  event  perhaps 

»  Wharton,  I.  §§38-40.    For  the  report  itself,  see  Doniol,  I.  287- 
92,  especially  287-8;  and  for  a  translation,  Durand,  2-16. 
10  Doniol,  I.  273-9;  SMSS.,  No.  1316. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  75 

threatened  "dangers  that  it  was  not  within  human 
foresight  to  provide  against."31  Also  the  notion 
that  "Providence  had  marked  out  this  moment 
for  the  humiliation  of  England  by  striking  her 
with  the  madness  which  is  the  sure  precurser  of 
destruction"  is  ostentatiously  disavowed  in  the 
name  of  both  the  Bourbon  kings.32  On  the  other 
hand,  two  propositions  are  offered  as  axiomatic: 
first,  that  the  prolongation  of  the  American  war 
would  be  "highly  advantageous  to  both  France 
and  Spain,  inasmuch  as  it  would  be  calculated  to 
exhaust  both  the  victors  and  the  vanquished";33 
and  secondly,  that  whatever  the  final  result  of  the 
struggle  between  England  and  her  Colonies, 
France  could  hardly  hope  for  peace,  since  if 
England  conciliated  or  subjected  the  Colonies 
she  would  be  tempted  by  the  large  forces  on  hand 
to  make  an  easy  conquest  of  the  West  Indies, 
whereas  if  she  lost  them,  she  would  be  driven 
thus  to  indemnify  herself.34  And  from  these  sup- 
posed facts  it  is  held  to  follow  that  it  was  for  the 
interest  of  both  France  and  Spain,  while  "dexter- 
ously reassuring"  England  as  to  their  intentions, 
to  "extend  the  insurgents  secret  aid  both  in 
money  and  military  stores  without  seeking  any 
return  for  so  doing  beyond  the  political  objective 


81  Doniol,  I.  273 
»!&.,  275. 
»/&.,  276. 
*•/&.,  274-5. 


76  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

of  the  moment".  This  should  be  the  program  for 
at  least  the  ensuing  twelve  months.  Meantime 
"the  idea  of  independence,  which  seems  to  ger- 
minate rather  slowly  among  the  Americans," 
would  perhaps  have  come  to  maturity.  At  any 
rate  the  two  crowns  would  have  had  opportunity 
to  perfect  their  forces.35 

Adroitly,  however,  as  this  argument  was 
framed  to  anticipate  the  objections  of  the  control- 
ler-general, it  did  not  conceal  the  essential  risk 
of  the  program  it  supported.  It  is  significant, 
therefore,  that  the  burden  of  Turgot's  criticism 
of  the  Considerations  is  a  protest  against  any 
program  likely  to  precipitate  an  avoidable  war, 
the  expense  of  which  must  necessarily  aggravate 
the  already  serious  state  of  the  royal  finances. 
For  the  rest,  striking  to  the  very  heart  of  the  for- 
eign secretary's  argument,  its  mercantilist  pre- 
suppositions, the  controller-general  predicted 
that  the  day  of  "colonies  exclusively  riveted  to 
the  mother-country"  was  over,  and  counselled 
that  that  nation  would  show  itself  wisest  and  most 
deserving  of  happiness  which  should  first  convert 
its  colonists  from  subjects  to  allies.  Spain,  said 
he,  "ought  to  expect  to  see  herself  abandoned  by 
her  colonies;  it  was  necessary  to  make  ready  for 
the  commercial  revolution  which  the  new  regime 
would  bring  about:  by  the  same  sign,  there  was 
little  need  of  uneasiness  lest  England  pounce 

»/&.,  277-8. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  77 

upon  France's  colonies,  since  there  was  no  ad- 
vantage involved  in  longer  possessing  them." 
"What  difference  did  it  make,  then,  whether 
England  subjugated  her  colonies  or  not?  Sub- 
jugated, they  would  occupy  her  attention  by  their 
desire  to  become  free ;  freed,  their  whole  commer- 
cial system  would  be  altered  and  England  would 
have  no  further  interest  than  to  appropriate  to 
herself  the  benefits  of  the  new  system."30  As  to 
the  likelihood  that  England  was  planning  to 
attack  France,  Turgot  was  frankly  sceptical,  but, 
he  argued,  if  that  were  found  to  be  the  case,  then 
France  ought  to  prepare  for  the  danger  nearer 
at  home,  and  especially  by  strengthening  her 
fleet.  Meantime  it  would  be  proper  to  put  the 
Americans  in  the  way  of  procuring  the  munitions 
and  even  the  money  they  needed  by  means  of 
trade,  but  there  should  be  no  departure  by  the 
government  itself  from  neutrality  and  no  act  of 
direct  aid.37 

Turgot,  however,  was  fighting  what  from  the 
first  was  foreordained  a  losing  battle.  In  the 
words  of  Soulavie,  the  cause  of  "Reform,  Re- 
trenchment, and  Rights  to  be  realized"  could  not 
hold  its  own  with  a  selfish  and  ambitious  court 
against  a  program  of  "Revenge,  Glory,  and  Hu- 

"Ib.,  281. 

"76.,  282-3.  Turgot  also  makes  the  point,  later  to  be  empha- 
sized by  the  Spanish  government,  that  "an  attack  on  England 
would  be  a  signal  for  the  reconciliation  of  England  and  America 
and  would  precipitate  the  very  danger"  which  the  Foreign  Office's 
policy  ostensibly  sought  to  avoid. 


78  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

miliation  to  be  retrieved";  and  even  liberals  like 
LaFayette  found  the  iflea  of  shedding  blood  for 
liberty  abroad  more  to  their  taste  than  that  of 
shedding  feudal  immunities  at  home.  There  had, 
indeed,  been  a  period  at  the  end  of  February  and 
early  in  March  when  the  Maurepas  cabinet  had 
seemed  about  to  succumb  to  the  joint  attacks  of 
the  friends  of  Choiseul  and  Guines.  But  while 
the  sentiments  of  the  latter  nobleman  were  so  ex- 
cessively pacific  that  he  had  just  been  superseded 
by  the  Duke  de  Noailles  at  Saint  James',38  Choi- 
seul was  loudly  critical  of  the  ministry's  apparent 
failure  to  appreciate  the  possibilities  of  the  Ameri- 
can revolt;39  and  the  total  result  of  the  episode 
had  been  to  solidify  the  ministry,  except  for 
the  Liberals  Turgot  and  Malesherbes,  in  support 
of  a  more  enterprising  policy.  In  their  comments 
on  the  Considerations,  St.  Germain,  the  minister 
of  War,  and  Sartines,  the  minister  of  Marine,  did 
little  more  than  reecho  the  arguments  of  Ver- 
gennes,  while  Maurepas  took  a  line  that  was 
frankly  belligerent.40 

»  See  Doniol,  I.  359-68. 

"Stormont  to  Weymouth,  Dec.  6,  1775;  Jan.  10  and  Feb.  14, 
1776:  SMSS.,  1307,  1313,  1314.  For  the  circumstances  attending 
the  recall  of  Guines  from  London,  for  which,  curiously  enough, 
Turgot  was  primarily  responsible,  and  the  intrigue  that  had  for 
its  purpose  to  bring  Choiseul  into  power,  see  Last  Journal  of  Hor- 
ace Walpole  (Ed.  Doran,  London,  1859,  2  vols.),  II.  9-13. 

*Ib.,  280,  284-6.  The  statement  as  to  Maurepas'  attitude  is 
based  on  the  assumption,  sanctioned  by  M.  Doniol,  that  the  "Re- 
flexions sur  la  N6cessit6  de  secourir  les  Ame>icains  et  de  se  pr6- 
parer  a  la  Guerre  avec  1'Angleterre"  was  his  work.  This  document 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  79 

The  ministerial  arguments,  moreover,  were 
again  supplemented  by  the  ardent  advocacy  of 
Beaumarchais,  to  whose  effusion  entitled  La 
Paix  ou  la  Guerre  is  generally  credited  Louis' 
final  conversion  to  the  plan  of  secret  aid.41  On 
May  2nd  the  king  at  last  definitely  authorized  the 
advance  of  a  million  livres  to  Beaumarchais  for 
the  purchase  of  supplies  to  be  transferred  to  the 
Americans.  Six  weeks  later  the  Spanish  court 
made  a  similar  advance,  and  the  following  Au- 
gust the  famous  house  of  Hortalez  et  Cie  opened 
its  doors.  Within  a  twelvemonth  it  had  des- 
patched to  America  eight  ship-loads  of  warlike 
stores,  valued  at  more  than  six  million  livres 
and  drawn  in  large  part  from  the  royal  arsenals.42 
Meantime,  on  May  12th,  Turgot  had  been  dis- 
missed, leaving  Vergennes  the  directing  influence 
in  the  ministry. 

closes  with  the  following  illuminating  observation :  "Toutes  ces  con- 
siderations r6unies  pourroient  done  porter  a  conclure  meme  Poffen- 
sive  comme  le  seul  moyen  de  r£tablir  notre  marine  d'une  part  et  de 
1'autre  d'affaiblir  celle  de  1'Angleterre,  et  comme  le  seul  moyen 
d'assurer  pour  longtems  la  paix  du  Continent  qui  n'a  jamais  6t6 
troubled  que  par  leurs  intrigues  ou  leur  argent."  "The  ablest  man 
I  knew,"  wrote  Horace  Walpole,  "was  the  old  Comte  de  Maurepas. 
.  .  .  Knowing  his  enmity  to  this  country,  I  told  him  .  .  .  that  it 
was  fortunate  for  England  that  he  had  been  so  long  divested  of 
power."  Trevelyan,  The  American  Revolution,  Pt.  III.  413  fn. 

4lDurand,  op.  cit.,  74-85;  Lomenie,  op.  cit.,  267-71. 

41  See  the  references  in  note  27,  supra,  especially  Wharton,  I. 
§§  60  ff.;  also  C.  J.  Stille,  "Beaumarchais  and  the  Lost  Million," 
Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  XI.  1-36. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  PORTUGUESE  AND  CORSAIR  QUESTIONS 

For  many  months  secret  aid  was  a  mystery 
closely  guarded  from  even  its  beneficiaries.  The 
decision  to  render  it,  none  the  less,  involved  cer- 
tain diplomatic  consequences  at  once.  Beaumar- 
chais  had  not  yet  begun  operations  when  Eng- 
land lodged  a  complaint  against  Americans  being 
allowed  to  procure  powder  in  the  French  West 
Indies  and  to  fly  the  French  flag  from  their  mast- 
heads.1 Perceiving  the  bearing  of  the  question, 
Vergennes  promptly  took  up  an  aggressive  posi- 
tion. He  recalled  England's  traffic  in  arms  with 
Corsica  when  France  was  subjugating  that  island. 
He  asserted  entire  willingness  to  abide  by  the 
English  doctrine  that  contraband  must  have  a 
hostile  destination,  wherefore  vessels  plying  be- 
tween France  and  the  French  islands  would  not 
be  subject  to  seizure  on  the  charge  of  carrying 
it.  He  ridiculed  the  idea  that  England  could 
pretend  a  grievance  in  the  fact  that  the  Ameri- 
cans were  getting  aid  from  France  through  the 
channels  of  trade :  the  French  markets  were  open 

'Gamier  to  Vergennes,  May  6,  1776,  Doniol,  I.  463. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  81 

to  all  and  those  who  paid  best  would  have  the 
preference.  Thus,  to  use  a  more  modern  termin- 
ology, Vergennes  gave  notice  of  his  government's 
intention  to  treat  the  Americans  as  possessed  of 
"belligerent  rights",  including  the  right  of  an 
inviolable  asylum  in  neutral  ports  for  their  peace- 
ful traders.2 

But  the  question  of  the  trading  rights  of  neu- 
trals was  from  the  outset  but  one  ingredient  of 
the  diplomatic  situation  between  England  and 
France,  and  not  the  most  important  ingredient 
at  that.  Far  more  ominous  was  the  stage  which 
the  dispute  between  Spain  and  Portugal,  arising 

3  Vergennes  to  Gamier,  June  15  and  21,  ib.,  466-9.  See  also 
Vergennes  to  Noailles,  March  21,  1777,  ib.,  II.  334:  "Nous  en 
[the  question  of  prizes]  usons  avec  les  insurgens  comme  nous 
ferions  avec  toute  nation  amie  qui  seront  en  guerre  avec  1'Angle- 
terre."  Other  interesting  documents  in  the  same  connection  are 
Dumas'  letter  to  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence,  May 
14,  1776,  Wharton  II.  90-2;  the  "Expose  des  Motifs  de  la  Conduite 
du  Roi  Tres-Chr6tien  relativement  a  1'Angleterre,"  Doniol,  III. 
823-56;  and  Observations  on  the  Justificatory  Memorial  of  the 
Court  of  London  (see  Appendix  IV),  102-12.  That  the  modern 
distinction  between  "Belligerency"  and  "Independence"  in  the 
case  of  communities  seeking  admission  to  the  Family  of  Nations 
found  no  place  in  the  Public  Law  of  the  period  is  shown  by  the 
following  passage  from  the  pen  of  Horace  Walpole:  "An  Amer- 
ican privateer  had  carried  three  prizes  into  Bilboa.  The  governor 
had  detained  them.  .  .  .  He  was  ordered  by  Grimaldi's  letter  to 
restore  them,  the  king  of  Spain  professing  an  exact  neutrality, 
which  was  in  effect  owning  our  colonies  for  an  independent  state," 
Last  Journals,  II.  87.  It  it  an  interesting  speculation,  to  what 
extent  the  French  alliance  with  the  United  States  was  made  neces- 
sary by  the  absence  of  a  distinction  which  would  have  enabled 
France  to  aid  the  Americans  without  violating  England's  rights. 


82  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

from  the  latter's  aggressions  in  South  America, 
had  now  reached.  Because  of  the  alliances  of 
these  powers  with  France  and  England  respec- 
tively, the  outbreak  of  war  between  them  meant 
almost  inevitably  war  between  England  and 
France  as  well.3  The  Spanish  ambassador  at 
Paris,  the  Count  d'Aranda,  who  was  a  bitter 
enemy  of  England,  had  from  the  first  pro- 
claimed this  as  a  welcome  development  in  view 
of  England's  growing  embarrassment  in  North 
America.4  Vergennes,  on  the  other  hand,  dis- 
liking the  obvious  ambition  of  Spain  to  annex 
Portugal,  both  because  he  regarded  such  a  pro- 
ject as  contrary  to  the  precepts  of  the  Systeme 
de  Conservation  and  also  because  he  feared  for 
the  smooth  working  of  the  Family  Compact 
should  Spain  become  the  equal  of  France,  had 
sought  to  compose  the  differences  of  the  Iberian 
states.  His  efforts  at  pacification  had,  however, 
been  followed  by  fresh  aggressions  on  Portugal's 
part,  instigated,  Spain  hinted,  by  the  English;5 

•"Si  la  guerre  entre  FEspagne  et  le  Portugal  devient  indis- 
pensable, ce  que  la  situation  prdsente  des  affaires  entre  les  deux 
puissances  ne  donne  que  trop  sujet  d'appr&iender,  il  est  inevitable 
que  la  guerre  avec  FAngleterre  en  sera  la  suite  et  que  la  France 
ne  pourra  pas  se  dispenser  d'y  prendre  la  part  la  plus  directe." 
Such  are  the  opening  words  of  the  memoir  read  by  Vergennes  to 
the  council  of  ministers  held  at  Marly,  July  7,  1776,  Doniol,  I. 
527. 

*  Vd.  ib.,  352  ff.  For  an  interesting  characterization  of  this 
unique  individual,  see  S£gur,  Memoirs,  I.  390.  Cf.  Doniol,  V.  30. 

•On  the  whole  matter,  see  Doniol,  I.  75-6,  298-312,  330-7,  525, 
532-3. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  83 

and  by  the  beginning  of  July,  Vergennes  had 
come  quite  around  to  Aranda's  viewpoint. 

A  warlike  situation  now  developed  rapidly.6 
To  a  council  of  ministers  held  at  Marly  on  July 
7th  Vergennes  presented  the  Spanish-Portu- 
guese matter  as  offering  France  the  opportunity 
"to  break  the  power  of  the  single  enemy  she  had 
cause  to  fear,"  provided  only  French  diplomacy 
was  equal  to  the  occasion.  First  and  foremost, 
the  war  must  be  kept  from  spreading  to  the  Con- 
tinent, which  could  be  readily  guaranteed  by 
Austria's  standing  by  to  prevent  Russia  from 
falling  upon  Sweden.  Again,  in  Holland  the 
ashes  of  the  old  Republican  party  must  be  fanned 
to  flame  once  more  and  Dutch  neutrality  be  se- 
cured by  appeal  to  Dutch  avarice.  Finally,  it 
was  essential  "to  let  the  Americans  know  of  the 
present  state  of  affairs  and  the  results  which  it 
presaged,  and,  without  assuming  engagements 
with  them,  yet  to  make  them  understand  the  full 
advantage  which  existing  circumstances  prom- 
ised had  they  but  the  hardihood  and  patience  to 
await  their  unfolding."7 

•Vergennes'  English  correspondence  at  this  period  contains 
many  sharp  criticisms  of  the  treatment  French  subjects  were 
alleged  to  be  receiving  in  Newfoundland  and  Hindoostan.  Most 
of  these  supposed  grievances  were  long-standing  ones.  Their 
revival  at  this  moment  is  indication  of  the  French  government's 
belligerent  intention.  See  generally  the  references  in  note  2, 
above. 

7  76.,  527-8.  Compare  Garnier's  "Lettre  particuliere"  of  May  15, 
SMSS.,  No.  868. 


84  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Four  days  later  Deane,  the  Continental  Con- 
gress' first  agent  to  France,  who  had  just  arrived 
at  Paris,  was  admitted  by  Vergennes  to  a  secret 
interview.  The  secretary  would  not  express  him- 
self on  the  subject  of  American  independence, 
especially  as  "the  United  Provinces"  had  not  yet 
expressed  themselves ;  but  he  gave  assurance  that 
no  obstacles  would  be  placed  in  the  way  of  Amer- 
icans trading  in  French  ports,  whether  in  muni- 
tions or  other  products.  He  proposed  that  Deane 
should  keep  the  Foreign  Office  en  rapport  with  all 
important  happenings  in  America,  and  strongly 
advised  him  to  steer  clear  of  Englishmen.8  Then 
on  August  13th  Gamier  wrote  from  London 
that  the  Americans  had  at  last  declared  their  in- 
dependence.9 In  a  "committee"  consisting  of 
the  king  and  cabinet,  held  on  August  31st,  Ver- 
gennes, casting  equivocation  aside,  proclaimed 
that,  as  between  the  advantages  and  disadvan- 
tages of  a  war  "against  England  in  the  present 
juncture,  .  .  .  the  former  outweigh  the  latter  so 
unmistakably  that  no  comparison  can  be  made" : 
The  Americans  had  now  declared  their  indepen- 

8  Deane  to  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence,  Wharton, 
op.  cit.,  II.  112-6.  The  British  government  protested  against 
Deane's  having  been  allowed  to  land  in  France,  a  protest  at  which 
Vergennes  professed  to  take  great  umbrage:  "Le  Roy  est  le 
maltre  chez  lui,  .  .  .  il  n'a  compte  a  rendre  a  qui  que  soit  des 
etrangers  qu'il  juge  a-propos  d'admettre  dans  ses  Etats,"  Doniol, 
I.  583. 

»/&.,  561. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  85 

dence.  These  same  Americans  it  was,  their 
sailors  and  soldiers,  who  had  made  "those  vast 
conquests  of  which  France  has  in  times  past  so 
keenly  felt  the  humiliation."  They  were  now 
available  allies;  and,  thanks  to  commerce,  the 
connection  now  formed  with  them  could  not  fail 
to  be  lasting.10  Against  these  arguments  no  voice 
was  raised,  and  a  week  later  the  memoir  embody- 
ing them  was  despatched  to  Madrid  for  approval 
by  that  court. 

Why,  then,  did  not  the  war  come  ?  The  answer 
is  supplied  by  the  fact  that  the  very  day  that  the 
response  of  the  Spanish  government  arrived  ac- 
cepting its  ally's  program,  though  with  a  char- 
acteristic stipulation  for  further  delay,11  the  news 
came  from  Garnier  of  the  American  defeat  at 
Long  Island.12  Vergennes  at  once  decided  that 
the  policy  of  secret  aid  still  remained  the  better 
part  of  valor,  but  he  was  able  to  conceal  his  re- 
treat under  the  pretext  of  disapproving  of 
Spain's  plan,  which  still  included  the  conquest  of 
Portugal.13  "The  king,"  he  wrote,  "will  always 
regard  the  aggrandizement  of  the  Spanish  mon- 
archy with  satisfaction  but  His  Majesty  is  unable 
to  conceal  from  the  king,  his  uncle,  that  the  con- 
quest of  Portugal  would  be  alarming  to  all  states 

*•/&.,  567-77,  especially  570-1;  SMSS.,  No.  897. 
11  Grimaldi  to  Aranda,  Oct.  8,  1776,  Doniol,  I.  603-13.    The  main 
points  of  the  document  are  summarized  on  pages  612-13. 
11  76.,  615-6. 
13  "Reflexions,"  »&.,  681-8. 


86  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

interested  in  maintaining  the  balance  of  power." 
"If,"  he  continued,  "it  is  a  universal  maxim,  as 
contended  by  the  Marquis  de  Grimaldi,  that  one 
makes  war  only  for  the  purpose  of  gain,  yet  this 
maxim  ought  to  be  adopted  by  the  two  crowns  in 
the  existing  situation  only  with  the  idea  in  mind 
that  everything  is  to  be  gained  by  breaking  down 
the  power  of  England."  Could  that  be  done, 
then  would 

France  and  Spain  have  achieved  an  advantage  more 
precious  than  could  be  represented  by  the  conquest  of  a 
rich  province.  For  once  England  is  unable  to  keep 
going  the  flame  of  discord  among  the  great  sovereigns 
of  Europe,  then  will  the  two  monarchs  no  longer  be  ham- 
pered in  exercising  their  better  inclinations,  which  look 
only  to  securing  to  their  own  subjects  and  to  all  Europe 
the  sweet  fruits  of  a  sure  and  durable  peace.14 

A  few  weeks  later  we  find  Vergennes  penning 
the  British  ambassador  the  following  billet: 

Versailles,  December  21st,  1776.  Monsieur:  I  am 
indeed  touched  at  the  attention  shown  me  by  Your  Ex- 
cellency in  admitting  me  to  share  your  joy  at  the  satis- 
factory news  of  the  success  of  British  arms  in  Connecti- 
cut and  New  York.  I  beg  Your  Excellency  to  accept 
my  many  thanks  at  this  testimonial  of  your  friendship, 
and  my  sincere  felicitations  upon  an  event  so  calculated 
to  contribute  to  the  reestablishment  of  peace  in  that 
part  of  the  globe.  I  shall  impart  the  communication 
made  me  to  the  king  and  now  take  it  upon  myself  to 
assure  you  that  His  Majesty  will  always  receive  with 
"76.,  685-7. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  87 

pleasure  news  of  whatever  may  contribute  to  the  satis- 
faction and  glory  of  the  king  your  master.15 

Vergennes'  policy  during  the  late  months  of 
1776  and  the  early  months  of  1777  may  be  char- 
acterized in  the  poignant  phrase  of  today  as  one 
of  "watchful  waiting."  The  secretary  had  aban- 
doned none  of  his  fundamental  premises:  "The 
purpose  of  every  offensive  war  is  either  to  ag- 
grandize one's  self  or  to  enfeeble  the  rival  power, 
whose  superiority  one  fears.  ...  As  everything 
is  relative  in  the  political  order,  they  [the  two 
crowns]  will  necessarily  increase  by  reason  of  the 
enfeeblement  of  their  rival.  .  .  .  By  renouncing 
every  idea  of  supremacy  the  English  would  be 
free  to  recognize  the  independence  against  which 
they  are  armed":  and  more  to  like  effect.16  On 


.,  II.  107,  fn.  2.  A  month  earlier  than  this,  Vergennes  had 
told  Stormont  that  it  was  contrary  to  the  king's  intention  that  his 
subjects  should  go  to  America,  SMSS.,  No.  905.  On  Dec.  10,  the 
secretary  ordered  Lenoir  to  arrest  all  persons  giving  out  that  they 
were  intending  to  go  to  America,  ib.,  No.  1385.  Vergennes'  de- 
spatches to  Noailles  at  this  period  display  considerable  uneasiness 
as  to  British  intentions,  ib.  Nos.  907,  913,  and  917.  The  fact  is 
that  Vergennes,  relying  on  American  and  Spanish  assistance,  had 
been  planning  an  attack  upon  England  for  which  the  French 
marine  was  not  at  all  fit.  See  Doniol,  II.  156-70.  Hence,  the  extent 
of  his  reaction  after  the  American  defeat  at  Long  Island. 

"Vergennes  to  Ossun,  Mar.  11,  1777,  ib.,  238-41.  See  also  the 
document  given  in  Appendix  II.  Though  the  work  of  a  "private 
citizen"  it  was  prepared,  Doniol  thinks,  for  the  Council.  Vd.  ib.,  118. 
Its  speculations  as  to  the  effect  of  the  success  of  the  Revolution 
on  France's  position  in  Europe  take  a  wide  range. 


88  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

the  other  hand,  it  is  quite  apparent  that  his  con- 
fidence in  the  military  capacity  of  the  Americans 
—indeed,  in  the  vitality  of  their  cause — had  suf- 
fered a  great  shock  from  the  disaster  of  Long 
Island.  Of  these  facts  he  must  again  be  per- 
suaded before  he  would  consent  to  risk  the  dig- 
nity of  the  French  crown,  and  meantime,  between 
American  importunity  and  British  suspicion,  he 
must  take  his  way  charily. 

The  clue  to  the  period  is  furnished  by  the  com- 
parison of  two  memoirs  from  the  secretary's  pen 
that  are  dated  respectively  April  12th  and  April 
26th,  1777.  The  latter,  a  criticism  upon  certain 
propositions  of  the  Spanish  government,  which 
still  continued  in  a  warlike  frame  of  mind,  con- 
tained the  following  homily  in  favor  of  peace: 

"One  knows  well  enough  where  war  begins,  but  no 
one  can  know  where  or  how  it  will  end.  If  one  could  be 
sure  that  England  would  concentrate  against  us  and  not 
extend  her  efforts  to  the  Continent,  the  present  occasion 
would  be  very  seductive  and  it  would  require  a  sublime 
exercise  of  virtue  to  repulse  it.  But  the  existence  of 
England  is  a  matter  of  concern  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  equilibrium  of  Europe;  it  is  accordingly  necessary 
to  anticipate  that  she  will  not  be  left  alone.  .  .  .  The 
uprising  in  America  has  remained  up  to  the  present  a 
purely  domestic  matter  so  far  as  England  is  concerned ; 
she  sees  in  the  insurgents  only  a  people  in  revolt  whom 
she  has  a  right  to  recall  to  their  obedience  by  whatever 
means  lie  within  her  reach  and  without  other  powers 
having  any  title  to  mix  up  in  the  affair.  To  offer  to 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  89 

intervene  would  be  in  some  sort  to  recognize  and  support 
the  independence  which  the  American  provinces  have 
declared,  since  it  is  only  between  equal  powers  that 
intervention  ordinarily  takes  place.17 

The  earlier  memoir  struck  a  quite  different  note. 
Composed  in  anticipation  of  a  visit  of  the  em- 
peror to  Paris,  it  urged  the  necessity  of  the 
Austrian  connection  to  France,  because,  by  assur- 
ing the  peace  on  the  Continent,  it  paved  the  way 
for  "taking  measures  against  England,  the 
natural  and  most  inveterate  enemy  of  France,  her 
glory  and  prosperity."18 

""Lettre  .  .  .  communiquee  au  Roi,"  etc.,  t&.,  271  ff.,  272-4 
See  also  passage  to  like  effect  in  Vergennes  to  Ossun,  Mar.  22, 
1777,  #>.,  248.  Also,  same  to  same,  Apr.  12,  where  the  following 
words  occur:  "Si  nous  pouvions  r6tablir  1'opinion  du  bon  etat  de 
nos  finances,  toutes  nos  possessions  servient  bien  plus  en  surete 
sous  cet  abri  que  sous  la  protection  d'escadres  nombreuses  qui 
peuvent  etre  primees  ou  surpassees,"  ib.,  261, — a  sentiment  alto- 
gether worthy  of  Turgot! 

tsffe.,  428;  Flassan,  Histoire  gtntrale  et  raisonnte,  etc.,  VII.  135. 
See  also  Vergennes'  note  of  February  12  to  Aranda  in  response 
to  propositions  emanating  from  the  British  government  looking 
to  a  general  disarmament  by  France,  Spain,  and  Great  Britain: 
"Si  nous  accordons  a  desarmer  nous  epargnons  sans  doute  une 
grande  depense  mais  Foconomie  sera  plus  grande  pour  1'Angle- 
terre,"  etc.  Doniol,  II.  155,  208-9.  It  was  also  during  this  period 
that  the  controversy  occurred  between  the  French  and  Spanish  gov- 
ernments over  the  question  of  sending  further  reinforcements  to 
Hayti  and  Santo  Domingo,  in  view  of  the  continued  possibility 
of  war  over  the  Portuguese  question.  Vergennes  argued  against 
the  idea  on  the  ground  that  the  climate  was  fatal  to  Europeans 
and  on  the  ground  that  such  a  step  would  tend  to  alarm  Great 
Britain  and  make  her  less  ready  to  accept  France's  friendly  as- 


90  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Inevitably,  it  was  a  period  of  episodes.  It  was 
at  this  time  that  LaFayette,  eluding  the  decep- 
tive vigilance  of  the  royal  officers,  made  his  way 
to  America,  though  he  would  have  preferred  to 
lead  a  filibustering  expedition  against  the  Eng- 
lish settlements  in  the  East.19  It  was  at  this  time 
that  the  minister  of  War,  St.  Germain,  induced 
Steuben  to  come  to  America  to  assist  in  training 
the  Continental  Army.  It  was  also  at  this 
time  that  the  Count  de  Broglie  launched  his 
scheme,  which  had  the  approval  of  Deane,  for 
making  himself  a  sort  of  temporary  stadtholder 
of  the  United  States  and  commissioned  Kalb, 
Choiseul's  former  emissary  to  America,  to  enlist 
the  interest  of  Congress. 

Writing  Kalb  from  his  country-seat  at  Ruff ec, 
December  llth,  Broglie  set  forth  the  outlines 
of  his  plan  as  follows: 

A  military  and  political  leader  is  wanted,  a  man  fitted 
to  carry  the  weight  of  authority  in  the  colonies,  to  unite 
its  parties,  to  assign  to  each  his  place.  The  main  point 
of  the  mission  with  which  you  have  been  entrusted  will 
therefore  consist  in  explaining  the  advantages,  or  rather, 
the  absolute  necessity  of  the  choice  of  such  a  man. 
The  rank  accorded  the  candidate  would  have  to  be  of 
the  first  eminence,  such  for  instance,  as  that  of  the 
Prince  of  Nassau;  but  his  functions  would  have  to  be 

surances.     As  the  troops  were  sent  later  on  (in  July:  see  Doniol, 
II.  453),  we  man  conclude  that  the  second  was  the  important  con- 
sideration.   See  references  in  Chapter  I.,  supra,  note  8. 
"Doniol,  II.  ch.  2;  SMSS.,  No.  756. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  91 

confined  to  the  army,  .  .  .  with  perhaps  the  single 
exception  of  the  political  negotiations  with  foreign 
powers;  .  .  .  the  assurance  of  the  man's  return  to 
France  at  the  end  of  three  years  will  remove  every  ap- 
prehension in  regard  to  the  powers  to  be  conferred  and 
will  remove  even  the  semblance  of  an  ambitious  design 
to  become  governor  of  the  new  republic.  Of  course 
large  pecuniary  consideration  would  have  to  be  claimed 
for  the  preparation  of  the  journey  and  for  the  journey 
itself  and  a  liberal  salary  for  the  return  home.  You 
can  give  the  assurance  that  such  a  measure  will  bring 
order  and  economy  into  the  public  expense,  that  it  will 
reimburse  the  cost  a  hundred-fold  in  a  single  campaign. 
You  will  be  equally  mindful  to  dwell  upon  the  effect 
necessarily  produced  by  such  an  appointment  on  its 
mere  announcement  in  Europe.20 

I  know  of  no  documentary  evidence  connecting 
Vergennes  with  this  extraordinary  scheme.  Yet 
it  seems  to  me  hardly  supposable  that  a  great 
noble  like  Broglie,  who  obviously  had  none  of  the 
youthful  enthusiasm  of  LaFayette  and  who  was 
already  more  or  less  at  outs  with  the  court  on 
account  of  his  connection  with  the  Secret  du  Roi, 
would  have  risked  the  king's  further  displeasure 

"Friedrich  Kapp,  Life  of  Kalb,  pp.  94-5.  See  also  Kalb's 
memoir  of  Dec.  17,  addressed  to  Deane,  which  is  to  be  found  in  the 
French  Archives  des  Affaires  6trangeres.  Here  the  additional 
argument  is  offered  that  the  step  proposed  by  Broglie  would  so 
enlist  the  interest  of  the  nobility  that  they  would  force  the  king 
to  make  an  alliance  with  the  Americans.  Broglie's  own  expecta- 
tions from  the  scheme  are  also  set  forth  in  greater  detail.  SMSS., 
No.  604;  Deane  Papers,  I.  426-31. 


92  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

by  lending  himself  to  a  project  of  incalculable 
possibilities  without  some  sort  of  assurance  as  to 
the  attitude  of  his  government.  Moreover,  the 
plan  lent  itself  rather  nicely  to  the  requirements 
of  the  American  situation  as  these  appeared  to 
the  French  government  at  the  moment:  The 
American  cause  was  on  the  verge  of  collapse  for 
want  of  competent  military  leadership;  it  also 
lacked  prestige  in  Europe;  the  king  did  not  dare 
openly  take  up  the  cudgels  for  so  feeble  a  client; 
French  officers  were  departing  daily  for  America 
on  their  own  account;  if  Broglie  failed,  it  would 
be  as  easy  to  disavow  him  as  to  disavow  LaFay- 
ette,  Coudray,  or  any  other;  if  he  succeeded, 
France  would  reap  the  fruits  of  his  success;  His 
Most  Christian  Majesty  has  proffered  Poland  a 
Conti,  why  not  America  a  Broglie?21 

But  now  a  policy  of  marking  time  is  one  that 
from  the  nature  of  things  ceases  in  time  to  be 
feasible,  for  either  the  event  awaited  is  upon  one 
or  it  has  descended  below  the  horizon  of  sensi- 
ble probability.  Even  by  January  1st,  1777,  there 
was  in  train  a  series  of  events  that  by  mid-summer 
of  that  year  had  forced  Vergennes  finally  to 
choose  his  position.  The  rendition  of  secret 
aid  to  the  Americans  through  the  channels  of 
commerce  still  continued,  but  subject  to  be  inter- 

21  See  generally  C.  J.  Stille,  "The  Comte  de  Broglie,  Proposed 
Stadtholder  of  America,"  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History  and 
Biography,  XI.  369-405;  Doniol,  II.  Ch.  2;  Wharton,  I.  391-6. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  93 

rupted  at  any  time  by  measures  of  the  govern- 
ment meant  to  allay  British  suspicions.  The 
result  was  discontent  on  both  hands.  The,  per- 
haps designedly,  bungling  methods  of  the  agents 
of  secret  aid  were  constantly  furnishing  Lord 
Stormont  texts  for  remonstrance,22  and  mean- 
time American  gratitude  took  on  a  tinge  of 
resentment.23 

But  of  far  more  importance  was  the  fact  that 
Franklin  was  now  in  France.  Almost  from  the 
outset  had  Franklin's  assured  front  restored  the 
American  cause  to  the  footing  it  had  had  in  popu- 
lar estimation  before  the  news  of  Long  Island. 
The  prestige  of  his  immense  reputation — "more 
universal  than  that  of  Leibnitz  or  Newton,  Fred- 
erick or  Voltaire"24 — had  suggested,  for  the  first 

22  SMSS.,  Nos.  1306,  1309,  1418,  1427,  1496,  1519,  1531,  1593,  etc. 
In  his  despatch  to  Weymouth  of  Jan.  7,  1778,  Stormont  declares 
that  "the  very  existence  of  the  American  army  depends  upon  the 
arrival  of  these  succors,"  ib.f  No.  1822. 

"See,  for  instance,  Franklin,  Deane,  and  Lee  to  Vergennes, 
Jan.  5,  1777:  "We  are  also  instructed  to  solicit  the  court  of 
France  for  an  immediate  supply  of  twenty  or  thirty  thousand 
muskets.  .  .  .  This  application  has  now  become  the  more  neces- 
sary, as  the  private  purchase  made  by  Mr.  Deane  of  those  articles 
is  rendered  ineffectual  by  an  order  forbidding  their  exportation": 
Wharton,  II.  245.  Also,  to  like  effect,  ib.,  257.  The  inadequacy 
of  secret  aid  to  establish  any  hold  on  the  Americans  is  recognized 
by  Vergennes  in  his  despatch  to  Ossun  of  Apr.  7,  Doniol,  II.  341. 
And  see  ib.,  generally,  pp.  305-12. 

*Life  and  Works  of  John  Adams  (Boston,  1856),  I.  660.  The 
passage  is  worthy  more  extended  quotation:  "His  reputation 
was  more  universal  than  that  of  Leibnitz  or  Newton,  Frederick  or 
Voltaire,  and  his  character  more  beloved  and  esteemed  than  any 


94  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

time  perhaps,  that  if  America  was  to  be  made  an 
ally  at  all,  it  must  be  on  terms  of  exact  equality. 
The  charm  of  his  unique  personality,  the  interest- 
ing phases  of  which  he  exploited  with  faultless 
facility  and  with  just  the  touch  of  charlatanism 
that  the  sentimentalism  of  the  age  demanded,  had 
served  from  the  moment  of  his  landing  at  Auray 
to  focus  to  a  blaze  of  enthusiasm  the  diverse  lines 
of  opinion  making  among  all  classes  of  French- 
men for  the  king's  espousal  of  the  American 
cause.25 

or  all  of  them.  Newton  had  astonished  perhaps  forty  or  fifty 
men  in  Europe.  .  .  .  But  this  fame  was  confined  to  men  of  letters. 
The  common  people  knew  little  and  cared  nothing  about  such  a 
recluse  philosopher.  Leibnitz's  name  was  more  confined  still.  .  .  . 
Frederick  was  hated  by  more  than  half  of  Europe.  .  .  .  Voltaire, 
whose  name  was  more  universal  .  .  .  was  considered  as  a  vain  and 
profligate  wit,  and  not  much  esteemed  or  beloved  by  anybody, 
though  admired  by  all  who  knew  his  works.  But  Franklin's  fame 
was  universal.  His  name  was  familiar  to  government  and  people, 
to  kings,  courtiers,  nobility,  clergy  and  philosophers,  as  well  as 
plebeians,  to  such  a  degree  that  there  was  scarcely  a  peasant  or  a 
citizen,  a  valet  de  chambre,  coachman  or  footman,  a  lady's  cham- 
bermaid or  a  scullion  in  a  kitchen,  who  was  not  familiar  with  it, 
and  who  did  not  consider  him  a  friend  to  human  kind."  Matthew 
Arnold  somewhere  comments  on  the  curious  fact  that  America 
contributed  her  only  world-wide  reputation,  that  of  Franklin,  while 
she  was  still  a  province. 

"See  generally  Edward  Everett  Hale  and  Edward  Everett 
Hale,  Jr.,  Franklin  in  France  (Boston,  1886-8,  2  vols.).  "Tout 
Paris  visitait  Franklin  dans  sa  maison  de  Passy.  Admire"  par  les 
savants  et  les  philosophes  qui  le  comparaient  a  Socrate  et  a  New- 
ton, il  charmait  le  populaire  par  sa  bonhomie  et  par  la  simplicity" 
dc  ses  habits  bruns  et  de  ses  gros  souliers."  Lavisse,  op.  cit.,  IX.1 
104.  See  also  an  undated  pamphlet  by  Hilliard  d'Auberteuil  on 
Franklin  (Penn.  Hist'l  Soc.  Lib.). 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  95 

Franklin  arrived  in  Paris  December  21st,  and 
two  days  later  he  and  his  associates,  Deane  and 
Lee,  requested  an  audience  with  the  French  sec- 
retary, which  was  accorded  them  the  28th.26  The 
suggestion  of  a  formal  audience  having  been 
evaded  by  Vergennes,  on  January  5th,  1777,  the 
commissioners  made  explicit  their  expectations 
of  France  in  a  note:  "Eight  ships  of  the  line 
completely  manned,"  with  which  to  clear  the 
American  coast  of  British  cruisers,  and  twenty 
or  thirty  thousand  stand  of  muskets  and  bayonets, 
together  with  a  "large  quantity  of  ammunition 
and  brass  field  pieces,  to  be  sent  under  convoy." 
In  return  for  these  favors,  Congress  offered 
France  and  Spain  a  treaty  of  amity  and  com- 
merce and  also  "to  guarantee  in  the  firmest  man- 
ner to  those  nations  all  their  possessions  in  the 
West  Indies,  as  well  as  those  they  shall  acquire 
from  the  enemy  in  a  war  that  may  be  consequen- 
tial of  such  assistance  as"  it  requested.27  It  is 
hardly  surprising  that  Vergennes  found  these 
demands  rather  staggering.  However,  he  ar- 
gued his  refusal  of  them  with  the  utmost  suavity 
and  good  nature;28  and,  what  is  more,  followed 
it  up  with  an  advance  of  250,000  limes,  the  first 
instalment,  as  he  announced,  of  a  loan  of  two  mil- 

M  Franklin,  Deane,  and   Lee  to   Committee   of   Secret   Corres- 
pondence, Jan.  17,  1777,  Wharton,  II.  248;  SMSS.,  No.  606. 
*T  Franklin,  Deane,  and  Lee  to  Vergennes,  Wharton,  II.  245-6. 
28  Note  approved  by  the  king,  Jan.  9,  Doniol,  II.  120-2. 


96  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

lions  from  the  king,  who  exacted  only  that  the 
thing  be  kept  secret.29 

But  if  Vergennes  thought  thus  to  stop  the 
mouths  of  the  Americans,  he  soon  learned  his 
error.  Congress'  instructions  did  not  at  this  date 
permit  its  envoys  to  offer  France  and  Spain  an 
alliance, — only  treaties  of  amity  and  commerce.30 
On  February  2nd,  however,  with  the  news  before 
them  of  the  preparation  of  Burgoyne's  expedi- 
tion in  England,  the  commissioners  resolved  to 
break  through  this  limitation  and  to  offer  the  two 
crowns  a  pledge  that,  if  they  became  involved  in 
war  with  Great  Britain  in  consequence  of  making 
a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce  with  the  States, 
the  latter  would  not  conclude  a  separate  peace. 

*  76.,  266 ;  Wharton,  II.  247, 250  fn.,  404-5.  It  must  be  understood, 
of  course,  that  until  the  declaration  of  the  Treaty  of  Amity  and 
Commerce,  in  Mar.,  1778,  all  of  the  intercourse  of  the  commis- 
sioners and  the  Foreign  Office  was  guarded  from  publicity  with 
the  greatest  care.  Certain  precautions  were,  in  fact,  taken  against 
the  Americans  themselves,  even  after  they  were  admitted  to  the 
general  secret,  for  it  was  not  impossible,  of  course,  that  France 
might  eventually  find  it  convenient  to  clear  her  skirts  of  rebel- 
lious associations.  "No  written  proof  of  the  least  importance," 
says  Deane,  "was  ever  left  in  our  hands.  Even  M.  Gerard's 
letters  appointing  occasional  interviews  with  us  were  always  without 
any  signature;  though  five  hundred  thousand  livres  were  quarterly 
[in  1777]  paid  to  our  banker  from  the  Royal  Treasury,  not  the 
smallest  evidence  of  the  source  from  whence  that  subsidy  came 
was  permitted  to  remain  in  our  power."  Deane  Papers,  IV.  373. 

30  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress  (Ed.  W.  C.  Ford,  suc- 
ceeded by  G.  Hunt,  Washington,  1904  ff.,  25  vols.,  covering  the 
years  1774-82,  still  in  progress),  V.  768,  813,  ff.,  the  Instructions 
of  Sept.  24,  1776. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  97 

This  decision,  moreover,  was  speedily  confirmed 
by  new  instructions  from  Congress  authorizing 
"any  tenders  necessary"  to  secure  the  immediate 
assistance  of  the  Bourbon  powers.  The  result 
was  renewed  activity  on  the  part  of  the  commis- 
sion, and  of  a  much  more  ambitious  sort.31  On 
March  18th  Deane  sent  Vergennes  a  plan  of 
triple  alliance  between  France,  Spain,  and  the 
United  States  looking  to  an  immediate  war 
against  England  and  Portugal.  Hostilities  were 
to  continue  till  Spain  had  conquered  Portugal, 
till  the  United  States  had  established  their  inde- 
pendence, and  till  France  and  the  United  States 
had  expelled  England  from  the  North  American 
continent  and  the  West  Indies;  and  peace  was 
to  be  concluded  only  by  the  joint  consent  of  the 
allies. 

A  few  days  later  Franklin  laid  a  similar 
scheme  before  Aranda.32  The  Spaniard  was  en- 
thusiastic, Vergennes  cold.  "Considering,"  the 
latter  inquired  of  the  former,  "the  condition  of 
lassitude  and  division  in  which  this  people  is  at 
present,  what  security  could  we  have  that  our 
diversion  would  not  produce  their  defection,  espe- 
cially if,  as  no  doubt  would  be  the  case,  they  were 
offered  their  independence?"33  Meantime  Lee, 
having  at  the  instigation  of  Aranda  set  out  for 

MWharton,  II.  257,  260  and   footnote;   Harrison  et  al.  to  the 
Commissioners,  Dec.  30,  1776,  ib.,  240. 

'"Doniol,  II.  319-22;  Deane  Papers,  II.  25-7;  SMSS.,  No.  659. 
83  Vergennes  to  Aranda,  Apr.  10,  Doniol,  II.  325. 


98  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Madrid  with  the  idea  of  approaching  the  Spanish 
court  directly,  had  been  met  at  Burgos  by  Gri- 
maldi  and  turned  back,  though  with  pledges  of 
further  monetary  aid,  some  of  which  were  ulti- 
mately redeemed.34  Of  this  phase  of  the  episode 
the  British  ambassador  was,  however,  of  course 
ignorant.  Seeing  only  that  a  rebel  envoy  had 
been  denied  the  hospitality  of  Spanish  soil,  he 
promptly  made  the  fact  a  theme  for  obvious 
comparisons  unfavorable  to  France.35 

But  in  less  direct  ways  too  did  the  American 
commissioners  daily  contribute  to  rendering  the 
French  government's  equivocal  position  more  and 
more  precarious.  The  mere  fact  that  they  were 
in  Paris  created  an  ever  thickening  cloud  of  spec- 
ulation as  to  American  prospects  and  English 
and  French  designs.  It  also  brought  thither  the 
spies  and  secret  agents  both  of  the  British  gov- 
ernment and  of  the  Whig  opposition,  whose  busi- 
ness it  was  to  watch  the  Americans,  the  French 
ministers,  and  each  other.36  The  quite  normal 
precipitate  of  such  an  atmosphere  was  all  sorts  of 
startling  rumors,  many  of  which  were  concerned 
with  an  alleged  pending  agreement  between  rep- 
resentatives of  the  British  government  and  the 
American  commissioners,  granting  the  Colonies 
their  independence  and  providing  for  the  inevi- 

»*/6.,  195-6,  265-6;  Wharton,  II.  280-3.     Of.  ib.,  148. 
*  Vergennes  to  Ossum,  Apr.  12,  Doniol,  II.  268. 
"See  Wharton,  I.  Chs.  21  and  22. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  99 

table  joint  attack  upon  the  French  West  In- 
dies.37 Vergennes  received  these  rumors  with  a 
measure  of  scepticism.  "We  appreciate,"  he  wrote, 
"how  little  probable  it  is  that  the  English  would 
confide  so  dangerous  a  secret  into  the  keeping  of 
their  enemies  as  that  of  their  hostile  views  toward 
France  and  Spain,  and  we  are  aware  how  great  is 
the  interest  of  the  insurgents  to  create  suspi- 
cion."38 At  the  same  time  he  recognized  that 
France  had  not  yet  done  enough  for  the  Colonies 
"to  secure  their  gratitude,"39  and  he  feared  the 
import  of  the  armaments  which  England  was  pre- 
paring. Indeed,  at  no  time  during  the  Revolu- 
tion do  the  hazards  of  France's  equivocal  position 
appear  more  substantial  than  at  just  this  period. 
Yet  at  no  time  did  Vergennes  show  himself  more 
bent  upon  keeping  the  peace,  and  that  notwith- 
standing the  still  belligerent  temper  of  France's 
ally. 

And  meantime  a  fresh  element  of  complexity 
was  introduced  into  the  situation  through  Frank- 
lin's activity  in  encouraging  American  privateers 
to  resort  to  French  harbors.  Vergennes  had  from 
the  first  foreseen  that  difficulties  would  arise  when 
American  "corsairs"  began  seeking  the  hospital- 
ity of  French  waters  and  he  had  determined  to 

97Doniol,  II.  319,  335-8  and  fn.,  and  368-70. 
M/6.,  257. 
**'Ib.,  341. 


100  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

restrict  them  to  the  universally  recognized  right 
of  asylum,  that  is  the  right  to  take  refuge  from 
adverse  elements.  But  this  meagre  concession, 
which  signified  only  that  the  French  government 
did  not  accept  the  British  view  that  they  were 
pirates,  was  little  satisfactory  to  the  American 
vikings.  What  these  individuals  demanded  was 
the  right  to  equip,  arm,  and  supply  themselves  in 
French  ports,  to  bring  their  prizes  there  and  sell 
them,  to  arm  and  equip  once  more  and  sally  forth, 
— in  short,  the  right  to  make  the  French  coast  a 
base  of  operations  against  English  shipping.  In 
vain  did  Vergennes  point  out  how  entirely  incom- 
patible such  demands  were,  not  only  with  His 
Most  Christian  Majesty's  treaty  obligations,  but 
with  the  Law  of  Nations  itself;  for  these  were 
a  thick-skinned  gentry,  who  well  understood 
that  hard  words  break  no  bones  and  with  whom 
measures  to  be  effective  had  to  be  drastic.  The 
resultant  dilemma  personified  itself  in  the  bland 
Franklin  and  the  insistent  Stormont.  Franklin 
professed  to  accept  Vergennes'  legal  principles 
but  was  endlessly  resourceful  in  concocting  delays 
to  blunt  their  practical  application.  Stormont 
was  unremittingly  vigilant  of  results.39 

*•  In  general,  see  Hale,  Franklin  in  France,  I.  ch.  7.  Also,  the 
correspondence  between  the  English  and  French  government; 
Doniol,  II.  334-5,  478-9  and  504-19;  and  between  Vergennes  and 
the  commissioners,  ib.,  520-22  (translated  in  Wharton,  II.  364-6). 
See  also  index  to  SMSS.  under  "Conyngham,"  "Wickes,"  "Dolphin," 
"Lexington,"  "Reprisal." 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  101 

By  the  middle  of  July,  the  "corsair"  issue  had 
become  so  acute  that  it  was  clearly  necessary  for 
the  French  government  to  cease  drifting  and  take 
its  bearings  once  more.  Meantime,  and  this  was 
the  one  material  result  of  the  policy  of  delay,  the 
French  marine  had  reached  a  plane  from  which 
substantial  parity  with  the  British  marine  was 
within  easy  reach.  In  a  memoir  communicated  to 
the  king  on  July  23rd,  Vergennes,  contending 
that  the  moment  had  arrived  when  France  must 
resolve  "either  to  abandon  America  or  to  aid  her 
courageously  and  effectively,"  pronounced  with 
eloquence  and  fervor  for  a  close  alliance  with  her. 
The  document  is  worthy  of  a  brief  resume.™ 

The  primary  question,  Vergennes  declared, 
was  whether  France  and  Spain  could  afford  to 
see  the  colonies  return  either  directly  or  indirectly 
to  British  control;  and  that  question  turned 
on  the  further  one,  whether  it  was  sound  policy  to 
contribute  to  the  strength  of  an  enemy  when  op- 
portunity offered  to  enfeeble  that  enemy.  Eng- 
land was  the  natural  rival  of  the  House  of 
Bourbon.  Mistress  again  of  North  America  and 
its  immense  resources  of  all  sorts,  she  would  be  a 
menace  to  the  possessions  of  the  two  crowns  in 
that  part  of  the  world.  It  followed  that  the  re- 
union of  North  America  and  Great  Britain,  in 
whatever  manner  brought  about,  could  not  be 
indifferent  either  to  the  security,  the  prosperity, 

*Doniol,  II.  460-69. 


102  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

or  the  glory  of  the  two  crowns  and  that  no  pains 
must  be  spared  to  prevent  it.41  Secret  aid  had 
been  well  enough  in  its  day,  but  it  was  no  longer 
sufficient  to  prevent  the  reconciliation  of  the  col- 
onies and  the  mother-country,  especially  since  the 
charge  was  now  made  by  the  English  that  the 
policy  of  France  and  Spain  was  to  destroy  Eng- 
land by  means  of  America  and  America  by  means 
of  England.  It  was  necessary,  in  short,  that  the 
assistance  rendered  the  Americans  be  sufficient  to 
assure  their  total  separation  from  Great  Britain 
and  their  gratitude  to  the  House  of  Bourbon. 
Open  assistance  undoubtedly  meant  war.  But 
war  was  probably  imminent  anyway,  since  if 
Great  Britain  failed  in  the  current  campaign  to 
reduce  the  rebels,  she  would  make  an  accommo- 
dation with  them  and  then  with  their  assistance 
would  fall  upon  France  and  Spain.42  No  doubt 
the  magnanimity  and  religion  of  the  two  mon- 
archs  made  repugnant  to  them  the  thought  of 
profiting  by  the  circumstances  in  which  England 
found  herself  to  give  her  influence  a  mortal  blow. 
But  in  diplomacy  self-interest  was  the  major 
force,  and  in  politics  the  same  maxim  held  as  in 
war,  that  it  was  better  to  anticipate  than  to  be 
anticipated.,  Besides,  let  their  majesties  con- 
sider whether  their  flags  were  respected,  their 
commerce  free,  whether,  in  fact,  their  vessels  were 


"76.,  461. 
43  76.,  462-3. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  103 

not  subject  from  the  moment  they  left  home 
waters,  to  humiliating  visitations,  odious  seizures, 
unjust  confiscations.43  What  the  situation  called 
for  was  a  close  offensive  and  defensive  alliance 
with  the  Americans,  all  parties  to  which  should 
be  bound  not  to  abandon  the  war  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  others.  The  American  commissioners 
should  be  informed  of  the  intentions  of  the  two 
crowns  at  once;  but  at  any  rate  decisive  steps 
could  not  be  delayed  later  than  January  or  Feb- 
ruary, when  the  British  Parliament  would  meet 
to  determine  the  fate  of  the  present  ministry. 
Fortunately,  the  European  situation  was  in  every 
way  favorable  to  a  joint  enterprise  by  the  two 
crowns  against  England.  Spain's  difficulty  with 
Portugal  was  on  the  way  to  settlement,  and  a 
war  on  the  sea  would  not  spread  to  the  Continent. 
From  such  a  war,  it  was  possible  that  the  two 
crowns  would  not  derive  every  advantage  they 
could  hope  for,  but  to  succeed  in  breaking  the 
chain  between  England  and  America  would  for- 
ever be  an  immense  advantage.44 

The  memoir  was  approved  by  the  king  the 
same  day,  and  three  days  later  was  despatched  to 
Ossun,  Louis'  ambassador  at  Madrid,  to  be  sub- 
mitted by  him  to  the  Spanish  crown.45  Why 
then,  the  question  at  once  arises,  was  not  the 

«76.  464-5. 
44  76.,  467-9. 
*  76.,  469. 


104  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

course  it  recommended  promptly  entered  upon, 
at  least  by  France?  The  answer  is  to  be  found  in 
the  altered  attitude  of  Spain.  Spain's  desire 
for  war  during  the  latter  half  of  1776  and  the 
early  months  of  1777  had  rested  almost  alto- 
gether upon  the  prospect  of  having  Portugal  for 
her  quarry.  By  July  23rd,  however,  as  Vergen- 
nes  himself  noted,  the  contre-temps  between  the 
two  Iberian  courts  was  practically  at  an  end. 
With  a  new  monarch  on  the  Portuguese  throne, 
the  warlike  Pombal  had  fallen  from  power;  and 
meantime  the  Spaniards  under  Ceballos  had 
trounced  the  Portuguese  forces  along  La  Plata 
soundly.46  But  another  factor,  too,  in  bringing 
about  the  pending  settlement  had  been  Ver- 
gennes'  constant  opposition  to  the  idea  of  Spain's 
overrunning  her  neighbor;  and,  as  was  now  to 
transpire,  he  had  therein  overshot  his  mark.  For 
with  Portugal  out  of  the  calculation,  Spain  had 
no  wish  to  fight  England,  and  least  of  all  in  be- 
half of  American  independence.  On  the  other 
hand,  even  Louis'  assent  to  the  program  of  July 
23rd  was  only  a  conditional  one,  the  condition 
being  Spanish  cooperation.  Until,  therefore, 
either  Spain  could  be  brought  to  the  support  of 
this  program  or  Louis  could  be  persuaded  that  it 
was  perilous  for  France  longer  to  wait  upon  her 
ally,  decisive  action  was  impossible. 

«/&.,  432. 


CHAPTER  V 

FLORIDA  BLANCA  DEFINES   SPAIN'S   POSITION 

Notwithstanding  a  close  coincidence  of  race, 
religion,  and  economic  interests,  and  the  fact  that 
they  were  ruled  by  the  same  House,  the  two 
branches  of  which  were  bound  together  in  pre- 
sumably indissoluble  alliance,  the  French  and 
Spanish  peoples  of  the  eighteenth  century  were 
strongly  disposed  to  mutual  antipathy,  not  to  say 
antagonism ;  while  between  the  Spanish  and  Eng- 
lish, particularly  of  the  governing  classes,  there 
seems  always  to  have  been  a  considerable  measure 
of  reciprocal  understanding  and  sympathy.1  So 
long  as  Grimaldi,  a  Genoese  by  birth,  had 
remained  at  the  head  of  affairs  at  Madrid,  Ver- 
gennes  had  not  encountered  the  anti-Gallican 
prejudices  of  the  court  circle  of  the  Escurial. 
But  in  February,  1777,  Grimaldi  had  fallen  from 
power  and  had  been  succeeded  by  a  Spaniard  of 

lSee.  Francois  Rousseau,  "Participation  de  1'Espagne  a  la 
Guerre  d'Amerique,"  Revue  des  Questions  historiques,  LXXII. 
444  ff.  Note  also  Jay's  observation:  "They  [the  Spanish]  appear 
to  me  to  like  the  English,  hate  the  French,  and  to  have  prejudices 
against  us,"  Jay  to  the  President  of  Congress,  May  26,  1780, 
Wharton,  III.  733. 


106  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Spaniards,  Don  Jose  Monino,  the  Count  de 
Florida  Blanca.2  To  be  sure,  the  new  minister 
promptly  volunteered  the  assurance  that  he 
would  base  his  policy  on  the  maintenance  of  the 
Family  Compact,  and  "the  most  perfect  har- 
mony" between  the  two  crowns;3  but  he  also  soon 
made  it  clear  that  in  interpreting  the  alliance  be- 
tween France  and  Spain,  he  would  treat  the 
interests  of  his  own  country  as  of  quite  as  much 
importance  as  those  of  France  and,  furthermore, 
that  he  regarded  these  interests  as  strictly  mater- 
ial.4 Accordingly,  whereas  Grimaldi  had  ac- 
cepted Vergennes'  contention  that  Spain  as  well 
as  France  had  "much  to  gain  from  breaking  down 
British  power  by  effecting  the  complete  and 
radical  separation  of  the  colonies,"3  Florida 
Blanca  considered  "the  abasement  of  England" 
as  without  substantial  interest  to  a  nation  whose 
Continental  role  was  no  longer  worth  restoring.6 
Nor  yet  did  Vergennes'  notion  of  "a  durable 
peace"  to  follow  upon  England's  undoing  appeal 
more  strongly  to  him.  These  were  "moral  ob- 
jects," and  he  frankly  characterized  them  as 
"quixotic." 

However,    Vergennes    also    urged    it    as    an 
argument  for  his  program  that  the  total  separ- 

3  Doniol,  II.  24-7,  197-8. 

8Ossun  to  Vergennes,  Feb.  24,  1777,  ib.,  227-8. 

4  See  the  correspondence  cited  in  note  59,  supra. 
•Grimaldi  to  Aranda,  Feb.  4,  ib.,  192-3. 

•76.,  703.     Cf.  ib.,  567. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  107 

ation  of  the  American  provinces  from  Great 
Britain  would  make  for  the  security  of  French 
and  Spanish  colonial  possessions  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  and  he  contended  further  that,  inas- 
much as  Spain's  colonial  empire  in  this  part  of  the 
world  was  vastly  more  valuable  than  the  few 
islands  that  still  remained  to  France,  Spain's  in- 
terest in  bringing  about  the  separation  in  question 
was  proportionately  greater  than  France's.7 
Again  the  Spanish  minister's  views  diverged 
widely  from  those  of  his  respondent.  For  while 
he  was  ready  to  admit  that  British  sea-power  was 
more  or  less  of  a  menace  to  Spain's  holdings  in 
the  New  World  and  also  that  this  power  was  sus- 
tained to  an  important  extent  by  England's 
mastery  of  North  America,  he  was  not  ready  to 
conclude  that  therefore  the  independence  of  Eng- 
land's North  American  provinces  would,  so  far  as 
Spain  was  concerned,  remove  the  danger.  On  the 
contrary,  he  held  that  it  would,  if  due  precautions 
were  not  taken,  actually  increase  it.  We  are  thus 
brought  to  a  subject  that  must  be  of  very  con- 
trolling interest  in  the  pages  following. 

One  of  the  earliest  advocates  of  a  French- 
Spanish-American  alliance  was  the  Count 
d'Aranda,  the  Spanish  ambassador  at  Paris.8 
Unhappily  for  the  Colonies,  Aranda  was  less  a 
representative  of  his  government  than  a  Themis- 

rlb.,  461,  643-4;  III.  50-1,  140. 

8  See  his  memoir  on  the  subject,  loc.  cit.,  II.  210-8. 


108  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

tocles  in  exile, — a  former  chief -minister  whom 
the  existing  regime  at  Madrid  found  it  convenient 
to  devise  any  plausible  expedient  to  keep  remote 
from  the  seat  of  power.  So  long  as  Grimaldi  was 
Charles  Ill's  chief -minister,  Madrid  had  been 
quite  willing  that  Paris  should  make  its  own  ar- 
rangements with  the  rebellious  provinces,  but 
even  he  had  not  favored  Spain's  doing  more  than 
to  contribute  secretly  certain  funds  to  the  Ameri- 
can cause,  of  which  he  dexterously  made  France 
the  almoner.  And  after  Long  Island  his  attitude 
became  still  more  aloof.  Writing  Aranda  as  he 
was  about  to  leave  office,  he  admonished  his  too 
enthusiastic  subordinate  thus : 

The  king  our  master,  who  possesses  in  the  Indies 
domains  so  vast  and  important,  should  be  very  backward 
in  making  a  formal  treaty  with  provinces  which  as  yet 
can  only  be  regarded  as  rebels,  an  inconvenience  that 
would  not  exist  should  the  colonies  succeed  in  really 
throwing  off  the  yoke  and  constituting  themselves  an 
independent  power.  The  rights  of  all  sovereigns  to  their 
respective  territories  ought  to  be  regarded  as  sacred, 
and  the  example  of  a  rebellion  is  too  dangerous  to  allow 
of  His  Majesty's  wishing  to  assist  it  openly.9 

How  a  little  later  he  met  the  American  Lee  and 
turned  him  back  at  the  Spanish  frontier  has  al- 
ready been  told. 

And  if  Grimaldi  saw  cause  for  alarm  on  Spain's 
part  in  the  rebellious  example  of  the  Americans, 

•76.,  192. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  109 

the  Marquis  de  Castejon,  a  member  of  the  Span- 
ish royal  council,  saw  it  no  less  in  their  actual 
power  and  their  supposed  ambitions.  "Spain," 
said  Castejon,  writing  also  in  February,  1777,  "is 
about  to  be  left  alone,  face  to  face  with  one  other 
power  in  the  whole  of  North  America, — a  power 
which  has  assumed  a  national  name,  which  is  very 
formidable  on  account  of  the  size  of  its  population 
and  the  ratio  of  increase  thereof,  and  which  is 
accustomed  to  war  even  before  it  has  begun  it.  I 
think  that  we  should  be  the  last  country  in  all 
Europe  to  recognize  any  sovereign  and  indepen- 
dent state  in  North  America."  Such  a  state 
would  develop  more  rapidly  than  a  colony,  would 
have  its  resources  immediately  at  hand,  would  be 
uninfluenced  by  the  Balance  of  Power,  and  so, 
careless  of  the  good  will  of  Europe,  would  be  able 
to  push  its  own  designs  with  the  utmost  aggres- 
siveness. Furthermore,  even  assuming  the 
English  colonies  in  America  to  have  become  inde- 
pendent, "the  English  and  American  powers 
would  still  be  of  one  nation,  one  character  and  one 
religion,  and  would  so  form  their  treaties  and 
compacts  as  to  obtain  the  objects  they  both  de- 
sire." In  such  a  contingency  "the  kingdom  of 
Mexico  would  be  compromised,  in  fact  lost."10 

But  indeed  the  Foreign  Office  had  been  forced 
to  meet  and  allay  opinions  of  this  sort  even  from 
French  sources  from  the  very  outset  of  the  Revo- 

10  Sparks  MSS.,  CII.    The  date  of  the  document  is  Feb.  3,  1777. 


110  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

lution.  Thus  in  the  Reflexions  of  November, 
1775,  Gerard  had  recited:  "But,  they  say,  the 
independence  of  the  English  colonies  will  prepare 
a  revolution  in  the  new  world;  they  will  hardly 
be  at  peace  and  assured  of  their  liberty  than  they 
will  be  seized  with  the  spirit  of  conquest,  whence 
may  result  the  invasion  of  our  colonies  and  of  the 
rich  possessions  of  the  Spanish  in  South  Amer- 
ica." In  answer  to  these  objections  Gerard  had 
urged  two  considerations:  first,  that  the  existing 
war  would  fatigue  the  colonists  for  a  long  time 
to  come;  and  secondly,  that  if  they  became  inde- 
pendent, the  colonists  would  have  a  republican 
form  of  government  and  would  be  united  with 
each  other  only  in  a  loose  confederacy.  The  dom- 
inant spirit  of  the  new  community,  he  had  there- 
fore concluded,  would  be  one  of  trade,  industry, 
and  peace;  and  he  had  added:  "Even  supposing 
that  the  colonists  should  encroach  upon  the  Span- 
ish possessions,  that  is  far  from  proving  that  this 
revolution  would  be  prejudicial  to  France."11 

In  July,  1777,  however,  Vergennes  had  before 
him  the  direct  task  of  reassuring  Spanish  opinion ; 
and  it  is  entirely  evident  that  he  had  underesti- 
mated its  difficulty.  There  are  those,  he  wrote  in 
the  memoir  of  July  23rd,  who  hold  that  the  time 
will  come  when  America  will  be  "a  formidable 

u  Doniol,  I.  245.  See  also  a  passage  in  the  "Considerations,"  16., 
274.  For  further  arguments  against  Spain's  favoring  American 
independence,  forthcoming  from  English  sources,  see  Wharton, 
III.  727-31. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  111 

power  even  to  her  benefactors."  The  danger 
surely  was  greatly  exaggerated.  Doubtless 
America  would  in  time  become  a  considerable  na- 
tion, but  certainly  never  "a  terror  to  be  armed 
against."  For  one  thing,  their  constitution  stood 
in  the  way  of  such  a  consummation.  For  they 
were  held  together  only  by  a  confederacy  of  thir- 
teen members,  each  of  which  reserved  its  powers 
of  internal  administration.  Furthermore,  the  in- 
terests of  the  several  provinces  were  as  diverse  as 
their  climate;  and  particularly  striking  were  the 
differences  between  North  and  South.  The  South, 
with  its  sparse  population  and  with  the  cultivation 
of  its  soil  abandoned  to  negroes,  was  bound  to 
have  commerce  for  its  informing  principle.  The 
North,  it  was  true,  furnished  with  abundant  pop- 
ulation living  in  frugality,  might  well  breed  a 
spirit  of  emigration  and  conquest;  but  its  atten- 
tion in  turn  would  be  occupied  with  Canada, 
which  to  that  end  should  remain  in  the  hands  of 
the  English.  Also 

many  years,  not  to  say  ages,  must  pass,  ere  the  New 
Englanders  have  occupied  effectively  all  the  lands  which 
still  remain  for  them  to  cultivate  and  before  therefore 
they  will  have  a  superabundant  population  which  they 
will  want  to  be  rid  of ;  and  ere  that  time  shall  have  come 
our  vices  will  have  been  introduced  among  them  by  more 
intimate  intercourse,  with  the  result  of  having  retarded 
their  increase  and  progress.12 

™Ib.,  II.  466. 


112  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

The  argument  was  ingenious  but  to  Florida 
Blanca,  who  participated  to  the  fullest  extent  in 
the  apprehensions  that  had  been  voiced  by  Cas- 
te j  on,  it  was  quite  unconvincing.  The  Spanish 
minister's  program,  while  the  dispute  with  Portu- 
gal was  still  unsettled,  had  been  that  the  struggle 
in  America  should  be  kept  going  till  the  parties  to 
it  were  exhausted;  meantime  France  and  Spain 
should  increase  their  forces  in  the  West  Indies; 
then  when  the  moment  arrived,  they  should  inter- 
vene between  England  and  her  rebellious  prov- 
inces, with  the  object  of  filching  from  the  occasion 
such  profits  as  might  be  available,  perhaps  the 
Floridas  for  Spain  and  Canada  for  France.13 
And  in  August,  1777,  the  Spanish  minister  was  of 
opinion  that  the  time  was  not  yet  at  hand  for  any 
course  of  action  likely  to  precipitate  war  with 
England,  and  he  was  especially  averse  to  the  sug- 
gestion of  an  alliance  with  the  Americans:  For 
one  thing,  the  Spanish  treasure  fleet  from  Mexico 
would  not  arrive  until  spring,  and  it  would  never 
do  to  tempt  British  cupidity  with  that.  For  an- 
other thing,  for  the  two  crowns  to  declare  them- 
selves in  behalf  of  the  Colonies  would  be  to 
furnish  England  with  the  best  possible  argu- 
ment for  coming  to  an  accommodation  with  them 
at  once.  Finally  Spain  had  not  yet  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  build  up  a  sufficient  casus  belli  against 
the  English,  to  give,  that  is,  her  multiplied  causes 

13  76.,  264,  273-4. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  113 

of  complaint  that  fair  appearance  of  consistency 
that  decency  demanded.  Meantime,  however,  it 
would  be  pertinent,  with  a  view  to  preventing  the 
reconciliation  of  England  and  the  Colonies,  to  per- 
suade the  latter,  through  Franklin  and  Deane, 
and  also  through  envoys  to  the  Congressional 
chiefs,  that  any  accommodation  with  the  mother- 
country  would  be  useless  which  was  not  guaran- 
teed by  France  and  Spain.  "We  can  assure  the 
deputies  at  the  outset  that  we  would  not  sanction 
anything  contrary  to  the  liberty  and  advantage 
of  the  Colonies,  and  that  they  would  be  protected 
in  these  respects,  without  saying  more  for  the 
present."  Surely  the  Americans  could  not  with- 
stand such  an  inducement.14 

Obviously  balked  in  his  own  design  by  the 
specious  intransigency  of  the  Spaniard,  Ver- 
gennes,  in  his  despatch  to  Ossun,  of  August  22nd 
indicated  the  willingness  of  Paris,  for  the  nonce  at 
least,  to  follow  in  the  wake  of  Madrid:  "We  ad- 
mit, Monsieur,  without  abbreviation,  the  hypothe- 
sis of  the  Spanish  minister,  that  before  thinking  of 
a  rupture  we  should  make  sure  of  the  return  of 
our  own  fishermen  and  of  the  fleet  from  Mexico." 
Meanwhile,  it  would  be  appropriate  for  the  two 
powers  to  send  secret  envoys  to  America,  charged 
with  "brief,  indirect  hints"  as  to  the  advantage 

14  "Traduction  du  M£moire  de  la  cour  d'Espagne  du  8  aoust 
1776  [sic]  servant  de  reponse  a  celui  de  la  cour  de  France,  envoy<§ 
le  26  Juillet  meme  annee,".  «6.,  490-3. 


114  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

that  the  colonies  would  gain  if,  when  procuring 
England's  recognition  of  their  independence,  they 
should  also  obtain  "the  recognition  and  guaranty 
thereof  of  the  European  states  most  interested  in 
sustaining  it."  True,  it  did  appear  somewhat  im- 
probable that  the  American  deputies  in  Paris 
could  be  brought  round  to  this  view.  "Ready 
enough  to  enter  into  the  closest  kind  of  union  if 
the  two  crowns  would  consent  to  war,  they  are 
apparently  determined  to  decline  any  other  sort 
of  diplomatic  connection,"  and  "I  have  had  more 
than  one  occasion  to  observe  that  their  art  looks 
not  only  to  interesting  us  in  their  cause,  but  also 
to  compromising  us  with  England."  "Still,  I  will 
throw  out  some  words  to  them  of  a  guaranty,  and 
if  they  refuse  to  nibble  at  that  bait,  I  have  an- 
other idea  .  .  .  namely,  to  make  them  compre- 
hend that  it  would  not  be  enough  to  obtain  from 
England  a  recognition  of  their  independence 
without  taking  steps  at  the  same  time  to  establish 
its  permanence,"  and  that  the  measure  best  cal- 
culated to  that  end  would  be  treaties  of  amity  and 
commerce  with  the  powers  most  interested  in 
seeing  them  free  and  prosperous.15 

But  before  any  action  could  be  taken  along  this 
line,  opportunity  presented  itself  for  Vergennes 
to  press  afresh  for  open  war  with  England.  The 
very  day  the  French  secretary  penned  his  des- 
patch to  Ossun,  an  unaccredited  agent  of  the 

15  Vergennes  to  Ossun,  Aug.  22,  ib.,  500-3. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  115 

British  government  named  Forth  announced  to 
Maurepas  the  intention  of  his  government  to  ob- 
lige France,  under  pain  of  war,  to  return  to  their 
British  owners  all  prizes  brought  into  French 
ports  by  American  vessels.16  The  day  following 
Vergennes  presented  the  king  a  memoir  vigor- 
ously protesting  against  compliance  with  such  a 
demand.  To  do  so,  he  argued,  would  be  tanta- 
mount to  stigmatizing  the  American  privateers, 
and  their  countrymen  as  well,  as  pirates  and  sea- 
robbers  ;  and  the  result  of  that  would  be  to  arouse 
resentment  in  America  that  would  lead  at  once  to 
reconciliation  with  England  and  "a  desire  for 
vengeance  that  ages  perhaps  would  not  diminish." 
It  would  be  in  entire  accord  with  his  dignity  for 
the  king  to  make  some  concessions,  and  policy 
demanded  it  on  account  of  the  absence  of  the 
Spanish  treasure  fleet.  The  orders  against  the 
admission  of  American  privateers  and  their 
prizes  to  French  harbors  except  in  "absolutely 
urgent  cases"  could  be  renewed,  and  such  pri- 
vateers as  were  already  in  port  could  be  sent 
away,  without  however  the  time  of  their  depar- 
ture being  fixed.  But  more  than  this  could  not 
be  conceded.  "A  great  state  can  undergo  losses 
without  suffering  in  its  reputation,  but  if  it  sub- 
scribes to  humiliations,  it  is  undone."  As  to  "an 
assurance  of  the  possessions  of  the  two  crowns 
in  America," — for  apparently  Forth  had  sug- 

1-I6.,  525-6. 


116  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

gested  some  such  idea, — that  would  be  both  un- 
profitable and  useless.  "It  would  tie  our  hands 
so  that  we  should  be  unable  to  put  ourselves  in  a 
state  of  defense"  and  arm  our  enemy  with  a  club 
with  which  he  could  always  extort  some  new 
compliance.17 

The  memoir  received  the  approval  both  of  king 
and  council  the  same  day,  and  three  days  later  a 
second  despatch  was  sent  Ossun  to  acquaint  him 
with  the  new  turn  of  affairs.  It  was  accompanied 
by  a  letter  in  Vergennes'  own  hand  to  Florida 
Blanca,  which,  recounting  that  "a  new  order  of 
things"  had  most  surprisingly  intervened  since 
the  previous  communication,  indicated  the  opin- 
ion that  it  was  touch  and  go  as  between  war  and 
peace,  but  promised  that  every  precaution  which 
wisdom  could  suggest  would  be  taken  "to  avoid 
if  possible  that  the  first  blow  should  be  too  sen- 
sible."18 Four  days  later,  the  secretary  wrote 
Noailles,  at  London,  that  "the  British  ministry, 
despairing  of  subjugating  the  Americans  .  .  . 
will  seek  to  direct  the  passions  of  the  nation 
against  an  object  more  capable  of  inflaming  them, 
which  object  can  only  be  France  and  Spain,"19 

But  again  the  complexion  of  affairs  suddenly 
altered.  Not  only  did  Stormont  fail  to  back  up 
Forth's  representations,  but  what  is  more  to  the 

"76.,  527-9;  SMSS.,  No.  706. 

18  76.,  534-5. 

»  76.,  536-7.    See  also  to.,  526-9,  533-5. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  117 

point,  the  news  now  came  to  Paris  of  Burgoyne's 
capture  of  Ticonderoga.20  As  after  Long 
Island  Vergennes'  anxiety  as  to  the  ultimate  in- 
tentions of  the  British  ministry  underwent  nota- 
ble surcease.  Florida  Blanca  was  quick  to 
detect  the  French  secretary's  vacillation  and  the 
opportunity  offered  for  a  homily  against  Amer- 
ican wiles.  The  shaft  struck  home,  for  with  the 
advance  of  Burgoyne  through  northern  New 
York,  further  disconcerting  intelligence  had 
come  from  London.  His  despatch  of  September 
26th  shows  the  secretary  of  state  in  full  retreat, 
though  with  an  arrow  or  two  still  in  his  quiver: 
The  Spanish  minister  had  rightly  judged  that 
Forth's  mission  was  not  to  be  taken  seriously,  but 
what  then  was  to  be  expected  of  a  government 
that  lent  itself  to  such  pranks  in  the  midst  of  a 
civil  war!  France  would  give  the  preference  to 
peace,  of  that  Spain  could  be  assured,  and  the 
more  so  as  the  moment  had  passed  when  by  strik- 
ing at  England  she  could  have  guaranteed  suc- 
cess to  the  revolution  in  America.  No  doubt  the 
attention  of  France  and  Spain  ought  to  be  di- 
rected to  winning  the  confidence  of  the  Ameri- 
cans without  entirely  forfeiting  that  of  the 
English  but  the  task  would  not  be  an  easy  one, 
especially  since  the  English  government  at  least 
was  well  aware  of  what  it  was  for  the  interest 
of  the  two  crowns  to  do,  while  the  Americans  on 

39  Ib.,  537,  572  fn.,  628. 


118  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

the  other  hand  were  inconsiderately  disposed  to 
look  at  everything  from  the  point  of  view  of  their 
own  advantage.21 

And  what  precisely  was  the  attitude  of  the 
Americans  at  this  juncture?  Earlier  in  the  year 
it  had  been  their  tactics  to  keep  before  Vergennes 
the  possibility  that,  unless  France  promptly  es- 
poused their  cause,  the  Colonies,  "dispirited  by 
bad  success,"22  might  be  forced  to  accept  terms 
from  England  that  would  be  to  the  serious  dis- 
advantage of  France.23  But  these  methods,  if 
they  had  not  actually  injured  the  American  case 
by  making  the  secretary  sceptical  of  the  substance 
and  durability  of  the  Revolution,24  had  at  least 
netted  nothing,  and  after  Ticonderoga  the  com- 
missioners discarded  them.  Evidence  of  this  fact 
is  to  be  seen  in  their  letter  of  September  25th  to 
Vergennes  and  Aranda,  to  beg  a  subsidy  of  the 
two  crowns  or  their  friendly  offices  in  a  negotia- 
tion for  peace,  with  a  view  to  saving  to  America 
her  "liberties  with  the  freedom  of  commerce :" 

21 16.,  551-4. 

22  See  Carmichael  to  Vergennes,  SMSS.,  No.  647.     The  date  is 
illegible  save  for  the  year,  1777,  but  it  was  clearly  written  before 
the  news  of  Saratoga. 

23  See  Wharton,  II.  280-3;  Deane  Papers,  I.  434-42,  II.  52-6,  66-9; 
and  the  memorial  prepared  early  in  1777  by  Franklin,  Deane,  and 
the  Abb£  Niccoli,  SMSS.,  Nos.  149  and  150.     This  document  was 
communicated  to  Lord  Suffolk  by  the  British  spy  Wentworth  and 
was  later  quoted  by   Pownall  on   the  floor  of   Parliament.     See 
SMSS.,  No.  182,  and  Parliamentary  History,  XIX.  930  ff. 

24  See  p.  67  supra. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  119 

They  [the  commissioners,  the  letter  proceeds]  can 
assure  Your  Excellencies  that  they  have  no  account  of 
any  treaty  on  foot  in  America  for  an  accommodation, 
nor  do  they  believe  there  is  any.  Nor  have  any  propo- 
sitions been  made  by  them  to  the  court  of  London,  nor 
any  the  smallest  overture  received  from  thence  which 
they  have  not  already  communicated;  .  .  .  and  the 
commissioners  are  firmly  of  the  opinion  that  nothing 
will  induce  the  Congress  to  accommodate  on  the  terms 
of  an  exclusive  commerce  with  Britain  but  the  despair 
of  obtaining  effectual  aid  and  support  from  Europe.25 

On  October  3rd  Vergennes  proposed  that 
France  and  Spain  should  each  pledge  the  Colon- 
ies three  millions  livres  on  condition  that  they 
should  enter  into  no  negotiation  with  Great  Bri- 
tain without  the  joint  approval  of  the  two  crowns. 
Raisons  de  finance,  he  admitted,  were  apparently 
opposed  on  this  occasion  to  raisons  de  politique, 
but,  he  contended,  in  appearance  only,  since  if 
England  were  enfeebled  by  the  loss  of  America 
both  France  and  Spain  would  enjoy  peace  for 
many  years.26  But  Florida  Blanca  was  not  to  be 
persuaded ;  and  on  November  7th,  Vergennes  an- 

"SMSS.,  No.  1698.  See  also  Lee's  "Journal"  in  R.  H.  Lee's 
Life  of  Arthur  Lee,  I.  354.  On  November  27,  Deane  proposed  that 
the  commissioners  demand  "a  categorical  answer"  from  France. 
"Dr.  Franklin,"  Lee  writes,  "was  of  a  different  opinion:  he  would 
not  consent  to  state  that  we  must  give  up  the  contest  without 
their  interposition,  because  the  effect  of  such  a  declaration  upon 
them  was  uncertain.  It  might  be  taken  as  a  menace,  it  might  make 
them  abandon  us  in  despair,  or  anger.  Besides,  he  did  not  think 
it  true."  Lee  agreed  with  Franklin. 

"See  Doniol,  II.  564,  570,  575-8. 


120  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

nounced  that  Louis  had  determined  to  give  the 
United  States  three  millions  outright,  to  be  paid 
quarterly.27  Some  days  later,  the  Foreign  Office 
instructed  one  Holker  to  proceed  to  America  to 
sound  Congress  on  the  question  of  a  French- 
Spanish  guaranty  along  the  lines  originally  sug- 
gested by  Madrid.  The  instructions  were  never 
carried  out.  On  November  30th,  the  news  of 
Burgoyne's  surrender  at  Saratoga  reached 
Nantes,  and  M.  Holker  became  the  first  emissary 
to  America  of  a  new  and  decisive  policy.28 

"Ib.,  579-80.  But  word  of  this  decision  was  apparently  not 
communicated  to  the  commissioners  till  after  November  30,  as 
no  mention  is  made  of  it  in  their  report  to  Congress  of  that  date, 
Wharton,  II.  433-6.  And  cf.  ib.,  445. 

KIb.,  615-6  and  notes;  SMSS.,  No.  1748.  Holker  late  became 
the  first  French  consul  at  Philadelphia. 


CHAPTER  VI 

VERGENNES,  ALARMIST  AND  PROPAGANDIST 

Vergennes'  first  reaction  to  the  news  of  Sara- 
toga was  that  it  meant  American  independence 
and  that  the  problem  presented  to  France  by  it 
was  whether  she  could  beat  Great  Britain  out  in 
according  recognition  of  the  fact.  "The  power," 
he  wrote  Montmorin,  "that  will  first  recognize 
the  independence  of  the  Americans  will  be  the 
one  that  will  reap  the  fruits  of  this  war."1  Later 
he  revised  this  estimate:  Absolute  independence 
would  probably  cost  the  pride  of  the  British  mon- 
arch too  much,  but  even  so,  what  guaranty  was 

1  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  11,  Doniol,  II.  632;  SMSS., 
No.  1769.  The  words  are  taken  from  Beaumarchais'  extremely 
alarmist  letter  of  the  same  date  to  Vergennes:  The  ministry,  he 
writes,  are  denounced  in  London,  the  opposition  triumphs,  secret 
councils  multiply,  Ireland  prepares  to  rise.  What  is  the  meaning? 
"It  is  that  of  the  two  nations,  England  and  France,  the  first  who 
recognizes  American  independence  will  alone  gather  from  it  all 
the  fruits,  whilst  the  independence  will  be  certainly  fatal  to  the 
one  that  allows  its  rival  to  take  the  lead":  SMSS.,  No.  1768.  The 
letter  will  also  be  found  in  Doniol,  II.  684.  Vergennes'  recogni- 
tion of  the  decisive  character  of  Saratoga  was  delayed  somewhat 
on  account  of  the  exultant  tone  assumed  by  the  British  government 
and  its  ambassador  over  the  news  of  Howe's  capture  of  Philadel- 
phia and  Washington's  defeat  at  Brandy  wine:  op.  cit.,  620-4,  and 
footnotes. 


138  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

there  that  the  Americans,  wearied  by  the  war 
and  discouraged  by  the  indifference  of  Eu- 
rope, would  not  consent  to  waive  the  name  if 
they  were  given  the  substance?  At  any  rate, 
some  sort  of  reconciliation  of  the  mother-country 
and  her  rebellious  provinces  impended  and  with 
it  the  menace  of  a  joint  attack  by  the  English 
and  Americans  on  France  and  Spain.  The  suc- 
cor given  the  insurgents  by  the  two  crowns  would 
furnish  from  the  British  point  of  view  a  suffi- 
cient pretext  and  the  rehabilitation  of  the  French 
and  Spanish  navies  a  sufficient  grievance.  In 
such  a  war,  New  York  would  furnish  the  English 
a  port  of  embarkment  for  the  French  posses- 
sions ;  the  American  corsairs  would  enrich  them- 
selves by  falling  upon  French  and  Spanish  com- 
merce ;  the  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Mississippi 
would  be  a  powerful  lure  to  the  Americans,  and 
in  their  hands  would  render  the  possession  of 
Mexico  precarious,  because,  protected  by  the 
British  navy,  the  colonists  would  have  nothing  to 
fear  from  the  vengeance  of  France  or  Spain  on 
the  American  continent.  There  could  not  be  the 
least  doubt  in  the  world  that  such  a  program 
would  be  carried  through  were  it  not  for  His 
Britannic  Majesty's  squeamishness  in  the  matter 
of  independence.  Thanks  to  that,  the  House 
of  Bourbon  had  its  opportunity.2 

2Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  27,  Doniol,  II.,  665-6;  "Memoire 
lu  au  Roi,"  Jan.  7,  1778,  #>.,  724-5;  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  par 
1'Epine,  Jan.  8,  ib.,  719-20;  SMSS.,  Nos.  1805,  1824,  1826. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

A  question  touched  upon  at  the  beginning  of 
this  volume  becomes  at  this  point  of  renewed 
interest,  that  of  Vergennes'  intention  in  urging 
the  above  argument  for  his  crown's  intervention 
in  the  American  revolt.  Immediately,  of  course, 
his  intention  is  to  present  the  war  which  this  act 
of  intervention  will  probably  bring  in  its  wake 
as  essentially  a  war  of  self-defense  on  France's 
part,  rather  than  one  of  aggression,  or,  to  use 
his  own  terms,  as  "a  war  of  necessity"  rather  than 
"of  choice";  and  were  he  thus  making,  for  a 
policy  already  determined  upon,  the  usual  con- 
cession to  "the  decent  opinion  of  mankind,"  his 
words  would  call  for  little  comment.  But  in  fact 
he  is  doing  something  quite  different.  He  is  argu- 
ing for  the  adoption  of  a  proposed  policy,  and 
on  that  account  it  becomes  important  to  inquire 
with  some  particularity  whether  this  argument 
was  a  sound  one,  whether  it  was  probable,  was 
sustained  by  credible  evidence,  was  consistently 
adherred  to.  In  the  pages  immediately  following 
I  shall  canvass  these  questions. 

Certainly  the  theory  that  England,  defeated  in 
America,  would  attack  France  and  Spain  had  not 
gained  in  intrinsic  probability  in  the  three  years 
that  had  elapsed  since  it  was  first  broached.  Then 
the  weakness  of  the  French  and  Spanish  fleets 
had  presented  British  naval  aggressiveness  an 
obvious  temptation;  now,  by  the  statement  of 
Vergennes  himself,  this  weakness  had  been  re- 
paired and  Bourbon  naval  power  had  become 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

matter  for  alarm  on  England's  part.3  Then  the 
name  of  Chatham  and  his  monumental  hatred  of 
the  House  of  Bourbon  had  given  viability  to  the 
most  disturbing  speculations;  now  it  was  recog- 
nized by  the  French  Foreign  Office  itself,  as  at 
least  highly  probable,  that  the  North  ministry 
would  continue  as  the  instrument  of  His  Britan- 
nic Majesty's  American  policies.4  Then  it  was 
plausible  to  argue  that  the  colonies  could  yet  be 
drawn  off  from  their  pursuit  of  independence  by 
the  ancient  lure  of  an  attack  on  France,  and  the 
anticipated  assault  upon  the  French  Antilles  had 
accordingly  been  pictured  as  the  first  step  to 
reconciliation  between  England  and  America. 
Now  it  had  to  be  conceded  by  all  that  indepen- 
dence was  the  paramount  objective  of  the  Ameri- 
cans, with  the  result  that  this  hypothetical  assault 
had  to  be  presented  as  the  outcome  of  reconcilia- 
tion.5 But  in  this  connection,  Vergennes  is  fur- 

3  See   also   Vergennes'   comments   quoted   infra  on   Lord   Sand- 
wich's review  in  Parliament  of  the  British  naval  situation;  note, 
further,  the   following  words   in   the  Expost   des  Motifs   of  the 
French  government  (1779):    "It  is  notorious  that  the  armaments 
of  France  were  in  a  condition  to  act  offensively  long  before  those 
of  England  were  prepared,"  Animal  Register,  XXII.  394. 

4  There  was  no  possibility  of  Chatham's  being  called  to  power  at 
this    period.      Even    after    France    had    declared    the    Treaty    of 
Amity  and  Commerce  with  the  United  States,  we  find  George  III 
asserting  that  "nothing  shall  bring  me  to  treat  personally  with 
Lord  Chatham";  and  again,  that  "no  consideration  in  life  shall 
make  me  stoop  to  Opposition."    Donne,  Correspondence  of  George 
HI,  II.  149,  153. 

0  See  especially  Doniol,  II.  664  and  727. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  125 

ther  citable  for  the  admission,  as  we  have  just 
observed,  that  England  would  not  even  yet  offer 
the  Americans  complete  independence,  that  she 
would  insist  upon  retaining  at  least  a  nominal 
sovereignty  over  them.  The  question  thus 
emerges  whether  it  was  reasonable  to  suppose  that 
the  Americans  would  consent,  in  return  for  less 
than  independence,  to  join  in  an  assault  on  the 
possessions  of  France  and  Spain.  It  was  not  im- 
probable that  the  Colonies,  weary  of  war,  would 
finally  content  themselves  with  less  than  inde- 
pendence, if  France  did  not  come  to  their  aid,  but 
it  was  most  unlikely  that  they  would  do  so  with 
any  great  alacrity  or  precipitancy;  and  just  in 
proportion  as  the  necessity  of  peace  was  a  motive 
with  them  was  it  unlikely  that  they  would  embark 
upon  war  in  another  quarter  for  a  comparatively 
minor  object,  and  particularly  when,  in  the  pur- 
suit of  such  object,  they  would  alienate  the  only 
powers  that  had  befriended  them  and  whose  en- 
mity would  leave  them  henceforth  to  face  alone 
a  still  wrathful  mother-country.6 

Nor  when  I  pass  in  review  the  evidence  offered 
by  Vergennes  in  support  of  his  alarmist  theory, 

•Vergennes  himself  admitted  that  any  arrangement  between 
England  and  America  would  "not  be  the  affair  of  a  day,"  ib.t 
738-9,  fn.  In  his  despatch  to  Montmorin  of  Dec.  13,  the  secretary 
gives  it  as  his  own  opinion  that  the  commissioners  prefer  a 
coalition  with  the  two  crowns  to  a  reconciliation  with  England: 
i6.,  639.  See  also  the  Congressional  resolutions  of  Nov.  22,  1777, 
and  the  commissioners'  letter  of  Dec.  8  to  Vergennes,  Wharton, 
II.  425-6  and  444-5;  also,  pp.  117-9,  supra. 


126  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

am  I  better  convinced  of  its  substance.  First  I 
shall  consider  some  items  of  a  comparatively 
trustworthy  sort  that  bear  on  the  question  of 
what  terms  England  would  be  likely  to  offer 
America  and  America  be  likely  to  accept.  Then 
I  shall  turn  to  some  items  that  demand  more 
careful  scrutiny. 

Vergennes  knew  from  his  confidential  agents 
of  the  visit  to  Franklin  of  an  Englishman  named 
Hutton,  reputed  to  be  a  friend  of  the  English 
king;7  and  he  observed  that  Franklin  remained 
reticent  about  the  matter.8  This  circumstance, 
however,  was  plausibly  explained  to  him  by 
Chaumont,  one  of  the  above-mentioned  agents,  as 
due  to  Franklin's  reluctance  to  prejudice  an  old 
acquaintance  with  the  English  court,9  and  we  find 
the  secretary  himself  testifying  at  this  very  time 
to  his  confidence  in  Franklin's  loyalty  and  good 
faith.10  Again,  he  had  before  him  two  letters 
which  had  been  shown  him  by  the  American  com- 
missioners and  which  he  considered  so  important 
that  he  forwarded  copies  of  them  to  Madrid.  In 
the  first  of  these,  the  writer,  a  citizen  of  Boston, 
seems  to  have  advanced  the  idea  that  unless 
France  and  Spain  evinced  a  disposition  to  come 
to  the  assistance  of  the  colonies,  at  least  in  a 
financial  way,  Burgoyne's  victory  could  be  turned 

TDoniol,  II.  771-2. 

•76.,  718. 

"See  Note  113,  supra. 

10  Vergennes   to   Noailles,   Dec.    27,    Doniol,    II.   657,    footnote. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

to  best  account  by  getting  as  favorable  terms  as 
possible  from  England.11  In  the  other  one, 
which  had  been  sent  from  London  to  a  secret 
agent  of  the  commissioners  named  Bancroft,  the 
anonymous  writer  foreshadowed  the  intention  of 
the  North  ministry  to  bestow  something  like  au- 
tonomy on  the  colonies  for  their  internal  affairs, 
while  retaining  control  of  their  external  relations, 
political  and  commercial.12  Lastly,  he  knew 
from  Deane  that  an  Englishman  named  Went- 
worth  had  visited  this  commissioner  and,  suggest- 
ing a  truce  for  America,  had  proposed  that  the 
envoys  send  one  of  their  number  either  to  Eng- 
land or  up  into  the  Netherlands,  to  meet  there  an 
Englishman  of  high  rank  and  negotiate  a  recon- 
ciliation on  the  basis  of  a  qualified  dependency; 
but  he  knew  also  that  Deane  had  met  these  prop- 
ositions with  a  demand  for  unconditional  inde- 
pendence, and  that  the  Englishman  had  in  turn 
pronounced  the  latter  demand  unallowable.13 

But  obviously  this  evidence  is  quite  insufficient 
to  justify  Vergennes'  assertion  in  the  memoir  of 

"Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  11,  ib.,  634.  The  content  of 
the  letter  is  further  revealed  by  Florida  Blanca's  comments  upon 
it  in  his  despatch  to  Aranda  of  Dec.  23rd,  ib.,  769. 

"SMSS.,  Nos.  1787  and  1805;  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec. 
27,  Doniol,  II.  664-5.  For  some  interesting  speculations  as  to 
Bancroft's  real  character,  see  Wharton,  I.  621-41. 

"Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  19,  ib.,  661-2;  SMSS.,  No. 
1786.  See  also  Beaumarchais  to  Vergennes,  Doniol,  loc.  cit.,  685-6. 
Went  worth  was  a  spy  and  stock-jobber  in  whom  George  III  pro- 
fessed small  confidence,  Donne,  Correspondence,  II.  109. 


128  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

January  7th,  which  immediately  preceded  the 
king's  sanction  of  an  alliance  with  the  United 
States,  that  the  English  government  "already 
.  .  .  displays  to  them  [the  American  envoys]  the 
certain  advantages  of  a  coalition  against  France 
and  Spain,"14  and  still  less,  if  possible,  does  it 
prove  that  the  English  government  was  likely  to 
achieve  anything  by  such  tactics.  It  is  true  that, 
in  making  this  assertion,  the  secretary  pleads  that 
"the  particulars  are  too  long  to  detail,"  though 
he  says  the  king  knows  them.15  But  the  fact  is 
that  both  on  this  occasion  and  on  earlier  ones 
Vergennes  does  cite  numerous  "particulars,"16 
which  it  is  fair  to  conclude  are  the  most  cogent 
ones  for  his  purpose ;  and  while,  of  course,  we  do 
not  know  what  matters  Vergennes  reported  orally 
to  the  king,17  we  do  have  both  the  elaborate 
memoir  upon  which  the  royal  council  based  its 
decision  in  favor  of  an  American  alliance  and  also 
the  extended  correspondence  with  Madrid  at  this 

"Doniol,  II.  723.  The  statement  is  repeated  in  the  "Precis  of 
Facts  relative  to  the  Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Commerce,"  which 
was  read  to  the  Council  Mar.  18,  SMSS.,  No.  1904. 

15  76.,  724. 

"The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  he  straightway  contradicts  the 
words  just  quoted,  in  his  confidential  letter  of  the  day  following 
to  Montmorin,  where  he  writes:  "J'espere  que  ce  prince  [the  king 
of  Spain]  nous  jugera  favorablement  lors  qu'il  aura  peze"  les  raisons 
exposees  dans  le  m£moire  et  la  d£peche  que  vous  recevrez  par 
ce  courier."  Doniol,  II.  736.  For  the  memoire  and  despatch  re- 
ferred to,  see  ib.,  717-38. 

17  "Le  Roi  ...  a  entendu  mon  raport  particulier,  a  garde  les 
pieces,  a  examin£  le  pour  et  le  contre":  Vergennes  to  Montmorin, 
"Prive,"  Jan.  8:  ib.,  736;  SMSS.,  No.  1828. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  129 

period;  and  we  may,  I  submit,  reasonably  believe 
that  the  evidence  intended  for  the  eyes  of  the 
Spanish  king  and  for  the  critical  scrutiny  of  the 
Spanish  minister  was  at  least  as  convincing  in 
character  as  that  which,  supplemented  by  the  per- 
sonal presence  and  eloquence  of  the  French  secre- 
tary, persuaded  the  well-intentioned  but  stupid 
Louis  of  "the  moral  certainty  of  peril."18 

We  turn,  then,  to  consider  this  additional  evi- 
dence, if  "evidence"  it  may  be  called;  and  first 
we  note  the  kind  of  sources  from  which  it  issued. 
So  far  as  is  discoverable,  Vergennes'  informants, 
with  the  single  exception  of  the  French  ambassa- 
dor at  London,  were  either  professional  alarmists 
whose  practical  interests  were  already  enlisted 
with  the  American  cause — men  like  Beaumar- 
chais,  Chaumont,  and  Grand — or  the  mere  anony- 
mous voices  of  rumor, — as  witness  his  repeated 
"on  Ait."  From  such  sources  as  these  it  is  that  the 
statement  finds  its  way  into  the  secretary's  de- 
spatches, that  the  Howes  have  been  instructed 
to  open  negotiations  with  Congress,19  that  a 

18 "Ce  n'est  point  1'influence  de  ses  ministres  qui  1'ont  decide; 
Tevidence  des  faits,  la  certitude  morale  du  danger  et  sa  conviction 
1'ont  seuls  entrain^,"  loc.  cit.  To  the  same  effect  is  the  letter  of 
Louis  to  Charles,  Jan.  8,  ib.,  713-4. 

"Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  "P.S.,  Dec.  15,  ib.,  649:  "Ce 
qu'on  [N.  B.]  a  recueilli  de  plus  positif  est,  que  des  instructions 
ont  6te  envoyees  aux  freres  Howe  pour  entamer  une  negociation 
en  Amerique."  But  compare  with  this  the  cautious  tone  of  his 
despatch  to  Noailles  five  days  later:  "Des  ordres  de  reconciliation 
doivent  avoir  ei6  envoyes  tres  r£cemment  a  M.  Howe,"  ib.,  704.  For 


130  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

special  courier  has  been  sent  to  America,20  that 
Lord  George  Germaine's  secretary  is  in  Paris  to 
treat  with  the  commissioners,21  that  Franklin's 
attitude  of  silence  with  reference  to  Hutton  is 
matter  for  suspicion,22  that  the  first  steps  have 
been  taken  in  London  toward  the  formation  of  a 
coalition  ministry  of  which  Chatham  and  Shel- 
burne  are  to  be  members,23  that  at  Passy  "they 
are  negotiating  briskly"24  and  finally,  that  "one 
formal  proposition  is  to  unite  cordially  and  fall 
upon  us."25  Ordinarily,  it  is  true,  the  secre- 
tary discloses  through  what  channels  he  ob- 
tained his  information;  but  that  fact  does  not 
hinder  his  arguing  on  the  basis  of  it  without  allow- 
ance for  its  source,  nor  yet  from  sinning 
against  the  light  shed  by  more  reliable  sources. 

a  later  rumor  that  General  Howe  had  arrived  at  terms  of  recon- 
ciliation with  Washington,  see  Wharton,  II.  483.  This  rumor  was 
of  too  late  date  to  find  a  place  in  the  despatches. 

^Doniol,  II.  647. 

31  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  13,  "au  soir"  ib.,  645,  footnote 
2:  "D'une  autre  part  le  Lord  Germaine  .  .  .  envoye,  dit  on 
[N.  B.],  ici  son  secretaire  pour  traiter  avec  les  Americains." 

23  Same  to  same,  Jan.  8,  ib.,  718,  following  Grand's  alarmist 
account  of  the  matter,  ib.,  771. 

"Same  reference  as  note  21,  supra. 

**Same  reference  as  note  22.  The  source  of  this  item,  which 
Vergennes  himself  says  did  not  influence  his  decision,  was  Frank- 
lin and  Deane's  landlord  at  Passy,  who  was  in  Vergennes'  pay. 
Sparks  MSS.,  LXXVIII.  p.  139. 

"Doniol,  II.  649.  The  "inconnu"  was  Wentworth,  whose  prof- 
fers were  reported  by  Deane  to  Vergennes  a  day  or  two  later  as 
impossible,  since  they  did  not  include  unconditional  independence, 
supra,  p.  127. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  131 

The  person  best  entitled,  both  by  length  of  offi- 
cial experience  and  by  first-hand  knowledge,  to 
claim  something  like  authority  for  his  conclusions 
was  the  Marquis  de  Noailles,  Louis'  ambassador 
at  the  court  of  St.  James,  and  indeed  Vergennes 
himself  pays  striking  tribute  to  the  reliability 
cf  Noailles'  reports.26  Yet  it  is  plainly  not  the 
policy  of  the  secretary  to  put  forward  the  ambas- 
sador's communications  except  so  far  as  they  can 
be  wrought  into  the  fabric  of  his  own  alarmist 
theory.  Thus  Noailles  points  out  that  there  can 
be  no  binding  negotiations  between  the  British 
executive  and  the  Americans  till  Parliament  shall 
have  repealed  certain  statutes.  Vergennes,  with- 
out citing  Noailles,  repeates  the  observation  in  his 
despatches  to  Montmorin  but  accompanies  it  with 
the  conjecture  that  it  will  be  the  policy  of  the 
British  ministry  to  solicit  overtures  from  the 
Americans  as  a  basis  for  propositions  to  be  laid 
before  Parliament.  Again,  Noailles  always  im- 
plies that  the  North  ministry  will  survive.  This 
conclusion,  too,  Vergennes  seems  generally  to 
accept ;  but  he  pits  against  it  the  contention  that 
North  and  his  associates  now  participate  in  the 
Opposition's  way  of  thinking.27  Again,  Noailles 
assures  his  government  that  North  will  not  and 

"  Same  reference  as  note  21. 

27  Unfortunately,  what  "the  Opposition's  way  of  thinking"  was 
is  by  no  means  clear.  See  note  below.  As  used  by  Vergennes 
this  phrase  signified  what  was  for  the  most  part  a  figment  of  his 
imagination — or  calculation. 


132  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

cannot  offer  the  Americans  their  independence. 
That  is  quite  probable,  rejoins  the  secretary,  but 
the  real  danger  lies  in  the  possibility  that  the 
Americans  will  take  less.  At  this  point,  however, 
the  divergence  between  the  secretary  and  the  am- 
bassador becomes  flat  contradiction,  for  Noailles, 
like  Florida  Blanca  and  Montmorin,  is  confident 
throughout  that  the  Americans  will  never  take 
less.28 

Vergennes  is  determined,  in  short,  that  every- 
thing shall  be  grist  to  his  mill.  Unfortunately, 
there  are  times  when  his  heroic  endeavors  to  make 
it  such  hedge  perilously  upon  dereliction.  Thus 
on  the  authority  of  the  Courier  de  V Europe,  he 
erroneously  attributes  to  Lord  Sandwich  the  re- 
mark that  "the  time  will  come  perhaps  when  com- 
plete reparation  will  be  had  of  France  and  Spain 
for  their  insults,"  though  the  version  of  Sand- 
wich's speech  which  the  scrupulous  Noailles  had 
forwarded  him  contained  no  such  menacing  pas- 
sage.29 Again,  on  no  apparent  authority  at  all, 

28  See  Noailles  to  Vergennes,  Dec.  12,  23,  26,  SMSS.,  Nos.  1772, 
1793,  1803.  Cf.  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  19  and  27,  Jan.  8, 
16,  and  23,  SMSS.,  Nos.  1786,  1805,  1827,  1838,  1847. 

aVerg«nnes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  3,  Doniol,  II.  589.  Cf.  SMSS., 
Nos.  1743  and  1772;  also  Parliamentary  History,  XIX.  479.  Even  in 
quoting  the  above  remark  attributed  by  the  Courier  to  Lord 
Sandwich,  Vergennes  is  forced  to  add  the  Englishman's  admission 
that  "it  would  be  folly  to  propose  war  against  the  House  of 
Bourbon."  But  he  underscores  the  more  alarming  sentiment.  The 
Courier  de  I'Europe  was  evidently  somewhat  disposed  to  sensa- 
tionalism. See  Last  Journals  of  Horace  Walpole,  II.  181. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

he  attributes  to  Lord  North  the  idea  of  a  frater- 
nal union  with  America  and  a  new  family  com- 
pact to  confront  that  of  the  House  of  Bourbon, 
though  Noailles'  report  of  the  same  debate  quite 
correctly  credited  this  idea  to  Lord  Richmond, 
a  Whig  advocate  of  American  independence.30 
Indeed,  as  late  as  January  13th,  that  is  nearly  a 
week  after  the  royal  council  had  sanctioned  an 
alliance  with  the  United  States,  a  memoir  from 
the  Foreign  Office  repeats  the  assertion  that  Eng- 
land is  disposed  to  sacrifice  her  supremacy  in 
America  for  "a  sort  of  family  compact,  that  is  to 
say,  a  league  against  the  House  of  Bourbon." 
This  seems  to  be  a  distinct  reference  to  the  sen- 
timent which,  Vergennes  must  have  known,  had 
been  wrongly  attributed  to  Lord  North.  It  is, 
moreover,  the  only  reference  in  the  document, 
direct  or  indirect,  to  any  evidence  whatsoever 
supporting  the  charge  that  a  coalition  between 
England  and  America,  hostile  to  France,  im- 

30  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  13,  Doniol,  II.  640  and  645  fn. 
2.  Cf.  Noailles  to  Vergennes,  Dec.  12  and  23,  SMSS.',  Nos.  1772 
and  1793;  also  Parliamentary  History,  XIX.  591  and  609.  The  fact 
of  the  matter  is  that  the  Parliamentary  debates  during  the  period 
between  Burgoyne's  surrender  and  the  declaration  by  France  of 
the  Treaty  of  Amity  and  Commerce  were  singularly  free  of  hostile 
flings  at  that  power.  The  government  wanted  France's  support, 
the  Rockingham  Whigs  advocated  unqualified  independence  for  the 
colonies,  Chatham,  opposed  to  independence,  had  not  yet  further 
indicated  his  course.  The  fact  that  the  only  two  citations  which 
Vergennes  made  at  this  time  of  the  debates  were  the  two  spurious 
ones  considered  above  is  significant  of  their  general  tone  toward 
France. 


134  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

pended  !30"  But  even  where  the  secretary's  deflec- 
tions from  the  most  scrupulous  methods  of 
propagandism  are  more  venial,  they  are  fre- 
quently not  less  instructive;  and  it  is  interesting 
to  observe  conjectures  which  have  the  form  of 
positive  statement  in  a  despatch  to  Madrid  as- 
sume, in  a  despatch  of  the  same  date  to  London, 
the  more  modest  form  of  interrogation.31 

And  not  less  illuminating  is  the  constant  habit 
of  the  secretary  in  his  despatches  of  dropping  the 
note  of  alarm  for  that  of  confidence.  Examples 
might  be  multiplied,  but  one  will  suffice,  that 
furnished  by  his  comments  upon  Lord  Sand- 
wich's review  in  Parliament  of  the  British  naval 
situation : 

But  why  should  we  look  only  on  the  dark  side  of 
things  ?  According  to  Lord  Sandwich  himself,  England 
has  thirty-five  ships  of  the  line  ready  and  with  some 
effort  could  increase  the  number  to  forty-two.  That 
then  is  all  she  can  rely  upon  to  guard  the  Channel,  to 
observe  our  fleet  at  Brest,  the  Spanish  fleets  at  Cadiz 
and  Ferrol,  to  protect  her  establishments  and  her  com- 
merce in  the  Mediterranean  and  secure  the  defense  of 
her  islands  in  America.  Even  she  does  not  count  greatly 
upon  the  naval  forces  which  she  has  in  North  America. 
These  consist  of  such  ancient  vessels,  with  such  impover- 
ished and  dilapidated  equipment,  that  they  could  lend 

308  The  memoir  is  given  in  Appendix  III.  It  represents  an 
effort  to  bring  together  every  possible  argument  for  the  Ameri- 
can alliance. 

81  Of.  SMSS.,  Nos.  1805  and  1807,  bearing  date  of  Dec.  27,  1777. 
See  also  note  19  above. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  135 

little  assistance  to  inferior  forces.  All  of  which,  as  you 
see,  Monsieur,  is  not  calculated  to  discourage  the  two 
crowns  if  they  know  how  to  take  their  time  and  strike  at 
the  proper  moment.32 

How  badly  these  words  comport  with  Ver- 
gennes' supposed  anxieties  for  the  French  An- 
tilles is  obvious.  But  what  is  equally  to  the 
point,  the  inconsistency  thus  exemplified  is  much 
more  than  a  characteristic  of  the  secretary's  ar- 
gument; it  also  projects  itself  into  his  policy  in 
the  most  vital  way,  if  we  are  to  regard  that  as 
designed  primarily  for  the  defense  of  the  Antilles. 
The  only  feasible  method  of  either  attacking  or 
defending  the  Antilles  was  with  a  fleet;  but  the 
United  States,  though  they  had  ports  of  embark- 
ment,  had  no  fleet  capable  of  such  an  enterprise, 
while  Spain,  pledged  to  come  to  France's  assist- 
ance at  the  first  hostile  blow,  had  both  a  fleet  and 
ports  of  embarkment  that  opened  directly  on  the 
Caribbean.  Yet  Vergennes  deliberately  put  in 
jeopardy  the  alliance  with  Spain  in  order  to  get 
an  alliance  with  the  United  States;  and  in  so 
doing,  moreover,  made  war  with  England  a 
certainty  !33 

82  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  27,  Doniol,  II.  666;  SMSS.; 
No.  1805.  See  also  to  same  general  effect  Vergennes  to  Mont- 
morin, Jan.  30,  Doniol,  II.  789-90;  SMSS.,  No.  1853.  Note,  too, 
the  secretary's  complacent  survey  of  the  defenses  of  the  West 
Indies,  in  his  "Project  de  Reponses,"  to  Florida  Blanca's  ques- 
tions, which  was  read  to  the  king  Jan.  28,  Doniol,  II.  782. 

33  Of  course,  if  it  was  assumed  that  America  reconciled  with 
England,  would  be  the  one  to  instigate  the  attack  on  the  French 


136  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Nor  does  inconsistency  stop  short  always  of 
contradiction.  For  the  fact  of  the  matter  is 
that  Vergennes  himself  is  quotable  for  the  conten- 
tion that  the  defense  of  the  French  Antilles  was 
not  a  leading,  or  even  a  considerable  object  with 
his  government.  Thus,  early  in  the  volume  I 
drew  attention  to  a  despatch  penned  shortly  after 
the  news  of  Saratoga  in  which  he  wrote :  "The  in- 
terest of  Spain  is  at  least  tenfold  our  interest ;  our 
islands  are  little  designed  to  tempt  the  cupidity 
of  the  English ;  they  already  have  enough  of  that 
sort  of  thing ;  what  they  want  is  treasure,  and  that 
is  to  be  got  only  from  the  continent."34  And 
the  alliance  having  been  consummated,  he  ex- 
pressed himself  even  more  to  the  point: 

West  Indies  and  that  England  would  not  otherwise  make  such  an 
attack,  then  the  above  argument  would  fail.  But  Vergennes 
suggests  America's  interest  in  such  an  attack  in  only  one  passage 
and  that  put  in  the  form  of  an  interrogation.  Thus,  in  his  des- 
patch of  December  27th  to  Montmorin,  he  writes:  "Les  Ame"ri- 
cains  nous  proposent  de  conqu^rir  les  isles  angloises  et  de  leurs  y 
accorder  un  commerce  libre.  Si  vice  versd  les  Anglois  font  la 
meme  proposition,  ne  sera  t'elle  pas  ecout6e,  sera  t'elle  rejettee?" 
Doniol,  II.  665.  It  is  true  that  he  represents  the  Spanish  colonies 
as  also  presenting  certain  temptations  to  the  Americans,  e.g.,  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  but  he  also  constantly  assures  Spain 
that  the  Americans  will  be  very  peaceable  neighbors,  quite  dif- 
ferent from  the  avaricious  English.  As  we  have  seen  repeatedly, 
it  is  upon  the  proverbial  cupidity  of  England  and  the  desire  she 
will  have  to  retrieve  her  losses  that  Vergennes  bases  his  whole 
alarmist  argument.  As  to  the  Spanish  alliance  being  put  in 
jeopardy,  the  memoir  given  in  Appendix  III  proves  that  the 
Foreign  Office  was  quite  ready  to  face  the  possibility,  in  January, 
1778,  that  Spain  would  remain  neutral  throughout  the  war.  Vd.  ib. 
34  76.,  643. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  137 

It  is  not,  I  assure  you  [he  wrote  Montmorin,  April  3, 
1778],  without  something  of  pain  and  effort  that  the 
king  and  those  of  his  ministers  who  enjoy  his  closest 
confidence  have  brought  themselves  to  adopt  a  dif- 
ferent course  with  reference  to  American  affairs  than 
that  of  the  Catholic  king  and  his  ministry;  but  indeed, 
the  interest  of  Spain  herself  has  had  greater  weight  in 
our  decision  than  our  own  interest.  The  latter  is  com- 
paratively feeble,  if  we  measure  it  by  our  possessions, 
for  these  are  hardly  of  a  nature  to  whet  the  desires  of  the 
English,  since  they  have  none  of  the  precious  metals  for 
which  the  English  are  so  famished.  It  is  rather  toward 
the  Spanish  mainland  that  their  eyes  are  turned,  and 
I  demand  if  England,  mistress  of  the  industry  and  re- 
sources of  North  America,  and  capable  of  fructifying 
these  with  her  own  wealth,  would  not  be  a  neighbor  more 
inconvenient,  more  formidable  than  the  United  States 
could  probably  ever  become,  given  over  as  they  are  to 
the  inertia  which  is  the  very  essence  of  democratic  in- 
stitutions?35 

Now,  of  course,  it  is  quite  true  that  these  pas- 
sages both  occur  in  despatches  intended  for 
Madrid  and  designed  to  persuade  that  govern- 
ment that  its  interest  lay  with  France  and  Amer- 
ica, wherefore  it  may  be  argued  that  they  are  not 
to  be  taken  too  seriously  as  a  revelation  of  the  way 
of  thinking  of  the  French  Foreign  Office.  Let 
the  argument  be  granted  to  the  fullest  extent: 
what,  then,  is  the  implication  as  to  utterances 
designed  primarily  for  another  forum  and  show- 
ing imminent  peril  to  French  possessions?  Be- 

35  /&.,  III.  50-1. 


138  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

sides,  it  does  not  appear  very  precisely  how, 
supposing  there  had  been  a  reasonable  degree  of 
likelihood  of  France  having  to  come  to  the  de- 
fense of  her  possessions,  Vergennes'  plea  in  ex- 
tenuation of  her  course,  addressed  as  it  was  to 
France's  ally,  was  strengthened  by  disparaging 
that  fact.  Palpably,  the  very  contrary  is  the  case. 
However,  it  may  be  urged  from  another  angle, 
that  the  material  feature  of  the  passages  under 
consideration  is  the  assertion  of  France's  concern 
for  the  safety  of  Spanish  America,  and  that  since 
this  feature  constantly  reappears  both  in  papers 
intended  for  Madrid  and  those  intended  for  his 
own  court,  it  is  to  be  taken  as  expressing  a  ser- 
ious objective  of  his  policy.  Let  this  too  be 
granted:  the  question  then  confronts  us,  Why 
was  this  so?  It  will  hardly  be  contended,  I  sup- 
pose, that  the  French  government  was  moved  to 
any  great  extent  by  altruistic  considerations,  and 
especially  since  the  course  it  took  was  extremely 
disagreeable  to  the  only  possible  beneficiary  of 
its  altruism.  And  by  the  same  token,  the  terms  of 
the  Family  Compact  can  scarcely  be  cited  to  fur- 
nish the  required  explanation.  One  explanation, 
then,  and  only  one,  remains :  The  very  keen  in- 
terest that  France  felt  at  all  times  in  preventing 
a  British  conquest  of  Spain's  holdings  in  America 
sprang  from  considerations  connected  with  the 
doctrine  of  the  Balance  of  Power,  the  idea  being 
that,  since  England  and  France  were  rivals,  any 
accession  of  new  resources  to  the  former  would 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  139 

put  the  latter  at  a  correlative  disadvantage  in  the 
field  of  rivalry.  Yet  the  moment  these  considera- 
tions are  made  premises  of  the  discussion, 
France's  vast  interest  in  promoting  the  separa- 
tion of  Great  Britain  and  North  America  looms 
before  us.  And  which  of  the  two  contingencies, 
this  separation  or  a  British  conquest  of  Spanish 
America,  must  have  appeared  the  more  imminent 
after  Saratoga,  and  therefore  as  furnishing  the 
more  calculable  basis  of  policy,  is  hardly  a  matter 
for  serious  doubt. 

"The  interest  of  separating  the  English  colo- 
nies from  the  mother-country  and  of  preventing 
their  reunion  at  any  time  in  any  manner  what- 
soever is  so  primary  a  one  that  if  the  two  crowns 
should  purchase  it  at  the  price  of  a  war  a  little 
disadvantageous,  yet  if  they  brought  this  separ- 
ation about,  it  would  seem  that  they  ought 
not  to  regret  the  war  whatever  its  outcome" 
Thus  wrote  Vergennes  in  December,  1777,  while 
American  recognition  was  still  under  debate.36 
And  why  should  France  desire  this  separation? 
The  answer  is  supplied  from  another  despatch 
written  after  the  cause  of  recognition  had  tri- 
umphed, in  these  words:  "That  which  ought 
to  determine  and  indeed  has  determined  her 
[France]  to  join  with  America  is  the  great  en- 
feeblement  of  England  effected  by  the  subtrac- 

"Ib.,  II.  644.    To  the  same  effect  is  the  memoir  given  in  Appen- 
dix III. 


140  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

tion  of  a  third  of  her  empire/'37  And  why  should 
France  desire  the  enfeeblement  of  England? 
This  question  is  answered  in  a  third  despatch, 
written  with  reference  to  the  appearance  of  the 
Bavarian  Succession  question,  at  the  moment  the 
American  alliance  was  in  the  act  of  consumma- 
tion. "England  is  our  first  enemy,  and  the  others 
never  had  any  force  or  energy  except  from  her/'38 
But  with  these  and  like  passages  before  us,39 

37  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  June  20,  1778,  ib.,  III.  140. 

38Vergennes  to  Noailles,  Jan.  17,  ib.,  II.  745-6  and  fn.;  SMSS., 
No.  1839. 

39  See  Ch.  I,  note  21.  "Ou  est,  pourra  t'on  me  dire,  la  surete" 
que  cette  guerre  nous  sera  heureuse?  Je  repons  d'abord:  est 
elle  de  choix  ou  de  necessite".  Si  elle  est  de  la  derniere  espece, 
comme  tout  en  fait  la  demonstration,  il  faut  done  s'y  soummettre 
avec  resignation  et  courage.  Mais  supposons  qu'elle  soit  mal- 
heureuse,  ce  qui  est  bien  proble'matique.  Si  I'independance  de 
VAmerique  en  est  la  consequence,  si  cette  independence  est  absolue; 
si  elle  ne  produit  pas  un  pacte  de  fraternitd  qui  reindentifieroit 
les  deux  peuples  et  n'en  feroient  plus  q'un,  les  deux  Couronnes 
n'auront  elles  pas  infmiment  gagn6  d'avoir  procure"  une  separation 
aussi  considerable  et  diminu£  d'autant  la  puissance  de  leur  ennemi 
inveter£?"  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  27,  Donlol,  II.  666. 
Florida  Blanca  thus  epitomizes  the  arguments  of  the  French 
despatches:  "La  cour  de  Versailles  a  pense1  de  son  cote"  qu'il 
convenoit  a  sa  gloire,  a  la  bonne  politique  et  aux  inte>ets  les  plus 
essentiels  de  la  monarchic  francoise  de  gagner  de  vitesse  1'activite" 
du  cabinet  britannique,  et  de  ne  point  laisser  £chaper  une  occasion 
aussi  favorable  (et  qui  ne  se  pre"sentera  plus  jamais)  de  convertir 
en  avantages  immenses  pour  la  maison  de  Bourbon  les  memes 
moyens  dont  les  Anglois  avoient  imagine"  pouvoir  se  servir  pour  sa 
mine,'  'ib.,  749.  "L'objet  principal  des  ministres  du  roi  6tait 
d'assurer  I'independance  des  Etats-Unis  et  d'enlever  ces  treize 
riches  provinces  a  1'Angleterre,"  Se*gur,  Memoires  ou  Souvenirs 
et  Anecdotes  (Paris,  1844,  3  vols.),  I.  166.  Se"gur  was  a  friend  and 
confidant  of  Vergennes. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  141 

it  becomes  evident  that  the  substance  of  Ver- 
gennes'  concern  in  the  period  following  the  news 
of  Saratoga  was  not,  primarily,  the  security  of 
the  French  West  Indies ;  that,  indeed,  the  anxie- 
ties which  he  at  times  professed  on  this  score,  at 
other  times  minimized,  are  not  to  be  regarded  too 
seriously.  His  real  concern,  a  concern  that  finds 
repeated  utterance  in  his  despatches  and  again 
through  Gerard,  in  the  latter 's  negotiations  with 
Franklin,  Deane,  and  Lee,  was  of  a  reconciliation 
between  England  and  America  which,  however 
devoid  of  belligerent  intent  toward  the  House  of 
Bourbon,  would  yet  pave  the  way  for  the  final 
restoration  of  British  dominion  over  the  military, 
industrial,  and  commercial  resources  of  America, 
and  especially  of  the  last.40  In  other  words,  his 
concern  was  the  obverse  of  his  desire,  and,  with 
the  evidence  that  Saratoga  afforded  of  the  real 
dimensions  of  the  Revolution,  of  his  hope,  that  is 
to  say,  the  hope  of  seeing  England  and  America 
permanently  separated.  The  way,  however,  to 
make  that  sure,  he  argued,  was  for  France  to 
espouse  the  cause  of  American  independence; 
for  then  the  Americans  would  persist  till  inde- 

40  See  Doniol,  II.  633-4,  638,  640,  655-6  fn.,  665-6,  738  fn.,  and  837; 
SMSS.,  Nos.  1831  and  1847.  "We  must  now  either  support  the 
colonies  or  abandon  them.  We  must  form  the  alliance  before  Eng- 
land offers  independence  or  we  will  lose  the  benefit  to  be  derived 
from  America,  and  England  will  still  control  their  commerce." 
Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  73  (citing  the  Archives 

des  Affaires  fetrangeres,  Espagne,  588,  No.  17). 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

pendence  was  in  fact  won  and,  when  won,  would 
use  their  liberty  of  action  in  ways  beneficial  to 
France.  But  before,  of  course,  he  could  put  this 
program  into  effect  he  had  either  to  persuade  his 
own  king  and  the  king  of  Spain  to  join  in  ac- 
cepting it,  or  to  persuade  Louis  to  take  a  line  of 
his  own.  He  soon  found  that  the  latter  alterna- 
tive was  the  immediately  feasible  one,  though  not 
so  easily  feasible ;  whereas,  in  so  important  a  mat- 
ter as  this  one  of  intervention,  involving  the  cer- 
tainty of  war,  no  half-way  conversion  of  the  king 
to  the  ministerial  program  would  at  all  suffice. 
The  somewhat  abstract  argument  showing  the 
large  but  rather  intangible  advantages  to  flow 
from  England's  loss  of  North  America  and  its 
resources,  had,  therefore,  to  be  supplemented  by 
an  argument  of  a  more  imperative  sort,  showing  a 
danger  immediate  and  concrete. 

The  notion  that  French  possessions  in  the 
West  Indies  were  menaced  by  a  pending  Eng- 
lish-American coalition  played  an  important  part 
in  bringing  France  into  the  War  of  Indepen- 
dence. It  was  this  suggestion,  supported  by  the 
somber  name  of  Chatham,  which  first  drew  Ver- 
gennes'  infra- Continental  gaze  to  what  was  tak- 
ing place  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  It 
was  with  the  same  notion  that  Vergennes  him- 
self was  able  to  counter  Turgot's  argument 
against  secret  aid,  that  it  invited  war.  Lastly,  it 
was  with  this  notion  that  Vergennes  overcame 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

Louis'  reluctance  to  part  company  with  his  royal 
uncle  for  the  sake  of  some  rascally  American 
rebels.  Yet,  when  all  is  said,  the  theory  in  ques- 
tion throws  little,  if  any,  light  on  the  nature  of 
the  principal  advantage  which  the  secretary  ex- 
pected that  France  would  derive  from  interven- 
tion. And  clearly,  his  statement  at  the  moment 
of  the  royal  council's  decision  in  favor  of  an 
American  alliance,  that  it  was  "not  the  influence 
of  his  ministers  that  decided  the  king"  but  "the 
evidence  of  facts,  the  moral  certainty  of  peril," 
should  be  taken  with  a  saving  allowance  of  salt. 
No  doubt  Louis  was  convinced  by  the  "facts"  as 
they  were  represented  to  him ;  but  if  the  monarch 
was  unable  to  discern  the  flimsy  texture  of  hear- 
say and  guess-work  beneath  the  ministerial  var- 
nish, the  secretary  was  not  so  unaware  of  the 
quality  of  his  own  elaboration,  as  his  constant 
admissions  attest.  Nor  does  "the  evidence  of 
facts"  from  American  sources  assist  his  effort 
thus  to  bridge  the  gap  between  remote  possibility 
and  calculable  probability.  Not  a  single  state- 
ment of  either  Franklin,  Deane,  or  Lee  is  on 
record  showing  either  that  they  ever  heard  the 
word  "coalition"  from  any  British  agent,  or  that, 
after  Saratoga,  they  ever  hinted  such  an  idea  to 
the  French  government,  or  that  they  supposed 
the  French  government  to  be  alarmed  on  that 
score.  The  argument  from  silence  is  not  always 
the  most  convincing,  but  its  concurrence  with 


144  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

more  positive  considerations,  as  in  this  instance, 
is  at  least  reassuring.41 

41  The  theory  of  an  impending  hostile  English- American  coalition 
having  played  its  part  in  bringing  the  king  into  line  for  an 
American  alliance  was  next  utilized  to  exonerate  France's  con- 
duct to  legitimist  Europe.  The  original  form  of  the  French 
government's  apology  for  recognizing  the  independence  of  the 
United  States  is  to  be  found  in  the  "Precis  of  Facts  relative  to 
the  Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Commerce,"  which  was  read  to 
the  Council,  March  18,  1778,  (SMSS.,  No.  1904).  Several  months 
later  a  more  extended  apology  was  put  forth  in  the  form  of  the 
Expose  des  Motifs,  et<\  (translated  in  the  Annual  Register,  XXII. 
390  ff.).  In  the  latter  document  the  following  statement  occurs: 
"The  French  treaty  defeated  and  rendered  useless  the  plan 
formed  at  London  for  the  sudden  and  precarious  coplition  that 
was  about  to  be  formed  with  America  and  it  baffled  those  secret 
projects  adopted  by  His  Britannic  Majesty  for  that  purpose." 
This  document  was  answered  for  the  British  government  by 
Gibbon  the  historian  in  a  paper  of  vast  ability,  entitled  Mdmoire 
justicatif,  etc.,  and  written  in  French.  (For  translation,  see 
Annual  Register,  XXII.  397  ff.)  Gibbon  taxes  the  French  gov- 
ernment with  having  rendered  the  Colonies  secret  aid — "the  court 
of  Versailles,"  he  says,  "concealed  the  most  treacherous  con- 
duct under  the  smoothest  professions";  with  having  revived  old 
quarrels  reaching  back,  some  of  them,  to  before  the  Peace  of 
Utrecht;  and  with  claiming  the  privileges  of  a  belligerent  while 
professing  the  character  of  a  neutral.  Coming  then  to  the  coali- 
tion charge,  he  writes:  "When  an  adversary  is  incapable  of 
justifying  his  violence  in  the  public  opinion,  or  even  his  own  eyes, 
by  the  injuries  he  pretends  to  have  received,  he  has  recourse  to 
chimerical  dangers.  .  .  .  Since,  then,  that  the  court  of  Versailles 
cannot  excuse  its  procedure  but  in  favor  of  a  supposition  desti- 
tute of  truth  and  likelihood,  the  king  hath  a  right  to  call  upon 
that  court,  in  the  face  of  Europe,  to  produce  a  proof  of  an  asser- 
tion as  odious  as  bold;  and  to  develop  those  public  operations  or 
secret  intrigues  that  can  authorize  the  suspicions  of  France  that 
Great  Britain,  after  a  long  and  painful  dispute,  offered  peace  to 
her  subjects  with  no  other  design  than  to  undertake  a  fresh  war 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  145 

against  a  respectable  power  with  which  she  had  preserved  all 
the  appearances  of  friendship."  The  author  of  Figaro  was  now 
set  to  answer  the  historian  of  the  Decline  and  Fall.  His  answer, 
entitled  Observations  sur  les  Memoire  justicatif,  etc.,  in  its  original 
form  practically  ignored  Gibbon's  challenge.  The  bulk  of  it  con- 
sists of  an  excited  review  of  cases  of  seizures  of  French  vessels 
by  the  British  on  the  charge  of  carrying  contraband,  and  the  coali- 
tion idea  appears  in  a  single  paragraph  near  the  end  of  the  docu- 
ment. See  Oeuvres  Completes  (Paris,  1835),  pp.  530-43.  The 
work  was  unsatisfactory  to  the  Foreign  Office,  however,  and  was 
recast,  presumably  by  Rayneval,  Vergennes'  secretary.  (See 
Appendix  IV  and  bibliographical  data  there  given.)  In  the  form 
in  which  it  received  official  sanction  the  Observations  rehashes 
Beaumarchais'  review  of  British  seizures,  stoutly  denies  Gibbon's 
charge  of  secret  aid,  asserts  that  the  Americans  were  independent 
in  fact  when  France  recognized  them,  and  devotes  considerable 
space  to  the  coalition  charge,  but  without  very  convincing  results. 
Thus  Gibbon's  demand  for  proof  is  met  by  the  assertion  that 
naturally  the  British  government  was  not  so  imprudent  "as  to 
leave  direct  marks  of  its  darksome  manouvre"  and  by  the  reputa- 
tion of  the  king  of  France  for  probity.  "It  was  natural,"  the  docu- 
ment continues,  "for  the  British  ministry,  unable  to  subdue  her 
Colonies,  to  seek  to  be  reconciled  with  them."  "In  this  situation," 
the  query  is  put,  "ought  it  not  to  be  supposed  that,  the  moment 
the  British  ministry  perceived  the  necessity,"  etc.  Finally,  it  is 
added:  "Moreover,  although  the  king  had  not  had  certain  proof 
of  the  hostile  views  of  the  court  of  London,  it  would  have  been 
sufficient  to  have  had  probable  grounds  to  suspect  that  they 
existed,"  etc.  In  other  words,  if  the  fact  did  not  exist,  it  at 
least  behooved  the  French  government  to  imagine  that  it  did. 
Later  passages  in  the  document  defend  France  against  the  charge 
of  having  entered  the  war  for  the  purpose  of  crushing  England: 
her  purpose  was  only  to  diminish  British  power,  and  in  this  en- 
deavor she  represented  the  interests  of  Europe.  See  Appendix 
IV;  also  the  following  note.  For  the  more  general  considerations 
supporting  the  conclusions  of  the  above  chapter,  see  chapter  I, 
supra. 


146  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

NOTE 

Just  as  the  page  proof  of  this  book  is  coining  in  I  receive 
my  April  number  of  the  American  Historical  Review,  in  which 
Professor  C.  H.  Van  Tyne  reasserts  the  notion  that  the  French 
government's  decision  to  enter  into  alliance  with  the  United  States 
after  Saratoga  was  determined  by  the  fear  that  otherwise  it 
would  be  confronted  with  a  hostile  English-American  coalition 
which  would  pounce  on  its  West  Indian  holdings.  The  printer  has 
kindly  put  space  at  my  disposal  for  some  comments  on  this 
article,  and  I  avail  myself  of  the  opportunity  the  more  gladly 
as  in  doing  so  I  can  perhaps  make  my  own  position  somewhat 
clearer:  1.  To  begin  with,  Professor  Van  Tyne  is  in  error  in 
stating  that  this  explanation  of  France's  action  has  heretofore 
escaped  American  writers.  Pitkin  (History,  I.  398-400),  Otis' 
Botta  (II.  423-39),  Perkins  (France  in  the  American  Revolution, 
pp.  231-S),  and  Laura  C.  Sheldon  (France  and  the  American 
Revolution},  passim,  all  note  this  argument  for  the  alliance. 
And  see  further  American  State  Papers,  "Foreign  Affairs,"  I. 
569-71.  Indeed,  so  far  from  the  idea  in  question  being  at  all 
"elusive,"  as  Professor  Van  Tyne  suggests,  it  is  quite  impossible 
for  one  perusing  the  documents  to  escape  it,  the  only  question 
being,  what  weight,  when  all  the  evidence  is  compared,  ought 
to  be  assigned  it  in  explanation  of  the  alliance.  So  also,  Doniol 
places  the  "coalition"  argument  alongside  the  "enfeeblement"  ar- 
gument as  explanatory  of  the  alliance,  without  however  making 
any  effort  to  assess  the  relative  value  of  the  two  as  representa- 
tive of  French  motives  or  to  distinguish  between  the  point  of  view 
of  the  Foreign  Office  and  that  of  the  king.  See  ib.,  II.  624-5.  As 
to  the  French  writers  whom  Professor  Van  Tyne  cites  as  voicing 
his  own  view,  it  may  be  conjectured  that  they  got  the  idea  from 
widely  circulated  Observations  described  above.  But  it  is  to  be 
noted  that  later  writers,  like  Lavisse  and  Sorel  both  of  whom 
have  investigated  the  origins  of  Bourbon  diplomatic  policy  and 
both  of  whom  had  Doniol  available,  give  the  "coalition"  argument 
no  weight  whatsoever.  2.  Professor  Van  Tyne  would  draw  a  hard 
and  fast  line  between  the  policy  of  secret  aid  and  the  policy  of  al- 
liance. But  as  he  himself  shows,  the  "coalition"  argument  was 
urged  no  less  in  behalf  of  secret  aid  than  in  that  of  the  alliance. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  147 

Indeed,  it  is  altogether  obvious  that  the  reasoning  by  which  the 
Foreign  Office  supported  its  policy  from  start  to  finish  was  all  of  a 
piece,  and  that  the  American  victory  at  Saratoga — and,  conse- 
quently, the  situation  which  it  produced — was  the  consummation, 
exactly,  which  secret  aid  had  from  the  first  been  intended  to\ 
bring  about.  3.  Professor  Van  Tyne  brings  forward  what  he  calls 
a  "key-document"  to  the  motives  of  the  French  government  in 
entering  into  alliance  with  the  United  States  in  1778.  I  fail  to  see, 
however,  that  this  document  has  any  significance  whatsoever, 
save  that  it  may  have  been  the  source  from  which  Professor 
Van  Tyne  himself  first  derived  his  idea  of  French  motives.  Thus, 
on  the  point  under  discussion,  it  merely  repeats  several  earlier 
documents  (see  previous  note)  and  brings  forward  not  one  iota  of 
additional  evidence,  except  that  it  apparently  endeavors  to  repre- 
sent North's  conciliatory  propositions,  which  post-dated  the  alli- 
ance, as  having  been  known  to  the  French  government  at  the  time 
of  its  decision.  Again,  it  was  written  more  than  five  years  after  the 
events  which  it  narrates.  Finally,  it  was  written  with  the  pur- 
pose of  silencing  the  very  bitter  criticism  which,  after  Grasse's 
defeat  in  the  West  Indies,  was  visited  on  the  ministry's  American 
policy.  Vergennes'  tactics,  it  seems  clear,  are  to  remind  the  king 
of  his  own  responsibility  for  this  policy  and  so  to  fasten  on  his 
critics  the  charge  of  lese-majeste.  See  Doniol,  V.  186-7  and  fn.; 
Revue  d'Histoire  diplomatique  VII.  528  ff.;  Jobez,  La 
France  sous  Louis  XVI  (Paris,  1881),  II.  492-506.  4.  Nor  is 
Professor  Van  Tyne's  citation  of  one  or  two  other  documents  in 
support  of  his  thesis  beyond  criticism.  Thus  the  Carmichael 
memorial  cited  by  him  on  p.  538  of  the  Review  was  written  before 
Saratoga  and  is  in  no  wise  applicable  to  show  the  attitude  of  the 
American  commissioner  at  the  later  date.  See  p.  118,  supra. 
Again,  the  Broglie  memoir,  cited  at  p.  537  of  the  Review,  makes 
distinctly  against  the  thesis  it  is  brought  forward  to  support. 
For  while  Broglie  argues  that  England  must  in  an  endeavor  to 
preserve  her  rank,  try  to  recoup  her  losses  at  the  expense  of 
France  and  Spain,  he  rejects  the  idea  that  the  Colonies  will  accept 
a  coalition  with  her  or  anything  less  than  independence.  And  it 
may  be  fairly  said  that  while  it  is  insisted  that  England  will,  from 
the  very  desperation  of  her  case,  fall  upon  the  Antilles,  the  whole 
trend  of  the  argument  is  that  she  has  already  lost  her  opportunity, 


148  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

together  with  her  naval  superiority.  Finally,  Broglie  opposes  an 
alliance  with  the  Americans,  contending  that  a  commercial  con- 
nection will  answer  all  purposes.  See  Doniol,  II.  674  ff.  All  of 
the  other  material  which  Professor  Van  Tyne  cites  that  is  rele- 
vant to  his  contention  will  also  be  found  in  Doniol,  and  is  suffi- 
ciently discussed  in  the  above  chapter.  5.  At  the  close  of  his 
article  Professor  Van  Tyne  writes  thus:  It  seems  "clear  that 
Vergennes  did  not  invent  this  motive  for  the  alliance— the  idea  that 
France  was  confronted  by  the  dilemma  of  war  with  England  any- 
way .  .  .  merely  ...  to  get  the  consent  of  the  king  and  the 
other  ministers  to  the  plan  he  wished  to  pursue.  But  whether  it 
is  his  conviction  or  his  device,  the  idea  of  this  terrible  dilemma 
remains  the  reason  for  the  decision  of  the  French  cabinet."  These 
words  avoid  the  real  issue  on  several  accounts:  The  "terrible 
dilemma"  with  which  Vergenes  confronted  the  king  was  not  of  a 
war  with  England  simply — for  that  France,  backed  as  she  would 
have  been  by  Spain,  was  quite  ready  (see  following  chapter) — but 
of  a  hostile  English- American  coalition.  Again,  the  attitude  of 
the  cabinet  was  assured  from  the  first  (see  pp.  78-9,  85  supra),  and 
it  is  the  conversion  of  the  king  alone  which  Vergennes  finds  it 
worth  while  to  explain — in  terms  meant  for  the  ears  of  the 
Spanish  court — in  his  despatch  of  January  8.  See  Doniol,  II.  736. 
Finally,  since  the  American  alliance  was  the  work  of  Vergennes, 
it  is  the  underlying  reason  for  his  preference  that  we  really  need 
to  know.  Does  this  reason  connect  itself  primarily  with  the 
history  of  French-English  rivalry  for  colonial  dominion  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  or  with  the  history  of  French-English  rivalry 
for  influence  on  the  Continent  of  Europe?  That  is  the  interesting 
question.  See  further,  the  data  in  chapter  XVI,  infra. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  TREATY  OF  ALLIANCE  AND  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR 

The  steps  by  which  the  fascinated  monarch 
approached  the  decision  that  was  ultimately  to 
cost  him  his  crown  and  his  life  are  visible  in  the 
stages  by  which  the  Foreign  Office  and  the  Ameri- 
can commissioners  came  to  terms.  On  Decem- 
ber 6th  the  king  authorized  advances  to  the 
Americans  looking  to  a  good  understanding  be- 
tween the  new  republic,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
France  and  Spain,  on  the  other, — but  nothing 
more  definite.1  In  the  audience  that  he  ac- 
corded the  commissioners,  six  days  later,  in 
consequence  of  this  authorization,  Vergennes 
emphasized  the  fact  that  the  common  policy  of 
France  and  Spain  made  it  impossible  for  the  king 
to  agree  to  a  negotiation  without  the  concurrence 
of  his  uncle.  The  Americans  in  turn  indicated 
their  preference  for  a  simple  treaty  of  amity  and 
commerce  and  renewed  an  argument  they  had 
earlier  made,  that  such  an  engagement  would  not 
involve  the  two  crowns  in  war.  But  to  this  con- 

*Ib.,  625-6.  For  further  details  of  this  interview  and  of  the 
ensuing  negotiations,  see  Lee's  "Journal"  in  R.  H.  Lee's  Life  of 
Arthur  Lee,  I.  357-89. 


150  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

tention  Vergennes  demurred  strongly,  urging 
that  if  they  were  to  treat  at  all  "it  must  be  in 
good  faith"  and  on  such  foundations  of  justice 
that  the  resulting  ties  "would  have  all  the  solidity 
of  human  institutions."2 

Mid-December  came  the  rumor  that  Lord 
Germaine's  secretary  was  in  Paris,  and  Ver- 
gennes at  once  authorized  Gerard  to  go  to 
Passy  and  "make  glitter  before  his  [Deane's] 
eyes,  as  consented  to  in  advance,  everything 
necessary  to  keep  the  legation  in  the  lap  of 
France."3  On  December  17th,  accordingly, 
Gerard  brought  to  Passy  the  news  that  the 
king  had  decided  to  acknowledge  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  United  States,  to  enter  into  a  treaty 
of  amity  and  commerce  with  them,  and  to  sustain 
their  independence  by  all  the  means  at  his  dis- 
posal without  exacting  any  compensation  for  the 
risks  he  took,  "since,  besides  his  real  good- will  to 
us  and  our  cause,  it  was  manifestly  the  interest 
of  France  that  the  power  of  England  should  be 
diminished  by  our  separation  from  it."  Of  an 
active  alliance,  however,  Gerard  said  not  a  word. 
On  the  contrary,  according  to  the  united  testi- 
mony of  the  three  Americans  he  stated  explicitly 
that  the  king  would  "not  so  much  as  insist  that,  if 
he  engaged  in  a  war  with  England  on  our  account, 
we  should  not  make  a  separate  peace,"  the  only 

3Doniol,  II.  637-9. 
*Ib.,  647. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  151 

condition  being  "that  we,  in  no  peace  to  be  made 
with  England,  should  give  up  our  independence 
and  return  to  the  obedience  of  that  govern- 
ment."4 In  other  words,  while  recognition  of 
American  independence  had  been  decided  upon, 
the  question  of  an  alliance  was  still  in  abeyance. 
There  now  ensued  a  fortnight's  delay  while 
word  from  Madrid  was  being  awaited.  It  came 
the  last  day  of  the  year  and  was  unfavorable.5 
A  further  delay  of  a  week  was  set  against  the 
gout  of  the  aged  chief -minister.  Meantime,  the 
Americans  were  pressing  for  a  more  indicative 
sign  of  the  course  that  France  was  to  take,  and 
the  date  of  the  British  Parliament's  reassem- 
bling, January  20th,  was  drawing  nigh.  At  last, 
on  January  7th,  a  royal  council,  convened  at 
Versailles,  declared  unanimously  for  a  treaty  of 
amity  and  commerce  with  the  United  States,  and 
a  treaty  of  alliance  which  should  embody  the  fol- 
lowing features :  first,  it  should  become  operative 
only  upon  the  outbreak  of  war  between  France 
and  Great  Britain;  secondly,  it  should  have  for 
its  end  to  secure  the  "absolute  and  unlimited  inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States";  thirdly,  it 
should  stipulate  a  reciprocal  guarantee  of  the 
possessions  of  the  two  powers  in  North  America 
and  the  West  Indies ;  fourthly,  it  should  allow  the 
accession  of  either  party  to  it  to  a  treaty  of  peace 

4  Wharton,  II.  452-3. 

BDoniol,  II.  706,  footnote,  and  765-70. 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

with  the  common  enemy  only  upon  the  consent  of 
the  other;  lastly,  it  should  provide,  in  a  separate 
and  secret  article,  for  the  right  of  Spain  to  join 
the  alliance.6 

The  next  evening  Gerard  made  a  second  visit 
to  Passy.  Pledging  the  Americans  to  secrecy, 
he  began  by  repeating  much  of  what  he  had  said 
on  the  earlier  occasion,  inveighed  strongly 
against  a  curtailed  independence,  especially  as 
to  matters  of  commerce — saying  that  "clear- 
sighted people  had  perceived  this  to  be  a  com- 
mercial war  from  the  outset" — and  urged  that 
the  deputies  at  once  forego  every  appearance  of 
negotiating  with  their  enemy.  Franklin,  inter- 
rupting, inferred  that  war  would  be  begun  at 
once  by  the  king  upon  England,  but  Gerard 
answered  that  such  was  not  the  king's  plan,  that 
that  was  out  of  the  question.  He  then  asked  what 
the  deputies  would  consider  a  sufficient  induce- 
ment to  make  them  reject  all  propositions  from 
England  which  did  not  include  full  independence 
in  matters  of  trade  as  well  as  of  government ;  also 
what  terms  would  evoke  a  like  response  from  the 
American  Congress  and  people.  To  the  first 
question  the  envoys  returned  answer  on  the  spot: 
the  immediate  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  commerce 
and  alliance  would  close  their  ears  to  all  pro- 
posals not  providing  for  the  unqualified  indepen- 
dence of  the  United  States  both  political  and 

•76.,  729-30. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  153 

commercial.  Gerard  now  announced  that  he  was 
authorized  to  say  that  the  king  would  conclude 
such  an  arrangement  at  once,  in  the  form  of  two 
treaties,  one  a  commercial  treaty,  which  should 
go  into  effect  upon  ratification  and  should  be 
strictly  reciprocal,  and  the  other  an  eventual 
treaty  of  alliance.  He  then  referred  to  the  pos- 
sible conquest  of  the  American  continent  by  the 
United  States,  Deane  having  told  him  that 
Franklin  was  eager  for  this  and  indeed  found  in 
it  the  principal  reason  for  an  alliance  with 
France.  But  Gerard  indicated  that  he  was  un- 
certain how  far  His  Most  Christian  Majesty 
would  engage  to  cooperate  in  such  an  enterprise. 
He  also  let  them  know  that  he  now  spoke  for 
France  alone  and  not  for  Spain,  with  whom,  he 
implied,  they  would  have  to  come  to  terms  sep- 
arately,— an  announcement  which  disappointed 
Franklin  greatly.7 

Three  days  later  the  commissioners,  through 
Deane,  returned  Gerard  an  answer  to  his  second 
question.  It  was  a  demand  for  "an  immediate 
engagement"  on  the  part  of  France  "to  guarantee 
the  present  possessions  of  the  Congress  in  Amer- 
ica, with  such  others  as  they  may  acquire  on  the 

T  Gerard's  Narrative,  Jan.  9,  1778,  SMSS.,  No.  1831.  Note  that 
on  this  occasion,  as  on  that  of  his  earlier  visit  to  the  commissioners, 
Gerard's  chief  concern  was  to  make  sure,  not  that  the  Americans 
would  not  come  to  terms  with  England  before  making  a  treaty 
with  France,  but  that  they  would  not  come  to  terms  with  her  at 
any  time  on  any  other  basis  than  that  of  complete  independence. 


154  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

continent  during  the  war,  and  either  to  enter  into 
a  war  with  England  or  furnish  Congress  with 
the  money"  to  do  so,  until  "all  that  the  English 
now  possess  on  the  continent  shall  be  conquered" 
and  the  English  fisheries  be  secured  "to  the 
United  States  and  their  allies."8  From  this 
time  forward  the  principal  point  of  difference 
between  the  envoys  and  the  Foreign  Office  was 
whether  the  alliance  should  go  into  effect  at 
once  or  be  contingent  upon  the  outbreak  of  war 
between  France  and  Great  Britain,  the  desire  of 
the  Americans  being  to  see  the  guaranties  stipu- 
lated by  the  treaty  effective  at  once.  Though  they 
eventually  gave  way,  they  showed  themselves,  ac- 
cording to  Vergennes'  unexpectedly  pertinacious ; 
and  actually,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  their  concession 
was  immaterial.9  The  first  drafts  of  the  treaties 
had  been  handed  the  commissioners  by  Gerard 
on  January  18th;  the  final  drafts  were  signed 
February  6th.10 

•The  Deane  Papers,  II.  313-4;  SMSS.,  No.  796. 

•  See  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Jan.  16  and  30,  Doniol,  II.  774 
and  791;  SMSS.,  Nos.  1838  and  1853;  and  Lee's  "Journal,"  in  Lee's 
Lee,  I.  388. 

"The  text  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  is  given  in  Appendix  I. 
During  the  final  stages  of  the  negotiation,  the  Foreign  Office 
received  two  memoirs  that  may  have  had  some  part  in  inducing 
the  king  to  take  the  final  plunge.  One  of  these  came  from 
Broglie,  who,  arguing  that  England  "without  colonies  and  com- 
merce" would  be  without  a  marine  and  without  a  marine  would  be 
"henceforth  only  a  third-rate  power"  but  that  she  must  none  the 
less  now  concede  American  independence,  concluded  from  these 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  155 

From  the  negotiations  between  the  Foreign 
Office  and  Passy  we  turn  to  those  that  were  pro- 
ceeding synchronously  between  the  Foreign  Office 
and  the  Pardo ;  for  though  the  general  result  of 
this  correspondence  has  been  anticipated,  some 
of  the  details,  too,  are  of  interest.  Partially  mis- 
led perhaps  by  Aranda's  enthusiasm  for  a 
French- Spanish- American  alliance,  which  was 
redoubled  by  the  news  of  Saratoga,  partially 
misled  too,  it  may  be,  by  his  own  enthusiasm  for 

premises  that  she  would,  simply  in  an  effort  to  preserve  herself, 
attempt  to  appropriate  the  French  Antilles  and  portions  of  Span- 
ish America.  The  fact  that  Broglie  was  averse  to  any  but  a 
commercial  connection  with  the  United  States  may  have  given  his 
argument  additional  weight.  Doniol,  II.  673-82.  Beaumarchais' 
memoir  is  in  characteristic  vein.  One  of  its  principal  arguments 
is  the  assertion  that  Chatham  and  Shelburne  would  probably 
join  the  Tory  ministry  before  February  2nd.  Then  would  fol- 
low, it  was  possible,  American  independence  and  a  British- Ameri- 
can attack  on  the  French  West  Indies,  and  France  would  be 
the  laughing-stock  of  Europe.  To  meet  this  situation,  the  king 
should  at  once  declare  openly  that  he  recognized  American  inde- 
pendence. The  document  thus  foreshadows  the  action  taken 
early  in  March,  in  declaring  the  Treaty  of  Amity  and  Com- 
merce, in  which  connection  it  should  be  compared  with  Vergennes' 
despatch  of  January  23rd  to  Montmorin,  written  the  day  follow- 
ing the  presentation  of  the  memoir.  The  memoir  will  be  found 
in  Doniol,  II.  841-7,  and  SMSS.,  No.  1814.— A  circumstance  tend- 
ing to  prolong  the  negotiations  was  the  difficulty  that  arose  be- 
tween Lee  and  the  Foreign  Office  over  the  Xlth  and  Xllth  articles 
of  the  Treaty  of  Commerce.  It  was  eventually  agreed  that  Con- 
gress should  pass  upon  these  articles  separately;  and  Congress 
exercised  its  option  by  rejecting  them.  See  J.  T.  Morse,  Benjamin 
Franklin  (American  Statesmen  Series),  277  ff.;  also  Wharton,  II. 
477-85  passim. 


156  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

the  enf  eeblement  of  England,  but  also  finding  it 
the  better  policy  to  show  a  confident  front  on  this 
question  that  was  quite  in  contrast  with  his  pessi- 
mism in  the  matter  of  British  intentions,  Ver- 
gennes  professed  to  believe,  as  long  as  he  could 
plausibly  do  so,  that  His  Catholic  Majesty  could 
be  brought  into  line  quite  promptly  with  what- 
ever policy  toward  the  Americans  His  Most 
Christian  Majesty  should  adopt  for  the  security 
of  the  House  of  Bourbon  and  its  possessions. 
The  aged  Ossun,  who  had  long  since  shown 
himself  quite  unable  to  hold  his  own  with  Florida 
Blanea,  had  now  been  superseded  at  Madrid  by 
the  Count  de  Montmorin,  a  personal  friend  of  the 
king  and  admirer  and  confidant  of  Vergennes. 
Privately  the  secretary  tried  to  stir  the  am- 
bition of  the  young  diplomat  by  a  portrayal  of  the 
unique  opportunity  offered  by  the  existing 
situation.  It  was  an  opportunity  that  could  not 
often  recur,  especially  since,  "if  we  come  out  of 
it  successfully  I  hope  we  shall  have  quiet  for  a 
long  time."11  "Take  for  your  motto,"  he  accord- 
ingly exhorted,  "and  make  them  adopt  it: 
Aut  nunc  aut  numquam"  "Let  Spain  give  her 
word  and  the  good  word  and  we  shall  anticipate 
England."  If,  however,  contrary  to  all  expec- 
tations, we  should  neglect  "the  most  interesting 
conjecture  that  heaven  could  present  us,  the 
reproaches  of  the  present  generation  and  of  the 

11  Same  to  same,  "Prive,"  Dec.  13,  SMSS.,  No.  1775. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  157 

generations  to  come  will  accuse  us  forever  of  our 
culpable  indifference."12 

To  all  such  pleadings  the  astute  Spaniard 
turned  a  heedless  ear.  He  was  willing  to  give 
abundant  money  succor  to  the  colonies  under 
"the  express  condition  of  an  inviolable  secrecy" ; 
also  to  offer  them  "protection"  should  they  need 
it,  "provided  they  conducted  themselves  with 
loyalty  and  prudence";  and  he  admitted  that  an 
alert  attention  ought  to  be  given  to  the  current 
vicissitudes  of  the  various  English  parties,  espe- 
cially so  far  as  these  might  affect  the  American 
question.13  For  the  rest,  however,  he  was  as  in- 
tractable as  ever:  The  existing  British  ministry 
would  never  incur  the  odium  of  proposing  inde- 
pendence for  the  Americans  and  the  Americans 
would  now  never  take  less.  There  was,  therefore, 
no  danger  of  an  English-American  coalition 
unless  the  British  should  be  spurred  to  extreme 
measures  by  the  efforts  of  France  to  win  over  the 
Americans.  For  France  and  Spain  to  recognize 
American  independence  was  quite  unnecessary, 
since  their  interest  attached  the  insurgents  to  the 
two  crowns  anyway.  His  Catholic  Majesty  had 
an  unconquerable  repugnance  to  recognizing 
American  independence  and  the  prejudices  of  a 
man  of  sixty-two  were  not  easily  uprooted.  The 

"Doniol,  II.  644-5. 

13  Florida  Blanca  to  Moirtmorin,  Dec.  23,  ib.,  695,  fn.  2. 


158  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

abasement  of  England  was  no  object  to  Spain.14 
Coming  to  the  Pardo  one  day  late  in  Decem- 
ber, Montmorin  was  informed  that  a  despatch 
just  received  from  Aranda  showed  the  govern- 
ment at  Versailles  to  be  already  in  negotiation 
with  the  Americans.  Montmorin  had  not  received 
word  to  this  effect  and  believed  that  the  infor- 
mation was  false,  but  he  decided  not  to  contradict 
it  at  first  because  he  wanted  to  see  what  the  effect 
would  be  if  the  case  really  were  as  Aranda  had 
stated.  He  soon  discovered,  for  the  Spanish 
minister,  in  a  mounting  rage,  denounced  the 
folly,  inconsiderateness,  and  precipitancy  of 
France's  policy  to  his  heart's  content.  When  the 
storm  had  a  little  abated,  the  young  Frenchman 
said:  "You  will  be  astonished  to  learn  that  far 
from  having  begun  with  the  Americans,  despite 
the  urgency  of  the  case  .  .  .  the  king  awaits  .  .  . 
the  advice  of  his  uncle."  For  a  moment  Florida 
Blanca  was  taken  aback,  but  soon  recovered  suffi- 
ciently to  resume  his  reproaches:  Only  the  year 
before  Spain  had  been  ready  for  war  and  France 
had  backed  down.  Again,  it  was  France  that  had 
left  Spain  in  the  lurch  in  1762.  To  treat  with 
the  Americans  was  equivalent  to  declaring  war  on 
England.  However,  if  Spain  did  enter  the  war 
she  "would  not  be  the  first  to  ask  for  peace." 
"Before  asking  for  it  she  would  sell  her  last  shirt," 

"Florida  Blanca  to  Aranda,  Dec.  23,  ib.,  765-70;  Mortmorin  to 
Vergennes,  same  date,  ib.,  700. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  159 

to  which  Montmorin  rejoined  pleasantly  that  he 
hoped  it  was  the  English  who  would  have  to  sell 
their  shirts.15 

But  if  the  young  ambassador  thought  that  he 
had  drawn  his  enemy's  fire  against  the  day  when 
he  would  have  to  tell  the  whole  truth  about  his 
government's  policy  he  was  much  mistaken. 
Louis'  decision  to  ally  himself  with  the  Ameri- 
cans was  communicated  to  Charles  in  a  note  from 
the  royal  hand  under  date  of  January  8th,16 
which  Montmorin  transmitted  nineteen  days 
later, — a  delay  that  is  to  be  credited  to  the  finesse 
of  the  French  secretary,  who,  it  may  be  conjec- 
tured, did  not  wish  news  of  the  Pardo's  reaction 
to  Versailles'  decision  until  the  latter  had  been  put 
beyond  recall.  The  Spanish  minister's  reception 
of  the  news  was  most  dramatic.  The  intensity  of 
his  emotion  displayed  itself  in  both  countenance 
and  gesture.  To  contradict  or  oppose  him  was  in 
vain.  "He  trembled  in  all  his  body  and  had  the 
greatest  difficulty  in  the  world  in  expressing  him- 
self." "You  think,"  said  he  finally,  "this  moment 
a  most  auspicious  one  for  the  two  crowns ;  I  think 
it  the  most  fatal  for  Spain;  but  it  would  be  the 
fairest  day  of  my  life  if  the  king  would  let  me  re- 
tire." Next  day  Montmorin  visited  the  king  who, 
he  soon  perceived,  shared  his  minister's  feelings  to 
the  full.  His  Majesty  voiced  in  solemn  tones 

15  76.,  696-9. 
"Z6.,  713-4. 


160  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

his  affection  for  his  nephew  and  his  concern  for 
the  peril  in  which  Spain  found  herself.17 

Yet  in  the  days  following  both  monarch  and 
minister  recovered  something  of  their  equanimity 
in  apparent  resignation  to  accomplished  fact. 
They  were,  moreover,  counting  on  the  ostensible 
disposition  of  France  at  the  moment  not  to  antici- 
pate events  further.  Vergennes'  original  pro- 
gram had  been  to  secure  Spain's  assent  to  the 
general  principle  of  an  alliance  with  the  United 
States  and  then  to  leave  the  two  powers  ample 
time  to  make  their  own  terms  with  one  another.18 
This  course  he  had  indeed  abandoned  when  he  en- 
tered upon  negotiations  with  the  Americans,  but 
the  Treaty  of  Alliance  itself  still  carefully  safe- 
guarded in  Spain's  interest  the  margin  of  time  be- 
tween its  signature  and  the  anticipated  outbreak 
of  war  with  Great  Britain.19  Furthermore,  as 
Florida  Blanca  analyzed  the  motives  probably 
governing  the  British  cabinet,  this  interval  was 
not  unlikely  to  be  a  considerable  one,  provided 
only  the  initiative  were  in  future  left  with  that 
body.  Thus  guaranteed,  as  he  thought,  the  spa- 
cious tomorrows  so  dear  to  the  Spanish  heart,  His 
Catholic  Majesty's  minister  began  early  in  Feb- 
ruary gradually  unfolding  the  expectations  of 

"  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  Jan.  28,  ib.,  750-2.  See  also  Florida 
Blanca  to  Aranda,  Jan.  27,  ib.,  748-50. 

M"Les  epoques  de  1'Espagne  seront  les  notres,"  Vergennes  to 
Montmorin,  Dec.  11,  ib.,  636.  See  also  ib.,  637-8  and  644. 

19  See  the  separate  and  secret  article  in  Appendix  I. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  161 

Spain.  "The  Spaniards,"  wrote  Montmorin  in 
comment,  "are  a  little  like  children.  They  can  be 
interested  only  by  presenting  shining  objects  to 
their  gaze."  The  Spaniard  on  the  other  hand 
complained  that  France's  moderation  had  hope- 
lessly prejudiced  his  case  from  the  outset.  He 
did,  however,  venture  to  indicate  the  restoration 
of  the  Floridas  and  a  share  in  the  Newfoundland 
fisheries  as  possible  objects  of  ambition  to 
Spain.20 

But  while  Florida  Blanca  was  just  beginning 
his  bidding  in  a  game  which  he  evidently  expected 
to  be  a  leisurely  one,  Vergennes  was  coming  to 
the  conclusion  that  by  France  and  England  at 
least  aD  cards  must  soon  be  boarded, — a  conclu- 
sion to  which  he  was  undoubtedly  assisted  by  an 
interview  he  had  with  the  British  ambassador  on 
January  22nd.  Stormont  initiated  the  conversa- 
tion by  taxing  the  secretary  with  reports  in  circu- 
lation about  Paris  of  active  military  preparations 
going  on  at  certain  French  ports.  Vergennes, 
showing  embarrassment,  disavowed  any  knowl- 
edge of  these,  whereupon  Stormont  brought  for- 
ward the  report,  which  "gains  ground  every  day," 
of  a  treaty  or  convention  with  the  rebels  or  "at 
least"  of  France's  "having  accepted  some  pro- 
posals from  them."  Vergennes  now  became  more 
embarrassed  than  the  Englishman  had  ever  seen 

30  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  Feb.  2,  5,  9,  16,  26,  paraphrased  in 
Doniol,  II.  795-8. 


162  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

him,  "played  with  his  fingers  and  remained  quite 
silent,"  whereupon  the  relentless  Stormont  pro- 
ceeded: "Your  Excellency,  who  was  so  long  a 
foreign  minister  .  .  .  certainly  knew  how  to  ob- 
serve the  silence  as  well  as  the  language  of  those 
you  treated  with.  You  will  allow  me  to  follow 
that  example."  He  then  cited  an  interview  of 
the  previous  month  in  which  the  secretary  had  met 
a  similar  report  with  a  hearty  denial,  which  was 
no  doubt  truthful.  But  on  the  present  occasion, 
he  continued,  being  unwilling  "to  stoop  to  false- 
hood .  .  .  [you]  did  not  answer  a  single  sylla- 
ble." Vergennes  now  sought  retreat  behind  a 
distinction  between  "Lord  Stormont"  and  "the 
British  ambassador":  when  the  former  had  jocu- 
larly questioned  "the  Count  de  Vergennes"  about 
the  current  rumors  of  an  American  treaty,  "the 
Count  de  Vergennes"  had  been  free  to  respond 
with  candor,  but  when  "the  British  ambassador" 
seriously  questioned  "the  secretary  of  state"  on 
so  important  a  matter,  the  latter  before  answer- 
ing must  first  obtain  the  views  of  his  royal  mas- 
ter.21 Certainly,  a  rather  lame  evasion.  But 
what  was  even  more  ominous,  though  "Lord 
Stormont"  continued  malignantly  to  pester  "the 
Count  de  Vergennes"  with  unwelcome  questions, 
"the  British  ambassador"  carefully  refrained 
from  pressing  inquiries  "a  categorical  answer  to 

21  Stormont  to  Weymouth,  Jan.  22,  SMSS.,  No.  1846;  Vergennes 
to  Noailles,  Jan.  24,  Doniol,  II.  792-3. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  163 


which  .  .  .  would  probably  lead  to  the  most  ser- 
ious consequences."22 

In  other  words,  not  only  was  it  evident  that  the 
British  government  took  it  for  granted  that  a 
treaty  existed  between  France  and  America,  but 
also  that  it  desired  to  conceal  the  fact;  and,  of 
course,  the  inference  was  inevitable  that,  if  con- 
cealment was  calculated  to  promote  England's 
plans,  it  could  not  be  a  good  thing  for  France.23 
Moreover,  the  unsatisfactory  answer  that  the 
American  envoys  had,  on  January  llth,  returned 
to  Gerard's  second  question  had,  naturally,  not 
been  forgotten;  while  the  fact  that,  if  the  Treaty 
of  Alliance  was  eventual  as  to  France  it  was  the 
same  as  to  Congress  also,  could  not  be  ignored. 
Lastly,  Vergennes,  recalling  no  doubt  some  of 
his  own  experiences  with  legislative  bodies  on  the 
Continent,  began  to  apprehend  the  possible  ef- 

28  Stormont  to  Weymouth,  Jan.  28,  SMSS.,  No.  1851 ;  Vergennes 
to  Montmorin,  Jan.  30,  ib.,  No.  1853. 

28  Wentworth,  had  written,  as  early  as  Dec.  29,  in  the  most  posi- 
tive terms,  of  the  decision  of  France  and  Spain  to  support  Ameri- 
can independence  (SMSS.,  No.  722),  but  this  was  obviously  mere 
guesswork  on  his  part;  and  little  credence  seems  to  have 
been  given  by  George  III  to  his  reports  (Donne,  II.  109, 
121).  As  late  as  Jan.  13  George  is  still  confident  that  the  French 
ministers  want  peace  (ib.,  118),  but  by  Feb.  9,  he  has  changed  his 
opinion  (ib.,  133)  and  has  come  to  recognize,  in  consequence,  the 
need  of  offering  some  measure  of  conciliation  to  America,  a  thing 
he  had  previously  opposed,  apparently.  In  a  letter  of  Feb.  23, 
Gibbon  says  that  treaties  were  signed  at  Paris  with  the  Americans 
on  the  5th  of  the  month. 


164  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

feet  of  British  gold  on  the  loyalty  of  Congress.24 
Vergennes'  determination  to  force  develop- 
ments is  made  clear  in  his  despatch  of  January 
23rd,  and  again  in  that  of  January  30th.25 
In  the  latter  he  gives  renewed  assurance  of  the 
secrecy  of  the  French  government  and  the  Amer- 
ican commissioners,  but  argues  that  as  soon  as 
the  treaties  reach  America  the  news  of  them  will 
speedily  become  public.  From  this  he  concludes 
that  it  will  be  necessary  for  the  king  to  proclaim 
the  Treaty  of  Amity  and  Commerce  by  the  end  of 
April  or  the  first  of  May,  that  is,  several  weeks 
before  the  Mexican  fleet  will  have  reached  Spain. 
He  accordingly  offers  Spain  the  loan  of  ten  ves- 
sels of  war  for  her  Cadiz  squadron  and  to  make 
sure  the  safe  return  of  the  treasure  fleet. 

Not  only,  however,  did  the  Spanish  minister 
sulkily  decline  the  proffered  war  craft,  he  also 
showed  himself  quite  determined  not  to  quicken 
his  pace  in  negotiation,26  thus  stressing  anew  the 
precarious  situation  in  which  France  now  found 
herself,  with  the  old  love  off  and  the  new  one  not 
yet  securely  on.  True,  the  Treaty  of  Amity  and 
Commerce  constituted  a  pledge  of  American 
friendship,  but  so  long  as  Spain  remained  aloof, 
something  more  than  this  was  wanted;  while,  on 

*•  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  repeating  a  rumor  that  the  English 
government  was  sending  500,000  guineas  to  America  to  pave  the 
way  for  a  negotiation,  Doniol,  II.  802,  footnote. 

*/&.,  738-9,  footnote,  and  789-92;  SMSS.,  Nos.  1847  and  1853. 

29  See  note  11,  above. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  165 

the  other  hand,  England,  now  aware  of  the  ex- 
istence of  a  treaty  between  France  and  the 
United  States,  might  at  any  moment  offer  the 
latter  their  independence,  which  offer  the  Amer- 
icans were  still  free  to  accept,  and  then  withdraw 
from  the  war.27  On  February  17th  Lord  North 
introduced  his  plan  of  conciliation  into  Parlia- 
ment. It  undoubtedly  fell  a  long  way  short  of 
according  the  colonies  independence,  but  there 
was,  of  course,  the  constant  possibility  of  its 
being  further  modelled  on  that  idea.28  The  same 
day,  moreover,  a  colloquy  occurred  in  the  House 
of  Commons  between  Fox  and  Grenville  on  the 
one  hand  and  Lord  North  on  the  other  which 
furnished  additional  evidence  that  the  British 
ministry  was  well  informed  of  the  subsisting 
relations  between  France  and  America  but  pre- 
ferred to  keep  the  matter  hidden  for  the  time 
being.29 

"See  art.  I  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance. 

38  Parliamentary  History,  XIX.  762  ff.;  "Instructions  to  the 
Earl  of  Carlisle,"  etc.,  Apr.  19,  17T8,  SMSS.,  No.  440.  "Upon  the 
subject  of  commercial  regulations,"  runs  this  document,  "the 
prevailing  principle  has  always  been  to  secure  a  monopoly  of 
American  commerce."  If  these  ancient  restraints  were  to  be 
abolished,  then  certain  new  ones  must  be  stipulated  in  their 
place.  That,  however,  was  a  matter  for  Parliament,  but  before 
it  was  considered,  representatives  from  the  colonies  would  be 
admitted  to  that  body.  Evidently  there  was  no  intention  of 
surrendering  the  old  commercial  system  without  a  further  struggle. 
See  further  SMSS.,  Nos.  359-63  and  Part.  Hist.,  XIX.  379,  577, 
and  942. 

9  Parliamentary  History,  XIX.  769,  774-5.     There  was  also  in- 


166  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

On  March  7th  Louis  approved  a  declaration  of 
the  Treaty  of  Amity  and  Commerce  between 
France  and  "the  independent  States  of  America," 

creasing  tension  between  the  two  governments  at  this  time  on 
account  of  certain  of  England's  naval  measures.  In  Vergennes' 
despatch  of  Feb.  21st  occurs  the  following  passage  that  has  an 
obvious  pertinency  to  recent  questions  between  the  United  States 
and  certain  of  the  present  European  belligerents:  "Vous  lui  [Lord 
Suffolk]  ferez  sentir  .  .  .  que  le  droit  des  gens,  les  trait6s  et 
surtout  la  dignit6  de  la  Couronne  de  France  ne  sauroient  d6pendre 
des  circonstances  ou  peut  se  trouver  la  Grande-Bretagne."  Doniol, 
II.  806.  Vergennes  was  evidently  now  coming  around  to  the  view 
that  England  meant  to  attack  France  first,  or  to  force  France  to 
attack  her,  and  then  press  negotiations  in  America,  ib.,  744  fn. 
2,  and  803-5.  Another  circumstance  that  may  have  influenced 
Vergennes  in  deciding  to  precipitate  developments  with  England 
is  the  belief  which  he  may  have  formed  at  this  time  that  Arthur 
Lee  was  acting  the  spy  for  the  British  government.  Doniol  gives 
a  paper  said  to  be  in  Vergennes'  own  hand  and  endorsed  thus: 
"Extrait  d'une  lettre  de  M.  Arthur  Lee  a  Md.  Shelburne,  £crite 
imm6diatement  apres  la  signature  du  trait6  entre  la  France  et  les 
Etats-Unis  de  l'Am6rique."  The  passage  in  question  informs 
Shelburne  that  the  treaty  is  about  to  be  signed  and  that  England 
will  have  to  make  haste  if  she  is  to  prevent  the  alliance  of  France 
and  the  United  States.  Doniol,  III.  169;  Wharton,  I.  639.  The 
letter  referred  to  was  probably  the  work  of  Lee's  secretary  Thorn- 
ton, who  was  undoubtedly  a  British  spy;  see  data  in  Whar- 
ton, I.  659-61  (§  207).  Again,  it  may  not  have  been  known 
to  Vergennes  as  early  as  March  7,  1778.  But  in  this  connection, 
the  memoir  of  Beaumarchais  to  Vergennes  of  March  13,  1778, 
is  important.  An  early  paragraph  of  this  document  contains  the 
following  charge:  "Son  plan  [Lee's  plan]  ay  ant  tou  jours  6t6 
de  pr6f6rer,  entre  la  France  et  1'Angleterre,  la  puissance  qui  le 
m£nerait  plus  surement  a  la  fortune,  1'Angleterre,  a  pour  lui  des 
avantages  reconnus;  il  s'en  a  souvent  expliqu6  dans  les  soupers 
libertins,"  Deane  Papers,  II.  392.  For  Beaumarchais'  interest  in 
attempting  to  discredit  Lee,  see  Moncure  D.  Conway  in  the  A  the- 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  167 

which  Noailles  deposited  with  the  British  foreign 
office  six  days  later.30  The  purpose  of  the  move 
was  threefold;  first,  to  forestall  any  tampering 
with  Congress  by  British  agents,  by  making  the 
American  public  aware  that  France  had  recog- 
nized American  independence;  secondly,  to 

naewn  for  1900,  I.  305.  Lee's  loyalty  to  the  Alliance  is,  in  fact, 
above  suspicion.  See  Wharton,  I.  525-50;  also  Ballagh's  Letters 
of  R.  H.  Lee,  II.  132-42;  also  Lee's  own  "Journal."  But  the 
matters  above  detailed  go,  of  course,  to  explain  the  distrust  hence- 
forth manifested  by  Vergennes  and  his  representatives  toward  Lee, 
and  to  a  less  extent  toward  his  relative,  R.  H.  Lee.  See  infra. 

^Doniol,  II.  820-6.  See  also  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Mar.  6 
and  10,  for  statement  of  motives,  %b.t  810-2  and  813-8.  In  the  latter 
we  find  Vergennes  reiterating  the  argument  that,  whatever  course 
France  took,  war  was  inevitable:  "Je  pense  .  .  .  que  quelque  parti 
que  nous  prennions,  de  moderation,  de  force,  ou  meme  de  foiblesse, 
nous  ne  pouvons  plus  eviter  la  guerre.  Ce  ne  seront  ni  nos 
engagemens  avec  l'Am£rique  ni  les  secours  que  nous  pouvons  lui 
avoir  donn^es  qui  nous  la  procureront;  c'est  la  de"route  de  Bur- 
goyne  qui  Fa  preparee  et  d6cidee.  Le  ministre  anglois  a  senti  au 
moment  meme  ou  cet  ev^nement  a  eclatt6  que  la  continuation  de 
la  guerre  pour  soumettre  les  Ame"ricains  devenait  impossible,  mais 
pour  detourner  Panimadversion  de  sa  nation  de  dessus  sa  mauvaise 
conduite,  il  nous  a  destines  deslors  a  etre  les  objets  de  la  haine 
nationale  et  de  sa  vengeance  particuliere."  However,  he  continues 
thus:  "Je  crois  bien  qu'il  la  suspendroit  volontiers  pour  peu  de 
terns  jusqu'a  ce  qu'il  cut  celui  terminer  avec  les  Etats-Unis  .  .  .  ; 
pourvu  toutefois  que  nous  consentions  a  deVor£r  dans  le  silence 
les  afronts  multiplies  .  .  .  ;  mais  independam't  que  ce  sisteme 
passif  et  honteux  ne  peut  6tre  celui  d'une  grande  puissance,  fer- 
merons  nous  les  yeux  a  I'int6ret  majeur  que  nous  avons  d'empecher 
et  preVenir  une  reconciliation  et  une  coalition  entre  1'Angleterre  et 
l'Am£rique  qui  uniroit  ces  deux  nations  dans  un  meme  sisteme  de 
paix  et  de  guerre?"  Such  is  the  final  form  of  the  secretary's 
apology  for  his  program:  ib.,  816. 


168  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

hasten  the  breach  between  France  and  England 
which  it  was  felt  the  former's  recognition  of 
American  independence  must  produce,  with  a 
view  to  making  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  operative ; 
thirdly,  to  associate  America  in  an  act  flouting 
British  dignity  in  a  way  to  anticipate  and  pre- 
vent any  proffer  by  England  of  independence  to 
the  United  States.31  Fearful  that  the  British 
government  would  still  endeavor  to  conceal  the 
insulting  intelligence,  Noailles  was  also  instructed 
to  drop  a  hint  of  it  in  private  conversation.32 
On  March  19th,  Stormont  left  Paris  and  Noailles 
London;33  and  the  American  commissioners, 
after  being  presented  at  court,  dined  with  Ver- 
gennes.34  Nine  days  later,  Louis,  addressing 

81  In  this  connection  see  Chatham's  words  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  May  30,  1777,  Parliamentary  History,  XIX.  319.  Also,  com- 
pare the  attitude  of  the  Rockinghams  and  that  of  Chatham  when 
the  French-American  treaty  became  known.  The  former  wished  to 
grant  independence  immediately,  but  the  latter  contended  that 
national  honor  forbade.  See  his  last  speech,  that  of  Apr.  6,  1778. 
So  long  of  course  as  it  was  not  generally  known  that  the  British 
government  knew  of  the  French-American  treaty,  North  was  free 
to  offer  America  what  terms  he  chose.  And  anyway,  even  if 
England  should  choose  to  pocket  her  pride  and  recognize  American 
independence,  she  would  plainly  have  done  so  because  France  had 
forced  her  to  it  and  the  latter  power  would  have  America's 
gratitude.  Doniol,  II.  815. 

32  Ib.,  826. 

33  "The  French  message  was  deemed  so  ironic  and  insulting  that 
at  night  orders  were  sent  to  Lord  Stormont  to  leave  France  di- 
rectly without  taking  leave,  and  M.  Noailles  was  acquainted  with 
that  step,  that  he   might   retire   too,"   Last  Journals   of  Horace 
Walpole,  II.  224.     See  also  Doniol,  II.  828-38. 

'"See  G6rard  to  the  Commissioners,  Mar.  17,  Wharton,  II.  516. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  169 

two  letters  to  his  "Very  Dear  and  Great  Friends 
and  Allies,"  informed  Congress,  in  the  one,  that 
he  had  appointed  M.  Gerard  "to  reside  near  you 
in  quality  of  our  minister  plenipotentiary";  and 
in  the  other,  that  he  was  sending  a  fleet  under  the 
Count  d'Estaing  <<rto  endeavor  to  destroy  the 
English  forces  upon  the  shores  of  North  Amer- 
ica."35 The  first  hostile  blows  were  passed  on 
the  evening  of  June  17th  between  a  French  fri- 
gate and  two  English  vessels  off  Ushant.36 

Thus  step  by  step  did  Vergennes  lead  his  halt- 
ing monarch  into  war  in  behalf  of  American  inde- 
pendence. Yet  even  before  the  American  treaties 
had  been  drafted,  the  Continental  peace  upon 
which  the  success  of  the  design  hinged  had  been 
brought  into  jeopardy  by  the  appearance  of  the 
question  of  the  Bavarian  Succession.37  For  our 
purposes  it  is  sufficient  to  know  that  upon  the 
death  of  the  Elector  Maximilian  Joseph,  his  suc- 
cessor made  a  treaty  in  January,  1778,  recogniz- 
ing certain  claims  of  Austria  to  lower  Bavaria  and 
upper  Palatinate,  and  that  Frederick  II  had 
promptly  interfered  in  the  name  of  other  heirs  to 
the  lands  involved  to  prevent  this  treaty's  being 
carried  out.  France  was  thus  confronted  with  a 
difficult  alternative.  Her  traditional  policy  and 


35  76.  521-2. 

M  Doniol,  III.  147-8. 


"See  Vergennes  to  Noailles,  Jan.  17,  Doniol,  II.  745-6  and  foot- 
notes; SMSS.,  No.  1839. 


170  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

her  position  as  guarantor  of  the  Treaty  of  West- 
phalia required  that  she  should  side  with  Prussia. 
But  if  she  did  this  she  ran  the  imminent  risk  of 
throwing  Austria  into  the  lap  of  England  once 
more,  which  would  be  the  first  step,  perhaps,  in 
producing  a  Continental  conflagration.  Never- 
theless, Vergennes  decided  to  follow  the  line  dic- 
tated by  the  Systeme  de  Conservation  and  to 
throw  France's  weight  in  with  the  lesser  claimants. 
Fortunately  he  was  able  to  count  on  the  peaceful 
inclinations  of  Maria  Theresa  and  to  draw  the 
czarina  to  France's  side.  The  Treaty  of  Teschen 
(May,  1779),  which  excluded  Austria  from  all 
but  a  small  district  of  Bavaria  and  yet  left  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  intact  was  a  great  triumph 
for  the  secretary's  diplomacy  and  should  be  re- 
garded as  signalizing  the  restoration  of  France 
to  something  like  her  former  influence  in  Conti- 
nental affairs.38 

And  while  he  was  thus  saving  one  situation, 
Vergennes  was  creating  another,  more  propitious 
one.  In  asserting  the  right  of  France  to  receive 
American  vessels  in  her  ports  because  of  the  bel- 
ligerent character  of  the  provinces  in  revolt 
against  Great  Britain,  and  of  the  right  of  French 
merchants  to  send  goods  to  America  and  to  re- 
ceive them  thence,  Vergennes  had  had  occasion  to 
revive  and  to  define  with  new  precision  those 

MLavisse,  Histoire  de  France,  IX.1  98-100,  109-10;  Doniol,  III. 
Ch.  3. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  171 

principles  of  the  Law  of  Nations  which  the  neu- 
tral states  of  Europe  had  long  pitted  against  the 
harsher  rules  that  England  supported;  and  in 
articles  XXIII-XXVIII,  of  the  Treaty  of 
Amity  and  Commerce,  the  opportunity  had  been 
seized  to  give  these  principles  formal  and  summary 
statement.  Here  one  will  find  asserted  the  prin- 
ciple that  "Free  ships  make  free  goods";  also, 
rules  restricting  the  belligerent  right  of  visit  and 
search  within  narrowest  compass;  also,  a  stipu- 
lated contraband  list  confining,  for  the  most  part, 
the  prohibitions  imposed  in  the  case  of  such  goods, 
to  munitions  of  war.  Then  on  July  28th,  the 
French  government  issued  a  Reglement  which  to 
a  reiteration  of  the  above  principles  added  the 
principle  that  a  blockade  to  be  binding  must  be 
effective.  These  principles,  neutral  states  were 
informed,  France  voluntarily  agreed  to  observe 
for  the  ensuing  six  months  for  the  benefit  of  all 
neutral  states,  and  thereafter,  for  the  benefit  of 
all  such  states  as  were  prepared  to  force  England 
to  observe  the  same  principles  with  reference  to 
themselves.  The  declaration  was,  in  other  words, 
a  clever  bid  for  neutral  pressure  upon  Great  Bri- 
tain to  force  her  to  surrender  her  more  aggressive 
rules.  But  neutral  states  were  wary,  and  until 
1780  the  declaration  met  with  only  a  very  quali- 
fied success.  Early  in  this  year,  however,  the 
czarina,  angered  by  the  seizure  of  some  Russian 
vessels  by  the  Spanish,  issued  a  declaration  of  her 


172  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

own  which  followed  very  closely  the  lines  of  its 
French  predecessor;  and  let  it  be  known,  more- 
over, that  she  was  prepared  to  back  up  her 
principles  by  force  of  arms.  At  Vergennes' 
instigation  both  the  French  and  Spanish  govern- 
ments immediately  announced  their  acceptance 
of  this  declaration,  while  the  English  government 
held  back.  The  czarina  who  had  hitherto  lent  her 
sympathies  to  England,  now  transferred  them  to 
the  Bourbon  powers.  The  result  was  the  First 
League  of  Neutrals,  which,  comprising  practi- 
cally all  the  neutral  powers  of  Europe,  announced 
its  intention  of  supporting  for  the  benefit  of  its 
several  members  the  principles  of  maritime  war- 
fare which  had  found  formulation  in  the  Regle- 
ment  of  July,  1778.  To  the  war  which  began  as 
a  war  for  American  nationality  and  French 
prestige  was  thus  imparted  the  more  universal 
character  of  a  war  for  the  freedom  of  the  seas.39 

"Lavisse,  loc.  cit.,  111-12;  Doniol,  III.  Ch.  12;  IV.  Ch.  8;  Paul 
Fauchille,  La  Diplomatic  frangaise  et  la  Ligue  des  Neutres  (Paris, 
1893).  For  the  Czarina's  Declaration  and  the  responses  to  it  of 
the  courts  of  London,  Paris  and  Madrid,  see  the  Annual  Register, 
for  1780,  pp.  347  ff. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

SPANISH    MEDIATION    AND    THE    CONVENTION 
OF  ARANJUEZ 

To  have  affixed  to  France's  assault  upon  the 
British  Empire  a  character  that  was  ultimately 
to  attract  the  moral  support  of  all  Europe  and 
to  have  preserved  the  indispensable  condition  of 
success  for  France,  peace  on  the  Continent,  were 
notable  achievements  for  Vergennes'  diplomacy. 
Even  so,  so  long  as  Spain  remained  a  mere  on- 
looker of  the  struggle,  the  secretary  regarded  his 
war  program  as  lacking  a  vital  element.  For  one 
thing,  he  must  show  Europe  that  French  and 
Spanish  policy  still  marched  abreast ;  for  another 
thing,  the  condition  of  the  royal  finances  coun- 
selled a  quick,  decisive  war.  To  Florida  Blanca's 
frank  notification  that  Spain  would  never  shoul- 
der the  risk  and  expense  of  war  merely  for  the 
intangible  and  highly  speculative  benefits  to  flow 
from  the  enfeeblement  of  England  and  a  read- 
justment of  the  balance  of  power  he  had,  as  we 
have  seen,  lent  a  heedful  ear  for  some  time.  Un- 
fortunately, before  it  had  been  possible  for  the 
Foreign  Office  "to  penetrate  Spain's  desires," 

173 


174  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

the  situation  had  developed  which  had  forced 
France  to  break  with  England;  and  the  result 
of  this  step,  in  turn,  was  a  new  obstacle  to  Span- 
ish cooperation  that  was  quite  as  formidable  as 
any  of  those  which  it  reinforced. 

The  keynote  of  French- Spanish  negotiations 
throughout  the  spring  and  early  summer  of  1778 
is  furnished  by  the  ever  recurrent  reference  in 
Montmorin's  despatches  to  "the  wounded  amour- 
propre"  of  the  Catholic  king.  Louis  had  taken 
action  vitally  affecting  the  joint  interests  of  the 
two  crowns  not  only  without  awaiting  the  assent 
of  his  uncle,  but  even  without  making  a  plausible 
show  of  consulting  him.  Darkly  ruminating  this 
fact  Charles  concluded  that  his  nephew  had  come 
to  regard  Spain  as  standing  in  some  sort  of  vice- 
royalty  to  France,  from  which  it  followed  that 
Spain's  first  duty  was  to  herself,  to  demonstrate 
her  independence  and  dignity.1  Whether  Florida 

1  Doniol,  III.  10-25.  Charles  had  of  course  been  greatly  offended 
to  begin  with  by  the  French-American  treaty.  See  ib.,  II.  747-57. 
Florida  Blanca  sketched  his  monarch's  character  thus:  "Caractere 
mal  connu  en  France,  rempli  de  la  plus  exacte  prohibit^,  plein  de 
tendresse  pour  sa  maison,  mais  defiant,  soupconneux,  tres  at- 
tach6  a  ses  opinions ;  on  a  off enc6  son  amour-propre,  il  a  cru  qu'  on 
le  consideVait  comme  un  viceroi  d'une  province  de  France  devant 
prendre  ou  quitter  les  armes  suivant  les  ordres  qu'il  recevait; 
cette  id£e  1'a  humili6  et  des  ce  moment  il  a  con£u  le  projet  de 
prouver  qu'il  6tait  libre;  d'ailleurs,  n'6tant  plus  jeune,  tres  pieux 
toute  sa  vie,  des  scruples  viennent  a  present  Tassaillir,  le  souvenir 
de  ses  disgraces  passees  le  rend  timide,  tout  concourt  a  lui  in- 
spirer  le  d£sir  d'6viter  la  guerre;  il  faudrait  pour  le  d6cider  lui 
presenter  quelque  succes  brilliant  qui  flattdt  son  amour-propre; 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  175 

Blanca  felt  the  same  degree  of  alarm  that  Charles 
professed,  lest  the  younger  branch  of  the  House 
of  Bourbon  should  suddenly  find  itself  in  a  posi- 
tion of  tutelage  to  the  older,  may  well  be  doubted, 
but  at  any  rate  his  royal  master's  resentment  was 
too  good  grist  to  his  mill  to  be  turned  aside.  Not 
only  did  it  fend  off  all  danger  that  an  untimely 
appeal  by  Louis  to  the  Family  Compact  would 
succeed,  but  it  furnished  a  further  argument  for 
that  delay  which,  the  wily  Spaniard  early  dis- 
covered, was  bound  to  whet  France's  appetite 
for  greater  aid  than  the  Family  Compact  stipu- 
lated for  and  which  must,  therefore,  be  purchased 
on  Spain's  terms.2 

There  was  one  respect,  moreover,  and  that  an 
important  one,  in  which  both  monarch  and  man 
were  in  genuine  accord  in  reckoning  France's 

je  le  connais;  quoique  deVot  1' amour  de  la  gloire  le  touche  et  il 
voudrait  illustrer  son  regne,  ib.f  III.  495.  To  much  the  same  effect, 
is  M.  Bourgoing's  characterization  in  his  letter  to  Rayneval  of 
May  25,  1778,  ib.,  40. 

2  See  infra.  M.  Bourgoing's  letter,  referred  to  in  the  above  note, 
contains  many  acute  observations  upon  the  principal  persons  and 
factions  then  at  the  Spanish  court.  Of  Florida  Blanca  he  writes: 
"Discret,  dissimul£  meme,  il  a  le  talent  rare  de  bien  cacher  quand 
il  veut  ce  qu'il  sait,  ce  qu'il  sent."  Comparing  him  with 
Aranda,  Bourgoing  says  further:  "Les  deux  principaux  traits  de 
dissemblance  entre  ces  deux  ministres  sont  que  1'un  est  aussi 
ferme  que  1'autre  eioit  foible  et  facile  a  conduire;  que  Tun  se  dis- 
simule  au  point  qu'on  ne  sait  gueres  qui  il  hait,  qui  il  aime  ni  en 
qui  il  met  sa  confiance,  au  lieu  que  1'autre  se  livroit  sans  retenue 
a  ses  animosit£s  et  ne  voioit  presque  rien  que  par  les  yeux  de 
.  .  .  M.  de  Campo:"  »6.,  42,  45.  — .  For  an  interesting  analysis  of 
Florida  Blanca's  policy,  see  ib.,  559,  576,  and  583. 


176  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

precipitancy  a  substantial  grievance  to  Spain, 
and  that  was  its  tendency  to  put  the  question  of 
the  American  peril  out  of  reach  of  a  satisfactory 
solution.  In  March  Florida  Blanca's  views  on 
this  subject  were  still  very  much  "in  the  vague": 
The  Americans  ought  first  to  be  allowed  to 
weaken  themselves  and  then  left  in  anarchy  akin 
to  that  of  Germany.3  Four  months  later  he  was 
forthcoming  with  a  more  definite  remedy:  "Seeds 
of  division  and  jealousy"  must  be  sown  between 
the  new  republic  and  its  former  mother-country; 
to  which  end  the  latter  must  be  left  Canada  and 
Acadia.4  The  suggestion  fell  in  well  with  Ver- 
gennes'  own  program,  and  he  at  once  answered 
that,  while  independence  "implied  the  free  pos- 
session of  all  parts  of  the  Thirteen  States,"  it  had 
not  been  guaranteed  by  France  for  "other  English 
possessions  which  had  not  participated  in  the 
uprising."5  And  by  November,  the  Spanish 
court's  view  of  the  American  question  had  re- 
ceived yet  further  clarification  from  America  it- 

3  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  Mar.  30,  1778,  ib.,  20. 

4  Same  to  same,  Oct.  15  and  19,  ib.,  556-9.     In  the  latter  des- 
patch Montmorin  makes  the  good  point,  that  to  leave  "seeds  of 
dissension"  between  England  and  America  was  to  leave  the  seeds 
of    a    fresh   war    for    which,   very    probably,    France    and    Spain 
would  not  be  so  well  prepared  as  for  the  present  one.   He  also  dep- 
recated the  idea  that  danger  could  result  from  the  prosperity  of 
the  United  States.    That  danger,  said  he,  is  "fort  eloign6  et  meme 
incertain." 

5  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Oct.  30  and  Nov.  2,  ib.,  561-2. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIAN€E  177 

self.6  "There  is  no  concealing  the  fact,"  wrote 
Montmorin  at  this  time,  "that  the  interest  they 
feel  here  in  the  Americans  is  not  very  tender." 
"Spain  regards  the  United  States  as  destined  to 
become  her  enemy  in  no  remote  future,  and  conse- 
quently, far  from  allowing  them  to  approach  her 
possessions  she  would  omit  no  precaution  calcu- 
lated to  keep  them  off,  and  especially  from  the 
banks  of  the  Mississippi."7  Florida  Blanca  would 
"drive  both  the  English  and  the  Americans 
from  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi."  "He  would 
render  forever  impossible  the  accession  of  the 
Spanish  colonies  to  the  United  States,  whom  he 
more  distrusts  than  he  does  the  English."8  These 
words,  be  it  noted,  do  not  compromise  an  appeal 
from  Spain  to  France,  or  anything  like  it.  They 
are  reported  by  Montmorin  on  his  own  initiative 
and  quite  casually.  Why,  then,  the  question  sug- 
gests itself,  did  Spain  not  make  such  an  appeal? 
Plainly,  because  she  recognized  that  the  discus- 
sion now  touched  interests  with  regard  to  which 

•  See  ch.  XI,  infra. 

7  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  Nov.  12,  ib.,  575-6.     To  this  Vergen- 
nes  answered:     "II  est  bien  etrange  qu'on  s'obstine  a  voir  dans 
les  Am6ricains  un  voisin  plus   dangereux  que  ne  le  seroient  les 
Anglois.      II    ne    faudroit    pour    se    desabuser    qu'examine>    avec 
reflexion   les   constitutions  .  .  .  que   les    Etats-Unis   se   sont   don- 
ne"es.     Leur  R6publique,  s'ils  n'en  corrigent  pas  les  vices,  .  .  .  ne 
sera  jamois  q'un  corps  foible  et  susceptible  de  bien  peu  d'activitS 
.  .  .  .  Je  vous  avoue  que  je  n'ai  q'une  foible,  confiance  dans  l'£nergie 
des  Etats-Unis:"  ib.,  581.     Vergennes  was   apparently  somewhat 
disappointed  in  the  new  ally. 

8  Ib.,  585. 


178  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

France  was  already  committed;  and  this  being 
so,  Spain  must  keep  a  free  hand  to  deal  with  the 
American  question  in  accordance  with  her  own 
interests. 

Thus  the  problem  of  getting  Spain  into  the 
war  tended  to  become  more  and  more  compli- 
cated. At  the  same  time,  Vergennes'  impatience 
to  bring  the  thing  about  became  more  and  more 
intense.  In  a  memoir  addressed  to  the  king  on 
June  20th,  he  had  declared  his  belief  that  the 
temporizing  policy  of  Spain,  if  persisted  in,  spelt 
disaster  for  both  crowns:  There  could  be  no 
doubt,  of  course,  what  the  choice  of  His  Catholic 
Majesty  would  be  when  it  was  once  made,  but 
delay  alone  might  easily  prove  fatal  to  Bourbon 
hopes.  France  ought  to  stand  ready,  in  order  to 
spur  her  ally  to  action,  to  promise  aid  in  recover- 
ing Gibraltar,  in  casting  off  certain  distasteful 
commercial  arrangements  that  had  been  foisted 
on  her  by  England,  and  in  conquering  Jamaica,  a 
portion  of  the  Newfoundland  fisheries,  and  the 
mastery  of  the  Caribbean.9  And  the  Spanish 
ambassador  was  not  less  urgent,  though  for 
rather  different  reasons.  From  the  first  a  confi- 
dent prophet  of  American  independence,  he  was 
now  convinced  that  the  triumph  of  France  and 
America  over  England  was  near  at  hand.  If  then 
Spain  wished  to  be  in  at  the  killing,  she  must 

'"Reflexions  sur  la  conduite  a  tenir  dans  les  circonstances  pr6- 
sentes  relativement  a  PEspagne,"  ib.,  159-63. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  179 

make  her  election  without  delay.  "It  is  only  a 
dolt,"  he  declared  sententiously,  "who  armed  cap 
a  pie  will  consent  to  stand  guard  over  others  com- 
fortably eating  their  dinners."  Spain  could  not 
rely  indefinitely  on  any  efforts  save  her  own. 
"When  the  sowing  is  late  the  harvest  is  usually 
meagre."10 

"Aranda  to  Florida  Blanca,  Dec.  28,  1777,  April  11,  Aug.  4, 
and  Nov.  1,  1778,  Sparks  MSS.,  CII.  Other  characteristic  ex- 
pressions from  these  despatches  are  the  following:  "There  is 
not  much  to  be  read  in  this  despatch,  but  a  great  deal  to  be  thought 
and  not  slept  over."  "Spain  alone  is  the  party  that  will  be 
exposed  [to  danger]  unless  she  takes  heed.  .  .  .  They  [the  Ameri- 
cans] will  have  no  other  neighbors  than  Spain, — they  close  at  hand 
but  we  afar  off,  they  increasing  in  population  and  flourishing  and 
we  the  contrary."  "Let  us  confess  that  a  like  opportunity  will 
not  present  itself  in  centuries  for  Spain  to  right  herself  in  several 
particulars."  "Spain  has  treasures  which  she  must  redeem. 
.  .  .  This  chance  will  hardly  return  while  the  world  shall  last." 
Writing  on  May  2,  1779,  with  reference  to  the  still  pending  project 
of  mediation,  Aranda  declared  that  if  it  succeeded,  he  would 
"weep  tears  of  blood,  that  Spain  should  have  taken  care  of  the 
business  of  others  and  neglected  her  own."  Florida  Blanca 
expresses  the  point  of  view  of  the  Spanish  court  in  his  despatch  to 
Aranda  of  April  19,  1778:  "All  the  considerations  that  Your 
Excellency  so  wisely  sets  forth  are  less  important  than  that  of  the 
king's  ceasing  to  be  sovereign  and  making  himself  the  subject  of 
another  in  the  great  matters  of  peace  and  war."  In  a  report  on 
the  French  navy,  of  Aug.  4,  1778,  Aranda  says  that  by  November 
it  will  be,  with  the  naval  aid  stipulated  for  by  the  Family  Com- 
pact, "in  condition  to  subjugate  England  without  [further]  as- 
sistance." "This  crown,"  he  continues,  "wants  nothing  but  the 
disposition ;  its  immense  population,  its  adventurous  spirit,  its  great 
wealth  permit  everything."  He  predicts  the  success  of  France's 
enterprise  and  resulting  "tranquility  for  many  years."  Evidently, 
he  had  become  thoroughly  indoctrinated  in  Vergennes'  viewpoint. 


180  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

But  was  Spanish  aid  really  worth  waiting  for? 
Would  it — considering  the  sulky  humor  of 
Charles  and  the  palpable  self-seeking  of  his 
minister — be  worth  the  price  that  would  have 
to  be  paid  for  it?  Young  Montmorin  was  scepti- 
cal. "The  moderation  affected  to-day,"  he  wrote, 
"will  to-morrow  make  way  for  an  ambition  that 
will  cause  more  embarrassment  than  Spainish  as- 
sistance will  pay  for."11  Vergennes,  however,  for 
the  reasons  already  suggested,  gave  the  warning 
less  weight  than,  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events, 
it  may  seem  to  have  deserved.  His  answer  was 
that  assurance  could  not  be  made  too  sure,  that 
another  campaign  must  see  the  two  nations  act- 
ing together,  if  it  was  humanly  possible  to  bring 
the  thing  about.12 

The  road  by  which  Spain  finally  took  her  lei- 
surely way  into  the  war  was  the  edifying  one  of 
mediation.  There  were  several  reasons  why  it 
seemed  good  to  Florida  Blanca  to  dress  his  mon- 
arch up  as  the  champion  of  peace  and  capable  in 

Further  correspondence  between  the  two  men  is  taken  by  Sparks 
from  D.  Antonia  Ferrer  del  Rio,  Historia  del  Reinado  de  Carlos 
III  en  Espana,  III.  pt.  V.,  ch.  I.,  pp.  256-67.  Aranda  in  a 
postscript  had  quoted  Maurepas  as  saying  that  evidently  "Spain 
hoped,  by  her  mediation,  to  pick  something  from  the  cracks.'* 
This  makes  Florida  Blanca  extremely  angry.  "It  is  a  malicious 
invention,"  he  says,  but  continues  that  if  "England  is  hard  pick- 
ing for  us,  we  shall  not  be  less  so  for  those  gentlemen."  Sparks 
MSS.,  XCVII. 

11  Report  of  June  22,  Doniol,  III.  473. 

12  See  ib.,  481-5,  486,  526-32,  etc. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  181 

its  interest  of  dispensing  an  even  justice  between 
France  and  her  ally  on  the  one  hand  and  Great 
Britain  on  the  other.  For  one  thing,  the  pro- 
posal gave  His  Catholic  Majesty  that  indepen- 
dent role  which  his  affronted  dignity  demanded. 
Again,  it  furnished  a  new  reason  for  delay. 
Lastly,'  in  the  form  it  finally  assumed,  it  prom- 
ised Spain  an  opportunity  to  curtail  American 
independence. 

The  great  difficulty  was  to  get  the  idea 
launched  under  proper  auspices.  For  France, 
whose  act  had  precipitated  the  war,  to  solicit 
Spain's  good  offices  at  the  outset  would  have  been 
ridiculous ;  while  England  on  the  other  hand,  en- 
tirely apart  from  her  natural  distrust  of  the  con- 
nection between  France  and  Spain,  was  of  no 
mind  to  accept  peace  on  any  terms  that  did  not 
leave  her  free  to  deal  with  her  rebellious  colo- 
nies as  she  saw  fit.  A  round-about  hint  from 
Florida  Blanca  in  April  that  His  Catholic  Ma- 
jesty's services  were  available  to  England  and 
France,  which  was  accompanied  by  some  absurd 
by-play  designed  to  conceal  the  manner  of  its 
origination,  was  met  with  a  blunt  snub  from 
London.  Florida  Blanca  vented  his  chagrin 
on  the  British  ambassador,  and  for  the  moment 
it  looked  to  Montmorin  as  though  Spain  might 
enter  the  war  without  more  ado.13  But  so  incon- 

13  For  these  and  other  details  with  reference  to  this  abortive 
effort  at  mediation,  see  ib.,  56-80,  passim. 


182  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

tinent  abandonment  of  the  cause  of  his  affronted 
dignity  was  hardly  to  be  expected  of  the  quixotic 
Charles.  Four  months  later,  however,  His  Cath- 
olic Majesty  had  begun  to  relent  somewhat,  and 
the  English  government,  alert  to  the  fact  and 
eager  to  keep  Spain  out  of  the  autumn  campaign, 
did,  in  September,  convey  a  very  definite  intima- 
tion to  the  Spanish  ambassador  at  London  that 
His  Britannic  Majesty  hoped  to  see  "the  war 
ended  by  the  mediation  of  Spain"  and  "had  no 
doubt  that  she  would  be  able  to  save  the  honor  of 
Great  Britain  without  lessening  that  of  France."14 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  necessity  of  placat- 
ing Charles  this  event  may  well  be  regarded,  as 
M.  Doniol  indicates,  as  decisive.  On  September 
28th,  Florida  Blanca  sent  a  note  to  Almodovar 
stating  the  moral  obligation  that  Spain  would 
be  under  if  England  did  not  submit  propositions 
along  with  the  king  of  France,  and  ten  days 
later  Vergennes  also,  conformably  with  a  hint 
from  Montmorin,  wrote  the  Spanish  ambassa- 
dor formally  accepting  Spanish  intervention.15 
Charles'  gratification  expressed  itself  in  a  variety 
of  attentions  to  the  French  ambassador,  while 
Florida  Blanca,  though  ostensibly  sceptical  of 
peace,  professed  to  be  not  less  satisfied  on  that 
account.  He  now  predicted  to  Montmorin  that 
the  following  spring  would  find  Spain  in  arms 
alongside  her  ally.16 

14  Ib.,  513.     See  also  ib.,  497-9. 

15  Ib.,  515  and  footnotes. 
"76.,  516. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  183 

From  this  point  on,  though  Spanish  policy  con- 
tinues as  devious  as  ever,  the  course  of  events 
becomes  comparatively  straightforward.  The 
British  answer  to  the  Spanish  note  of  September 
28th  was  delayed  some  six  weeks,  and  when  it 
arrived,  it  laid  down  the  impossible  condition  that 
mediation  must  be  preceded  by  the  withdrawal  of 
the  French  fleet  from  American  waters  and  the 
cessation  of  French  aid  to  the  Americans.17  The 
obvious  incompatibility  of  these  conditions  with 
those  that  had  already  been  laid  down  by  France 
ought,  it  would  seem,  have  at  last  given  the 
mediation  project  the  bare  bodkin.18  But  the 
obstinacy  of  the  Spanish  monarch,  who  now  had 
the  scent  of  a  great  role  in  his  nostrils,  and 
the  subtlety  of  his  minister,  who  still  saw  profit 
in  delay,  were  equal  to  the  occasion.  On  Novem- 
ber 20th  Charles  himself  addressed  Louis  a  note 
accompanied  by  a  "confidential  declaration"  in 
which,  while  France's  obligation  to  secure  inde- 
pendence for  the  United  States  was  fully  recog- 
nized, it  was  pointed  out  that  the  demand  for 

"76.,  524. 

18  The  French  conditions  are  laid  down  in  the  "Articles  a  pro- 
poser pour  la  Paix"  of  Oct.  17,  ib.,  551-4.  The  first  paragraph 
reads:  "Le  roi  d'Angleterre  avouera  I'inddpendence  absolue  des 
13  Etats-Unis  de  PAm6rique  septentrionale  pour  le  politique,  le 
civil,  et  le  commerce  et  les  reconnoitra  pour  Etats  souverains  et 
parfaitement  libres.  S.  M.  B.  s'engagera  de  retirer  immediatement 
toutes  les  forces  de  terre  et  de  mer  qu'elle  tient  dans  aucune  partie 
des  dits  Etats-Unis  et  de  leurs  remettre  toutes  les  places,  terri- 
toires,  et  isles  en  d6pendans." 


184  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

a  direct  and  formal  recognition  of  it  would  be 
a  serious  offense  to  British  pride.  Why  then, 
it  was  argued,  should  not  the  procedure  that 
had  been  taken  in  the  case  of  the  Low  Coun- 
tries be  followed  again?  In  that  case  France, 
supporting  the  liberty  and  independence  of  Hol- 
land against  Spain  herself,  had  been  content  with 
obtaining,  in  the  first  place,  a  long  truce  in  favor 
of  her  protege,  and  then,  when  Holland  had 
wished  to  make  a  definitive  treaty  with  Spain, 
had  merely  stipulated  that  this  should  not  be 
ratified  without  her  consent.  Peace,  the  Span- 
ish court  further  urged,  was  necessary  to  America 
herself,  wherefore  there  was  always  the  danger 
that  England  might  seduce  the  United  States 
into  accepting  a  separate  treaty, — a  poignant  ar- 
gument at  the  moment,  as  we  shall  presently 
appreciate.  The  conclusion  was  inevitable  that 
some  sacrifice  in  form  was  advisable  to  secure 
peace  at  once,  though  no  sacrifice  of  real 
obligation.19 

It  is  perhaps  hardly  necessary  to  point  out 
how  entirely  this  proposal  of  a  truce  for  a  term 
of  years  for  the  Americans  in  lieu  of  a  permanent 
peace  met  Florida  Blanca's  problem  of  neutraliz- 
ing American  independence  as  far  as  possible. 
Such  an  arrangement  would  abound  in  oppor- 
tunities for  "sowing  seeds  of  discord"  between 
the  English  and  Americans  and,  by  the  same 

19  76.,  622-3. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  185 

token,  in  opportunities  for  making  the  latter  feel 
the  necessity  of  a  guaranty  of  their  independence 
from  the  Bourbon  crowns.  And  such  a  guaranty 
need  not,  of  course,  be  accorded  gratuitously.  It 
might  well  be  made  to  bring  a  substantial  price  in 
terms  of  American  territory  along  the  Mississippi. 
But  though  fully  awake  to  the  possible  ad- 
vantages to  Spain  of  peace  in  America  on  such  a 
basis,  the  Spaniard  was  not  over-credulous  of 
its  ever  coming  about,  nor  blind  to  the  necessity 
of  keeping  the  door  hospitably  ajar  to  the  other 
alternative.  The  royal  communication  and 
memoir  were  accompanied  to  Paris  by  a  charac- 
teristic product  of  the  minister's  own  pen,  ad- 
dressed to  Vergennes:  His  Catholic  Majesty 
was  still  genuinely  hopeful  of  peace,  but  at  the 
same  time  he  was  well  aware  of  the  possibility  that 
negotiations  might  fail.  He  accordingly  still 
continued  his  preparations  "with  the  greatest 
activity  and  trusted  that  his  nephew  was  doing 
the  same."  Indeed,  the  king  was  "of  the  opinion 
that  without  the  greatest  dissimulation  up  to  the 
very  moment  of  striking  no  advantage  could  be 
got  of  England."  Meantime,  it  became  perti- 
nent to  inquire  what  "advantages  Spain  might 
obtain,  and  how  and  in  what  terms  France  might 
bring  herself  not  to  listen  to  any  proposition  with- 
out assuring  them  to"  her.20 

20  76.,  619-21.    The  last  sentence  quoted  above  is  underscored  in 
the  translation  of  the  document  by  Vergennes. 


186  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Before,  however,  Vergennes  could  deal  with  this 
most  significant  inquiry,  he  had  to  settle  the  more 
exigent  question  posed  by  the  royal  communica- 
tion, whether  France  could,  harmoniously  with 
her  engagements  with  the  United  States,  accept 
for  them  a  truce  in  substitution  for  a  permanent 
peace.  His  first  opinion  was  plainly  adverse. 
"The  Peace  of  Vervins,"  he  wrote  Montmorin, 
December  1st,  "was  unavailable  as  a  precedent 
in  the  case  of  the  Americans,"  for  the  situation  of 
France  and  her  engagements  with  the  United 
State  were  of  "quite  a  different  character  to 
those  which  Henry  IV  and  his  predecessors  had 
contracted  with  the  Dutch."21  But  as  it  hap- 
pened, Franklin's  English  friend  Hartley  was  at 
this  very  moment  urging  much  the  same  idea 
from  the  British  point  of  view.  When  accordingly 
Franklin,  making  a  confidant  of  Vergennes, 
showed  the  latter  Hartley's  letter,  it  was  not 
difficult  to  elicit  from  the  American  the  sentiment 
that 

provided  France  and  Spain  were  ready  to  accord  the 
United  States  their  good-will  and  protection,  indepen- 
dence, whether  recognized  as  a  matter  of  right  or  only 
as  one  of  fact,  would  be  a  very  good  thing  for  them,  in 
that  it  would  secure  them,  along  with  the  sweets  of 
peace,  or  of  a  truce,  the  time  and  opportunity  to  perfect 
their  political  arrangements  and  internal  order.22 

"Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Dec.  1,  ib.,  583,  footnote.     See  also 
note  18,  above. 

23  Same  to  same,  Dec.  4  and  Dec.  24,  ib.,  595  and  599. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  187 

In  his  despatch  of  December  24th  to  Mont- 
morin,  Vergennes,  though  still  insisting  that  the 
Peace  of  Vervins  afforded  no  precedent,  yet  in- 
dicated that  France  would  be  willing  to  consent, 
either  to  the  Americans  "treating  directly  and 
alone  with  England,  under  the  express  condition, 
however,  that  the  treaty  shall  keep  pace  with 
our  own  and  that  each  treaty  shall  be  null  and 
void  until  the  other  is  concluded";  or,  to  a  long 
truce  between  Congress  and  Great  Britain  which 
should  leave  France  at  liberty  to  make  a  defini- 
tive treaty.  In  either  event  the  negotiations 
should  proceed  under  the  mediation  of  the  Catho- 
lic king,  and  England  should  treat  with  the  Amer- 
icans as  if  they  were  independent  and  should  at 
once  withdraw  her  forces  from  "all  parts  of  the 
American  continent  comprised  in  the  Confedera- 
tion" ;  and  the  truce,  were  there  one,  should  run  for 
from  twenty  to  fifty  years  and  be  guaranteed  by 
France  and  Spain,  or  at  least  the  former. 
Franklin,  Vergennes  added,  had  been  prepared 
for  "an  imperfect  recognition  of  the  indepen- 
dence of  his  country"  but  not  his  associates,  for  in 
them  "I  do  not  have  the  greatest  confidence."23 
The  day  following  Vergennes  wrote  Gerard,  the 
French  representative  at  Philadelphia,  to  prepare 
Congress  for  a  truce  and  indirect  recognition. 
The  matter  was  to  be  handled  "with  dexterity" 
and  the  unalterable  disposition  of  the  king  to 

28  The  despatch  of  Dec.  24,  ib.,  596-9,  602-3. 


188  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

sustain  all  his  engagements  was  to  be  unremit- 
tingly insisted  upon.24 

Thus  was  the  first  concession  registered  at  the 
expense  of  His  Most  Christian  Majesty's  en- 
gagements with  the  United  States  to  the  program 
of  getting  Spain  into  the  war,  and  others  were 
to  follow.  There  was  now  of  course  no  question 
of  bringing  Spain  into  the  autumn  campaign,  for 
that  had  long  since  closed,  but  Vergennes,  who 
was  already  finding  the  Americans  disappointing 
allies,  was  now  becoming  fearful  that  even  the 
spring  would  find  the  Escurial  still  balancing  and 
undecided.  On  December  5th  the  secretary  pre- 
sented the  king  a  second  memoir  on  the  subject 
nearest  his  heart : 

If  it  is  a  fact  [he  wrote]  that  Your  Majesty  cannot 
alone  long  sustain  a  contest  with  the  English  on  equal 
terms  and  that  the  war  unduly  prolonged  would  involve 
both  Your  Majesty's  commerce  and  finances  in  ruin,  .  .  . 
then  it  necessarily  follows  that  everything  advises  our 
risking  something  in  order  to  bring  this  ally  to  the  de- 
sired point  of  reunion  with  us.  I  do  not  conceal  the 
fact,  Sire,  that  the  pretentions  and  expectations  of 
Spain  are  gigantic,  but  it  is  necessary  to  consider  that 
the  time  one  would  employ  in  opposing  them  would  be 
lost  for  the  establishment  of  that  concert  of  operations 
which  cannot  be  effected  too  promptly.25 

Three  weeks  later,  in  the  same  despatch  in  which 
he  announced  to  Montmorin  the  French  govern- 

24  76.,  613-5. 

25  Ib.,  588-90.     For  Vergennes'  view  of  the  Americans  at  this 
date,  see  note  7,  above. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  189 

ment's   willingness   to   accept   a  truce  for   the 
United  States,  Vergennes  wrote  further  that, 
despite  the  vast  difference  between  the  general 
situation  as  it  existed  at  the  opening  of  the  war, 
when  England  would  have  been  fairly  "at  the 
knees  of  the  two  crowns,"  and  now  when  she  had 
had  time  to  fortify  all  her  possessions,  His  Ma- 
jesty "approved  in  advance  all  that  the  king  his 
uncle  should  deem  it  right  and  fitting  to  exact."26 
But  a  vague  disposition  of  concession  was  not 
what  Florida  Blanca  was  after, — this  must  pre- 
cipitate itself  in  a  shower  of  definite,  concrete 
stipulations,  and  particularly  must  the  objects 
be  named  for  which  France  would  fight  to  the 
end.    And  what  is  even  more  important,  with  the 
possibility  of  a  truce  between  England  and  the 
Americans   to  be   guaranteed   by   France   and 
Spain,  the  mediation  project  was  still  worth  cod- 
dling for  its  own  sake.    In  his  despatches  of  Jan- 
uary 12th  and  13th,  Montmorin  told  Vergennes 
that  he  had  sought  in  vain  to  secure  Florida 
Blanca's  views  in  detail  of  the  advantages  which 
France  and  Spain  might  expect  to  obtain  from 
the  war  with  England.    "At  that  point  the  prime 
minister  had  placed  his  lever,  there  he  had  an- 
chored solidly."     "His  Catholic  Majesty,"  the 
Spanish  minister's  own  plea  had  run,  "wished  to 
show  his  nephew  the  same  measure  of  confidence 
that  the  latter  had  shown  him.    He  accordingly 

"Ib.,  607-8. 


190  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

desired  that  His  Most  Christian  Majesty  should 
be  the  one  to  specify  the  conditions  without  which 
he  would  promise  not  to  consent  to  peace/' 
Montmorin's  own  opinion  was  that  a  convention 
guaranteeing  Spain  the  possession  of  Mobile  and 
Pensacola,  the  expulsion  of  the  English  from 
Honduras,  and  the  restitution  of  Gibraltar  would 
be  signed  promptly  if  mediation  failed,  and  that 
Jamaica  was  no  longer  an  object.  At  the  same 
time  he  noted  that,  according  to  Florida  Blanca 
at  least,  the  king  still  preferred  peace  and  that 
consequently  it  still  remained  necessary  to  "allay 
the  scruples  that  were  to  be  anticipated  from  a 
conscience  at  once  so  delicate  and  so  timorous."27 
But  all  things  end,  and  the  term  of  Spain's 
vacillations — always  more  apparent  than  real- 
was  at  last  nigh  at  hand.  On  February  12th 
Vergennes  sent  Montmorin  the  desired  draft  of  a 
convention  together  with  full  powers  to  agree  "to 
any  modifications  or  additions  that  might  seem 
needful."28  The  keystone  of  the  project  was  its 
third  article  which  reiterated  the  stipulation  of  the 
Family  Compact  that  neither  party  should  make 
peace  without  the  consent  of  the  other.  The 
fourth  article  further  pledged  both  parties  not 
to  make  peace  till  Great  Britain  should  recog- 
nize American  independence.  The  fifth  declared 

*Ib.,  641-3.     See  also  the  letter  from  Florida  Blanca  to  Ver- 
gennes, of  Jan.  13,  17T9,  #>.,  681-3. 
88  Ib.,  685. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  191 

certain  additional  objectives  of  a  successful  war 
that  would  be  of  interest  to  France,  including  the 
restoration  to  His  Most  Christian  Majesty  of  the 
right  to  build  such  works  at  Dunkirk  as  he  chose 
and  the  expulsion  of  the  English  from  New- 
foundland. The  sixth  article  pledged  France,  in 
case  she  should  regain  Newfoundland,  to  admit 
Spanish  subjects  to  the  fisheries  there.  The 
seventh  enumerated  the  objects  of  interest  to 
Spain,  to  wit,  those  that  Montmorin  had  listed  in 
his  report.29 

Florida  Blanca's  reception  of  the  proposed 
convention  was  at  first  apparently  cordial  but  he 
soon  developed  numerous  criticisms,  and  particu- 
larly against  the  fourth  article;  and  finally  he 
proposed  that  he  be  allowed  to  draw  up  a  project 
of  his  own.30  Spain's  policy,  wrote  Montmorin, 
is  "to  exact  everything  and  accord  nothing" ;  yet, 
he  added,  it  is  only  by  adopting  her  terms  that  we 
can  bring  her  in.  "I  have  need  of  patience 
a-plenty."31  Vergennes  in  reply  professed  some 
surprise  at  the  attitude  taken  by  the  Spanish 
minister  toward  "a  work  that  was  in  some  sort 
more  his  own  than  ours,"  yet  he  continued:  "We 
are  literally  committed  to  omitting  nothing  that 
may  appear  to  enlist  the  interest  of  Spain."  Some 
of  the  difficulties  that  had  been  raised  he  was  dis- 

29  Ib.,  803-10,  left  hand  column. 

80  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  Feb.  28,  1779,  ib.,  665-7. 

81  Same  to  same,  same  date,  ib.,  662. 


192  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

posed  to  attribute  to  Florida  Blanca's  faults  of 
temper,  on  which  he  heartily  commiserated  the 
young  ambassador.  Nor  was  he  greatly  aston- 
ished at  the  repugnance  which  the  Spanish  min- 
ister had  expressed  against  recognizing  American 
independence  at  present:  "From  Spain  nothing 
is  to  be  got  for  nothing:  we  have  from  her  di- 
rectly that  she  wishes  some  advantages  from  the 
Americans  as  well  as  from  us,  and  we  will  not 
oppose  her."  At  the  same  time,  Vergennes 
thought  some  reference  ought  to  be  made  to  the 
secret  article  of  the  American  treaty;  for  even 
though  the  convention  with  Spain  would  also  be 
secret  when  entered  upon,  yet  in  time  it  would  see 
daylight,  and  then  "the  glory  and  honor  of  the 
king  would  suffer  if  it  appeared  that  he  had  neg- 
lected this  ally,  and  that  in  order  to  gain  the 
powerful  protection  of  the  crown  of  Spain."  In 
short,  any  proposition  would  be  approved  of 
provided  that  "by  the  general  tenor  of  the  act  we 
have  not  neglected  the  interests  of  this  republic."32 
On  April  12th,  1779,  the  secret  Convention  of 
Aranjuez  was  signed  by  Florida  Blanca  and 
Montmorin.  The  first  article  declared  the  inten- 
tion of  the  Catholic  king,  in  the  event  that  His 
Britannic  Majesty  rejected  the  ultimatum  of  the 
third  of  the  month  offering  Spain's  friendly  of- 
fices for  the  last  time,  of  making  common  cause 
with  His  Most  Christian  Majesty  against  Great 

32  Vergennes   to   Montmorin,  Mar.   19,  tfe.,  670-2. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  193 

Britain.  The  third,  fifth,  sixth,  and  seventh  arti- 
cles were  essentially  the  same  as  the  correspond- 
ing articles  in  Vergennes'  project.  The  fourth 
article,  on  the  other  hand,  was  very  different. 
Diligently  recording  the  fact  that  the  king  of 
France  had  "proposed  and  demanded  that  the 
Catholic  king  should  from  the  day  when  war 
should  be  declared  against  England  recognize  the 
independence  and  sovereignty  of  the  United 
States  and  offer  not  to  lay  down  his  arms  until 
that  independence  should  be  obtained,"  it  re- 
served to  the  Catholic  king  the  right  to  conclude 
for  himself  a  treaty  with  the  Americans  to  govern 
"their  reciprocal  interests,"  the  sole  condition  be- 
ing that,  to  any  treaty  made  by  Spain  with  or 
affecting  France's  ally,  Louis  should  also  be  a 
party.  The  article  was  well  understood  on  both 
sides  to  be  mere  banality.  More  than  a  fortnight 
before  this  Florida  Blanca  had  confided  to  Mont- 
morin,  who  in  turn  had  confided  it  to  Vergennes, 
that  the  Spanish  monarch,  fearful  of  the  "ex- 
ample he  would  give  his  own  possessions,"  would 
"not  recognize  the  independence  of  the  United 
States  until  the  English  themselves  should  be 
forced  to  do  so  by  a  treaty  of  peace."33  Finally, 
article  IX  of  the  convention  read  thus: 

Their  Catholic  and  Most  Christian  Majesties  promise 
to  make  every  effort  to  procure  and  acquire  for  them- 
selves all  the  advantages  above  enumerated  and  to  con- 

33  Ib.,  753  for    ? 


194  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

tinue  their  efforts  until  they  have  obtained  the  end  which 
they  propose  to  one  another,  mutually  pledging  them- 
selves not  to  lay  down  their  arms  nor  to  make  any 
treaty  of  peace,  truce,  or  suspension  of  hostilities  with- 
out having  at  least  obtained  .  .  .  the  restitution  of 
Gibraltar  and  the  abolition  of  the  treaties  relative  to 
the  fortification  of  Dunkirk,  or  in  default  of  this  last 
some  other  object  to  the  taste  of  His  Most  Christian 
Majesty.34 

"76.,  803-10. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  TWO  ALLIANCES  COMPARED 

Spain  was  at  last  committed — conditionally! 
We  may  then,  without  anticipating  much  that  is 
to  follow,  proceed  to  consider  the  question  al- 
ready suggested,  of  how  far  France  was  forced, 
in  the  interest  of  bringing  Spain  into  the  war 
with  England — and  later,  of  keeping  her  there — 
to  modify  her  obligations  with  the  United  States 
as  defined  by  the  Treaty  of  February  6th,  1778. 
The  most  interesting  phase  of  this  question  is  that 
touching  the  direct  clash  of  interests  of  the  United 
States  and  Spain  along  the  Mississippi  river,  and 
this  we  reserve  for  fuller  treatment  in  the  chap- 
ters to  follow.  At  the  moment  we  have  to  review 
some  lesser  consequences  of  the  necessity  which 
Vergennes  finally  found  himself  under,  of  yoking 
his  government  to  two  more  or  less  antagonistic 
allies  instead  of,  as  he  had  originally  hoped,  to 
governments  themselves  allied. 

The  question  of  the  shape  which  British  recog- 
nition of  American  independence  should  take  has 
already  been  touched  upon.  By  the  Treaty  of 
February  6th  British  recognition  was  to  be  either 

195 


196  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

formal  or  tacit,  but  in  either  case  it  was  to  be  by 
a  peace  ending  the  war.1  By  the  Spanish  propo- 
sition, however,  which  Vergennes,  after  some 
hesitation,  finally  adopted  and  transmitted  to 
Gerard  with  orders  to  obtain  Congress'  assent  to 
it,  a  truce  to  run  for  a  term  of  years  and  to  be 
accompanied  by  the  actual  withdrawal  of  Brit- 
ish forces  from  the  territory  of  the  United  States 
was  to  count  as  a  fulfilment  of  the  purpose  of 
the  alliance,  provided  that  France  continued 
to  guarantee  American  independence  or  that 
France  and  Spain  jointly  guaranteed  it.  In 
point  of  fact  Gerard  received  the  orders  referred 
to  at  an  embarrassing  moment  and  in  consequence 
presented  his  case  so  feebly  that  Congress  in  its 
Instructions  of  August  14th,  1779,  made  no  dec- 
laration on  the  subject  of  a  truce.2  Not  till  June, 
1781,  in  circumstances  to  be  reviewed  later,  did 
Congress  formally  declare  its  assent  to  the  idea 
of  a  truce  which  should  be  accompanied  by  a 
British  evacuation  of  all  territory  of  the  United 
States.8 

treaty  of  Alliance,  art.  VIII. 

2  Indeed,  by  the  Instructions  of  this  date  "The  commissioner  to 
be  appointed  to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Great  Britain" 
was  ordered  "to  make  it  a  preliminary  article  to  any  negotiation 
that  Great  Britain  shall  agree  to  treat  with  the  United  States  as 
sovereign,  free  and  independent."  Journals  of  the  Continental 
Congress,  XIV.  956. 

8  Op.  tit.,  XX.  652.  "If  a  difficulty  should  arise  in  the  course 
of  the  negotiation  for  peace,  from  the  backwardness  of  Britain  to 
make  a  formal  acknowledgment  of  our  independence,  you  are  at 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  197 

The  concession  demanded  of  Congress  in  the 
matter  of  British  recognition  owed  its  origin, 
though  not  its  later  repetition,  to  the  necessity 
that  France  thought  herself  under  at  the  end  of 
1778  of  supporting  Spanish  mediation.  Induce- 
ments more  directly  designed  to  bring  Spain  into 
the  war  against  England  were,  first,  the  promise 
by  France  in  the  Treaty  of  Aranjuez,  in  the 
event  of  the  conquest  of  Newfoundland  from 
Great  Britain,  of  a  share  in  the  fisheries  there, 
and  secondly,  the  listing  of  the  Floridas  as  ob- 
jects of  Spanish  ambition.  Though  the  Floridas, 
in  significant  distinction  to  "the  northern  parts 
of  America,"  were  not  specifically  mentioned  in 
the  American  treaty,  it  was  acknowledged  by  Ver- 
gennes  in  his  instructions  to  Gerard  of  March 
29th,  1778,  that  they  entered  "into  the  plans  of 
conquest  of  the  Americans."  Gerard  was  ac- 
cordingly instructed  more  than  a  year  before  the 
Treaty  of  Aranjuez  was  signed,  in  view  of 
Spain's  well-understood  desire  to  restore  her 
monopoly  over  commerce  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico, 
"to  prepare  them  for  an  eventual  withdrawal"; 
or,  if  he  was  not  able  to  obtain  this — and  it  was 
recognized  that  the  matter  was  one  that  would 
"require  all  the  dexterity  of  M.  Gerard" — he 
should  at  least  "exert  himself  to  obtain  Pensacola 

liberty  to  agree  to  a  truce,  or  to  make  such  other  concession  as 
may  not  affect  the  substance  of  what  we  contend  for;  and  provided 
that  Great  Britain  be  not  left  in  possession  of  any  part  of  the 
thirteen  United  States." 


198  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

and  the  parts  of  the  coast  which  will  be  estimated 
to  be  of  the  greatest  value  to  the  court  of  Ma- 
drid."4 Gerard  did  as  he  was  told,  but  again  his 
efforts  met  with  little  success,  as  meantime  the 
Florida  and  Mississippi  questions  had  become 
merged.  Eventually,  in  1780  and  1781,  Spain 
went  ahead  and  conquered  the  British  posts  in 
Florida  for  herself, — without  American  aid,  it 
is  true,  but  also  without  American  protest.5 

The  reason  for  the  French  government's  tak- 
ing the  United  States  into  its  confidence  with 
reference  to  the  Floridas  is  to  be  found  in  arti- 
cles VI  and  XI  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance.  Under 
the  latter,  if  the  United  States  had  conquered 
this  region  and  obtained  its  cession  from  Great 
Britain,  France  would  have  been  bound  to  guar- 
antee them  in  its  possession.  By  the  former,  His 
Most  Christian  Majesty  had  "forever  renounced 
possession  of  any  part  of  the  continent  of  North 
America"  which  had  previously  belonged  to  Great 
Britain,  a  stipulation  which  naturally  carried 

*  Memoire  pour  servir  d'Instruction  au  Sr.  Geirard,"  etc., 
"Approuve,"  Mar.  29,  1778,  Doniol,  III.  153-7:  see  pp.  155-6. 
See  also  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  Oct.  15,  ib.,  556.  From  the 
latter  document  it  appears  that  Florida  Blanca  was  willing  at  this 
date  to  see  all  of  the  Floridas  go  to  the  Americans  except  such 
part  as  was  necessarily  for  the  security  of  Spain's  "navigation  in 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,"  i.e.,  probably  for  the  security  of  Spain's 
monopoly  of  trade  on  the  Gulf. 

"Other  phases  of  the  Florida  question  are  treated  of  in  the 
chapters  following,  in  connection  with  the  Mississippi  question 
and  Jay's  residence  in  Spain. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  199 

with  it  the  further  idea  that  His  Majesty  was  not 
free  to  tender,  even  contingently,  any  portion  of 
this  continent  to  another  power  in  consideration 
for  a  treaty  therewith.  But  if  this  was  the  case 
with  the  Floridas,  then  why  was  it  not  also  the 
case  with  Newfoundland?  Yet  in  article  V  of  the 
Convention  of  Aranjuez  "the  expulsion  of  the 
English  from  the  island  and  fisheries  of  New- 
foundland" is  listed  as  one  of  the  advantages 
which  France  sought  by  the  war,  while  in  article 
VI  it  is  agreed  that  if  His  Most  Christian  Ma- 
jesty "succeeds  in  becoming  master  and  acquiring 
possession  of  the  island  of  Newfoundland,  the 
subjects  of  His  Catholic  Majesty  are  to  be  ad- 
mitted to  the  fisheries."  Evidently  the  Foreign 
Office  interpreted  the  term  "continent"  of  article 
VI  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  rather  strictly, 
although  it  does  not  seem  to  have  taken  Congress 
into  its  confidence  in  the  matter.  And  while  the 
representatives  of  the  French  government  at 
Philadelphia  frankly  combatted  the  idea  from 
the  first  that  the  Americans  were  entitled  of  pre- 
scriptive right  to  continue  to  enjoy  that  participa- 
tion in  the  fisheries  which  was  theirs  as  British 
subjects,  they  always  did  so  on  the  ground  that 
France  ought  not  to  be  asked  to  assume  fresh  ob- 
ligations the  discharge  of  which  might  delay 
peace.6 

c  But  while  the  French  government  did  not  inform  Congress  of 
its  views  in  this  matter,  it  probably  did  so  inform  the  American 


200  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

And  from  the  fisheries  one  turns  readily  to 
Canada  and  Nova  Scotia,  to  which  the  self-deny- 
ing ordinance  registered  by  France  in  article  VI 
of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  bore  especial  reference.7 

commissioners.  Thus  Lee  records  in  his  "Journal"  that,  in  view 
of  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  "continent"  in  article  VI,  he,  with 
the  approval  of  Franklin  and  Deane  framed  an  additional  clause 
by  which  France  was  also  to  renounce  the  right  to  all  conquests  "in 
the  islands  of  Newfoundland,  Cape  Breton,  St.  John's  Anticosti, 
and  the  Bermudas."  Lee's  Lee,  I.  378-9,  383.  In  the  final  treaty 
the  Bermudas  alone  are  mentioned  in  this  connection.  It  ought  to 
be  recalled  that  by  the  Peace  of  1763  Spain  had  lost  her  share 
of  the  Newfoundland  fisheries,  while  France  had  retained  hers. 

TSee  Vergennes  to  Guines,  Aug.  7,  1775,  with  reference  to  the 
instructions  to  be  given  Bonvouloir.  One  point  that  he  should  be 
clear  about,  says  the  secretary,  is  to  reassure  the  Americans  "con- 
tre  la  frayeur  qu'on  cherchera  sans  doute  a  leur  donner  de  nous. 
Le  Canada  est  le  point  jaloux  pour  eux,  il  faut  leur  faire  entendre 
que  nous  n'y  songeons  point  du  tout."  Doniol,  I.  156.  See  also 
his  comment  on  Miralles'  suggestion  that,  while  Spain  recovered 
the  Floridas,  France  should  seek  to  recover  Canada:  "Vous  savez 
que  nous  sommes  d'une  opinion  contraire,  parceque  nos  posses- 
sions sur  le  continent  de  1'Amerique  ne  seroient  propres  qu'a  in- 
spirer  de  la  m6fiance  aux  Am£ricains  et  qu'a  les  raprocher 
insensiblement  de  la  Grande-Bretagne."  Vergennes  to  G6rard, 
Oct.  26,  1778,  ib.,  III.  570.  Earlier  Vergennes  had  offered  the 
same  objection  to  Florida  Blanca's  plan  of  intervention,  the  pur- 
pose of  which  for  France  was  to  be  the  recovery  of  what  she  had 
lost  in  1763:  "La  France  a  des  colonies  dans  la  proportion  qui 
convient  a  sa  population  et  a  son  industrie.  Plus  seroit  une 
charge  plutdt  q'un  benefice.  Si  la  perte  du  Canada  a  £t6  sen- 
sible elle  doit  la  moins  regretted  depuis  que  1'abandon  qu'elle  a  6te 
obligee  d'en  faire  est  devenu  le  signal  de  la  revolte  des  provinces 
angloises  sur  le  continent.  Si  nous  tentions  de  nous  y  reintegrer 
nous  reveillerons  les  anciennes  inquietudes  et  jalousies  qui 
faisoient  le  gage  de  la  fidelity  et  de  la  soumission  de  ces  memes 
provinces  a  1'Angleterre;  leur  veritable  facon  de  pense>  est 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  201 

Indeed,  by  article  V  of  the  same  treaty,  as  I  have 
just  mentioned,  the  expectation  of  the  United 
States  to  attempt  the  reduction  of  what  British 
power  remained  in  "the  northern  parts  of  Amer- 
ica" is  formally  recorded.  From  the  very  outset, 
nevertheless,  the  French  government  was  deter- 
mined, if  not  to  thwart,  at  least  to  discourage  in 
every  way  possible,  this  expectation  on  the  part 
of  its  ally.  Vergennes'  own  plan  for  Canada 
and  Nova  Scotia  originally  was  to  exipel  the 
English  thence  and  establish  there  a  free  "agri- 
cultural and  commercial  state  which  should  gov- 
ern itself  under  the  protection  of  France"  and 
enjoy  reciprocal  naturalization  and  commercial 
privileges  with  it.  In  this  way,  he  argued,  the 
country  would  be  peopled  by  the  French  them- 
selves and  "by  any  who  choose  to  go  there,"  and 
a  national  spirit,  grounded  on  similarity  of  lan- 
guage, customs,  and  national  character  and  kept 
alive  by  constant  intercourse,  would  be  created 
substantially  identical  with  that  of  France  her- 
self. Thus  would  France  raise  up  to  herself  an 
ally  which,  without  being  burdensome  to  her 

d6couvert  dans  les  propositions  qu'elles  nous  ont  fait  parvenir: 
elles  ne  s'efforcent  pas  de  secoiier  le  joug  de  leur  patrie  pour 
s'expose>  a  subir  celui  de  toute  autre  puissance."  Letter  to  the 
king  of  Apr.  26,  1777,  ib.,  II.  274-5.  See  also  ib.,  III.  62-3  and  527, 
where  France's  indifference  to  territorial  acquisitions  of  any  sort 
is  insisted  upon.  It  is  interesting  to  regard  article  VI  of  the 
Treaty  of  Alliance  as  a  sort  of  forerunner  of  that  phase  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  which  declares  that  "the  American  continent  is 
no  longer  subject  to  colonization." 


202  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

would  yet  avail  to  protect  the  French  interests  in 
the  Newfoundland  fisheries  and  to  check  the  new 
republic  to  the  south.8 

But  this  apparently  was  the  dream  of  a  mo- 
ment.9 At  any  rate,  by  the  beginning  of  1778 
Vergennes  had  come  to  believe  that,  to  furnish 
the  necessary  make-weight  to  the  United  States, 
Canada  and  Nova  Scotia  should  be  left  with 
Great  Britain.  In  Gerard's  instructions  we  ac- 
cordingly read  that,  though  Congress  has  much 
at  heart  the  project  of  a  conquest  of  Canada, 
Nova  Scotia,  and  the  Floridas  and  would  like  to 
obtain  an  agreement  with  France  looking  to  the 
carrying  out  of  these  projects,  the 

king  has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  possession  of 
these  three  countries,  or  at  least  of  Canada,  by  England 
would  be  a  valuable  source  of  uneasiness  and  vigilance 
to  the  Americans,  that  it  would  make  them  feel  the  need 

8  Aranda  to  Grimaldi,  Oct.  10,  1776,  Sparks  MSS.,  CII.    Aranda 
also  quotes  Vergennes  as  saying  that  France  herself  "would  not 
again   occupy   anything   more  than   the   islands   to   the  north   of 
the  St.  Lawrence." 

9  See,  however,  Estaing's  "Addresse  a  tous  anciens  Francois  de 
l'Am£rique   septentrionale"   of  Oct.,   1778:     "I   shall  not   urge   a 
whole  people  that  to  join  the  United  States  is  to  secure  their 
own  happiness;  since  a  whole  people  .  .  .  must  know  their  own 
interest;  but  I  will  declare  and  I   now   formally  declare  in  the 
name  of  His  Majesty  .  .  .  that  all  his  former  subjects  in  North 
America  who  shall  no  more  acknowledge  the  supremacy  of  Great 
Britain  may  depend  upon  his  protection  and  support."     The  Con- 
tinental Journal  and  Weekly  Advertiser   (Boston),  Dec.  3,  1778. 
See  further,  Doniol,  III.  417-25. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  203 

they  have  of  the  friendship  and  alliance  of  the  king,  and 
that  it  is  not  to  his  interest  to  destroy  such  a  feeling.10 

In  the  views  thus  expressed  Vergennes  was  forti- 
fied in  the  course  of  the  months  following  by  the 
similar  views  communicated  in  Spain's  behalf  by 
Montmorin.11  As  it  chanced,  however,  at  this 
very  time  La  Fayette  was  perfecting  in  conjunc- 
tion with  a  committee  of  Congress  a  plan  for  a 
joint  campaign  in  Canada  by  the  allies.  Com- 
menting upon  the  plan,  Vergennes  wrote  Gerard 
thus:  "I  will  confide  to  you,  but  to  yourself 
alone,  that  the  opinion  of  Spain  is  that  it  will  be 
advantageous  to  reserve  Canada  and  Acadia  to 
Great  Britain,  and  you  feel  yourself  that  we 
ought  to  be  far  from  contradicting  her.  .  .  . 
But,  I  repeat,  it  is  for  circumstances  to  confirm 
or  modify  our  views."12  The  final  disposition  of 

10  76.,  III.  156-7.  Note  also  the  extracts  furnished  by  the  Count 
d'Estaing  from  his  Instructions,  to  Gerard:  "7e  chef — Requis 
que  je  dois  faire  de  contribuer  a  la  conqueste  du  Canada  autre- 
ment  que  par  une  croisere  et  par  des  attaques  des  posttes.  .  .  . 
3e  chef  .  .  .  chaque  expression  dSsigne  la  r6pugnance  que  le  Roy  a 
pour  cette  enterprise."  76.,  237-9.  See  also  Vergennes  to  Mont- 
morin, Oct.  30:  "Nous  ne  d^sirons  pas  a  beaucoup  pres  que  la 
nouvelle  rdpublique  qui  s'eleve  demeure  maitresse  exclusive  de 
tout  cet  immense  continent."  Accordingly  Canada  and  Nova 
Scotia  should  remain  with  England  in  order  to  make  the  Ameri- 
cans feel  the  need  "de  s'assur6r  des  garants,  des  allies,  et  des  pro- 
tecteurs."  Ib.,  561.  See  also  SMSS.,  Nos.  872  and  891. 

u  76.,  557  and  616. 

13  Nov.  18,  1778,  »6.,  IV.  43  footnote  3 ;  and  to  same  effect  is  ib., 
III.  616.  See  also  Adolphe  de  Circourt,  Histoire  de  I' Alliance  et 
de  I' Action  commune  de  la  France  et  de  I'Amerique  (Paris,  1876, 


204  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

the  question  was  somewhat  curious.  The  plan 
mentioned  having  been  referred  to  Washington, 
the  commander-in-chief  reported  against  it.  Of- 
ficially and  publicly  he  based  his  objection  upon 
the  impossibility  of  furnishing  sufficient  forces 
for  the  expedition,  but  in  a  confidential  letter  to 
the  president  of  Congress  he  also  voiced  the  fear 
of  offering  France  the  temptation  of  reestab- 
lishing her  power  in  a  country  filled  with  the 
memory  of  her,  whose  customs,  morals,  religion, 
habits  of  government,  everything,  recalled  her, 
and  the  possession  of  which  would  be  valuable  to 
her  in  many  ways,  especially  in  the  facility  it 
would  afford  "of  controlling  these  states,  the 
natural  and  most  formidable  rival  of  every  mari- 
time power  in  Europe."13 

But  after  all,  Canada,  the  Floridas,  the  fish- 

3  vols.).  The  work  is  a  translation  of  vol.  X  of  Bancroft's  His- 
tory, of  the  edition  of  1874,  with  added  notes  and  documents. 
Here,  vol.  III.  pp.  263-4,  Vergennes,  writing  Gerard  under  date 
of  Dec.  25,  1778,  says:  "You  have  done  wisely  to  elude  the  over- 
tures made  you  concerning  Halifax  and  Quebec.  Your  instruc- 
tions embody  the  king's  way  of  thinking  upon  this  subject;  and 
His  Majesty  has  changed  the  less  because  he  has  reason  to  believe 
that  it  enters  into  the  policy  of  Spain  as  well  as  in  ours,  to  main- 
tain the  English  in  possession  of  Nova  Scotia  and  of  Canada." 
M.  Doniol  would  make  Spain  originally  responsible  for  the  idea 
of  leaving  Canada  in  England's  hands,  but  in  this  he  is  clearly 
mistaken. 

"Washington  the  President  of  Congress,  Nov.  14,  1778,  Writ- 
ings of  Washington  (Ed.  Sparks,  Boston,  1834,  12  vs.),  VI. 
106-10.  Later,  however,  Washington  changed  his  opinion  on  this 
subject.  See  Doniol.  IV.  565;  also  ch.  XIII,  infra. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  205 

eries,  and  even  the  form  that  British  recognition 
should  take,  are  matters  more  or  less  by  the  way. 
For  either  France  did  not  transgress  her  engage- 
ments with  the  United  States  with  reference  to 
them,  at  least  to  any  very  easily  definable  extent, 
or  else  she  candidly  took  the  United  States  into 
her  confidence  and  asked  their  cooperation.  The 
one  point,  and  the  only  one,  at  which  there  was 
flat  incompatibility,  technically  at  least,  between 
the  Treaty  of  February  6th,  1778,  and  the  engage- 
ments subsequently  incurred  by  His  Most  Chris- 
tian Majesty  with  Spain  was  the  stipulation  by 
the  secret  Convention  of  Aranjuez,  that  France 
should  make  no  peace  without  the  consent  of 
Spain,  which  was  fortified  by  the  further  and 
more  definite  stipulation  that  the  war  should  con- 
tinue until  His  Catholic  Majesty  had  obtained 
Gibraltar.  Thus  was  the  purpose  of  the  war,  in 
which  the  United  States  were  already  bound  to 
remain  to  the  end,  altered  and  enlarged,  not  only 
without  their  consent,  but  without  their  knowl- 
edge.14 Having  failed  in  her  efforts  to  ally  with 
one  another  the  powers  with  which  she  herself 
was  allied,  France  bound  the  two  to  one  an- 
other's fortunes  by  conditioning  peace-making  in 
all  cases  upon  her  own  consent,  but  while  the  re- 
lation thus  created  between  France  and  the 
United  States  was  known  to  Spain,  the  analo- 

14  That   it   was    the    purport    of   Florida    Blanca's   program   to 
"alter  the  object  of  the  war"  is  stated  by  Montmorin,  «&.,  III.  48T. 


206  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

gous  relation  between  Spain  and  France  was 
unknown  to  the  United  States. 

And  this  discrepancy,  of  which  the  United 
States  were  contingently  the  victim,  is  thrown 
into  even  higher  light  when  we  turn  to  the 
history  of  M.  Gerard's  early  months  at  Philadel- 
phia. Here  Louis'  representative  found  upon 
his  arrival  a  widespread  belief  that  the  United 
States  could  make  peace  at  any  time  with  Eng- 
land, provided  only  they  did  not  renounce  their 
independence.15  The  source  of  the  idea  is  not 
far  to  seek.  It  was  the  commissioners'  letter  of 
December  18th,  which  was  written  at  the  period 
when  the  French  government  was  negotiating 
for  the  amity  and  commerce  of  the  Colonies,  but 
not  their  active  alliance.  But  the  later  treaty, 
which  however  in  July  had  not  yet  been  pub- 
lished in  America,  proceeded  of  course  along 
quite  different  lines.  As  soon,  therefore,  as  Ver- 
gennes  learned  the  state  of  belief  in  the  United 
States  on  the  subject  of  peace-making,  as  he  did 
from  some  American  newspapers  even  before 
Gerard  had  reached  Philadelphia,  he  penned  the 
latter  a  despatch  ordering  him  preemptorily  to 
"destroy  an  opinion  .  .  .  which  would  reverse 
the  whole  system  upon  which  our  Treaty  of  Al- 
liance rests."16 

This  despatch  reached  Gerard  early  in  August. 

"/&.,  III.  277-84. 

"/&.,  284.     See  further  ib.,  399-401,  and  IV.  17-34. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  207 

At  the  same  moment,  with  the  arrival  of  Deane 
in  Philadelphia,  whither  he  had  been  summoned 
by  Congress,  the  famous  Deane-Lee  controversy 
broke  forth,  over  the  question  whether  the  Col- 
onies were  under  any  obligation  to  pay  for  the 
supplies  that  had  been  furnished  them  through 
Hortalez  and  Company.  Deane,  who  had  made 
a  contract  with  Beaumarchais  guaranteeing  pay- 
ment, contended  that  Congress  was  bound  to  live 
up  to  this  agreement,  while  Lee  asserted  that 
these  supplies  had  been  intended  by  the  French 
government  as  gratuities  and  that  Hortalez  and 
Company  had  been  a  mere  device  to  conceal 
French  assistance  under  the  guise  of  commerce, 
and  further  insinuated  that  Deane  and  Beau- 
marchais were  in  conspiracy  to  defraud  Con- 
gress.17 The  merits  of  the  controversy  are  di- 
vided. Lee  was  certainly  right  as  to  the  supplies 
purchased  with  the  money  that  had  been  con- 
tributed by  the  Bourbon  kings,18  but  was  quite 

"For  references  on  this  topic  see  Chapter  III.  notes  27  and 
42;  also  Letters  of  Richard  Henry  Lee  (Ed.  J.  C.  Ballagh,  N.  Y., 
1911-4,  2  vols.),  I.  373-5,  457-63,  II.  1-203,  passim. 

"Note  in  this  connection  the  following  words  from  Louis' 
letter  to  Charles,  of  January  8,  1778:  "Je  ne  parle  pas  des 
secours  d'argent  et  autres,  que  nous  leurs  avons  donn6s,  le  tout 
etant  passe  sur  le  compte  du  commerce."  Doniol,  II.  713.  The 
king's  intention,  therefore,  with  reference  to  the  million  livres 
which  were  entrusted  to  Beaumarchais  in  June,  1776,  seems  clear: 
he  meant  it  as  a  gift  to  the  Colonies.  Vergennes,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  perhaps  not  unwilling  that  Beaumarchais  should  have 
it,  in  return  for  his  services  to  the  Foreign  Office.  See  Wharton, 
I.  376-84;  also,  M.  D.  Conway  in  the  Athenaeum,  1900,  pt.  I.  305-7. 


208  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

unwarrantably  suspicious  of  Deane's  motives, 
while  Deane  was  right  as  to  the  balance  of  the 
supplies,  which  was  a  considerable  one.  The 
French  government,  however,  which  at  this  very 
moment  was  defending  itself  before  Europe 
against  the  indignant  charges  of  the  British  gov- 
ernment, of  having  clandestinely  aided  the  Col- 
onies while  the  two  powers  were  still  ostensibly 
at  peace,  could  not  afford  to  admit  that  Lee  was 
right  to  any  extent.  The  result  was  that  Gerard 
soon  took  up  the  cudgels  for  Deane,  with  the  na- 
tural result  of  offending  Lee's  brother,  Richard 
Henry,  who  revenged  himself  by  blocking  all  the 
envoy's  attempts  to  get  a  declaration  from  Con- 
gress on  the  subject  of  a  separate  peace.18*  For- 
tunately for  Gerard,  early  in  January  Thomas 
Paine,  who  was  secretary  of  Congress,  published 
some  articles  in  the  Pennsylvania  Packet,  sus- 
taining Lee's  case  with  citations  from  official 
documents,  which  action  forced  Congress  to  de- 
clare its  position  on  both  issues  at  once.  On 
January  12th,  accordingly,  it  passed  a  resolution 
disavowing  Paine's  lucubrations  and  declaring 

"•  For  Lee's  change  of  opinion  of  Ge>ard  in  consequence  of  the 
latter's  intervention  in  behalf  of  Deane,  vd.  his  Letters,  I.  423, 
427,  II.  114,  119-20,  and  124.  Gerard's  endeavor,  however,  to 
fasten  upon  Lee  the  stigma  of  disloyalty  to  the  alliance  falls 
flat  in  light  of  the  evidence.  See  especially  Lee's  letter  of  De- 
cember 16,  1778,  to  the  Pennsylvania  General  Advertiser,  ib.,  457- 
62,  where  he  satisfactorily  explains  his  relations  with  the  British 
agent  Berkenhout  and  his  sentiments  on  the  subject  of  a  separate 
peace. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  209 

itself  convinced  "by  the  most  inolisputable  evi- 
dence" that  the  supplies  furnished  by  Hortalez 
and  Company  "were  not  a  present"  and  that 
"His  Most  Christian  Majesty  .  .  .  did  not  pre- 
face his  alliance  with  any  supplies  whatever  sent 
to  America";  and  two  days  later  it  disavowed 
explicitly  the  notion  of  a  separate  peace.19 

In  other  words,  it  was  settled,  and  by  the  stren- 
uous insistence  of  the  French  government  itself, 
that  Congress  could  agree  to  no  peace  or  truce 

19  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,  XIII.  54-5,  62-3. 
"Whereas  it  hath  been  represented  to  this  House  by  the  Hon.  Sieur 
Gerard,  minister  plenipotentiary  of  France,  'that  it  is  pretended  the 
United  States  have  preserved  the  liberty  of  treating  with  Great 
Britain  separately  from  their  ally,  as  long  as  Great  Britain  shall 
not  have  declared  war  against  the  king,  his  master';  therefore, 
Resolved,  unanimously,  That  as  neither  France  or  these  United 
States  may  of  right,  so  these  United  States  will  not,  conclude 
either  truce  or  peace  with  the  common  enemy,  without  the  formal 
consent  of  their  ally  first  obtained."  It  will  be  noted  that 
the  advocates  of  a  separate  peace  finally  based  their  case  on 
the  fact  that  there  had  never  been  a  formal  declaration  of 
war  upon  France  by  Great  Britain.  The  resolution  which  Gerard 
had  desired  to  see  adopted  reprobated  the  condemned  opinion 
very  strongly,  but  it  was  superseded  by  the  resolution  just  quoted, 
p.  62.  The  action  of  Congress,  nevertheless,  elicited  some  criti- 
cism. Thus  a  writer  in  the  Pennsylvania  Packet  of  Mar.  18,  1779, 
while  denouncing  the  Lees  as  men  of  "base  principles,"  charges 
that  M.  G6rard  has  altered  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  from  its  orig- 
inal form.  The  charge  is  repeated  in  the  same  journal  of  Apr. 
8,  where  great  disfavor  is  expressed  with  the  treaty  with  France 
as  compared  with  the  one  published  "in  our  papers"  nine  months 
earlier.  "In  the  first  treaty,  by  one  of  the  articles  America  had 
the  right  to  withdraw  herself  from  the  war,  provided  she  did  not 
relinquish  her  independence." 


210  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

with  Great  Britain — though  it  might  "listen  to 
overtures" — without  the  consent  of  France;  while 
three  months  later,  France  agreed,  in  turn,  that 
she  would  not  consent  to  such  a  peace  or  truce  till 
Spain  would  do  the  same,  or  at  any  rate,  till 
Spain  had  obtained  Gibraltar.  Nor  is  M.  Don- 
iol's  contention  that  the  two  developments  were 
quite  unconnected  in  the  conscious  intention  of 
the  French  government  necessarily  sound  simply 
because  the  Congressional  interpretation  of  the 
Treaty  of  February  6th  came  first,  since  Ver- 
gennes  was  well  aware  from  a  much  earlier  date 
that  Spain  would  enter  the  war  only  on  condition 
that  her  objectives  be  made  a  sine  qua  non  of 
peace.  And  that  the  two  developments  were  con- 
nected in  practical  effect  is  obvious. 

But,  then,  did  the  French  government  by  ac- 
ceding to  the  Treaty  of  Aranjuez  commit  any- 
thing worse  than  a  merely  technical  breach  of  its 
engagements  with  the  United  States?  Did  it 
not,  on  the  contrary,  take  a  step  that  was  actually 
beneficial  to  the  United  States  in  forwarding  the 
cause  of  independence?  For  though  Spain  her- 
self was  not  allied  with  the  United  States,  yet 
once  she  had  entered  the  war  her  forces  were 
turned  against  the  common  enemy.  To  begin 
with,  I  think  it  highly  questionable  whether,  all 
things  considered,  Spanish  aid  really  paid  for 
itself.  Thus  the  opportunities  of  the  campaign 

19Doniol,  III.  762,  fn.  2. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

of  1778,  when  American  enthusiasm  for  the  al- 
liance was  fresh  and  the  new  French  marine  was 
in  the  pink  of  condition,  were  frittered  away  to 
no  small  extent  because  of  the  French  govern- 
ment's efforts  to  accommodate  its  course  to  the 
exigencies  of  the  Spanish  monarch's  whimsy 
mediation.20  Again,  the  campaign  of  1779 
netted  nothing,  largely  because  France  yielded 
again  to  Spain's  views,  which  were  for  an  inva- 
sion of  England.21  Again,  in  1780  Spain,  save 
for  the  forces  she  maintained  at  Minorca,  in  the 
Floridas,  and  along  the  Mississippi,  was  practi- 
cally out  of  the  war.22  Only  in  1781,  when  the 
siege  of  Gibraltar  was  formed,  was  Spain's  as- 
sistance more  than  negligible,  when  indeed  it  was 
not  worse.  In  short,  Montmorin's  prediction  that 
Spain's  demands  would  be  more  embarrassing 
than  her  help  was  worth  was  substantially 
fulfilled.23 

Waiving,  however,  the  question  of  the  value  of 
Spanish  aid,  can  it  yet  be  contended  that  the 
Convention  of  Aranjuez  signified  any  real  danger 
to  American  interests?  Verbally  the  United 

20  See,  for  instance,  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  June  22,  1778,  ib., 
472-3;  also  ib.,  503-7  and  590. 

21  Ib.,  IV.  322-4.     Florida  Blanca  was  of  the  opinion  that  "it 
was  possible  to  strike  the  English  so  they  would  feel  it  only  in 
England,"  ib.,  III.  674.     Charles  III  was  convinced  that  the  war 
must  begin  with  a  grand  coup  such  as  a  descent  upon  England,  ib., 
665.    See  also  Florida  Blanca's  plan  of  operations  of  Feb.  26,  1779, 
ib.,  688-91.    For  La  Fayette's  connection  with  the  plan  of  descent 
and  the  failure  of  the  project,  see  i6.,  IV.  ch.  V. 

a  The  Spanish  court  was  at  this  time  engaged  in  informal  and 


212  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

States  were  bound  by  article  VIII  of  the  Treaty 
of  Alliance  not  to  make  peace  till  France  gave 
the  word,  but  morally  their  obligation  would  be 
fulfilled  the  moment  Great  Britain  was  willing 
to  accord  them  independence  and  their  ally  an 
unconditional  peace;  and  certainly  Vergennes 
himself  must  have  foreseen  that  the  Americans, 
despite  the  secrecy  of  the  Treaty  of  Aranjuez, 
would  not  be  easily  hoodwinked  into  prolonging 
the  war  once  England  manifested  a  disposition 
to  grant  the  terms  just  described.  The  real  dan- 
ger of  the  Convention  of  Aranjuez  from  the 
point  of  view  of  American  interests  sprang  from 
its  secrecy  taken  in  connection  with  the  fact  that 
France  was  to  exert  a  powerful  influence  upon 

unavowed  negotiations  with  the  English  emissary  Richard  Cum- 
berland, Lord  George  Germaine's  private  secretary.  See  ch.  XII, 
infra. 

23  For  a  rather  more  favorable  estimate  of  Spanish  participation 
in  the  war,  see  Francois  Rousseau  in  Revue  des  Questions  his- 
toriques,  LXXII.  444  ff.  See  also  Florida  Blanca's  "Apology" 
for  his  administration,  William  Coxe,  Memoirs  of  the  Kings  of 
Spain  (London,  1813,  3  vols.),  I.  App.,  331-44.  Even  in  Congress, 
which  on  the  whole  was  not  favorably  disposed  toward  her,  Spain 
had  one  or  two  defenders.  Thus  we  find  Witherspoon  of  New 
Jersey  saying,  in  Aug.,  1782:  "Some  gentlemen  had  underrated 
the  services  of  Spain.  She  had  done  much.  She  had  entered  into 
the  war  with  the  common  enemy.  We  had  derived  as  much  ad- 
vantage from  her  exertions  as  if  she  had  agreed  to  the  treaty  of 
Alliance.  .  .  .  Besides  this  she  had  aided  us  with  money,  opened 
her  ports,  and  admitted  us  to  trade  to  Havannah,"  Thomson 
Papers  (N.  Y.  Hist'l  Soc.  Cols.,  18T8),  pp.  90-1.  See  also  a 
speech  by  Madison  to  much  the  same  effect  early  in  1783,  Writings 
(Ed.  Hunt),  I.  418-9. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  213 

Congress  in  shaping  the  terms  upon  which  that 
body  would  consent  to  peace.  For  at  the  out- 
set it  was  a  compensating  consideration  that,  in 
proportion  as  Vergennes  had  insisted  upon  the 
indispensability  of  France's  consent  to  America's 
making  peace,  so  by  the  same  token,  he  had  in- 
sisted upon  the  indispensability  of  America's 
consent  to  France's  making  peace,  and  had  there- 
fore bound  himself  to  give  respectful  heed  to  the 
American  interpretation  of  the  reciprocal  en- 
gagements of  the  allies.  Eventually,  however,  by 
the  Instructions  of  June  15th,  1781,  Congress 
surrendered  outright  to  the  French  ministers  the 
control  thus  given  it  over  the  final  peace.  There 
can  be  little  doubt,  I  think,  that  Congress'  ig- 
norance of  the  Treaty  of  Aranjuez  ought  to  be 
reckoned  as  one  of  the  circumstances  explaining 
this  surrender.24 

The  issue  thus  finally  becomes  whether  the 
Instructions  of  June  15th  were  in  the  circum- 
stances a  menace  to  American  interests — and  this 
issue  can  wait.  For  the  moment,  we  turn  back  to 
review  briefly  the  story  of  the  ultimatum  of  April 
3rd,  1779,  upon  the  rejection  of  which  by  Great 
Britain  the  Convention  of  Aranjuez  still  left 
Spain's  entrance  into  the  war  contingent. 

Great  Britain's  answer  to  the  suggestion  of  a 

"See  Chapter  XIII,  infra. 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

truce  involving  a  tacit  recognition  of  American 
independence  and  her  evacuation  of  American 
territory  did  not  reach  Madrid  till  March  27th, 
but  when  it  at  last  arrived  it  was  found  to  be 
explicit  to  the  point  of  insult:  Great  Britain 
could  not  recognize  the  right  of  France  "to  con- 
found her  own  affairs  with  the  pretended  inter- 
ests of  those  whom  she  affects  to  call  her  allies," 
or  to  dictate  "in  what  manner  His  Britannic 
Majesty  should  exercise  his  liberty  of  reestablish- 
ing his  authority  over  his  own  dominions."25  Yet 
notwithstanding  this  language,  which  he  admitted 
was  "hardly  satisfactory,"  Florida  Blanca,  plead- 
ing as  always  the  necessity  of  continuing  the 
deception  of  England,26  proceeded  to  draft  the 
ultimatum  just  referred  to.  In  essence,  what 
this  ultimatum  proposed  was  a  truce  of  indefinite 
duration  in  America  during  the  continuance  of 
which  England  should  remain  in  possession  of 
the  territory  she  still  held  there,  including  New 
York  City  and  Rhode  Island.27  Vergennes'  dis- 
may at  these  propositions,  when  he  learned  of 
them  on  April  12th,  may  be  imagined:  "The 
more  we  examine  them  and  weigh  them,"  he  wrote 
Montmorin,  "the  less  do  we  see  any  way  of  recon- 
ciling them  with  what  the  king  owes  himself  or 
his  new  allies."  Nor,  unfortunately  was  this  the 
worst  of  the  matter,  for  by  leaving  the  British 
forces  mingled  with  the  American  population  at 

^Doniol,  III.  746-8. 

39  Ib.,  748-9. 

27  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  Mar.  29,  ib.,  798-9. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  215 

some  of  its  most  important  centers,  the  Spanish 
proposals  still  kept  open  a  way  for  England's 
conciliation  of  her  alienated  subjects.  "Endea- 
vor, I  pray  you,"  he  continued  earnestly,  "to  pre- 
vent any  further  condescensions  of  the  sort,  for 
they  can  only  be  fatal  to  the  dignity  of  the  king, 
and  the  humiliation  resulting  from  them  the 
king  his  uncle  will  necessarily  share."28  On  April 
12th,  20th,  and  29th  and  again  on  May  14th, 
Vergennes  gave  vent  to  vehement  and  even  bitter 
protestations  against  the  action  that  the  Spanish 
government  had  so  unwarrantably  taken,  in  the 
very  face  of  its  repeated  promise  "to  guard  the 
honor  of  France  as  it  would  that  of  its  own  crown 
and  country."29  But  one  thing  Vergennes  had 
not  counted  upon — the  obstinacy  of  the  king  of 
England,  who,  blissfully  unaware  that  he  had 
been  presented  with  the  opportunity  of  shatter- 
ing not  only  the  French- American  alliance  but 
the  Family  Compact  as  well,  still  adhered  to  his 
resolution  to  bring  his  rebellious  subjects  to  their 
knees.  On  May  17th,  Montmorin,  breathing 
a  sigh  of  relief,  wrote  Vergennes  that  England 
had  repelled  the  Spanish  ultimatum  and  that  the 
Spanish  fleet  would  soon  join  the  French.  Yet 
Montmorin's  despatch  containing  this  welcome 
news  sounded  also  the  now  familiar  note  of  warn- 
ing: "We  ought  however  not  conceal  from  our- 


M76.,  767-8. 

"Loc.  cit.  and  pp.  770  and  801-3. 


216  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

selves,  Monsieur,  how  little  interest  Spain  takes 
in  the  United  States  of  America;  we  shall  cer- 
tainly have  evidence  of  this  in  the  course  of  the 
war  but  especially  when  the  question  shall  arise 
of  concluding  peace."30 

80  76.,  771.  Beaumarchais  in  writing  Vergennes  commented  upon 
Spain's  entry  into  the  war  in  characteristic  vein:  "Si  le  livre  est 
aussi  fort  que  la  preface  a  6t6  longue,  nous  devons  voir  de  belles 
choses  de  cette  nation-la;  mais,  je  ne  sais  pourquoi,  j'ai  toujours 
un  petit  glacon  dans  le  coin  de  ma  cervelle  6tiquet£  Espagne. 
J'ai  beau  faire,  je  ne  parviens  pas  a  ^chauffer  cette  idee-la,"  ib., 
IV.  446. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   MISSISSIPPI  AND  THE  WESTERN  LAND 
QUESTION 

The  claim  of  the  United  States  during  the 
Revolution  to  extend  to  the  Mississippi  was  based 
upon  both  sentiment  and  interest.  Rebels  against 
the  authority  of  the  British  Empire  could  not  have 
taken  an  impoverished  view  of  their  future;  and 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war  at  least  the  spirit  of 
Continentalism,  forerunner  of  Manifest  Des- 
tiny, was  abroad  in  the  land.  The  Earl  of  Cork 
had  proclaimed  that  "the  ball  of  empire  was  roll- 
ing westward  and  would  stop  in  America"  and 
the  prophecy  was  now  repeated,  while  in  confir- 
mation of  it  were  cited  "the  growing  millions  of 
western  world."  That  such  a  spirit  should  treat 
the  idea  of  being  "shut  up  within  the  Mountains" 
with  impatience  was  inevitable.1 

1  The  Earl  of  Cork's  words  are  reminiscent,  perhaps,  of  Bishop 
Berkeley's  famous  lines  in  his  essay  on  The  Prospect  of  Planting 
Arts  and  Learning  in  America: 

"Westward  the  course  of  empire  takes  it  way; 
The  first  four  acts  already  past, 
A  fifth  shall  close  the  drama  with  the  day: 
Time's  noblest  offspring  is  the  last." 
One  of  the  earliest  forecasts  by  an  American  of  the  "manifest 


218  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

And  the  view  that  sprang  in  the  first  place 
from  enthusiasm  found  ready  support  from  sober 
calculation.  The  original  belief  seems  to  have 

destiny"  of  this  continent  was  that  of  John  Adams,  in  a  letter 
written  in  1755:  "Soon  after  the  Reformation  a  few  people  came 
over  into  this  new  world  for  conscience  sake.  Perhaps  this 
apparently  trivial  incident  may  transfer  the  great  seat  of  empire 
into  America.  It  looks  likely  to  me:  for  if  we  can  remove  the 
turbulent  Gallicks,  our  people,  according  to  exactest  computations, 
will  in  another  century  become  more  numerous  than  England  itself. 
Should  this  be  the  case,  since  we  have,  I  may  say,  all  the  naval 
stores  of  the  nation  in  our  hands,  it  will  be  easy  to  obtain  the 
mastery  of  the  seas;  and  then  the  united  force  of  Europe  will  not 
be  able  to  subdue  us."  Life  and  Works  of  John  Adams  (Boston, 
1856,  10  vols.),  I.  23.  The  prophecy  of  naval  supremacy  for 
America  is  strikingly  like  that  of  Vergennes  twenty  years  later: 
vd.  supra,  ch.  Ill,  67-8  and  note.  Less  than  three  years  after 
Adams,  James  Wolfe  was  writing  his  mother  from  Louisbourg, 
thus:  "These  colonies  are  deeply  tinged  with  the  vices  and  bad 
qualities  of  the  mother  country;  and,  indeed,  many  parts  of  it  are 
peopled  with  those  that  the  law  or  necessity  has  forced  upon  it. 
Notwithstanding  these  disadvantages,  .  .  .  this  will,  some  time 
hence,  be  a  vast  empire,  the  seat  of  power  and  learning."  Beckles 
Willson,  The  Life  and  Letters  of  James  Wolfe  (London,  1909), 
p.  395.  The  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  naturally  enhanced  the 
vision  of  imperial  greatness  entertained  by  the  friends  of  America. 
In  this  connection  various  expressions  in  Dr.  Richard  Price's  fa- 
mous pamphlet  entitled  Observations  on  the  Nature  of  Civil 
Liberty  and  the  Principles  of  Government  and  the  Justice  and 
Policy  of  the  War  with  America  (London,  1776)  are  interesting: 
see  pp.  21  ffg.  Price  concludes  that,  "It  is  probable  that  the 
Americans  in  fifty  or  sixty  years  will  be  double  our  number  and 
form  a  mighty  empire  consisting  of  a  variety  of  states,  all  equal 
or  superior  to  ourselves."  In  the  same  connection  an  extract  from 
the  Antigua  Gazette  of  Sept.  10,  1777,  is  interesting.  In  what 
purports  to  be  a  "Circular  Letter"  delivered  by  a  ministerial 
messenger  to  the  different  foreign  ambassadors  resident  at  Lon- 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  219 

been,  at  any  rate  it  was  the  view  of  Franklin 
and  Deane,  that  the  lands  west  of  the  Mountains 
were  subject  to  the  disposal  of  Congress  to  meet 
the  expenses  of  the  common  effort.2  Later,  with 

don,  warning  is  given  that  it  is  obviously  "the  common  interest  of 
Europe  to  annihilate  America,"  which  is  destined  to  rival  all 
countries  in  production,  to  undermine  their  commerce  by  means 
of  free  navigation,  and  to  draw  off  their  population  in  the  way  of 
emigration.  The  British  territory  in  America  is  estimated  at 
718,592,000  acres,  capable  of  supporting  145,918,400  people,  or 
twenty-six  million  more  than  Europe.  The  phrase  above  quoted, 
"the  growing  millions  of  the  western  world,"  is  from  a  letter  in 
the  Pennsylvania  Packet,  No.  144,  postscript.  See  also  in  the 
same  journal,  No.  147,  an  extract  from  a  sermon  by  John 
Lathrop,  American  pastor  of  the  Second  Church  in  Boston: 
"America  has  every  natural  advantage.  ...  A  coast  three  thous- 
and miles  in  length  and  a  breadth  as  yet  unexplored.  .  .  .  The 
united  wisdom  of  North  America  should  be  collected  in  a 
general  congress  of  all  the  colonies."  The  date  of  the  sermon  was 
June  6,  1774.  See  also  the  Boston  Evening  Post  and  General 
Advertiser  of  June  26,  1779:  "We  are  now  upon  the  stage  of 
America,  have  an  arduous  task  to  perform,  we  act  not  only  for 
ourselves  but  for  remotest  posterity.  The  political  misery  or 
happiness  of  millions  unborn  depends  on  the  conduct  of  our 
public  measures  at  this  day."  These  words  occur  in  a  plea  in 
support  of  the  right  of  Congress  "to  ascertain  and  fix  the  limits 
of  those  states  that  claim  to  the  Mississippi  or  South  Sea." 

2  The  first  form  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation  as  reported  to 
Congress  was  in  the  hand  of  Franklin.  Article  XI  of  this  draft 
provided  that  all  purchases  of  lands  from  Indians  were  to  be 
made  only  with  the  consent  of  Congress,  that  Congress  was  to 
have  authority  to  determine  Indian  boundaries,  and  that  "all 
purchases  from  them  [the  Indians]  by  Congress  [were  to  be]  for 
the  general  advantage  and  benefit  of  the  United  Colonies,"  Com- 
plete Works  of  Benjamin  Franklin  (Ed.  Bigelow,  N.  Y.,  1887-8, 
10  vols.),  V.  552-3.  Article  XVIII  further  gave  Congress  the 
power  to  limit  "the  bounds  of  those  Colonies  which  by  charter  or 
proclamation,  or  under  any  pretence  are  said  to  extend  to  the 


220  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

the  rise  of  the  principle  of  State  Sovereignty,  nar- 
rower views  obtained  sway  and  the  conviction 
became  general  that  these  lands  were  the  prop- 
erty of  particular  states.  Yet  even  so,  all  states 
still  retained  an  interest  in  having  these  lands 
kept  open  to  settlement  by  their  citizens  and  in 
seeing  their  frontiers  secure,  both  of  which  ob- 
jects would  have  been  jeopardized  had  a  foreign 
power  obtained  control  of  the  region  in  question 
and  of  the  Indian  tribes  there.  Finally,  by  yet 
another  turn  of  the  wheel  of  public  opinion,  from 
1781  on  the  prospect  developed  that  the  states 
credited  with  the  sovereignty  and  ownership  of 
these  lands  would  surrender  their  claims  to  the 
Confederacy  at  large.  Once  more  the  interest  of 
all  states  in  seeing  the  American  title  established 
became  what  it  originally  had  been. 

What,  then,  was  this  title?     As  I  have  just 
hinted,  it  was  twofold:  that  of  the  American  Peo- 

South  Sea."  This  clause  gave  rise  to  a  debate,  Aug.  2,  1776, 
which  marks  the  beginning  of  the  struggle  between  the  "land- 
less" states,  headed  by  Maryland,  and  the  "landed"  states,  headed 
by  Virginia,  and  which  ended  five  years  later  in  the  acts  of  cession 
of  western  territory  to  the  Confederacy.  Chase  of  Maryland 
"denied  that  any  colony  has  a  right  to  go  to  the  South  Sea." 
Harrison  of  Virginia  thereupon  inquired,  "How  came  Maryland 
by  its  land,  but  by  its  charter,"  and  added:  "By  its  charter, 
Virginia  owns  to  the  South  Sea."  Huntington  of  Connecticut 
was  all  against  "mutilating  charters."  Stone  of  Maryland  con- 
tended for  the  right  of  the  small  colonies  to  "happiness  and 
security,"  and  that  "they  would  have  no  safety  if  the  great 
colonies  were  not  limited."  The  clause  was  stricken  out  in 
committee.  Life  and  Works  of  John  Adams,  II.  501-2. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

pie  to  the  region  in  question,  and  that  of  certain 
states.  True,  these  two  titles  were  mutually 
conflicting,  and  true  also,  the  peculiar  titles  of 
some  of  the  states  conflicted  with  those  of  other 
states;  and  doubtless,  if  the  matter  were  one  to 
be  resolved  dialectically,  this  fact  would  have  ser- 
ious consequences.  The  question  raised,  however, 
is  not  one  of  logic  but  of  law;  and  it  has  accord- 
ingly to  be  remembered  that  in  the  analogous 
case  of  real  estate,  titles  that  conflict  are  often 
consolidated  to  produce  a  title  that  is  unimpeach- 
able. It  is  therefore  not  inconceivable  that  while, 
on  the  one  hand,  no  state  had  a  perfect  title 
against  either  the  United  States  or  her  sister 
states  to  western  domain,  yet,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  titles  of  all  parties  combined  exhausted  the 
legal  rights  to  the  region. 

The  states  that  held  individual  claims  to  do- 
main west  of  the  Mountains  were  Massachusetts, 
Connecticut,  New  York,  Virginia,  the  Carolinas, 
and  Georgia.  The  claims  of  Massachusetts,  Con- 
necticut and  New  York  were  confined  to  terri- 
tory north  of  the  Ohio  river;  that  of  Virginia, 
the  most  sweeping  of  all,  was  to  the  whole  of  this 
territory,  and  also  to  the  region  south  of  the  Ohio 
that  today  comprises  the  state  of  Kentucky ;  those 
of  the  Carolinas  and  Georgia  were,  roughly,  to 
the  lands  lying  between  their  present  western 
boundaries  and  the  Mississippi  river.  The  foun- 
dation for  these  claims,  save  that  of  New  York 


£28  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

who  based  hers  on  a  pretended  overlordship  over 
the  Iroquois  Indians  and  their  conquests,  was  in 
all  cases  furnished  by  the  "sea-to-sea"  clauses 
of  the  colonial  charters  as  curtailed  by  the  Treaty 
of  1763,  which  made  the  Mississippi  river  the 
western  boundary  of  British  America.8  As  I 

•As  noted  immediately  below,  England  based  her  case  against 
France  in  the  dispute  leading  to  the  last  French  and  Indian  war 
partly  upon  the  colonial  charters,  and  undoubtedly  this  dis- 
pute more  than  anything  else  made  the  colonies  aware  and  confi- 
dent of  their  charter  claims  to  the  Mississippi  boundary.  Yet 
it  is  interesting  to  observe  that  the  English  cartographer  Bollan 
complained  that  his  predecessors,  Popple  (in  1732),  Keith  (in 
1733),  Oldmixon  (in  1741),  Moll  (at  several  dates),  and  Bowen 
(in  1747)  had  all  been  recreant  to  British  interests,  Winsor, 
Mississippi  Basin,  p.  331.  The  rising  dispute,  however,  soon 
registered  itself  in  the  views  of  the  mapmakers.  Thus  Bowen's 
map  of  1749  is  entitled:  "A  Map  of  the  British- American  Plan- 
tations .  .  .  including  all  the  back  settlements  in  the  respective 
provinces  as  far  as  the  Mississippi."  The  famous  Mitchell  Map 
of  1755  also  recorded  British  official  pretensions,  which  in  turn 
were  supported  by  citations  of  Mitchell's  and  Bowen's  maps. 
On  the  other  hand,  Evans'  map  of  the  same  year  set  the  western 
boundary  of  Virginia  at  the  Mountains;  while  as  late  as  1777, 
French  mapmakers  applied  the  term  "Louisiana"  to  the  region 
between  the  AUeghenies  and  the  Mississippi.  See  generally 
Winsor's  Narrative  and  Critical  History,  V.  79-86,  and  235.  Cer- 
tain other  occurrences  also,  lying  between  1754  and  the  outbreak 
of  the  Revolution,  tended  to  confirm  Virginia's  charter  preten- 
tions.  Thus  Governor  Dinwiddie,  in  1754,  made  promises  of  land 
to  the  Virginia  soldiers,  while  a  convocation  of  the  chiefs  of 
the  Cherokee  and  Choctaw  Indians  at  Charleston  the  same  year 
recognized  the  right  of  the  Virginia  and  Carolina  governments 
to  establish  magazines  among  them,  and  certain  other  rights  of 
apparent  suzerainty.  The  legal  significance  of  the  Proclamation 
of  1763,  restraining  settlements  westward  of  the  mountains,  is 
doubtful  (see  infra),  but  the  discussion  concerning  it  was  calcu- 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

have  just  pointed  out,  the  fact  that  these  claims 
in  some  instances  overlapped  was  not  necessarily 
fatal  to  them  as  against  third  parties.  There 
were  other  obstacles  to  their  admission,  however, 
that  were  more  formidable. 

The  two  nations  against  whose  pretensions  it 
was  requisite  for  the  states  to  secure  their  claims 
were  Spain  and  Great  Britain.  The  latter  power, 

lated  again  to  arouse  public  attention  to  the  question  of  where 
the  western  boundary  of  the  colonies  lay.  Also,  the  Proclamation 
was  constantly  being  transgressed  or  officially  waived.  "I  have 
had,  my  Lord,"  wrote  Lord  Dunmore  in  his  Report  to  Lord 
Dartmouth  of  December  24,  1774,  "frequent  opportunities  to  re- 
flect upon  the  emigrating  spirit  of  the  Americans  since  my 
arrival  to  this  government.  There  are  considerable  bodies  of 
inhabitants  settled  at  greater  and  less  distances  from  the  regular 
frontiers  of,  I  believe,  all  the  colonies.  In  this  colony,  procla- 
mations have  been  published  from  time  to  time  to  restrain  them; 
but  impressed  from  their  earliest  infancy  with  sentiments  and 
habits  very  different  from  those  acquired  by  persons  of  a  similar 
condition  in  England,  they  do  not  conceive  that  government  has 
any  right  to  forbid  their  taking  possession  of  a  vast  tract  of 
country,  either  uninhabited  or  which  serves  only  as  a  shelter  to 
a  few  scattered  tribes  of  Indians.  Nor  can  they  be  easily  brought 
to  entertain  any  belief  of  the  permanent  obligation  of  treaties 
made  with  those  people,  whom  they  consider  as  but  little  re- 
moved from  brute  creation."  R.  G.  Thwaites  and  Louise  P. 
Kellogg,  Documentary  History  of  Dunmore's  War,  p.  371.  See  also 
ib.,  pp.  369-70  and  footnote  91,  also  p.  5,  footnote  8,  for  data 
with  reference  to  the  Treaty  of  Fort  Stanwix  (1768)  and  the 
Walpole  Grant  of  1769,  both  of  which  transgressed  the  principle 
of  the  Proclamation  of  1763.  On  the  eve  of  the  Revolution  oc- 
curred Lord  Dunmore's  War  which  gave  rise  to  an  acrimonious 
dispute  between  Dunmore  and  the  proprietary  governor  of  Penn- 
sylvania, John  Penn,  with  reference  to  Virginia's  western  claims. 
It  was  the  forerunner  of  later  disputes,  in  the  course  of  the 
Revolution,  between  the  states  with  fixed  western  boundaries  and 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

having  urged  the  charter  rights  of  the  colonies  in 
partial  support  of  her  own  claims  against  France 
anterior  to  the  Seven  Years'  War,  was  perhaps 
estopped  from  denying  that  those  rights  had  been 
all  that  she  had  once  asserted  them  to  be.  The 
Treaty  of  1763,  however,  had  been  followed  by 
the  Royal  Proclamation  of  the  same  year,  forbid- 
ding the  colonial  governors  to  make  further 
grants  of  land  in  the  region  west  of  the  Alle- 
ghenies.4  The  question  therefore  arises  whether 

those  claiming  to  extend  to  the  Mississippi.  Dunmore,  in  his 
Proclamation  of  Sept.  17,  1774,  asserted  that  Virginia's  "ancient 
claim"  was  "founded  in  reason,  upon  pre-occupancy,  and  the 
general  acquiescense  of  all  persons,"  but  makes  no  mention  of 
Virginia's  charter  rights,  Force's  American  Archives,  4th  series, 
I.  790-1.  Finally,  in  the  Virginia  Constitution  of  1776,  it  is  pro- 
vided that  "the  western  and  northern  extent  of  Virginia  shall  in 
all  respects  stand  as  fixed  by  the  charter  of  King  James  I  in  the 
year  1609  and  by  the  public  peace  between  the  courts  of  Great 
Britain  and  France  in  the  year  1763."  For  Virginia's  champion- 
ship of  the  charter  claims  and  Maryland's  opposition  to  them,  see 
Collections  of  the  New  York  Historical  Society,  1878  (Thom- 
son Papers),  passim. 

4  The  text  of  the  Proclamation  of  1763  is  to  be  found  in  the 
Annual  Register  for  that  year,  pp.  208-13,  and  in  Force's  Ameri- 
can Archives,  4th  series,  I.  171-5.  The  salient  clause  is  the  follow- 
ing: "We  do  ...  declare  it  to  be  our  royal  will  and  pleasure 
.  .  .  that  no  governor  or  commander-in-chief  of  our  other  col- 
onies or  plantations  in  America  do  presume  for  the  present,  and 
until  our  further  pleasure  be  known,  to  grant  warrant  of  survey 
or  pass  patents  for  any  lands  beyond  the  heads  or  sources  of  any 
of  the  rivers  which  fall  into  the  Atlantic  from  the  west  or  north- 
west; or  upon  any  lands  whatsoever  which,  not  having  been 
ceded  to  or  purchased  by  us,  as  aforesaid,  are  reserved  to  the  said 
Indians  or  any  of  them."  The  line  actually  drawn  by  Hills- 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

it  was  the  purpose  of  the  Proclamation  to  set  a 
definite  western  boundary  to  such  provinces  as 
had  thus  far  remained  without  one.  The  Amer- 
ican advocates  contended  that  this  was  not  the 
case,  that  the  intention  of  the  Proclamation  had 
been  "not  to  take  away  but  to  restrain  an  existing 
right,"  of  which  therefore  it  furnished  formal  offi- 
cial recognition.5  But  this  opinion,  it  seems  clear, 

borough  in  pursuance  of  the  Proclamation  made  exception  in 
favor  of  the  Virginia  settlements  on  the  Great  Kenawha.  The 
ostensible  purpose  of  the  Proclamation  was  to  pacify  the  In- 
dians, but  Hillsborough  in  1772  admitted  another  motive,  viz., 
to  keep  the  populace  under  the  restraint  of  the  seaboard  authori- 
ties. A  third  motive,  possibly,  was  to  discredit  the  colonial 
charters.  Winsor,  Mississippi  Basin,  430-1.  Winsor  also  implies 
that  the  Proclamation  met  with  some  contemporary  protest. 
"The  party  of  progress,"  he  says,  "called  it  a  tyrannous  check 
on  the  inevitable  expansion  of  the  race."  I  am  rather  of  opinion, 
however,  that  such  criticisms  came  later,  when  the  general  argu- 
ment against  England's  American  policy  was  being  shaped  up. 
This  is  certainly  true  of  Burke's  characterization  of  the  Proclama- 
tion, quoted  by  Winsor  as  if  contemporary,  as  an  attempt  "to 
keep  a  lair  of  wild  beasts  that  earth  which  God,  by  an  express 
charter,  has  given  to  the  children  of  men."  Both  Washington 
and  Franklin  regarded  the  Proclamation  to  be,  as  its  terms  imply, 
a  temporary  measure,  and  this  was  probably  the  view  generally 
held  of  it. 

6  Livingston  to  Franklin,  Jan.  7,  1782,  Wharton,  V.  88.  This 
important  document  is  also  to  be  found  in  the  Complete  Works 
of  Benjamin  Franklin,  VII.  348  ff.  Other  important  state- 
ments of  the  American  argument  on  the  territorial  question  are 
the  "Instructions  to  Jay"  of  Oct.  17,  1780,  in  Journals  of  the 
Continental  Congress,  XVIII,  935  ff.,  and  Writings  of  James 
Madison  (Ed.  Hunt),  I.  82  ff.;  and  the  "Facts  and  Observations 
in  support  of  the  several  claims  of  the  United  States,"  presented 


226  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

runs  counter  to  the  evidence.  Thus  in  1772,  when 
Franklin  and  some  associates  sought  a  grant  from 
the  Privy  Council  of  a  tract  of  land  on  the  Ohio 
and  the  argument  was  brought  forward  that  the 
proposed  grant  contained  "part  of  the  dominion 
of  Virginia  to  the  south  of  the  river  Ohio,"  it  was 
answered  "that  no  part  of  the  above  tract  is  to 
the  eastward  of  the  Allegheny  mountains  and  that 
those  mountains  must  be  considered  as  the  true 
westward  boundary  of  Virginia";  and  this  argu- 
ments prevailed  with  the  council*  Two  years 
later  moreover  the  Quebec  Act  was  passed  with 
the  proviso  "that  nothing  herein  contained  rela- 
tive to  the  boundary  of  the  province  of  Quebec 
shall  in  any  wise  affect  the  boundaries  of  any 
other  colony,"  notwithstanding  which  the  south- 
ern boundary  of  the  province  was  drawn  along 
the  Ohio.7  We  may  admit  the  American  conten- 
tion that,  since  the  Quebec  Act  was  itself  one  of 
the  causes  of  the  Revolution,  "to  build  anything 
upon  it  would  be  to  urge  one  wrong  in  support  of 

to  Congress,  Aug.  16,  1782,  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress, 
XXIII.  471-524,  and  Thomson  Papers,  102-41. 

•  Complete  Works  of  Benjamin  Franklin,  V.  3  and  25-35.  The 
opposition  to  the  proposed  grant  was  headed  by  Lord  Hills- 
borough,  President  of  the  Lords  of  Trade.  The  authorship  of 
the  answer  to  Hillsborough's  representations  is  usually  ascribed 
to  Franklin,  but  Professor  C.  W.  Alvord  contends  that  its  author 
was  Samuel  Wharton  of  Philadelphia.  See  the  Nation,  XCIX. 
220-1.  Wharton  may  have  stood  sponser  for  the  answer  and  yet 
Franklin  have  been  the  author  of  it. 

7  Force's  American  Archives,  4th  Series,  I.  216-20. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  227 

another."8  Nevertheless,  the  evidential  value  of 
the  act  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  Proclamation 
of  1763,  the  validity  of  which  was  never  ques- 
tioned, still  remains. 

And  as  against  Spain  the  claims  of  the  Ameri- 
can states  were  weaker  still.  Spain  desired,  first, 
to  keep  the  Americans  back  from  her  own  posses- 
sions, and  secondly,  to  restore  her  monopoly  of 
trade  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico;9  to  both  of  which 
ends  it  was  essential  that  she  should  withhold  from 
the  Americans  the  right,  which  in  1763  she  had 
accorded  the  subjects  of  Great  Britain,10  of  navi- 

•Wharton,  V.  88.  In  the  debate  on  the  Quebec  Bill,  Dunning 
contended  that  the  measure  was  inconsistent  with  England's  posi- 
tion in  the  Seven  Years'  War.  "Consider,"  he  said,  'Svhat  it  was 
for  which  you  engaged  in  the  last  war:  encroachments  of  the 
French  upon  our  colonies.  .  .  .  You  repelled  force  by  force. 
They  offered  to  you  to  withdraw  from  the  south  of  the  Ohio  and 
retire  to  the  north,  making  that  river  the  boundary  of  the  two 
colonies.  No,  you  replied,  the  river  of  St.  Lawrence  is  the 
boundary  of  Canada;  .  .  .  the  tracts  which  you  claim  are  parts 
of  our  colonies  of  Virginia,  Pennsylvania,  etc.;  and  we  cannot 
grant  away  the  certain  and  undoubted  right  of  our  subjects  in 
such  a  manner."  Yet  this  was  precisely  what  Parliament  was 
doing  by  the  Quebec  Bill:  it  was  merging  with  Canada  what 
England  had  always  contended  was  no  part  of  Canada.  The 
Attorney-General,  Thurlow,  answered  Dunning  thus:  "It  is 
success  in  war  that  gives  success  in  peace,  and  by  no  means  the 
imaginary  line  drawn  by  a  state  in  its  colonies;  nor  have  the 
limits  now  drawn  anything  to  do  with  old  Canada;  ...  it  is  a 
new  scheme,  and  by  no  means  a  restoration  of  those  old  limits  the 
French  once  contended  for."  Parliamentary  History,  XVII. 
1359  ff. 

•  See  Chapter  XIV. 

10  Art.  VII  of  the  Treaty  of  Feb.  10,  1763:     "Provided  that  the 


228  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

gating  the  Mississippi  through  Louisiana  to  its 
mouth.  For  by  denying  the  Americans  this  right, 
so  obviously  essential  to  an  agricultural  popula- 
tion between  the  Mountains  and  the  River,  she 
would  discourage  the  further  immigration  of 
Americans  westward;  while  she  would  also  be 
taking  an  excellent  preventive  measure  against 
the  appearance  of  American  smugglers  on  the 
Gulf.  And  her  desire  to  acquire  the  left  bank 
of  the  Mississippi  looked  to  the  same  ends.  She 
had  no  use  for  the  region  simply  as  so  much  ter- 
ritory, but  once  it  was  hers,  any  question  of 
American  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  would  be 
foreclosed. 

But  now  be  it  noted  that,  in  order  to  achieve 
her  purposes  in  the  Mississippi  country,  all  that 
was  necessary  for  Spain  to  do  at  the  outset  was 
to  assert,  not  a  title  of  her  own  to  the  left  bank 
of  the  River,  but  merely  that  of  her  enemy,  Great 
Britain,  which  thereupon  of  course  she  would  be 
free  to  acquire  by  conquest  if  she  could.  She, 
therefore,  no  less  than  Great  Britain,  was  able 
to  plead  in  her  behalf  the  Proclamation  of  1763, 
while,  unlike  Great  Britain,  she  was  not  estopped 

navigation  of  the  river  Mississippi  shall  be  equally  free,  as  well 
to  the  subjects  of  Great  Britain  as  to  those  of  France,  in  its 
whole  breadth  and  length,  from  its  source  to  the  sea,  and  ex- 
pressly that  part  which  is  between  the  said  island  of  New  Orleans 
and  the  right  bank  of  that  river,  as  well  as  the  passage  both  in 
and  out  of  its  mouth."  Chalmers,  Collection  of  Treaties,  I.  467- 
83;  Martens,  Recueil  de  TraiUs,  I.  104-2L 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  229 

from  contending  that  the  British  title  to  the  West 
was  itself  founded  on  conquest.  Indeed,  this  was 
a  natural  position  for  both  herself  and  France  to 
take,  since  in  the  Seven  Years'  War  both  had 
contested  the  British  charter  claims  by  force  of 
arms,  as  France  had  previously  done  diplomati- 
cally.11 And  with  reference  to  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi  the  position  of  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment was  still  more  advantageous.  The  Amer- 
ican argument  was  that  the  British  right  in  this 
respect  had  devolved  upon  the  United  States 
in  their  capacity  as  proprietors  of  the  former 
British  holdings  along  the  River.12  In  other 
words,  the  American  claim  to  this  right  depended 
at  best  upon  the  further  claim,  which  Spain  did 
not  admit,  of  American  proprietorship  of  the 
lands  in  question.  But  furthermore,  the  view 
that  the  British  right  to  use  the  Mississippi  within 
territory  subject  to  Spain  comprised  a  servitude 
for  the  benefit  of  all  lands  adjoining  the  Missis- 

uAn  extended  presentation  of  the  French  case  is  to  be  found 
in  the  Memoire  historique  sur  la  Louisiane  of  1802.  See  ch.  I.  9-13 
and  note. 

"This  was  so,  it  was  urged,  both  because  the  grant  of  right 
made  His  Britannic  Majesty  by  article  VII  of  the  Treaty  of 
1763  was  intended  to  run  with  the  soil,  was,  in  other  words,  an 
easement,  and  also  because  it  was  in  accordance  with  the  Law 
of  Nature  and  of  Nations,  that  the  dwellers  along  the  upper 
reaches  of  a  river  should  have  access  to  the  sea  through  its 
lower  reaches.  See  Journals  of  Continental  Congress,  XVIII. 
942-3;  also  American  State  Papers,  I.  252-3,  where  the  argu- 
ment is  renewed  by  Jefferson  as  Secretary  of  State,  1792. 


230  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

sippi  was  rejected  by  Spain.  The  right  which 
British  subjects  enjoyed  to  pass  down  the  Mis- 
sissippi through  New  Orleans  and  Louisiana,  she 
contended  forcefully,  was  a  privilege  granted  by 
His  Catholic  Majesty  solely  to  His  Britannic 
Majesty  and  would  therefore  not  be  claimable  by 
the  United  States  even  though  they  should  make 
good  their  claims  to  territory  touching  the  Mis- 
sissippi to  the  northward.18 

But  the  claim  of  the  United  States  to  extend 
to  the  Mississippi  was  also  presented  as  the  right 
of  the  American  People.  This  argument  rested 
upon  the  following  propositions:  first,  that  "the 
rights  of  the  king  of  Great  Britain  to  America 
were  incident  to  his  right  of  sovereignty  over 
those  of  his  subjects  that  settled  America";  sec- 
ondly, that,  since  with  the  Declaration  of  Indepen- 

uSee  Vergennes'  Instructions  of  July  18  and  Sept.  25,  1779, 
to  La  Luzerne,  infra;  also  Doniol,  IV.  92.  There  can  be  little 
question  that  Spain's  position  in  this  controversy  was  the  correct 
one  at  International  Law.  Thus,  after  considering  the  question 
"whether  rights  of  navigation  are  possessed  by  states  over  rivers, 
or  portions  of  rivers,  not  within  their  territory,"  in  the  light  of  the 
most  important  data,  W.  E.  Hall  concludes:  "From  the  fore- 
going facts  it  appears  .  .  .  that  where  rivers  flowing  through 
more  than  one  state  are  now  open,  they  have  usually  at  some 
time  either  been  closed  or  their  navigation  has  been  subjected 
to  restrictions  or  tolls  of  a  kind  implying  that  navigation  by 
foreigners  was  not  a  right  but  a  privilege;  .  .  .  and  that  the 
opening  of  a  river,  when  it  has  taken  place,  having  been  effected 
either  by  convention  or  decree,  has  always  been  consistent  with, 
and  has  sometimes  itself  formed,  an  assertion  of  the  paramount 
right  of  property,"  International  Law  (5th  ed.,  London,  1904), 
139-40. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

dence  the  right  of  sovereignty  of  the  king  of 
Great  Britain  over  the  people  of  America  was 
forfeited,  all  rights  founded  in  that  sovereignty 
were  forfeited  with  it;  thirdly,  that  one  such  right 
was  the  right  to  the  backlands  of  America.14  The 

"Wharton,    V.    88-9;    Journals    of    the    Continental    Congress, 
XVIII.  936-7;  Collections  of  the  New  York  Historical  Society, 
1878,  pp.    138-9.     The  last   citation   gives   the   argument   in  the 
form  in  which  it  was  presented  on  the  floor  of  Congress,  Aug.  16, 
1782.     Arthur  Lee  and  Bland  of  Virginia  at  once   attacked  it 
vigorously.     "Congress,"  said  the  former,  "had  no  authority  but 
what  it  derived  from  the  states.     The  states  individually  were 
sovereign   and  independent,  and  upon  them   alone  devolved   the 
rights   of  the   Crown   within   their   respective   territories."     This 
was  the  position  of  the  charter  states.    The  position  of  the  "land- 
less states"  was  presented  by  Witherspoon  of  New  Jersey,  who 
first  attacking  the  charter  claims  as  mutually  contradictory  and 
conflicting  and  altogether  extravagant,  proceeded:     "The  several 
states  were  known  to  the  powers  of  Europe  only  as  one  nation 
under  the  style  and  title  of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  Whether  the 
uncultivated   wilderness  on   the   frontiers   should   belong   to   one 
state  or  another  was  a  matter  of  little  concern  to  the  European 
powers.     The  only  argument  that  would  weigh  with  them  was 
whether  it  was  necessary  for  the  security  of  the  United  States  that 
other  nations  should  be  excluded  from  that  country,  and  particu- 
larly Great  Britain,  the  enemy  of  these  states."     On  August  27, 
a   petition   was   reported   to   Congress    from   the   inhabitants   of 
Kentucky,  which,  declaring   that   they   considered   themselves   as 
"subjects  of  the  United  States  and  not  of  Virginia"   and  that 
"the  charter  under  which  Virginia  claimed  that  country  had  been 
dissolved,   asked   Congress   "to  erect   them  into   a  separate   and 
independent  state  and  admit  them  into  the  federal  Union,"  loc* 
cit.}  p.   146.     Lee  declared  that  the  countenance  that  had  been 
given  the  petition  was  "an  insult  to  Virginia."    Madison  character- 
ized "the  supposition  that  the  right  of  the  crown  devolved  on  the 
United  States"  as  "so  extravagant  that  it  could  not  enter  into 
the  thoughts  of  any  man,"  to  which  Witherspoon  rejoined  that  it 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

argument  thus  traversed  the  general  opinion  that 
it  was  not  the  American  People  but  the  American 
States  that  had  succeeded  to  the  sovereign  rights 
of  Great  Britain,  but  by  the  same  token  it  was  the 
more  accordant  with  the  philosophy  of  the  right 
of  revolution,  which  is  a  right  of  populations  and 
not  of  political  units;  and  it  also  did  justice  to  the 
claims  of  the  "landless"  states,  of  which  Mary- 
land was  the  unyielding  champion.15  Diplomati- 
cally, too,  it  had  the  advantage  of  avoiding  the 
difficulties  that  had  their  origin  from  the  conflict 
of  titles  based  on  the  colonial  charters.  On  the 
other  hand,  plainly,  it  was  adequate  to  establish 
the  American  title  only  as  against  powers  that 
had  recognized  American  independence,  and 
Spain  had  not  yet  done  this. 

The  question  of  the  abstract  validity  of  the 
American  claims  in  the  West  is,  however,  a  mat- 
ter, after  all,  of  secondary  importance  both  in  our 
own  interest  and  in  fact.  Our  interest  is  in  the 
policy  of  France,  which  in  turn  was  shaped  with 
reference  to  these  claims  quite  indifferently  to 
speculative  considerations.  To  anticipate  some- 

evidently  could,  since  it  actually  had  entered  into  his  own  thoughts 
and  also  "the  thoughts  of  the  petitioners  and  into  the  thoughts  of 
very  many  sensible  men  at  the  beginning  of  the  present  contro- 
versy," ib.,  149.  See  also  J.  C.  Welling  in  American  Historical 
Association  Papers,  III.  167  if. 

15  See  H.  B.  Adams,  "Maryland's  Influence  upon  Land  Cessions 
to  the  United  States,"  Johns  Hopkins  University  Studies,  III. 
pt.  I. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  233 

what  the  results  of  the  inquiry  to  follow :  So  long 
as  it  was  a  question  of  pleasing  the  United  States 
alone,  France,  having  herself  no  territorial  am- 
bitions on  the  American  continent,  accepted  the 
American  pretensions  without  demur.  Later 
however  arose,  first,  the  problem  of  bringing 
Spain  into  the  war  and,  secondly,  the  problem  of 
securing  peace  with  Great  Britain,  once  that 
power  was  prepared  to  accord  the  main  objec- 
tive of  the  war,  namely  American  independence. 
Also,  it  was  always  a  part  of  French  calculations 
not  to  allow  the  United  States  to  become  too 
strong.  The  claims,  therefore,  that  it  had  at  first 
admitted,  the  French  government  came  eventu- 
ally to  repudiate.  Several  questions  are  thus 
raised:  1.  Could  France  act  thus  consistently 
with  her  engagements  with  the  United  States? 
2.  Was  her  repudiation  supplemented  by  open 
championship  of  the  interests  of  Spain  along  the 
Mississippi?  3.  What  light  does  her  final  atti- 
tude thrown  upon  the  peace  negotiations  of  1782? 
In  the  pages  to  follow  I  shall  endeavor  to 
answer  these  questions. 

France's  engagements  with  the  United  States 
touching  the  territorial  possessions  of  the  latter 
were  defined  by  articles  XI  and  XII  of  the 
Treaty  of  Alliance,  which  read  as  follows : 

XI — The  United  States  and  France  guarantee  each 
to  the  other,  the  United  States  to  His  Most  Christian 
Majesty  his  possessions  in  North  America  forever;  His 


234  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Most  Christian  Majesty  to  the  United  States  their 
liberty,  sovereignty,  and  independence,  absolute  and 
unlimited,  as  well  in  matters  of  government  as  of  com- 
merce, and  also  their  possessions,  and  the  additions  or 
conquests  that  their  Confederation  may  obtain  during 
the  war  from  any  of  the  dominions  now  or  heretofore 
possessed  by  Great  Britain  in  North  America,  con- 
formably to  the  5th  and  6th  articles  above  written,  the 
whole  as  their  possessions  shall  be  affixed  and  assured  to 
the  said  states  at  the  moment  of  the  cessation  of  their 
present  war  with  England.  XII. — In  order  to  fix  more 
precisely  the  sense  and  application  of  the  preceding 
article,  the  contracting  parties  declare  that,  in  the 
case  of  a  rupture  between  France  and  England,  the 
reciprocal  guaranty  declared  in  the  said  article  shall 
have  its  full  force  and  effect  the  moment  such  war  shall 
break  out ;  and  if  such  rupture  shall  not  take  place,  the 
mutual  obligations  of  the  said  guaranty  shall  not  com- 
mence until  the  moment  of  the  cessation  of  the  present 
war  between  the  United  States  and  England  shall  have 
ascertained  their  possessions. 

The  first  question  that  arises  with  reference 
to  these  articles  is  whether  "the  reciprocal  guar- 
anty" that  by  article  XII  was  to  be  effective  from 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  between  France  and 
Great  Britain  extended  to  the  possessions  of  the 
United  States  at  that  moment.  The  French  gov- 
ernment, after  its  change  of  position  with  refer- 
ence to  the  pretensions  of  the  United  States  in 
the  West,  contended  that  this  guaranty  extended 
only  to  the  sovereignty  and  independence  of  the 
United  States  and  that,  with  reference  to  the 
possessions  and  conquests  of  the  United  States, 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  235 

His  Most  Christian  Majesty's  guaranty  was  not 
to  come  into  effect  till  these  had  been  determined 
by  the  final  treaty  of  peace.  As  to  conquests 
there  can  of  course  be  no  doubt  of  the  correctness 
of  this  view,  for  the  reason  that  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  guaranty  would  come  into  exist- 
ence, if  at  all,  only  with  the  treaty  of  peace.  The 
possessions  of  the  United  States,  on  the  other 
hand,  would  at  any  particular  moment,  what 
there  were  of  them,  be  part  and  parcel  of  the 
United  States — would,  geographically  speaking, 
comprise  the  United  States.  It  was  therefore  not 
unreasonable,  to  say  the  least,  for  the  American 
advocates  to  contend  that  the  guaranty  extended 
by  the  treaty  to  the  sovereignty  and  indepen- 
dence of  the  United  States,  and  admitted  by 
France  to  be  effective  from  the  outbreak  of  war 
between  France  and  Great  Britain,  extended 
also,  from  the  necessity  of  things,  to  the  posses- 
sions of  the  United  States.  Furthermore,  the 
guaranty  in  question  is  spoken  of  as  reciprocal. 
But  unless  it  extended  to  the  possessions  of  the 
two  powers  it  was  not  reciprocal,  since  it  was  only 
certain  possessions  of  France  that  the  United 
States  guaranteed  by  any  view  of  the  treaty. 
And  such  direct  testimony  as  we  have  confirms 
this  view  of  the  matter.  Thus,  when  the  Ameri- 
can envoys  saw  that  they  could  not  get  an  uncon- 
ditional alliance  and  proposed,  as  a  compromise, 
that  the  guaranty  in  the  treaty  of  the  indepen- 


236  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

dence  and  liberty  of  the  United  States  should  go 
into  effect  at  once,  Gerard,  speaking  in  the  name 
of  the  Foreign  Office,  repelled  the  suggestion  by 
saying  that  the  independence,  liberty,  and  posses- 
sions of  the  United  States  must  all  stand  on  the 
same  footing  in  this  regard;  that  as  to  all  alike 
the  guaranty  was  contingent  upon  the  outbreak 
of  war.15*  And  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from 
Vergennes'  vehement  protest  against  Florida 
Blanca's  action  in  proposing  the  uti  possidetis  for 
the  United  States  in  April,  1779,  is  the  same. 
This,  the  French  secretary  declared,  menaced 
France's  obligations  to  the  United  States  at  an 
essential  point,  which  however  was  the  case  only 
on  the  assumption  that  France  was  already  the 
guarantor  of  the  territorial  integrity  of  the 
United  States.16 

Yet  suppose  we  admit,  for  the  sake  of  the  ar- 
gument, that  France  did  guarantee  the  posses- 
sions  of  the  United  States  "against  all  other 
powers"  only  from  the  close  of  the  war,  to  what 
extent  are  the  engagements  incurred  by  her  in 
the  Treaty  of  Alliance  relaxed?  Undoubtedly 
to  the  extent  of  relieving  her  from  the  necessity 
of  continuing  the  war  with  Great  Britain  for  such 
possessions,  as  distinguished  from  the  sovereignty 
and  independence  of  the  United  States.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  concession  does  not  relieve  by  one 

"•  Arthur  Lee's  "Journal,"  Lee's  Lee,  I.  388.    For  Gerard's  later 
view,  see  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,  XXIII.  518-9. 
M  See  Doniol,  III.  802. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  237 

whit  the  incongruity  of  active  championship  by 
France  of  the  right  of  Spain,  as  part  of  the  price 
of  bringing  that  power  into  the  war  and  keeping 
her  there,  to  seize  the  possessions  of  the  United 
States.  In  short,  the  question  of  the  possibility 
of  France's  satisfying  Spain  along  the  Missis- 
sippi harmoniously  with  her  engagements  with 
the  United  States  resolves  itself  into  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  recognized 
the  United  States  as  holding  territorial  posses- 
sions in  the  Mississippi  country,  possessions  from 
which,  as  it  subsequently  developed,  Spain  de- 
sired to  exclude  them. 

The  fifth  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  reads 
as  follows: 

If  the  United  States  shall  think  it  fit  to  attempt  the 
reduction  of  the  British  power  remaining  in  the  north- 
ern parts  of  America  or  the  islands  of  Bermudas  those 
countries  or  islands,  in  the  case  of  success,  shall  be 
confederated  with  or  dependent  upon  the  said  United 
States. 

Here,  as  in  article  XI  of  the  Articles  of  Confed- 
eration itself,  was  a  provision  looking  to  the  pos- 
sible accession  of  Canada  to  the  Americans,  or 
to  its  conquest,  and  to  one  or  the  other  of  the  even 
remoter  islands  of  the  Bermudas,  but  entire 
silence  with  reference  to  the  region  of  vastly 
greater  importance  to  the  United  States  lying 
to  the  westward  of  the  Mountains.17  The  implica- 

17  This  argument  is  from  the  Instructions  of  Oct.  17,  1780,  to  Jay, 
Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,  XVIII.  941-2.     It  is  as- 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

tion  could  not  possibly  have  escaped  those  who 
negotiated  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  on  the  part  of 
France,  and  especially  since  it  had  earlier  been 
brought  under  their  direct  observation  again  and 
again.  Thus  in  the  outline  of  a  treaty  accom- 
panying the  instructions  drawn  up  by  Congress 
for  "the  American  plenipotentiary  destined  for 
France,"  of  September  17th,  1776,  there  appears 
a  clear  distinction  between  the  portion  of  the  con- 
tinent thought  to  be  involved  by  the  Revolution 
and  such  outlying  British  dominions  as  Canada 
and  the  Floridas.18  Again,  in  the  project  of  a 
treaty  which  Deane  drew  up  for  the  French  gov- 
ernment this  distinction  gives  way  to  a  specific 
guaranty  to  the  United  States  of  the  "posses- 
sion of  all  that  part  of  the  continent  of  North 
America  which  by  the  last  treaty  of  peace  was 
ceded  and  confirmed  to  the  crown  of  Great 
Britain."19  Somewhat  later  Deane  also  ap- 

sumed  throughout  this  document,  which  was  largely  the  work 
of  Madison,  that  the  French  guaranty  of  American  possessions 
became  operative  with  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  itself,  that  is, 
upon  the  outbreak  of  war  between  France  and  England. 

18  See  art.  IX  of  the  Plan,  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress, 
V.  770. 

"Wharton,  II.  215-6,  and  footnote.  And  of  like  implication 
are  the  following  items.  On  the  occasion  of  General  Gates'  cele- 
bration of  the  Fourth  of  July  at  White  Plains  in  1778,  the  follow- 
ing toast  was  offered:  "May  our  brethren  in  Canada,  Florida, 
and  Nova  Scotia  speedily  enjoy  the  blessings  of  free  states." 
Connecticut  Courant,  July  14,  1778.  The  Pennsylvania  Packet 
of  April  6,  1779,  contains  a  letter  from  an  American  gentleman 
in  France,  dated  Dec.  8,  1778,  in  which  the  writer,  after  reporting 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  239 

preached  the  French  government  with  a  scheme 
for  obtaining  money  for  the  United  States  in 
France  on  the  basis  of  security  furnished  by  west- 
ern lands.20 

a  rumor  that  Great  Britain  had  offered  American  independence 
through  the  Spanish  ambassador,  adds  the  comment:  "We  can- 
not learn  that  these  offers  contain  anything  agreeable  respecting 
Canada,  Nova  Scotia,  or  the  Fishery."  Read  in  the  light  of  the 
great  concern  manifested  in  Congress  for  the  fate  of  the  region 
between  the  Alleghenies  and  the  Mississippi,  such  items  are  very 
instructive. 

"Deane  proposed  his  scheme  to  Congress  in  his  letter  of  Dec. 
1,  1776,  Wharton,  II.  203-5.  "The  good  and  wise  part"  of  Eu- 
rope, he  wrote,  "the  lovers  of  liberty  and  human  happiness,  look 
forward  to  the  establishment  of  American  freedom  and  inde- 
pendence as  an  event  which  will  secure  to  them  and  their  descen- 
dants an  asylum  from  the  effect  and  violence  of  despotic  power, 
daily  gaining  ground  in  every  part  of  Europe.  From  those  and 
other  considerations  .  .  .  emigrations  from  Europe  will  be  pro- 
digious immediately  on  the  establishment  of  American  indepen- 
dency. The  consequence  of  this  must  be  the  rise  of  the  lands 
already  settled,  and  a  demand  for  new  or  uncultivated  land;  on 
this  demand  I  conceive  a  certain  fund  may  now  be  fixed.  You 
may  smile,  and  recollect  the  sale  of  the  bear-skin  in  the  fable, 
but,  at  the  same  time,  must  be  sensible  that  your  wants  are  real, 
and  if  others  can  be  induced  to  relieve  them,  it  is  indifferent  to 
you  whether  they  have  a  consideration  in  hand  or  in  prospect." 
Deane,  it  must  be  remembered,  came  from  Connecticut.  His 
perfected  scheme  is  embodied  in  his  proposals,  communicated  to 
G6rard,  Mar.  18,  1777:  "First,  There  shall  be  laid  out  in  the  most 
fertile  part  of  the  country,  purchased  or  to  be  purchased  of  the 
natives  on  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi  or  Ohio,  a  tract  of  land 
equal  to  three  hundred  miles  square,  which  shall  be  appropriated 
as  a  security  for  the  hiring  of  money  to  the  United  States  of 
North  America.  Second,  each  subscriber  or  lender  of  money  shall 
have  secured  to  him  as  many  acres  of  that  land  as  he  shall  sub- 
scribe livres,  no  subscription  to  be  received  under  1,000  or  1,200 
livres,"  etc.  SMSS.,  No.  661. 


240  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Certainly  France  was  adequately  informed  of 
the  pretensions  of  the  United  States  respecting 
the  West.  Yet  not  only  is  there  no  record  of  her 
having  demurred  to  these  claims,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  the  evidence  clearly  proves  that  both 
Bourbon  governments  at  first  recognized  them  as 
valid,  as  least  so  far  as  the  territory  between  the 
Ohio,  the  Mississippi,  the  Alleghenies,  and  the 
somewhat  variable  northern  boundary  of  the 
Floridas  is  concerned.  So  when,  in  the  course  of 
his  interview  with  the  American  envoys  on  De- 
cember 12th,  1777,  Vergennes  raised  the  point 
that  Virginia's  charter  claims,  by  extending  to 
the  South  Sea,  tended  to  "trench  on  Spain's 
claims  to  California,"  and  the  Americans  pointed 
to  the  fact  that  by  the  Treaty  of  1763  a  western 
limit  had  been  set  to  the  Colonies  at  the  Missis- 
sippi and  suggested  that  this  line  be  drawn  from 
the  source  of  that  river,  "this,"  says  Lee  in  his 
Journal,  "was  admitted  as  adjusting  the  matter 
properly."208  Again,  what  could  have  been  more 
explicit  than  Florida  Blanca's  assertion  in  March, 
1778,  that  the  Mississippi  comprised  "a  boun- 
dary sufficiently  definite  and  visible"  between  the 
possessions  of  Spain  and  those  of  the  United 
States?21  Indeed,  it  was  exactly  because  he 

»•  Lee's  Lee,  I.  361. 

21  Montmorin  to  Vergennes,  Apr.  10,  1778,  Doniol,  III.  22.  And 
in  the  same  connection  note  the  implication  of  certain  passages 
in  Aranda's  despatches  to  Florida  Blanca  of  Feb.  23  and  Mar. 
23,  1778.  "I  incline,"  he  writes  in  the  former,  "to  the  opinion 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

recognized  this  to  be  the  case  that  the  Spanish 
minister  feared  the  United  States  to  the  degree 
that  he  did:  the  prescriptive  rights  of  the  United 
States,  sanctioned  as  they  were  by  France,  made 
the  situation  irremediable.  Vergennes,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  will  be  recalled,  was  at  great  pains 
to  allay  these  fears,  but  even  so,  he  did  not  assert 
that  the  Americans  were  intruders  in  the  region 
between  the  Mountains  and  the  Spanish  domin- 

that  the  great  question  with  the  [American]  commissioners  will 
be  as  to  retaining  Canada  and  Florida,  and  that  the  Congress 
will  make  resistance,  as  it  will  not  want  the  English  for  neighbors, 
but  will  wish  to  remain  complete  and  absolute  in  all  that  part  of 
North  America."  Sparks  MSS.,  CII.  In  the  latter  occurs  the 
following  passage:  "Still  less  will  he  [the  king  of  Spain]  dis- 
please the  colonies  after  the  signs  of  protection  that  he  has 
given  them,  and  being  a  new  power  which  must  come  to  be  a 
formidable  one  and  upon  which  he  is  to  border  alone  and  which 
would  never  pardon  such  a  turning  of  the  back,"  etc.  The  im- 
portant point  is  that  Aranda  here  recognizes  the  United  States 
to  be  at  that  date  a  power  bordering  on  Spanish  dominions. 
Note  also  the  following  words  from  his  despatch  of  Aug.  4  of 
the  same  year:  "It  seems  to  me  that  the  intention  of  this  Court 
cannot  be  to  maintain  that  the  new  United  States  should  charge 
themselves  with  the  rest  of  the  Northern  Provinces,  but  that  they 
should  be  limited  to  the  thirteen  confederated  from  the  begin- 
ning." Thus  the  court  of  London  may  "avoid  the  disgrace  of 
losing  the  whole  of  the  continent  of  America."  The  contrast,  it 
will  be  observed,  is  between  the  thirteen  confederated  Colonies 
and  the  northern  ones.  Another  interesting  document  in  the  same 
connection  is  Franklin's  letter  of  Dec.  12,  1775,  to  Don  Gabriel 
of  Bourbon:  "...  I  think  I  see  a  powerful  dominion  growing  up 
here,  whose  interest  it  will  be  to  form  a  close  and  firm  alliance 
with  Spain  (their  territories  bordering)."  Complete  Works  of 
Benjamin  Franklin,  V.  548.  Don  Gabriel,  therefore,  was  informed 
of  America's  pretensions  in  the  West  from  the  first. 


242  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

ions  On  the  contrary,  he  made  the  very  distinc- 
tion that  was  common  with  Americans,  between 
the  parts  of  America  in  revolt  and  such  outlying 
regions  as  the  Floridas  and  Canada;  he  cited  "the 
vast  expanse"  of  the  existing  dominion  of  the 
United  States  to  prove  that  it  would  be  ages  be- 
fore America  would  care  for  further  accessions  of 
territory;  and  he  contrasted  the  Americans  as 
"peaceable,  unambitious  neighbors"  with  the 
"avaricious,  implacable"  British.22  But  the 
Spanish  minister,  unconvinced  by  the  reasoning 
of  the  French  secretary,  at  last  came  to  the  deci- 
sion that  it  would  be  necessary  for  Spain  to  take 
the  law  into  her  own  hands  and  expel  the  Ameri- 
cans from  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi.  He  did 
not  suggest,  however,  that  the  matter  was  one  to 
be  treated  of  with  France,  though  the  conquest  of 
the  Floridas,  involving  American  interests  but 
not  American  rights,  was  such  a  subject.  And 
eventually  the  Treaty  of  Aranjuez  was  signed. 
Spain's  apprehension  of  the  United  States  had 
by  this  time  reached  its  climax,  as  had  also  the 
anxiety  of  France  to  bring  Spain  into  the  war. 
Yet  on  the  question  of  the  western  limits  of  the 
United  States  the  treaty  maintained  complete 
silence. 

MDoniol,  II.  785;  III.  51,  561.  The  argument,  however,  from 
the  distinction  made  between  colonies  in  revolt,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  Canada  and  the  Floridas,  on  the  other,  should  not,  in  the 
case  of  Vergennes,  be  pressed  too  rigorously,  since  it  does  not 
clearly  appear  whether  he  regarded  Canada  as  including  Quebec 
as  organized  under  the  Act  of  1774,  though  his  recognition  of 
Virginia's  charter  claims  would  tend  to  indicate  that  he  did  not. 


CHAPTER  XI 

SIEUK  GERARD  AND  THE   CONTINENTAL   CONGRESS 

The  views  finally  adopted  by  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment with  reference  to  the  Mississippi  ques- 
tion apparently  originated  on  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic  in  the  fertile  brain  of  an  Havana  mer- 
chant, one  Juan  de  Miralles,  who  having  been 
forced  by  mishap  to  put  into  Charleston  early 
in  1778  in  the  course  of  a  voyage  to  Cadiz,  later 
received  a  commission  from  the  captain-general 
of  Cuba  to  act  as  a  sort  of  observer  of  affairs  in 
the  United  States  for  His  Catholic  Majesty.1 

1  According  to  his  letter  of  Feb.  13,  1778,  to  Galvez,  Miralles 
had  set  out  from  Havana  for  Cadiz  the  previous  Dec.  31,  but  had 
been  forced  by  a  leakage  of  the  vessel  bearing  him  to  put  into 
Charleston,  Jan.  9.  He  had  remained  there  since  the  latter  date 
because  of  an  interdict  upon  the  departure  of  vessels  from  the 
harbor,  due  to  the  presence  outside  of  a  British  blockading  squad- 
ron, which  had  shown  itself  very  unscrupulous  in  seizing  neutral 
vessels.  He  intended  to  sojourn  at  Charleston  till  a  favorable 
opportunity  offered  itself  to  continue  his  journey  or  to  return 
to  Havana.  Meantime,  he  asked  letters  to  Washington,  Laurens, 
et  al.  His  purpose  in  visiting  Cadiz  was  to  secure  the  mon- 
opoly of  carrying  negroes  to  Havana,  the  right  of  the  existing 
monopolists  being  about  to  lapse.  He  would  like  to  institute  such 
a  commerce  from  the  Southern  American  states.  Would  Galvez 
urge  his  claims  upon  the  king?  As  we  have  already  seen,  Florida 
Blanca  had  announced  in  September,  1778,  that  Spain  then  had, 


244  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

"A  typical  Spaniard,  infinitely  zealous  and  well- 
informed  in  the  interests  of  his  court  in  this  part 
of  the  world,"  Miralles  came  to  Philadelphia  with 
the  idea  that  France  should  conquer  Canada  and 
that  Spain  should  conquer  "all  that  the  English 
had  acquired  by  the  Treaty  of  1763  in  Florida 
and  on  the  Mississippi";  but  especially  did  he 
"give  himself  over  to  all  the  speculations  which 
the  possession  of  the  Floridas  and  the  exclusive 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  could  suggest." 
And  the  basis  of  these  speculations  was  the  con- 
viction that  sooner  or  later,  the  Americans  were 
bound  to  become  the  enemies  of  Spain;  that,  in- 
deed, this  contingency  was  no  remote  one.2 

Miralles'  first  care  was  to  put  himself  in  close 
relations  with  M.  Gerard,  who  seems  to  have 
regarded  his  views,  so  far  as  they  touched  the 
interests  of  Spain,  with  entire  complacency. 
Thus  in  his  despatch  of  July  25,  1778,  to  Ver- 
gennes,  heralding  Miralles'  appearance  at  Phila- 
delphia, Gerard  wrote: 

I  have  persuaded  him  to  report  to  his  court  that  Con- 
gress would  never  consent  from  mere  generosity  to 
renounce  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  [which  is] 

or  would  presently  have  an  agent  in  America  to  observe  develop- 
ments. I  infer  that  the  actual  business  of  despatching  such  an 
agent  was  left  to  Galvez,  who,  seeing  the  opportunity  offered  by 
Miralles'  accidental  presence  at  Charleston,  commissioned  him 
to  act  in  this  capacity.  The  letter  just  paraphrased  is  to  be 
found  in  the  Sparks  MSS.,  XCVII.  Miralles  did  not  appear  in 
Philadelphia  till  July,  1T78. 
*  Gerard  to  Vergennes,  July  25,  1778,  Doniol,  III.  293-4. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  245 

necessary  to  serve  as  an  outlet  for  the  immense  settle- 
ments which  the  Americans  are  proposing  to  make  along 
the  Ohio  and  other  rivers  tributary  to  it ;  that  the  expe- 
dition commenced  by  Major  Willing  in  those  parts  was 
about  to  be  followed  up ;  that  it  had  been  suggested  that 
Pensacola  be  offered  Spain,  while  what  the  English  hold 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Mississippi  be  retained;  that  it 
appeared  to  me  important  that  His  Catholic  Majesty 
should  calculate  upon  this  difficulty  in  advance ;  that  the 
only  means  of  obviating  it,  as  it  seemed  to  me,  was  not 
to  put  it  in  the  way  of  the  Americans  to  formulate  de- 
mands in  regard  to  the  matter,  that  is  to  say,  to  dis- 
pense with  their  aid,  indeed  to  forestall  it,  by  seizing 
these  lands  with  Spanish  forces  alone. 

"Don  Juan,"  Gerard  concluded,  "feels  that  my 
observations  are  correct  and  has  promised  me  to 
render  an  account  of  them."3 

&Loc.  cit.  See  also  Miralles  to  Galvez,  Aug.  20,  1778,  Sparks 
MSS.  Here  Miralles  speaks  of  a  plan  communicated  to  him  by 
Patrick  Henry,  then  governor  of  Virginia  for  an  expedition 
against  St.  Augustine,  the  ultimate  objective  of  which  was  to 
be  the  conquest  of  the  provinces  of  Mobile,  Mississippi,  Pensa- 
cola, and  Florida.  The  original  author  of  the  plan,  which  called 
for  the  assemblage  of  three  thousand  men  at  Savannah,  was  the 
Marquis  de  Br^tigny,  with  whom  and  the  president  of  Congress 
Miralles  discussed  it  at  length.  The  latter  treated  the  matter 
rather  lightly:  it  was  good  enough  to  kill  time  with  over  a  bottle 
of  wine.  None  the  less,  Br6tigny  laid  the  plan  before  Congress 
in  French  and  reported  that  this  body  had  sent  it  to  the  inter- 
preter. Miralles  expresses  the  opinion  that  the  conquest  will  be 
easy,  but  fears  that  American  cooperation  will  give  rise  to 
pretexts  "injurious  to  the  dominions  of  the  king.  I  say,"  he  con- 
tinues, "the  same  as  to  the  conquest  of  Pensacola,  Mobile,  Mis- 
sissippi, and  the  other  countries  on  the  Mississippi  river,"  etc., 
"because  if  the  neighbors  assist  in  the  conquest  they  will  surely 
claim  the  use  and  free  passage  of  this  river,  ...  so  as  to  pass 


246  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

But  presently  we  find  Gerard  going  far  beyond 
this  tone  of  disinterested  criticism  and  becoming 
the  avowed  champion  of  the  cause  represented  by 
the  Spanish  agent.  For  this  there  were  several 
reasons:  To  begin  with,  diplomacy,  unlike  the 
law,  recognizes  no  such  category  of  questions  as 
res  adjudicatae.  Again,  as  I  have  already 
pointed  out,  it  was  the  most  natural  thing  in  the 
world  for  a  Frenchman  to  take  the  position  that 
England's  title  to  the  lands  along  the  Mississippi 
was  founded  on  conquest  alone  and  was,  there- 
fore, open  to  conquest  by  an  enemy.  Yet  again, 
Gerard  was  well  aware  of  the  anxiety  of  his  gov- 
ernment to  meet  the  views  of  Spain  at  all  possible 

out  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  It  cannot  but  be  apparent  to  the 
least  informed  person  .  .  .  how  prejudicial  this  would  be."  Br6- 
tigny's  plan  was  reported  to  Congress  adversely  by  the  Board  of 
War,  Oct.  31,  1778,  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,  XII. 
1083;  but  was  again  brought  before  that  body  by  a  letter  from 
Miralles  Nov.  24,  1779,  ib.f  XV.  1301.  This  time  the  plan  had  the 
backing  of  the  diplomatic  La  Luzerne  and  was  also  aided  by  the 
growing  seriousness  of  the  military  situation  in  the  South.  On 
Dec.  16,  accordingly,  it  was  resolved  "that  General  Lincoln  .  .  . 
be  ...  empowered  ...  to  ...  concert  with  the  Governor  of 
Havana,  or  any  other  person  or  persons  properly  authorized  by 
His  Catholic  Majesty,  such  plan  as  shall  in  his  opinion  be  best 
calculated  to  insure  the  reduction  of  the  enemy's  force  in  the 
state  of  Georgia  .  .  .  and  for  the  conquest  of  East  Florida." 
North  Carolina  voted  "nay,"  and  Georgia  was  not  present.  76., 
1388-9.  More  specifically,  Congress'  expectations  were,  that  Spain 
would  furnish  six  vessels  of  the  line  and  five  thousand  troops, 
that  Georgia  would  first  be  recovered,  and  that  then  the  joint 
expedition  would  turn  to  Florida.  The  plan  fell  through  when 
Lincoln  was  forced  to  surrender  at  Charleston. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  247 

points  and,  in  fact,  was  under  specific  instructions 
to  forward  these  views  in  several  respects.  Fi- 
nally, Gerard  had  little  understanding  of,  or 
sympathy  for  the  American  point  of  view  as  rep- 
resented in  Congress.4 

This  body,  changing  in  membership  and  com- 
plexion of  opinion  from  day  to  day,  voicing  a 
variety  of  local  interests  and  personal  animosities, 
deferring  strangely,  now  to  the  views  of  popular 
committees,  now  to  the  pretensions  of  thir- 
teen petty  sovereignties,  fell  quite  without  the  cut 
and  dried  categories  of  the  French  representa- 
tive's experience  as  a  diplomat  and  bureaucrat. 
Unfortunately,  it  was  this  fact  precisely  that  M. 
Gerard  most  fatally  failed  to  recognize.  Fol- 
lowing his  controversy  with  Congress  over  the 
subject  of  a  separate  peace,  it  is  apparent  that 
Gerard  pictured  that  body  to  himself  as  a  species 
of  landtag  or  diet  of  the  sort  that  France  in  the 
case  of  her  client  states  on  the  Continent  sought 
to  dominate  by  division.  In  the  case  of  the 

4  A  characterization  of  Gerard  by  Stormont  occurs  in  the 
latter's  despatch  of  Aug.  21,  1776:  "M.  Gerard  is  the  most  likely 
person  for  M.  de  Vergennes  to  employ  [in  dealing  with  Deane], 
and  he  could  employ  no  man  who  would  undertake  such  a  com- 
mission with  more  alacrity.  I  have  known  him  long.  He  has 
parts,  address,  and  no  small  share  of  artifice.  He  was  much 
trusted  at  Vienna  by  M.  de  Chatel€t,  and  he  has  the  same  spirit 
of  intrigue,  the  same  desperate  policy,  the  same  jealousy  and 
implacable  hatred  of  Great  Britain."  SMSS.,  No.  1350.  It  was 
partly  this  talent  for  intrigue  that  involved  Gerard  in  difficulties 
with  Congress. 


248  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Swedish  Diet,  for  instance,  it  had  been  the 
"Hats"  and  the  "Caps,"  the  one  the  party  of 
France,"  the  other  of  Russia.  So  in  the  case  of 
Congress  it  was  "the  Patriots,"  "the  Friends  of 
the  Alliance,"  "the  Friends  of  Peace,"  on  the  one 
hand,  "the  Swelled  Heads"  ("Tetes  Exaltees"), 
"the  Anti-Gallicans,"  "the  Anglicans"  on  the 
other.  That  the  latter  and  its  leaders,  Richard 
Henry  Lee  and  Samuel  Adams,  contemplated 
treason  to  the  alliance  at  the  first  opportunity, 
Gerard  had  little  doubt ;  and  as  the  same  faction 
stood  for  the  American  claims  in  the  West,  it 
followed  inevitably  that  those  claims  must  be 
spurious.5 

It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  Gerard  was 
shrewd  enough  to  begin  his  proselyting  in  Spain's 
behalf  with  the  representative  of  a  state  that  had 
only  a  very  moderate  interest  in  the  land  ques- 
tion, Gouverneur  Morris  of  New  York.  To 
Morris  he  urged  the  necessity  of  Congress'  re- 
assuring Spain  and  suggested,  to  that  end,  that 

5  Aside  from  an  interesting  but  quite  inadequate  article  by  John 
Fiske  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  LXIV.  220  ffg.,  the  subject  of 
Parties  in  the  Continental  Congress  has  received  little  attention 
in  proportion  to  its  importance.  Some  of  the  documents  in  the 
SMSS.  are  interesting  in  this  connection;  see  Nos.  487,  729,  733, 
737,  1616.  There  is  also  much  scattered  material  to  be  gleaned 
from  the  press  of  the  date;  see,  for  instance,  the  Pennsylvania 
Packet  of  May  20,  1778,  and  Rivington's  Gazette  (Loyalist,  N.  Y. 
City),  of  Mar.  8,  1780.  Still  more  valuable  are  the  despatches  of 
G6rard  and  La  Luzerne;  see  the  Index  to  Doniol,  under  "Congres," 
"G6rard,"  "La  Luzerne." 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  249 

St.  Augustine,  Pensacola,  and  Mobile,  and  the 
exclusive  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  be  guaran- 
teed her.  The  American  replied,  in  characteris- 
tic vein,  that  he  appreciated  the  necessity  of 
setting  limits  to  the  Confederacy,  and  particu- 
larly to  the  South,  since  he  was  thoroughly  per- 
suaded that  the  virtues  required  by  a  republic 
were  to  be  bred  only  in  a  hardy  climate.  Indeed, 
he  himself  thought  that  to  hand  over  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  Mississippi  to  Spain  from  the  mouth 
of  the  Ohio  would  be  accordant  with  the  best 
interests  of  the  United  States,  inasmuch  as  it 
was  the  only  measure  calculated  to  keep  the 
growing  population  between  the  Ohio,  the  St. 
Lawrence,  and  the  Mississippi  dependent  on  the 
republic.  At  the  same  time  he  was  aware  that 
many  members  of  Congress  regarded  this  as  a 
privilege  which  appertained  to  the  United  States 
of  right  and  that,  furthermore,  there  were  power- 
ful private  interests  enlisted  in  maintaining  this 
right.6 

Forearmed  with  this  not  unfriendly  warning, 
Gerard  began  a  couple  of  months  later  approach- 
ing groups  of  delegates  with  vague  insinuations 
bearing  more  or  less  remotely  on  the  matter  he 
had  at  heart.  On  December  22d  he  gave  a  din- 
ner to  which  Miralles  and  several  Congressmen 
were  invited,  in  honor  of  Jay,  who  had  just  been 

e  G6rard  to  Vergennes,  Oct.  20,  1778,  Doniol,  II.  72-3.    As  to  the 
private  interests  involved,  see  Wharton,  III.  135. 


250  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

elected  president  of  Congress.  Sitting  "la  pipe 
a  la  louche"  the  participants  spent  several  hours 
canvassing  the  subject  of  what  sort  of  principles 
ought  to  govern  the  new  republic  in  relation  to 
other  powers.  Gerard  admonished  his  hearers 
that  all  Europe  suspected  the  American  people 
of  having  inherited  the  aggressive  and  turbulent 
spirit  of  their  ancestors  and  deduced  the  neces- 
sity they  were  under  of  proving  the  contrary. 
Fortunately  they  had  an  opportunity  to  evidence 
their  love  of  justice  by  drawing  "a  permanent 
line  of  separation  between  the  Spanish  posses- 
sions and  their  own."  A  formal  proposition  to 
Spain,  even  though  it  were  rejected,  could  but 
do  them  credit  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  by  dem- 
onstrating their  willingness  to  renounce  both  for 
themselves  and  posterity  all  ambition  for  con- 
quest. His  hearers  acknowledged  the  wisdom  of 
his  remarks  but  protested  that  the  American 
Constitution  was  incompatible  with  the  spirit  of 
conquest,  notwithstanding  which  they  felt  con- 
fident that  Congress  "would  furnish  all  the 
additional  assurances  that  lay  within  its  power." 
Gerard  ought  at  this  point,  one  would  think, 
have  brought  forward  the  question  of  the  navi- 
gation of  the  Mississippi.  In  point  of  fact,  he 
kept  discreetly  silent  on  that  topic.  "It  is,"  he 
wrote  Vergennes,  "a  matter  to  be  handled  with 
secrecy  and  dexterity,"  for  there  existed  in  Con- 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

gress,  he  had  found,  "the  materials  of  a  powerful 
party"  opposed  to  Spain's  interests.7 

However,  Gerard  did  not  long  continue  in  this 
balancing  posture.  As  usual,  Congress  was  at 
this  date  in  great  financial  straits.  The  idea  ac- 
cordingly suggested  itself  to  the  French  and 
Spanish  representatives  that  that  body  might  be 
induced  to  sell  Spain  its  "recent  conquests  in 
Louisiana  and  the  Illinois  country";  and  in  a 
series  of  conferences  held  at  Miralles*  and  Ge- 
rard's dwellings,  this  suggestion  was  broached  to 
Jay  and  certain  of  his  associates.  How  far  nego- 
tiations actually  proceeded  on  this  basis  cannot, 

T  Circourt,  Histoire  de  I' Alliance,  etc.,  III.  260-3.  An  earlier  con- 
ference of  similar  purport  is  more  briefly  reported  in  Gerard's 
despatch  of  Dec.  12,  Doniol,  IV.  64-5.  These  conferences  were 
followed  by  one  with  Washington,  which  is  recounted  in  the 
despatch  of  Dec.  30:  J'ai  observe  que  1'Angleterre  auroit 
vraisemblablement  la  plus  grande  r6pugnance  a  c6der  aux  Etats- 
Unis  des  territoires  qui  ne  font  point  partie  int6grante  des 
Colonies  .  .  .  que  les  Etats,  n'ayant  a  cet  egard  qu'un  simple  droit 
de  conquete,  ne  doivent  naturellement  pas  s'attendre  que  leurs 
allies  faissent  la  guerre  un  jour  de  plus  pour  leur  procurer  un 
aggrandissement  Stranger  aux  principes  fondamentaux  du  sys- 
teme  de  notre  union,  acquisition  d6sagr6ee  et  pleine  d'inconviens 
pour  PEspagne.  On  a  paru  sentir  vivement  la  force  de  cette 
reflexion,  et  j'espere  que  cela  contribuera  a  determiner  les  offres 
a  faire  a  cette  Couronne.  M.  Washington  m'ayant  demande  quelle 
compensation  le  roy  demanderoit  si  ses  forces  concourraient  a  la 
conqufcte  du  Canada,  ma  r^ponse  a  6t6  que  je  1'ignorois,  mais  que 
j'6tois  convaincu  qu'elle  seroit  analogue  a  lettre  et  a  Pesprit  du 
traite  d'alliance."  Apparently,  while  G6rard,  in  speaking  of  ter- 
ritory that  "formed  no  integral  part  of  the  colonies"  had  the 
Mississippi  country  in  mind,  Washington  thought  he  was  referring 
to  Canada.  Ib.,  38. 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

unfortunately,  be  determined,  as  the  published 
Journals  of  Congress  are  silent  on  the  subject,  but 
according  to  a  letter  of  Miralles,  written  late 
in  January,  Congress  had  appointed  a  committee 
of  one  member  from  each  state  to  consider  his 
proposals,  and  he  had  been  informed  by  a  member 
that  favorable  action  was  all  but  imminent.  In- 
deed, according  to  a  report  of  later  date,  Miralles 
had  named  the  enormous  sum  of  two  hundred 
million  livres  as  the  amount  that  Spain  would  be 
willing  to  pay  for  the  territory  she  desired,  an 
offer  which,  had  it  been  made  definite,  should  have 
been  quite  irresistible.8 

Be  that  as  it  may,  Gerard  now  began  taking 
the  frankest  possible  tone  in  discussing  the  con- 
flict of  interests  between  Spain  and  the  United 
States  in  the  West.  "I  stated,"  says  he,  report- 
ing a  conference  that  occurred  late  in  January 
with  a  committee  of  Congress, 

that  the  United  States  had  no  sort  of  right  to  the 
possessions  of  the  English  monarch  which  would  not 
appertain  equally  to  the  king  of  Spain  whenever  he 
should  become  engaged  in  war  with  England ;  that  their 
right  was  restricted  to  the  territory  which  they  pos- 
sessed as  English  colonies ;  that  in  admitting  the  demand 
of  isolated  and  scattered  establishments,  they  contra- 
dicted the  principles  of  justice  and  equity  which  had 
directed  the  Revolution  .  .  .  ;  that  ...  the  king 
8  For  the  matter  of  this  paragraph,  see  Miralles  to  Galvez,  Dec. 
28,  1778,  and  Jan.  22  and  29,  1779;  also  Rendon  to  Galvez,  May 
10,  1780,  Sparks  MSS.,  XCVII. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  253 

would  never  prolong  the  war  a  single  day  to  procure  for 
them  the  possessions  they  coveted;  that  such  benefits 
were  absolutely  foreign  to  the  principles  of  the  alliance 
and  especially  to  the  policy  of  the  United  States  toward 
Spain,  as  well  as  the  interests  of  that  power ;  that  good 
feeling  would  never  be  established  with  Spain  so  long 
as  she  had  so  great  reason  for  distrust.9 

In  a  word,  Gerard  conveyed  the  idea  that,  if  his 
government  had  ever  accepted  American  preten- 
sions in  the  West,  it  did  so  no  longer.  In  this, 
however,  he  was  altogether,  and  probably  delib- 
erately, misleading.  For  it  is  quite  evident  that 
the  Foreign  Office  followed  in  the  wake  of  its 
plenipotentiary's  opinions  in  this  matter  rather 
than  vice  versa;  and  at  this  date,  the  Office  was 
still  unaware  that  these  had  changed. 

Early  in  February  Vergennes'  despatch  of  the 
previous  October  arrived  at  Philadelphia,  an- 
nouncing that  France  had  accepted  Spain's  offer 
of  mediation  and  urging  that  Congress  proceed 
at  once  to  formulate  the  conditions  upon  which 
it  would  consent  to  peace.  The  document  gives 
every  evidence  that  the  secretary  still  regarded 
the  United  States  as  the  rightful  proprietors  of 
the  region  west  of  the  Alleghenies.  Thus  speak- 
ing of  the  disposition  to  be  made  in  the  treaty  of 
peace  of  Canada,  Nova  Scotia,  the  Floridas,  and 
the  Newfoundland  fisheries,  it  says: 

9  Gerard  to   Vergennes,  Jan.   28,  1779,  Circourt,  op.   dt.,   III. 
264-6. 


254  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

It  would  be  of  advantage,  Monsieur,  that  Congress' 
ultimatum  should  include,  first,  the  renunciation  of 
Canada  and  Nova  Scotia,  or  at  least  of  Canada  and  the 
fisheries  along  the  coasts  of  Newfoundland;  secondly, 
the  abandonment  in  favor  of  Spain  of  the  Floridas,  or 
of  such  parts  of  these  colonies  as  shall  meet  the  favor- 
able acceptance  of  Spain. 

In  other  words,  the  distinction  between  the 
British  colonies  in  revolt  and  such  outlying  re- 
gions as  the  Floridas  and  Canada  still  underlies 
the  secretary's  thinking  about  the  territorial 
question;  and,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the  quite 
inevitable  deduction  from  this  distinction  is  rec- 
ognition of  the  extension  of  the  United  States, 
at  least  between  the  Ohio  river  and  the  some- 
what indefinite  northern  boundary  of  West 
Florida,  to  the  Mississippi. 

And  of  like  implication  are  the  secretary's 
words  on  the  question  of  the  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi : 

I  do  not  know  [he  wrote]  and  I  am  unable  to  previse 
the  intentions  of  the  court  of  Madrid  on  this  subject. 
But  I  judge  from  the  situation  of  places  that  the 
Americans  will  insist  upon  the  liberty  of  navigating  the 
Mississippi  for  the  settlements  which  they  propose  to 
•establish  along  the  Ohio,  and  I  assure  you  that  it  would 
appear  astonishing  to  me  should  anyone  attempt  to 
jefuse  them  this  demand.  However,  there  may  be  some 
considerations  of  a  local  nature  that  I  am  ignorant  of 
on  the  other  side  of  the  question,  considerations  merit- 
ing attention.  You  are  in  position  to  obtain  the  requi- 
site information  whether  from  the  Americans  themselves 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  255 

or  from  M.  Miralles ;  and  if  they  appear  to  be  of  such 
a  character  as  to  justify  the  refusal  of  Spain,  you  ought 
to  prepare  the  Americans  for  it  with  prudence  and 
management.  But  in  the  contrary  case,  you  ought  to 
prevail  upon  the  Spanish  agent,  not  only  to  avoid  charg- 
ing his  court  with  prepossessions  on  the  subject,  but 
also  to  lay  the  matter  before  it  in  such  fashion  that  it 
will  find  no  difficulty  in  according  the  Americans  the 
consent  which  they  will  not  fail  to  demand  of  it.10 

Two  weeks  later,  Gerard  addressed  Congress 
as  a  body  on  the  subject  of  peace  terms.  Speak- 
ing of  the  necessity  of  meeting  "the  convenience 
of  Spain,"  he  was  challenged  to  explain  what  he 
meant: 

I  answered  [he  writes]  that  His  Catholic  Majesty  is 
too  great  and  generous  to  desire  an  acquisition  of  terri- 
tory .  .  .  ,  that  it  was  the  security  of  his  frontier  and 
the  prevention  of  trouble  with  his  neighbors  that  gave 
him  his  only  concern  .  .  .  ,  that  the  possession  of  Pen- 
sacola  and  the  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Mississippi 
could  alone  fulfil  this  object.11 

At  this  date  Congress  was  still  hopeful  of  a 
recognition  from  His  Catholic  Majesty,  a  hope 
which  Miralles  did  not  scruple  to  foster  by  dis- 
seminating misleading  rumors.12  In  general 

"Doniol,  III.  569-70. 

u  Gerard  to  Vergennes,  Feb.  17,  1779,  Doniol,  IV.  110-4. 

"See  ft.,  III.  294.  The  earliest  word  to  reach  America  of  the 
alliance  represented  Spain  as  party  to  it,  SMSS.,  821.  The  Con- 
tinental Journal  and  Weekly  Advertiser  (Boston)  of  June  18, 
1778,  contained  the  following  item  from  a  London  correspondent: 
"We  can  now  assure  the  public  that  on  Saturday  a  rescript  was 
delivered  from  the  court  of  Spain  recognizing  the  independence  of 
America." 


256  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

terms,  therefore,  Congress  was  quite  willing  to 
declare  its  intention  of  meeting  Spain's  desires. 
Nevertheless,  it  was  speedily  made  clear  to  Ge- 
rard by  delegates  from  Virginia  and  North  Caro- 
lina, that  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  was 
not  a  matter  admitting  of  unlimited  concession. 
The  West,  said  they,  was  filled  up  with  adventur- 
ers, fugitives  from  justice,  bandits ;  this  was  not  by 
the  desire  of  the  states,  but  it  was  a  fact ;  the  way 
to  civilize  these  people  was  to  tie  them  up  with  in- 
dustry and  property,  for  which  access  to  the  sea 
by  way  of  the  Mississippi  was  essential  to  them ; 
that  Spain  should  continue  to  hold  the  key  to 
that  river,  and  even  to  strengthen  her  control  by 
the  acquisition  of  the  Floridas  was  all  right;  but 
at  least  she  must  accord  the  West  a  port  of  entry 
at  its  mouth  and,  preferably,  a  Mediterranean 
port  as  well;  such  a  policy  would  be  a  boon  to 
Spain's  own  commerce.13  Gerard,  though  ob- 
viously impressed  by  these  representations,  has- 
tened to  disavow  any  special  knowledge  of 
Spain's  commercial  system;  and  meantime  the 
matter  of  concession  to  Spain  was  becoming  in- 
volved with  other  issues.  With  the  general  ques- 
tion of  peace  terms  before  it,  Congress  proceeded 
to  develop  principles  meant  to  obtain  for  the 
United  States  as  much  as  possible  in  all  direc- 
tions, the  principle,  for  example,  that  the  United 
States  was  entitled  to  independence  plus  all  that 

18  G6rard  to  Vergennes,  Feb.  18,  ib.,  IV.  114-5. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  257 

had  incontestably  belonged  to  the  British  prov- 
inces at  the  moment  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Revo- 
lution; that  the  very  notion  of  independence 
implied  the  possession  of  Nova  Scotia;  and  so 
on.14  Noting  the  trend  of  opinion,  the  plenipo- 
tentiary brought  forward  the  suggestion  that  the 
fixation  of  boundaries  be  deferred  till  the  negotia- 
tion of  peace, — a  suggestion  designed  to  give  the 
mediating  power  a  chance  to  make  its  voice  heard. 
The  idea,  he  regretfully  admits,  found  no 
partisans.15 

In  fact,  Gerard  was  soon  to  discover  that  his 
troubles  had  only  begun.  From  his  first  recep- 
tion of  the  news  of  mediation  he  had  urged  that 
Congress  should  hasten  its  work.  In  the  middle 
of  March,  however,  that  body  began  a  four 
months'  wrangle  over  the  question  whether  the 
United  States  should  refuse  any  peace  by  which 
Great  Britain  did  not  accord  them  the  privilege 
they  had  enjoyed  as  her  provinces  of  participat- 
ing in  the  Newfoundland  fisheries.  The  interest 
back  of  this  proposition  was  a  local  one,  but  vital 
to  the  locality  concerned.16  It  was  also  ably 

14  The  father  of  this  species  of  dialectic  was  Samuel  Adams,  ib., 
83,  footnote  1,  and  93,  footnote  1. 

15  76.,  92. 

16  For  some  contemporary  newspaper  discussion  of  the  propriety 
of  making  the  right  to  fish  off  the  Grand  Banks  a  sine  qua  non  of 
peace  and  of  delaying  Congress'  decision  in  the  matter  of  peace 
terms    for    the    benefit    of   New    England,   see   the    Pennsylvania 
Evening  Post  of  early  July,  1779,  and  the  Pennsylvania  Gazette 
of  June  23.     Of  especial  interest  in  this  connection  is  a  manu- 


258  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

represented  and  soon  had  a  powerful  party  at  its 
behest.  And  not  only  was  the  French  govern- 
ment's program  of  facilitating  peace  put  in  jeo- 
pardy by  the  proposal  to  make  the  fisheries  a  sine 
qua  non  condition,  but  the  privilege  sought  could 
by  no  stretch  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Al- 
liance be  brought  within  its  purview.  Gerard's 
blood  was  aroused  as  it  had  not  been  before,  and 
this  time  at  least,  it  is  impossible  not  to  accord 
him  a  measure  of  sympathy.  "I  told  them,"  he 
records  in  his  report  of  May  14th,  "that  I  was 
convinced  that  England  would  grant  them  the 
fisheries  by  the  same  title  as  that  by  which  they 
had  previously  held  them,  to  wit,  as  subjects  of 
the  British  crown,  but  that  they  had  no  need  of 
the  aid  of  France  for  that  arrangement."17  At 
this  date  he  thought  he  had  a  considerable  ma- 
script  in  the  office  of  the  secretary  of  state  of  North  Carolina, 
unsigned  and  undated;  but  in  the  hand  of  Thomas  Burke,  a  North 
Carolina  member  of  the  Continental  Congress  at  this  period. 
The  document,  for  a  transcript  of  which  I  am  endebted  to  Mr. 
Waldo  T.  Leland  of  Washington,  comprises  an  account  of  the 
proceedings  in  Congress  from  March  to  July,  1779,  relative  to 
peace  terms.  Burke  expresses  sympathy  for  New  England's 
interest  in  the  fisheries  but  condemns  the  New  England  leaders 
for  the  lengths  to  which  they  pushed  their  claims.  "Their 
claims,"  he  writes,  "extended  so  far  as  to  interfere  with  the 
rights  which  must  by  the  Law  of  Nations  belong  to  Britain  after 
the  war  .  .  .  and  such  rights  as  Britain  is  always  jealous  of  in 
so  high  a  degree  that  she  would  make  war  at  any  time  to  prevent 
encroachments  on  them."  It  is  to  be  noted  that  Burke  does  not 
regard  the  territorial  question  as  having  caused  delay. 
"Doniol,  IV.  138. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  259 

jority  of  the  delegates  with  him  but  a  month 
later  he  had  to  confess  that  "the  Party  of  Peace" 
was  in  a  serious  predicament,  due  largely,  he 
charges,  to  the  hostile  influence  of  Thomas  Jef- 
ferson.18 The  crisis  came  the  middle  of  July, 
when  Jay  and  "two  other  well-intentioned  dele- 
gates," "torn  and  battered  by  the  fray"  and  fore- 
seeing civil  war  if  New  England  was  longer 
opposed,  advised  the  French  representative  that 
the  game  was  up.  In  the  interview  that  followed 
Gerard  by  turns  pleaded  with,  threatened,  and 
cajoled  his  interlocutors:  France  was  a  great 
power  and  would  remain  one  even  if  America  de- 
serted the  alliance,  but  that  America,  taking 
counsel  of  her  sense  of  shame,  would  never  do. 
The  prospect,  however  dismaying,  would  never 
force  the  king  "to  submit  his  neck  to  the  yoke  they 
would  fain  impose  upon  him." 

I  added  that  some  people  appeared  to  entertain  the 
wish  of  breaking  down  the  relations  of  France  with 
Spain,  but  that  I  believed  myself  able  to  predict  that, 
if  the  Americans  had  the  audacity  to  reduce  His  Ma- 
jesty to  the  necessity  of  choosing  between  the  two,  his 
decision  would  not  be  in  favor  of  the  United  States ;  and 
I  saw  with  astonishment  and  grief  that  the  guardians 
of  America's  welfare  saw  in  public  affairs  only  their 
own  factional  and  local  interests,  as  if  the  whole  world 
would  bow  down  before  their  capricious  and  changeable 
resolutions,  confined  within  the  circle  of  their  own  ad- 
vantage, .  .  .  that  certainly  the  king  would  not  con- 

1876V  135  ffg.,  153-5,  165-7,  174-5,  etc. 


260  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

sent  to  consume  the  rest  of  his  realm  through  a 
succession  of  years  in  order  to  procure  a  small  increase 
of  fortune  for  a  few  New  England  shipowners.19 

These  vigorous  representations  met  with  a  de- 
gree of  success.  For  in  the  instructions  finally 
voted  by  Congress  on  August  14th  the  claim  to  a 
share  in  the  Newfoundland  fisheries  was,  so  far 
as  the  anticipated  treaty  of  peace  was  concerned, 
left  to  the  chances  of  negotiation  and  its  recogni- 
tion made  a  sine  qua  non  condition  only  of  the 
commercial  treaty  with  England  which  it  was 
expected  would  follow  the  conclusion  of  hostili- 
ties.20 But  in  doing  this  much,  Gerard  had  done 
his  utmost.  The  making  a  commercial  treaty  with 
England  dependent  upon  American  participa- 
tion in  the  fisheries  was  to  the  prejudice  of  the 
tobacco  states,  whose  further  interests  in  the 
West,  accordingly,  Congress  was  less  disposed 
than  ever  to  sacrifice.  By  the  same  instructions 
of  August  14th,  the  western  boundary  of  the 
United  States  northward  of  31°  north  latitude 
was  asserted  to  be  the  Mississippi,  and  the  recog- 
nition by  Great  Britain  of  this  boundary  was 
made  an  ultimatum.21  A  month  later  further 

"Gerard  to  Vergennes,  July  14,  ib.,  177-81;  see  also,  same  to 
same,  July  18,  ib.,  219-23,  where  the  plenipotentiary  vigorously 
attacks  the  selfishness  of  individual  states. 

"  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,  XIV.  960-1.  However, 
a  treaty  of  commerce  could  have  been  entered  into  by  the 
"unanimous  consent"  of  the  states,  without  Great  Britains'  having 
met  the  sine  qua  non. 

*/&.,  958-9. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  261 

resolutions  were  adopted  proffering  the  assent 
of  the  United  States  to  His  Catholic  Majesty's 
conquest  of  the  Floridas,  on  condition  that  he 
accede  to  the  treaties  between  the  United  States 
and  France,  and  "provided  always,  that  the 
United  States  shall  enjoy  the  free  navigation  of 
the  river  Mississippi  into  and  from  the  sea." 
Also,  the  American  negotiator  was  "particularly 
to  endeavor  to  obtain"  for  Americans,  their  ves- 
sels and  merchandise,  a  free  port  or  ports  south 
of  the  thirty-first  parallel.22 

On  October  4th,  John  Adams,  a  reliable  cham- 
pion of  New  England's  interests,  was  appointed 
the  representative  of  the  United  States  for  the 
purpose  of  negotiating  peace  and  John  Jay, 
whose  attitude  on  the  boundary  question  was  at 
this  date  somewhat  ambiguous,  American  repre- 
sentative at  Madrid.23  Meantime,  Gerard, 
broken  in  health  and  awaiting  the  arrival  of  his 

22  Journals,  XV.  1084,  under  date  of  Sept.  17.  On  Oct.  13, 
Witherspoon  of  New  Jersey,  seconded  by  Governeur  Morris  of 
New  York,  moved  that  "the  claim  of  a  free  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi"  be  receded  from  if  the  obtaining  of  it  "be  found 
an  insuperable  bar  to  the  proposed  treaties  of  amity  and  com- 
merce between  these  states  and  His  Catholic  Majesty,"  ib.,  1168. 
The  motion  was  voted  down.  Its  ultimate  triumph  is  discussed 
infra. 

™Ib.,  1142-3.  The  result  was  arrived  at,  after  a  long  contest, 
by  a  combination  of  Jay's  and  Adams'  friends.  See  ib.,  1107  and 
1113.  It  should  be  noted  that  Adams'  known  bias  supplied  the 
deficiency  of  his  instructions  with  reference  to  the  fisheries,  while 
Jay's  instructions  on  the  Mississippi  question  made  his  personal 
opinion  a  matter  of  indifference. 


262  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

successor  with  impatience,  had  become  thor- 
oughly disgusted  with  Congress.  "The  only  way 
to  save  America  from  her  madness  and  despite 
herself,"  he  wrote  Vergennes,  "would  be  for  the 
king  to  take  advantage  of  the  delay  and  conclude 
a  peace  along  the  general  lines  of  the  alliance."24 
The  appointment  of  Jay  afforded  him  a  meas- 
ure of  consolation  at  the  moment  of  his  with- 
drawal from  America,  but  even  that  was  far  from 
concealing  his  practical  defeat.25 

31  Despatch  of  July  31,  Doniol,  IV.  201. 

38  See  t6v  211.  For  the  exchange  of  compliments  between  Ge>ard 
and  Congress  that  attended  the  former's  leave-taking,  see  Jour- 
nals, XV.  1072-4,  1085. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE    MISSION    OF   LA   LUZERNE 

Compared  with  that  of  his  predecessor,  the 
mission  of  Louis  XVFs  second  plenipotentiary 
to  his  republican  allies  was  a  pronounced  success. 
In  great  part  no  doubt  the  circumstances  of  the 
war,  as  we  shall  see  presently,  made  the  Chevalier 
de  La  Luzerne's  triumph  inevitable,  but  this  fact 
should  not  obscure  to  us  that  gentleman's  own 
personal  deserts  in  the  least.  Affable  of  address, 
good-natured,  sensible,  direct,  bent  on  discovering 
and  reporting  the  facts  rather  than  a  confirma- 
tion of  his  own  views  about  things,  experienced 
in  meeting  men  on  their  own  level,  turning  a  dis- 
cerning eye  upon  vulnerable  points  of  character, 
and  with  a  wholesome  endowment  of  the  spirit  of 
laissez  aller,  La  Luzerne  acquired  a  personal  as- 
cendancy over  Congress  in  matters  touching  the 
common  cause  of  France  and  the  United  States 
that  had  never  fallen  to  the  lot  of  the  acrid  and 
pedantic  Gerard,  even  in  the  honeymoon  days  of 
the  alliance.  His  methods,  it  must  be  admitted, 
were  not  always  unexceptionable,  for  if  we  are 
to  believe  his  own  accounts,  he  sought  on  occasion 

263 


264  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

to  "accelerate  public  opinion"  as  expressed  in 
Congress  by  well-placed  douceurs,  whereas  Ge- 
rard seems  to  have  done  nothing  more  reprehen- 
sible than  to  subsidize  pamphleteers  and  writers 
for  the  papers.  On  the  whole,  however,  the  Con- 
gresses that  the  later  envoy  had  to  deal  with  were 
of  higher  average  character  than  some  that  had 
come  earlier;  and  his  greatest  triumph,  the  vot- 
ing of  the  Peace  Instructions  of  June  15th,  1781, 
was  brought  about  with  the  assent  and  assistance 
of  men  who  would  have  scored  bribes.1 

1  For  a  characterization  by  the  Englishman  Wraxall,  see  Whar- 
ton,  I.  §84  (p.  425).  "The  Count  de  La  Luzerne,"  wrote  Gouver- 
neur  Morris,  "is  an  indolent,  pleasant  companion,  a  man  of 
honor  and  obstinate  as  you  please,  but  he  has  somewhat  of  the 
creed  of  General  Gates,  that  the  world  does  a  great  part  of  its 
own  business  without  the  aid  of  those  who  are  at  the  base  of 
affairs,"  ib.  For  testimony  to  La  Luzerne's  services  to  the  mili- 
tary establishment,  see  La  Fayette  to  Vergennes,  May  20,  July  23, 
Oct.  4,  1780,  and  Feb.  1,  1781,  SMSS.,  Nos.  1625,  1626,  1627,  and 
1633.  La  Fayette  notes  that  La  Luzerne  pays  no  attention  to  the 
quarrels  of  private  individuals  and  that  he  is  held  in  the  greatest 
esteem  both  in  and  out  of  Congress.  Another  item  to  the  same 
effect  is  to  be  found  in  Rivington's  Royal  Gazette  of  May  3,  1780. 
In  a  letter  of  the  previous  month  from  a  gentleman  in  Maryland 
to  a  correspondent  in  St.  Eustatia,  complaint  is  made  that  France 
has  "gained  an  absolute  ascendancy  over  the  councils  and  gov- 
ernment of  the  country."  "M.  G6rard  .  .  .  laid  the  foundation  of 
French  influence.  M.  La  Luzerne  .  .  .  has  steadily  pursued  the 
same  steps."  He  advised  Congress  to  pass  the  act  of  Mar.  18, 
1780,  redeeming  the  Continental  currency  at  the  ratio  of  40  to  1. 
He  "commands  the  majority  of  that  body  as  much  as  the  English 
ministry  do  that  of  the  British  Parliament.  He  has  told  them  that 
if  they  mean  to  govern  this  continent,  they  must  keep  the  people 
poor.  .  .  .  This,  says  he,  is  our  maxim  in  France.  .  .  .  Poor  men 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  265 

At  the  outset,  however,  La  Luzerne  was  forced 
to  treat  the  situation  before  him  more  or  less  from 
the  point  of  view  of  others,  since  his  first  instruc- 
tions, bearing  the  dates  July  18th  and  September 
25th,  1779,  were  prepared  by  the  French  Foreign 
Office  exclusively  in  the  light  of  the  information 
that  had  come  from  Gerard.  We  are  not  sur- 
prised, then,  to  find  these  despatches  setting  forth 
the  following  ideas:  That  there  existed  in  Con- 
gress a  party  headed  by  the  Lees  and  Adamses 
which,  if  it  had  not  "already  sold  out  to  Eng- 
land," at  any  rate  sought  to  establish  principles 
diametrically  opposed  to  the  alliance;  that  this 
party  stood  for  a  separate  negotiation  with  Eng- 
land to  be  followed  by  an  alliance  with  that 
power,  for  the  prolongation  of  the  war  for  ob- 
jectives outside  the  scope  of  the  alliance,  and 
for  opposition  to  the  interests  of  His  Catholic 
Majesty;  that  since  Spain  was  now  a  party  to  the 
war  and  thus  a  defender,  at  least  indirectly,  of 
American  independence,  it  was  the  duty  of  Con- 
gress to  satisfy  that  power  in  the  matter  of  a 
fixed  western  boundary  for  the  United  States, 
the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the  con- 
make  the  most  obedient  subjects  and  the  best  soldiers."  For 
instances  of  La  Luzerne's  intervention  with  Congress  in  behalf  of 
greater  military  efficiency,  see  Wharton,  III.  683-5  and  803-5. 
Though  he  did  not  mingle  in  the  quarrels  of  individuals  and  fac- 
tions, he  did  combat  openly  Arthur  Lee's  candidacy  for  the 
secretaryship  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  1781,  and  with  success,  secur- 
ing the  selection  of  Robert  R.  Livingston.  See  Doniol,  IV.  597. 


266  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

quest  of  the  Floridas;  that  the  United  States  had 
no  title  to  the  lands  adjoining  the  Mississippi, 
but  that  that  region  was  still  English  and  there- 
fore subject  to  conquest  by  Spain,  and  that  Spain 
ought  to  conquer  it  with  a  view  to  procuring 
"clear,  exact,  precise,  and  unchangeable"  limits 
to  the  pretensions  of  the  United  States  and  espe- 
cially "to  forestalling  the  hopes  of  conquest  to 
which  the  provinces  of  the  South  might  give 
themselves  over";  that  the  Americans  probably 
never  had  any  right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi, 
since  "the  boundaries  of  the  British  provinces 
did  not  extend  to  that  river"  and  it  would  be 
absurd  for  them  to  claim  the  right  on  the  score 
of  England's  title;  that  the  Floridas  did  not  ap- 
pertain to  the  United  States  under  any  title,  but 
that  Spain  had  the  greatest  interest  in  reposses- 
sing herself  of  this  colony,  which  was  so  necessary 
to  insure  her  commerce  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
from  outside  disturbance;  that  the  guaranty 
pledged  by  France  to  the  United  States  by  article 
XI  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  was  definitive  only 
as  to  their  sovereignty  and  independence  and 
would  extend  to  their  possessions  only  from  the 
close  of  the  war;  that  the  French  government 
was  confirmed  in  its  espousal  of  Spain's  interests 
in  North  America  by  the  consideration  that  it 
was  itself  without  interest  in  seeing  that  conti- 
nent "enjoy  the  role  of  a  power  or  in  seeing  her 
in  a  position  to  give  disquiet  to  her  neighbors"; 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  267 

that,  in  other  words,  "the  only  purpose  of  our 
views  with  reference  to  the  United  States  is  that 
they  shall  be  independent  and  peaceable."2 

La  Luzerne  received  the  despatch  of  July  18th 
on  January  20th,  1780,  seven  months  after  it  was 
penned,  and  a  few  days  later  communicated  its 
purport  to  Congress.  At  one  point,  however,  he 
deviated  conspicuously,  if  not  from  the  letter,  at 
least  the  spirit  of  his  instructions.  For  while 
Vergennes'  obvious  intention  had  been  that  the 
whole  influence  of  France  should  be  brought  to 
bear  upon  Congress  in  the  interest  of  Spain, 
La  Luzerne  had  been  long  enough  on  the  ground 
to  have  discovered  that  this  would  never  do.  For 
the  tone  of  advocating  Spain's  views  he  accord- 
ingly substituted  that  of  impartially  reporting 
them,  with  the  result  of  implying  that  his  own 
government's  concern  was  limited  to  having 
brought  to  an  end  an  unfortunate  difference  of 
opinion  between  its  allies.  But  his  discretion 
availed  him  little.  For  one  thing,  the  very  fact 
that  Spain  was  now  in  the  war  for  her  own  ob- 
jects prejudiced  his  efforts ;  for  it  was  well  argued 
that  the  principal  reason  for  concession  to  Spain 

•The  most  material  portions  of  these  documents  are  given  in 
Doniol,  IV.  224-5  and  357-61.  They  are  given  complete  in 
Circourt,  op.  tit.,  III.  266-84.  Cf.  Journals  of  the  Continental 
Congress,  XXIII.  518-9,  where  is  quoted  an  argument  of 
Gerard's,  dated  May  22,  1779,  on  the  guaranty.  This,  says  the  en- 
voy, "ne  commercera  qu'a  P6poque  a  laquelle  les  possessions  des 
Etats-Unis  auront  6t£  constat6es  par  la  cessation  de  la  guerre." 


268  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

had  been  all  along  to  make  her  a  party  to  the  war, 
whether  as  an  ally  of  the  United  States  or  not, 
and  that  this  reason  was  now  at  an  end.  More- 
over, as  it  chanced,  La  Luzerne  was  also  under 
the  necessity  at  this  juncture  of  disclosing  to 
Congress  the  final  terms  on  which  Spain  had  of- 
fered mediation  to  Great  Britain  and  Vergennes' 
objections  thereto.  Such  candor,  on  the  part  of 
our  ally,  as  well  his  opposition  to  the  principle 
of  the  status  quo,  was  of  course  most  reassuring, 
but  the  effects  of  the  communication  upon  Con- 
gress' attitude  toward  His  Catholic  Majesty  was 
naturally  bad.  When  therefore,  La  Luzerne  re- 
ported, it  was  learned  that  the  Spanish  monarch 
claimed  the  right  to  conquer  the  lands  to  the  east 
of  the  Mississippi,  he  found  himself  confronted 
with  "reasons  already  very  powerful"  to  which 
were  now  added  "unfavorable  dispositions,"  and 
his  endeavors  to  rebut  the  American  claims,  he 
frankly  owned,  "made  little  impression."  This 
was  early  in  February.  A  month  later  the  Phila- 
delphia Gazette  published  an  account  by  Miralles 
of  recent  Spanish  successes  along  the  Mississippi. 
The  effect  of  this  disclosure  was,  La  Luzerne 
wrote  his  government,  great  public  excitement 
and  a  universal  disposition  to  assert  the  American 
title  to  this  territory.  Thus  it  was  pointed  out 
that  several  states  had  sold  and  were  still  selling 
lands  in  the  regions  involved;  that  adventurers 
from  the  states  were  planting  the  banners  of  their 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  269 

provinces  there;  that  George  Rogers  Clark  had, 
in  behalf  of  his  state  Virginia,  been  waging  war 
against  the  British  posts  in  the  Northwest  for 
nearly  two  years.  In  his  perplexity  La  Luzerne 
turned  to  Miralles,  who  astonished  him  by  dis- 
closing the  fact  for  the  first  time  that  he  possessed 
neither  any  direct  authority  from  Madrid  nor  yet 
any  certain  knowledge  of  its  intentions.  Never- 
theless, the  arrival  at  this  moment  of  the  despatch 
of  September  25th  forced  the  French  representa- 
tive to  renew  his  efforts  in  Spain's  behalf,  which 
he  did  with  the  usual  measure  both  of  discretion 
and  effect.  Even  delegates  whose  friendship  to 
the  alliance  could  not  be  questioned  expressed 
regret  that  Spain  should  thus  seek  to  sow  seeds  of 
discord  between  herself  and  the  United  States. 
Some  months  later  La  Luzerne  reported  the  fol- 
lowing words  of  a  Virginia  delegate,  with  refer- 
ence both  to  the  land  question  and  the  question  of 
the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi:  "We  should 
be  endeavoring  to  deceive  Spain  if,  in  treating 
with  her,  we  obligated  ourselves  to  make  a  renun- 
ciation that  the  nature  of  things  renders  impos- 
sible." In  the  same  report,  La  Luzerne  also 
noted  that  the  delegates  from  the  Northern 
states,  though  without  direct  interest  in  the  mat- 
ter, generally  sustained  the  pretensions  of  the 
South.3 

3  For  this  paragraph,  see  Doniol,  IV.   331-7  paraphrasing  re- 
ports from  La  Luzerne  between  the  dates  Jan.  25  and  Aug.  25, 


270  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

La  Luzerne's  candid,  if  somewhat  discursive, 
reports  furnished  his  government  for  the  first 
time  with  anything  like  a  true  picture  of  Ameri- 

1780.  Some  further  items  of  the  same  purport  are  given  in 
P.  C.  Phillips,  The  West  in  the  Diplomacy  of  the  American 
Revolution,  pp.  150-84,  passim.  On  Aug.  22,  the  Virginia  dele- 
gates laid  before  Congress  instructions  from  the  legislature  of 
their  state  reasserting  Virginia's  charter  claims  and  the  Ameri- 
can right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi,  Journals,  XVII.  755; 
Papers  of  the  Continental  Congress,  No.  71,  I.  fol.  391.  This 
action  on  the  part  of  Virginia  led  Congress,  on  Oct.  4,  to  in- 
struct Jay  to  adhere  to  his  former  instructions  on  the  navigation 
question,  and  on  Oct.  17,  to  accept  the  before  cited  letter  of 
Oct.  17,  prepared  by  Madison  to  urge  the  American  claims  in  the 
West  at  length,  Journals,  XVIII.  900-2  and  935-47.  In  the  latter 
document  attention  is  paid  to  the  Spanish  claim  of  a  right  by 
conquest  to  some  of  the  western  country.  It  is  answered:  "1. 
That  these  possessions  are  few  in  number  and  confined  to  small 
spots.  2.  That  a  right  founded  on  conquest  .  .  .  cannot  compre- 
hend the  circumjacent  territory.  3.  That  if  a  right  to  the  said 
territory  depended  on  the  conquests  of  the  British  posts  within, 
the  United  States  have  already  a  more  extensive  claim  to  it  than 
Spain  can  acquire,  having  by  an  important  success  of  their  arms 
obtained  possession  of  all  the  most  important  posts  and  settle- 
ments on  the  Illinois  and  Wabash,  rescued  the  inhabitants  from 
British  domination,  and  established  civil  government  in  its  proper 
form  over  them.  They  have,  moreover,  established  a  post  on  a 
strong  and  commanding  situation  near  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio; 
whereas  Spain  has  a  claim  by  conquest  to  no  post  above  the 
northern  bounds  of  West  Florida  except  that  of  the  Natchez,  nor 
are  there  any  other  British  posts  below  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio 
for  their  arms  to  be  employed  against.  4.  That  whatever  extent 
ought  to  be  ascribed  to  the  right  of  conquest,  it  must  be  admitted 
to  have  limitations  which  in  the  present  case  exclude  the  pre- 
tensions of  His  Catholic  Majesty.  If  the  occupation  by  the  king 
of  Great  Britain  of  posts  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States, 
as  denned  by  charters  derived  from  the  said  king  when  consti- 
tutionally authorized  to  grant  them,  makes  them  lawful  objects 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  271 

can  opinion  on  the  Mississippi  question.  Fur- 
thermore, they  arrived  at  Versailles  at  a  time 
calculated  to  impart  to  their  message  considerable 
poignancy. 

Throughout  the  greater  part  of  1780  and  into 
the  year  following,  His  Catholic  Majesty,  practi- 
cally withdrawn  from  the  war,  was  engaged  in 
peace  negotiations  with  an  English  emissary. 
That  Spain  intended  actually  to  abandon  her  al- 
liance with  France,  Vergennes  professed  not  to 
believe,  but  he  very  justifiably  feared  that  she 
again  sought  to  impose  the  status  quo  on  the 
United  States.4  This,  however,  he  wrote  Mont- 

of  conquest  to  any  power  than  the  United  States,  it  follows  that 
every  other  part  of  the  United  States  that  now  is,  or  may  here- 
after fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  is  equally  an  object  of 
conquest.  Not  only  New  York,  Long  Island,  and  the  other  islands 
in  its  vicinity,  but  almost  the  entire  states  of  South  Carolina  and 
Georgia  might  by  the  interposition  of  a  foreign  power  at  war 
with  their  enemy,  be  forever  severed  from  the  American  con- 
federacy and  subjected  to  a  foreign  yoke."  Madison  was  greatly 
assisted  in  this  argument,  as  indeed  were  the  American  advocates 
generally,  by  the  fact  that  at  this  period  the  today  familiar  rule  of 
"effective  occupation"  had  no  place  in  International  Law.  See  also 
the  New  York  Gazette  of  July  15,  1780,  where  the  writer  calls  for 
the  early  "conquest  of  the  continent."  Evidently,  popular  expecta- 
tions in  this  matter  still  ran  high. 

4  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Mar.  31,  Apr.  21,  June  12,  June  30, 
July  6,  and  Sept.  28,  Doniol,  IV.  450-1,  453,  46T-84.  It  is  not  im- 
possible that  Vergennes  took  too  charitable  a  view  of  the  Spanish 
government's  proceedings  at  this  time.  According  to  a  recent 
account  of  Cumberland's  mission,  based  on  English  sources,  Florida 
Blanca  offered,  in  return  for  Gibraltar,  to  withdraw  from  the  war 
and  "to  pay  besides  in  ships,  treasure,  and  territory."  On  the 
British  side,  according  to  the  same  account,  "four  Cabinet  coun- 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

morin,  would  be  to  sacrifice  the  honor  of  France, 
the  substantial  purpose  of  the  war,  and  in  the  long 
run  Spain's  own  interest.  The  English  and  Amer- 
icans, left  in  juxtaposition,  would  reunite  their 
forces.  Incited  by  the  English,  the  Americans 
would  penetrate  to  the  heart  of  Mexico,  whose 
people  they  would  encourage  "to  aspire  to  a 
sweeter  government."  Then  indeed  would  Spain 
have  cause  to  fear  the  example  of  American  inde- 
pendence.5 These  arguments  made  as  little  im- 
pression upon  the  Spanish  monarch  and  his 
minister  as  they  had  two  years  before.  As  late 
as  the  end  of  October,  with  New  York  City,  the 
Carolinas,  and  Georgia  now  under  British  con- 
trol, Florida  Blanca  openly  defended  the  status 
quo  for  the  United  States.6 

cils  met  on  the  business"  and  finally  formulated  the  English  terms, 
which  however  were  still  more  exorbitant.  M.  A.  M.  Marks, 
England  and  America,  1763-1788  (London,  1907,  2  vols.),  II.  1196-7. 

5  Doniol,  IV.  450-1,  453,  and  480. 

•76.  409.  Vergennes  comments  on  Florida  Blanca's  attitude  in 
his  despatch  to  Montmorin  of  Jan.  22,  1781,  thus:  "M.  le  Cte.  de 
Floride  Blanche  croit,  M.,  que  nous  serions  fort  heureux  si  nous 
parvenions  a  obtenir  le  statu  quo,  pour  l'Ame>ique  sep'le.  Ce 
ministre  n'a  done  pas  jett6  les  yeux  sur  la  carte  de  cette  partie  du 
monde  pour  voir  ce  que  ce  seroit  qu'un  pareil  statu  quo  dans  le 
moment  actuel;  ou  bien  il  de"sespere  entierement  de  notre  cause,  ou 
enfin  il  nous  croit  assez  lagers  pour  abandonner  les  Ame"ricains 
sans  la  n6cessit£  la  plus  urgente.  La  v6rit6  est,  M.,  que  si  le  Roi 
stipuloit  r  uti  possidetis  a  regard  des  Etats-Unis,  il  les  mettoit 
entierement  a  la  merci  des  Anglois;  il  porteroit  d'ailleurs  atteinte 
a  sa  reputation;  il  autoriseroit  les  Am£ricains  a  la  defection,  vers 
laquelle  la  cour  de  Londres  dirige  essentiellement  toute  sa  poli- 
tique."  76.  510.  The  statu  quo,  in  short,  would  represent  the 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  273 

But  of  even  more  importance  than  the  selfish- 
ness of  Spain's  course  in  determining  Vergennes' 
attitude  at  this  time  on  the  Mississippi  question 
was  the  appearance  of  John  Adams  at  Paris  early 
in  February,  1780.  In  the  long  run,  this  visit  of 
Adams  to  the  French  capital  resulted  somewhat 
equivocally  for  American  interests,  since  it  fur- 
nished Vergennes  a  reasonable  pretext  to  demand 
the  Congressional  Instructions  of  June  15th, 
1781.  Immediately,  however,  the  impression  of 
obstinacy  and  independence  given  by  Adams, 
taken  in  connection  with  Spain's  contemporary 
proceedings,  led  the  French  government  to  ratify 
the  policy  of  Icdssez  faire  that  had  already  been 
put  into  effect  by  La  Luzerne  with  reference  to 
the  matters  at  issue  between  France's  allies. 

Adams  had  hardly  arrived  in  Paris  than  he 
startled  Vergennes  with  the  suggestion  that  he 
considered  it  his  right  and  duty,  though  a  general 
peace  was  no  longer  in  prospect,  to  communicate 
to  the  British  government  his  powers  to  con- 
clude with  it  both  a  treaty  of  peace  and  a  treaty 
of  commerce.7  Vergennes,  who  connected 
Adams  with  that  faction  in  Congress  which,  ac- 
cording to  Gerard,  had  been  bent  on  a  separate 
peace  with  England,  at  once  had  visions  of  an 

entire  defeat  of  the  purpose  of  the  alliance.    At  this  very  date  this 
was    just    what,    Vergennes     feared,    impended.      See    following 
chapter. 
7  Adams  to  Vergennes,  Feb.  12,  1780,  Wharton,  III.  492-3. 


274  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

outcome  to  France's  efforts  in  behalf  of  America 
that  would  have  been  ironical  in  the  extreme.7* 

To  be  solicitous  about  a  treaty  of  commerce  before 
peace  is  established  [he  wrote  Adams]  is  like  being  busy 
about  furnishing  a  house  before  the  foundation  is  laid. 
In  the  situation  in  which  America  stands  at  present  with 
regard  to  England,  to  announce  to  that  power  that  they 
have  forgotten  her  system  of  tyranny,  her  cruelties, 
and  her  past  perfidy,  is  discovering  too  great  a  degree 
of  weakness,  or  at  least  too  much  good  nature,  and 
inviting  her  to  believe  that  the  Americans  have  an 
irresistible  predilection  for  her.  .  .  .  To  propose  a 
treaty  of  commerce,  which  must  be  founded  on  confi- 
dence and  a  union  equivalent  to  an  alliance,  at  a  time 
when  the  war  is  raging  in  all  its  fury  .  .  .  ,  what  is  it 
but  to  give  credit  to  the  opinion  which  all  Europe  enter- 
tains, .  .  .  that  the  United  States  incline  toward  a 
defection,  and  that  they  will  be  faithful  to  their  en- 
gagements with  France  only  till  such  time  as  Great 
Britain  shall  furnish  them  a  pretext  for  breaking 
them?8 

But  Adams,  quite  obsessed  with  the  idea  that 
the  time  was  ripe  for  an  appeal  to  English  public 
opinion  in  behalf  of  peace  and  the  recognition  of 
American  independence,  refused  to  be  convinced 
by  the  French  secretary's  logic,  though  he  even- 
tually deferred  to  the  latter's  urgent  request  to 
postpone  action  on  his  opinion  till  further  in- 

TaSee  especially  Vergennes  to  La  Luzerne,  June  3,  Doniol,  IV. 
414. 

•"Observations  on  Mr.  J.  Adams'  Letter  of  July  17,  1780," 
Wharton,  IV.  3-6. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  275 

structions  from  Congress.9  But  this  was  only 
after  repeated  argument  on  the  subject,  and 
meantime  other  irritating  issues  had  arisen  be- 
tween the  two  men. 

Thus  in  June  the  question  came  up  of  the 
justice  of  the  "40  to  1"  Act  of  March  18th,  to 
foreign  holders  of  Continental  currency.  Ap- 
proached on  the  subject,  Adams  prepared  what 
was  an  able  defense  of  Congress'  action,10  but  to 
it  added  in  conversation  with  agents  of  the  For- 
eign Office,  some  rather  unnecessary  frills : 

The  course  Congress  had  taken  was  wise,  indeed  very 
wise,  just,  very  just;  and  those  who  complained  of  it 
were  either  English  emissaries  or  spies  .  .  .  [More- 
over] the  French  had  less  reason  for  complaint  than  any 
body  else  .  .  .  since  were  it  not  for  America,  to  whom 
France  should  understand  she  was  under  the  greatest 
obligation,  England  would  be  too  powerful  for  the 
House  of  Bourbon,  and  Russia,  Denmark,  Sweden, 

9  Adams  to  Vergennes,  July  26,  ib.,  7-11.    Congress  disapproved 
of  Adams'  efforts  to  communicate  his  powers  to  the  British  gov- 
ernment.   "Congress  consider  your  correspondence  with  the  Count 
de  Vergennes  on  the  subject  of  communicating  your  plenipoten- 
tiary powers  to  the  ministry  of  Great  Britain  as  flowing  from 
your  zeal  and  assiduity  in  the  service  of  your  country;  but  I  am 
directed  to  inform  you  that  the  opinion  given  you  by  that  min- 
ister relative  to  the  time  and  circumstances  proper  for  communi- 
cating your  powers  and  entering  upon  the  execution  of  them  is 
well  founded.     Congress  have  no  expectations  from  the  influence 
which   the   people   of   England   may   have    on    the   British    coun- 
sels. .  .  ."     Huntington,  President  of  Congress,  to   Adams,  Jan. 
10,  1781,  Wharton,  IV.  229. 

10  Adams  to  Vergennes,  June  22,  ib.,  III.  809-16. 


276  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Portugal,    and   Holland   would   never   be   confederated 
against  that  power.11 

A  month  later  Adams  wrote  Vergennes,  apro- 
pos the  despatch  of  Ternay  and  Rochambeau's 
expedition,  to  urge  that  a  French  fleet  be  main- 
tained somewhere  along  the  American  coast  over 
winter,  emphasizing  especially  the  value  to  be 
derived  from  thus  keeping  the  British  line  of 
supplies  and  communications  constantly  men- 
aced. Certainly  this  was  a  sensible  idea  enough. 
Unfortunately,  in  pressing  it  upon  the  French 
government  not  only  was  Adams  invading  the 
province  of  Franklin,  but  he  brought  to  his  self- 
assumed  task  the  most  egregious  lack  of  tact. 
"Let  the  whole  system  of  France  be  considered," 
he  wrote,  quoting  from  a  current  English  circular, 

from  the  beginning  down  to  the  late  retreat  from  Sa- 
vannah, and  I  think  it  is  impossible  to  put  any  other 

"Doniol,  IV.  416  fn.  This  was  on  June  17,  but  more  than 
a  month  earlier  Adams  had  written  to  Genet  to  much  the  same 
effect:  "To  suppose  that  France  is  sick  of  the  part  she  has  taken 
is  to  suppose  her  sick  of  that  conduct  which  has  procured  her 
more  respect  and  consideration  in  Europe  than  any  step  she  ever 
took.  It  is  to  suppose  her  sick  of  that  system  which  enabled  her 
to  negotiate  the  peace  between  Russia  and  the  Ottoman  Porte, 
as  well  as  the  Peace  of  Teschen;  that  system  which  has  enabled 
her  to  unite  in  sentiment  and  affection  all  the  maritime  powers — 
even  the  United  Provinces — in  her  favor  and  against  England.  It 
is  to  suppose  her  sick  of  that  system  which  has  broken  off  from 
her  rival  and  natural  enemy  the  most  solid  part  of  her  strength; 
a  strength  that  had  become  so  terrible  to  France  and  would  have 
been  so  fatal  to  her."  Adams  to  Genet,  May  9,  1780,  Wharton, 
III.  667. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  277 

construction  upon  it  but  this,  viz.,  that  it  has  always 
been  the  deliberate  intention  and  object  of  France,  for 
purposes  of  her  own,  to  encourge  the  continuation  of 
the  war  in  America  in  hopes  of  exhausting  the  strength 
and  resources  of  this  country  [England]  and  of  de- 
pressing the  rising  power  of  America. 

True,  he  himself  disavowed  harboring  any  such 
belief,  but  he  strongly  implied  that,  in  view  of  the 
desultory  fashion  in  which  France  had  thus  far 
waged  war,  it  was  by  no  means  an  unreasonable 
belief,  and  also,  that  it  was  one  which  was  likely 
in  time  to  gain  a  strong  foothold  in  the  United 
States.12 

Vergennes'  response  is  dated  a  week  later.  It 
announced  that  there  was  "every  reason  to  believe 
that  they  [Ternay  and  Rochambeau]  will  take 
their  station  during  next  winter  in  North  Amer- 
ica," and  continued:  "You  will  perceive,  sir,  by 
this  detail,  that  the  king  is  far  from  abandoning 
the  cause  of  America  and  that  His  Majesty  with- 
out having  been  solicited  by  Congress,  has  taken 
effectual  measures  to  support  the  cause  of  Amer- 
ica."13 Adams'  spontaneous  reaction  to  this  intel- 
ligence was  most  enthusiastic.  "I  assure  Your 
Excellency,"  he  wrote  the  day  following,  "that 
scarcely  any  news  I  ever  heard  gave  me  more 
satisfaction."14  But  this  was  due  to  the  fact  that 
he  had  not  given  proper  attention  to  the  state- 

"76.,  484-55. 
13  76.,  870-1. 
"76.,  872. 


278  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

ment  in  Vergennes'  letter  that  His  Majesty's 
action  had  not  been  solicited  by  Congress.  In 
his  letter  of  July  27th  to  the  secretary  he  proves  at 
length  that  Congress  had  asked  for  just  such  aid 
as  was  at  last  being  furnished,  as  early  as  1776, 
and  had  repeated  the  request  several  times  since.15 
This  was  the  straw  that  broke  the  camel's  back. 
Up  to  this  time  Vergennes  seems  to  have  kept 
his  temper  with  the  New  Englander  fairly  well, 
but  on  July  29th  he  wrote  him  that  henceforth 
His  Majesty's  government  would  confine  its 
dealing  in  matters  affecting  the  two  allies  to  Dr. 
Franklin.16  A  few  days  afterward  Adams  with- 
drew to  Holland.17 

But  some  time  before  this  upshot  of  the  matter, 
Vergennes  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
standing  of  the  alliance  with  the  American 
Congress,  whose  chosen  representative  Adams 
evidently  was,  was  too  delicate  to  be  further 
jeopardized  by  France's  appearing  in  the  thank- 
less role  of  champion  for  Spanish  interests  where 
these  conflicted  with  interests  of  the  United 
States.  In  his  despatch  of  June  3rd,  1780,  to  La 
Luzerne  the  French  secretary  reiterated  his  per- 
sonal belief  that  Spain  had  the  right  to  seize  the 
lands  to  the  east  of  the  Mississippi  if  she  could, 

15  Ib.,  IV.  12-4. 
ia/6v  16-7. 

17  Here,  too,  his  conduct   was  quite  displeasing  to   Vergennes, 
loc.  cit.,  562-3;  V.  48. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  279 

that  whatever  might  be  the  terms  of  the  charters 
of  the  Southern  states,  the  English  were  still  the 
proprietors  of  these  lands,  and  that  there  was, 
therefore,  nothing  to  oblige  Spain  to  hand  over  to 
the  Americans  such  of  them  as  she  should  con- 
quer. But,  he  continued,  that  was  not  a  matter 
for  France  to  decide,  wherefore  La  Luzerne 
should  utter  no  opinion  on  the  subject  but  should 
leave  the  whole  question  with  Miralles.  The 
French  envoy  should  limit  himself  to  advising 
influential  members  of  Congress  "not  to  use  the 
language  of  right  to  the  court  of  Madrid,  but 
rather  to  appeal  to  its  magnanimity."  Finally, 
he  added  that  he  had  confidential  word  to  the 
effect  that  the  Spanish  government  was  strongly 
disposed  to  surrender  to  the  Americans  the  east 
bank  of  the  Mississippi  above  the  Floridas  and 
to  accord  them  "some  sort  of  navigation  of  the 
river."18  And  his  despatch  of  August  7th  was 
along  sugstantially  the  same  lines.  The  pre- 
tensions of  Spain,  said  the  minister,  "are  very 
delicate  to  treat  of ;  our  intervention  has  not  been 
asked  for,  and  silence  will  be  without  disadvan- 
tage." La  Luzerne  should  therefore  merely  avail 
himself  of  such  occasions  as  chanced  to  offer  "to 
bring  Congress  to  have  confidence  in  the  Catholic 

18Doniol,  IV.  427-8.  In  a  despatch  to  Montmorin,  dated  June 
12,  Vergennes  reiterates  his  interpretation  of  the  guaranty  clauses 
of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance:  "La  garantie  des  domaines  des  Etats- 
Unis  est  eVentuelle,  son  £tendue  ne  sera  d£termin6  que  par  la 
future  pacification,"  ib.,  459-60,  footnote. 


280  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

king  and  to  decide  the  question  of  the  lands 
along  the  Mississippi  without  prejudice."19 

Notwithstanding  these  despatches,  in  October, 
1780,  while  La  Luzerne  was  absent  at  Hartford 
attending  a  conference  between  the  American  and 
the  French  commanders  on  the  military  situa- 
tion, his  youthful  secretary  Marbois,  at  the  in- 
stance of  Rendon,  the  successor  of  Miralles,  who 
was  now  dead,  presented  Congress  an  extended 
memoir  showing,  "with  the  greatest  energy,"  "the 
absence  of  any  foundation"  for  the  American  pre- 
tensions in  the  West  and  "giving  them  to  under- 
stand that  they  need  not  expect  the  king  of  Spain 
to  assent  to  them."20  The  following  February 
15th  Congress  did,  in  fact,  decide  upon  a  measure 
of  concession  to  Spain,  when  it  instructed  Jay  to 
recede  from  the  demand  for  the  right  to  navigate 
the  Mississippi  below  31°  north  latitude  and  a 
free  port  there,  "provided  such  cession  shall  be 
unalterably  insisted  upon  by  Spain."21  But  the 

"76.,  429. 

20  Rendon  to  Galvez,  Oct.  20,  1780,  Sparks  MSS.,  XCVII;  Doniol, 
IV.  593-4.  Marbois  was  assisted  in  the  preparation  of  this 
letter  by  Jenifer  of  Maryland,  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  "land- 
less" state  faction,  P.  C.  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  182-3.  Jenifer,  then 
president  of  the  Maryland  senate,  had  stated  his  views  at  length 
to  G6rard,  early  in  July,  1779,  Doniol,  IV.  168-70. 

*  Journals,  XIX.  152-4;  Wharton,  IV.  267-9.  This  resolution 
was  in  immediate  consequence  of  instructions  received  by  the 
delegates  of  Virginia,  authorizing  them  to  assent  to  the  terms 
indicated  in  the  interest  of  a  "speedy  conclusion  of  an  alliance 
with  Spain,"  Journals,  loc.  cit.  151.  The  motive  underlying  this 
resolution  was  distrust  of  the  negotiations  then  going  on  in  Spain. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  281 

decision  was  due  not  to  Marbois'  representation 
of  Spain's  rights,  which  indeed  was  answered  on 
the  spot,  but  to  the  state  of  the  war,  and  the  ques- 
tion of  the  lands  along  the  river  was  not  affected 
by  it.  Four  days  later — but  four  months  after 
Marbois'  intervention — Vergennes  again  wrote 
La  Luzerne  touching  the  Mississippi  question. 
The  envoy  was  urged  to  follow  his  former  instruc- 
tions and  to  leave  it  to  Congress  to  discuss  its 
pretensions  directly  with  Madrid  through  its  own 
plenipotentiary.  It  seems  not  unlikely  that  the 
despatch  was  elicited  by  intelligence  of  young 
Marbois'  officiousness.22 

In  brief,  then,  while  the  claim  of  the  United 
States  before  1783  to  a  western  boundary  along 
the  Mississippi  was  by  no  means  an  invulnerable 
one,  its  validity  seems  originally  to  have  been 
taken  for  granted  by  Vergennes,  as  was  also  that 
of  the  even  less  well-grounded  claim  to  a  right  to 

It  was  feared  that  Spain  might  be  detached  from  the  war  and 
that  this  might  lead  to  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  uti  possidetis. 
See  Writings  of  James  Madison,  I.  lOlff.;  IX.  86-9.  On  August 
10,  a  second  resolution  was  offered  to  empower  Jay  "to  make 
such  further  cessions  of  the  right  of  these  United  States  to  the 
navigation  of  the  river  Mississippi  as  he  may  think  proper,"  etc. 
It  was  voted  down  unanimously,  Journals,  XX.  853-4.  The  feel- 
ing in  Congress  at  this  latter  date  was  anything  but  cordial  toward 
Spain  on  account  of  the  action  of  the  Spanish  commander  in 
allowing  the  British  garrison  at  Pensacola,  on  the  surrender  of 
that  post  to  the  Spanish  forces,  to  retire  to  New  York.  See  the 
order  adopted  this  same  date,  loc.  cit.,  854. 
"Doniol,  IV.  593-4. 


282  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

navigate  the  lower  course  of  the  river  to  and 
from  the  sea.  Also,  both  the  language  and  his- 
tory of  article  XII  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance 
rendered  plausible  the  American  contention  that, 
from  the  moment  the  treaty  became  operative, 
His  Most  Christian  Majesty  became  guarantor 
of  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  United  States. 
In  his  instructions  to  La  Luzerne,  however,  of 
July  and  September,  1779,  Vergennes  not  only 
rejected  this  interpretation  of  article  XII,  but 
assumed  outright  championship  of  the  theory  that 
the  left  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  northward  of 
the  Spanish  boundary,  was  still  English  and  that, 
therefore,  Spain,  being  then  at  war  with  England, 
had  the  right  to  conquer  it.  In  bringing  about 
this  change  of  attitude  the  material  factors  were, 
first,  Vergennes'  desire  to  remove  the  principal 
obstacle  to  Spain's  hearty  participation  in  the 
war,  namely,  fear  of  the  Americans,  and  secondly, 
the  misinformation  that  had  come  from  Gerard 
as  to  the  intentions  of  the  so-called  Anti-Gallican 
party  in  Congress  and  the  extent  to  which  the 
Mississippi  boundary  was  desired  by  all  factions ; 
but  there  is  no  item  of  evidence  showing  an  ulter- 
ior idea  in  the  mind  of  the  secretary  that  France 
herself  would  wish  some  day  to  recover  Louisi- 
ana. When  presently  he  came  to  understand  the 
real  trend  of  American  opinion  in  this  matter 
and  the  probable  risk  involved  in  attempting  to 
traverse  it,  Vergennes  returned  to  his  original 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  283 

position,  that  it  was  for  Spain  and  the  United 
States  to  settle  by  themselves  the  questions  in  issue 
between  them.  This  was  conspicuously  the  posi- 
tion of  the  French  government  and  its  represen- 
tative at  Philadelphia  when  Congress  voted  the 
Instructions  of  June  15th,  1781, — a  fact  to  be  re- 
membered in  adjudging  Congress'  willingness  at 
that  time  to  entrust  American  interests  so  com- 
pletely to  the  keeping  of  France.  Whether,  once 
vested  with  this  power,  France  still  adhered  to 
her  attitude  of  aloofness,  which  after  all  rested 
upon  considerations  of  policy  and  not  of  right,  is 
reserved  for  later  consideration. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  CRISIS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION 

On  September  27th,  1780,  Vergennes  ad- 
dressed the  king  the  following  letter: 

Sire,  your  Majesty  learned  yesterday  the  details  which 
the  Count  de  Maurepas  had  to  communicate  with  re- 
gard to  the  financial  situation.  They  are  truly  alarming 
and  seem  to  leave  no  other  recourse  than  peace  and  a 
very  speedy  peace.  Spain  feels  the  same  press  of 
necessity  that  France  does  and  her  inclination  is  very 
evident.  Does  Your  Majesty  desire  to  instruct  his 
ambassador  at  Madrid  to  encourage  and  promote  this 
inclination?  I  have  not  the  least  fear,  Sire,  that  the 
Count  de  Montmorin  would  not  acquit  himself  of  such  a 
commission,  extremely  difficult  and  delicate  though  it 
would  be,  with  equal  prudence  and  celerity.  But  once 
the  avowal  were  made  to  Spain  that  we  have  need  of 
peace  and  that  we  rely  upon  her  to  obtain  it  for  us,  there 
is  no  one,  Sire,  who  could  answer  for  the  consequences  or 
assure  Your  Majesty  that  the  interest  of  his  reputation 
and  his  glory  would  not  be  compromised.  I  speak  only 
of  that,  Sire,  since  all  other  things  are  in  comparison  as 
nothing.  I  entreat  Your  Majesty  to  take  the  matter 
into  consideration  and  to  consult  the  Count  de  Maure- 
pas. If  the  outcome  of  your  deliberations  favors  an 
effort  for  peace  through  Spain,  I  very  humbly  beseech 
Your  Majesty  to  transmit  me  the  order  in  writing.  The 
circumstances  which  constitute  the  necessity  of  unhappy 

284 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  285 

courses  are  soon  forgotten,  while  the  evil  effects  which 
ensue  become  but  the  more  evident  with  the  passage  of 
time.1 

It  requires  no  inordinate  effort  to  perceive  in 
this  document  the  record  of  a  critical  moment  in 
the  history  of  the  alliance  and  of  the  Revolution 
itself.  Fortunately  for  the  cause  of  American 
independence  Vergennes'  prompt  and  astute  in- 
tervention with  the  king  saved  the  day.  Early  in 
October  the  secretary  forced  the  retirement  of 
the  incapable  Sartines  from  the  Marine  in  favor 
of  Castries  and  early  in  January  he  effected  a 
similar  reorganization  of  the  Department  of  War 
under  the  talented  Segur.2  Meantime,  as  these 
changes  indicate,  the  royal  assent  had  been  ob- 
tained to  a  new  campaign,  though  that  it  would 
probably  be  the  final  one  of  the  war  Vergennes  at 
once  recognized,  not  only  because  of  the  condition 
of  the  royal  exchequer  but  also  because  of  the 
situation  on  the  Continent.  With  the  powers 
announcing  in  rapid  succession  their  adherence 
to  the  League  of  Neutrals  and  with  Holland 
breaking  openly  with  England,  the  European 
horizon  wore  a  smiling  countenance  for  France  at 

1  Doniol,  IV   488. 

2  Ib.,  488-90.     Says  M.  Doniol  of  Vergennes'  triumph:     "Si,  ce- 
pendant,   les    petitesses    des   hommes    trouvent    encore   a    s'agiter 
quand  de  grandes  preoccupations  dominent,  ce  ne  sont  ces  peti- 
tesses  qui  commandent.     II  s'agissait  du   sort   de   la  France   en 
Europe;  tout  se  subordonna  a  ce  grand  interet,  consequemment  fut 
remis  aux  mains  de  M.  de  Vergennes,"  ib.,  490. 


286  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

the  opening  of  1781.  Diplomatic  combinations, 
however,  are  extremely  kaleidoscopic  affairs; 
besides  which  the  recent  death  of  the  empress, 
by  releasing  the  yet  untested  proclivities  of 
Joseph  II  from  a  control  that  had  usually  been 
friendly  to  France,  was  a  special  factor  of  un- 
certainty.3 Then,  early  in  1781  came  a  formal 
offer  from  Joseph  and  the  czarina  of  joint  media- 
tion between  France  and  her  allies,  and  Great 
Britain.  Inasmuch  as  the  offer  represented  the 
young  emperor's  initial  venture  in  the  field  of 
Continental  politics,  Vergennes  at  once  decided 
that  it  was  to  be  treated  with  consideration. 
Moreover,  he  could  but  reflect  that,  if  worse  came 
to  worst,  so  honorable  a  way  to  peace  might  prove 
very  welcome.4 

An  open  road  to  peace  at  the  end,  if  it  were 

•See  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Feb.  14,  1781,  ib.,  544-5.  "II 
seroit  souverainement  malheureux  que  cette  campagne  si  se  pass&t 
comme  la  pr£ceclente  sans  rien  produire  d'effectif.  Tout  nous 
invite  a  song6r  a  finir  cette  guerre;  les  moiens  de  la  soutenir 
s'6puissent  tous  les  jours,  et  la  disposition  de  PEurope  qui  jusqu'ici 
nous  a  £t£  si  favorable  peut  changer  d'un  moment  a  1'autre.  Les 
Anglois  ont  de  grands  moiens  pour  tente>  1'ambition  de  Pempereur 
et  pour  le  satisfaire;  1'offre  que  ce  prince  vient  de  nous  faire  de 
sa  mediation  peut  nous  faire  concevoir  I'esp6rance  qu'il  ne  se 
rendra  pas  si  aisement  a  leur  seductions  quand  bien  meme  nous 
n'aurions  pas  d'auitres  motifs  de  compt6r  sur  sa  perseverance  dans 
1'alliance  mais  il  n'est  pas  sans  exemple  que  la  vertu  la  plus  ferine 
soit  6branle>.  Pour  pare>  a  tous  les  inconv£niens  impossibles  a 
preVoir,  nous  ne  devons  nous  occup^r  qu'a  finir  cette  guerre;  nous 
n'y  parviendrons  pas  sans  frape>  un  grand  coup,"  ib. 

*  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Jan.  22,  1781,  ib.,  524-8. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  287 

humanly  possible,  of  a  successful  campaign — 
such,  in  brief,  was  Vergennes'  program  for  1781. 
One  question  remained,  that  of  the  military  ob- 
jective of  the  coming  campaign,  and  on  this 
there  were  three  contending  views.  A  party  at 
court,  composed  of  the  adherents  of  Choiseul  and 
Chatelet  sought  to  discredit  Vergennes'  policy  by 
clamoring  for  a  war  of  aggrandizement,  to  be 
waged  especially  in  the  West  Indies.5  Spain,  on 
the  other  hand,  at  last  disillusioned  of  the  idea 
of  getting  anything  valuable  except  by  fighting 
for  it,  was  now  demanding  that  she  be  assisted  to 
conquer  Gibraltar  and  Jamaica.6  Lastly,  from 
America  came  the  reiterated  suggestion  that, 
since  American  independence  was  the  main  objec- 
tive of  the  war,  North  America  was  its  natural 
and  most  advantageous  theatre. 

The  despatch  of  Rochambeau  and  Ternay  to 
America  early  in  1780  has  already  been  noted. 
For  this  determination  on  the  part  of  the  French 
government  to  add  military  assistance  to  naval 
and  financial  and  for  its  acceptance  of  the  for- 
mula of  "a  constant  naval  superiority  in  Ameri- 
can waters,"  which  Ternay's  squadron  was 

*La*t  Journal*  of  Horace  Walpole,  II.  438-9.  See  also,  for 
later  efforts  on  the  part  of  this  same  faction  to  discredit  Ver- 
.gennes'  policy,  Doniol,  V.  186-7  and  footnotes,  and  Revue  d'His- 
toire  diplomatique,  VII.  550-1. 

*  France's  refusal  to  cooperate  with  Spain  in  an  attack  upon 
Jamaica  had  been  one  of  Spain's  grievances  in  1780,  Doniol,  IV. 
496. 


288  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

designed  to  realize,  the  United  States  were  prin- 
cipally indebted  to  La  Fayette,  who  had  spent  all 
the  first  half  of  the  year  1779  in  France  pleading 
America's  cause  to  Maurepas  and  Vergennes.7 
Unfortunately,  two-fifths  of  the  army  of  ten 
thousand  that  had  been  intended  for  Rocham- 
beau's  command  was  blockaded  at  Brest  by  a 
British  squadron  before  it  got  away,  while  the 
naval  portion  of  the  expedition  was  rendered  use- 
less at  Newport  in  the  same  manner  shortly  after 
its  arrival.  And  the  total  result  at  the  end  of  the 
first  year  of  the  expedition  was  that  it  had  dis- 
appointed all  the  expectations  it  had  aroused, — 
had,  in  truth,  created  the  impression  on  American 
minds  of  a  promise  made  and  not  fulfilled.8 

But  a  much  more  important  consideration  with 
those  who  at  the  end  of  1780  besought  France  to 
lend  the  United  States  more  extensive  and  direct 
aid  was  the  state  of  the  war  in  America  at  this 
period.  Despite  the  alliance,  American  indepen- 
dence had  never  been  so  near  collapse.  The 
British  army  now  held  New  York,  the  Carolinas, 
and  Georgia,  while  the  British  fleet  ravaged  the 
coast.  Congress  was  bankrupt  and  forced  con- 
stantly to  resort  to  the  most  wretched  expedients 
to  obtain  money  or  to  dispense  with  its  employ- 

7  Charlemagne  Tower,  The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  in  the  Ameri- 
can Revolution  (Philadelphia,  1901,  2  vols.),  II.  ch.  XVIII;  Doniol, 
IV.  ch.  V. 

8  Tower,  op  cit.}  II.  125,  132,  157. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  289 

ment.  The  Continental  Army,  without  pay, 
food,  or  clothing  and  enlisted  for  short  terms,  was 
ever  on  the  verge  of  dissolution.  And  the  politi- 
cal situation  was  no  better.  With  public  spirit  at 
the  lowest  ebb,  the  war  had  become  throughout  a 
great  part  of  the  country  the  desperate  venture  of 
a  minority,  sometimes  a  small  minority.  The 
Articles  of  Confederation  were  still  in  abeyance, 
the  states  were  indifferent  to  their  duties,  the 
authority  of  Congress  was  flouted  daily.  To  this 
situation  the  treason  of  Arnold  was  the  natural 
climax.9 

The  outstanding  features  of  American  con- 
ditions in  the  autumn  of  1780  were  already  before 
Vergennes  from  the  correspondence  of  La  Lu- 
zerne.  Indeed,  it  may  be  said  that  almost  from 
the  moment  of  the  signing  of  the  American  trea- 
ties the  secretary  had  undergone  a  progressive 
disillusionment  in  the  military  prowess  and  poli- 
tical competence  of  France's  republican  allies: 
"the  inertia  of  democratic  institutions,"  which 
had  furnished  him  an  argument  in  his  efforts  to 
reconcile  Spain  with  the  idea  of  American  inde- 
pendence, he  had  soon  found  to  be  no  mere 

9  On  this  topic  there  is  a  superabundance  of  material.  See  Doniol, 
IV.  ch.  VII;  Tower,  op.  cit.  II.  chs.  XX-XXII;  Lecky's  American 
Revolution  (Woodburn,  ed.,  New  York,  1908),  ch.  Ill;  Writings 
of  Washington  (W.  C.  Ford,  ed.,  14  vols.),  VIII  and  IX,  passim; 
SMSS.,  Nos.  733,  737,  747,  1624-32;  Wharton,  IV.  256  and  V. 
151,  etc. 


290  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

truism.10  Yet  it  is  an  interesting  fact  that  to  those 
Frenchmen  who  had  come  into  personal  touch 

M  "I  avow  I  have  but  feeble  confidence  in  the  energy  of  the  United 
States,"  Vergennes  to  Montmorin,  Nov.  27,  1778,  Doniol,  III.  581. 
A  very  censorious  critic  of  the  Americans  was  Kalb,  whose  letters 
to  Broglie  were  probably  seen  by  Vergennes,  as  they  are  to  be 
found  in  the  archives  of  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs.  See 
e.g.,  Doniol,  IV.  19  fn.  Kalb  charges  the  American  character  with 
braggadocio,  dissipation,  corruption,  irresolution,  lack  of  patriot- 
ism, Anglomania,  SMSS.,  Nos.  821,  838,  845,  1971,  1987.  For  a 
partial  confirmation  of  some  of  these  strictures  by  a  more  lenient 
critic,  see  La  Fayette  to  Vergennes,  »&.,  No.  1609.  See  also  a 
letter  from  the  "Hon.  J.  Trevor  to  Mr.  Secretary  Fox,"  dated 
Ratisbon,  Apr.  16,  1782.  The  writer  gives  an  account  of  a  con- 
versation with  the  son  of  one  of  the  Elector  Palatine's  ministers 
at  the  Diet,  who  had  served  as  aide-de-camp  to  Rochambeau,  and 
who  had  come  away  from  America  greatly  disappointed  with 
France's  allies.  Fifth  Report  (1876)  of  the  Historical  Manu- 
scripts Commission,  the  Lansdowne  Papers,  p.  253.  Nor  were  the 
French  the  only  ones  who  were  disappointed.  "The  generosity  of 
our  allies,"  wrote  Washington  in  Aug.,  1780,  in  a  letter  to  the 
President  of  Congress,  "has  a  claim  to  our  gratitude,  but  it  is 
neither  for  the  honor  of  America  nor  for  the  interest  of  the  corn- 
man  cause  to  leave  the  work  entirely  to  them,"  Writings  (Ford, 
ed.)  VIII.  390.  "Had  America,"  began  Crisis  No.  IX,  written 
on  the  occasion  of  the  surrender  of  Charleston,  "pursued  her 
advantage  with  half  the  spirit  she  resisted  her  misfortunes,  she 
would  before  now  have  been  a  conquering  and  a  peaceful  people; 
but  lulled  in  the  lap  of  soft  tranquillity  she  rested  on  her  hopes, 
and  adversity  has  only  convulsed  her  into  action."  Vergennes,  in 
coming  to  depreciate  the  military  capacity  and  public  spirit  of  the 
Americans  as  a  whole  and  to  emphasize  the  necessity  of  con- 
trolling Congress,  showed  a  true  appreciation  of  the  character  of 
the  Revolution  in  its  last  days.  Indeed,  even  the  victory  at  York- 
town  did  little  to  break  up  the  popular  inertia  that  tied  the  hands 
of  Congress.  See  La  Luzerne's  elaborate  and  very  informing 
report  on  the  situation  at  the  end  of  1781,  Revue  d'Histoire  diplo- 
matique, V.  421-36. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  291 

with  the  American  cause,  that  cause  had  never 
appeared  in  more  appealing  light  than  at  this 
moment  of  its  greatest  prostration.  The  expla- 
nation, I  think,  is  to  be  found  in  the  personal 
ascendancy  of  Washington,  whose  intrepidity 
and  fortitude  naturally  stood  forth  all  the  more 
strikingly  as  the  other  mainstays  of  the  Revolu- 
tion fell  away.11 

At  almost  the  very  moment  that  Vergennes 
was  intervening  to  prevent  France's  withdrawal 
from  the  war,  a  conference,  consisting  of  Wash- 
ington, the  French  commanders,  the  French  en- 
voy, and  one  or  two  others,  was  assembling  at 
Hartford,  Connecticut,  to  consider  plans  for  the 
coming  campaign  in  North  America.  It  had  al- 
ready been  determined  that  the  objective  of  the 
campaign  ought  to  be  the  capture  of  New  York 
City.  It  was  now  further  resolved  that,  in  order 
to  render  this  objective  feasible,  the  French  com- 
manders should  ask  their  government  to  send  to 
America  enough  men  to  raise  Rochambeau's 
force  to  15,000,  enough  money  to  enable  Con- 
gress to  maintain  a  like  force,  and  a  sufficient  fleet 
to  command  the  American  waters.  The  con- 
ference's decisions  were  conveyed  to  France  by 
Rochambeau's  son  on  a  vessel  detailed  for  the 

"For  the  change  in  Kalb's  opinion  of  Washington  from  un- 
favorable to  favorable,  cf.  his  letters  of  Oct.  and  Dec.,  1777, 
to  Broglie,  SMSS.  Nos.  755  and  761.  For  some  tributes  by 
La  Fayette,  see  ib.,  1625,  1627,  1632. 


292  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

purpose  by  Ternay,  late  in  October.  In  the 
middle  of  February,  young  Laurens  sailed  for 
France  with  a  similar  commission  from  Congress. 
He  bore  with  him  the  friendly  injunction  of 
Rochambeau  "to  open  his  heart  as  to  the  state  of 
this  unhappy  land,  if  it  be  not  promptly  and 
powerfully  succored."12 

The  response  of  the  French  government  to 
these  demands  was  certainly  not  illiberal  either 
in  proportion  to  America's  deserts  or  its  own 
means.  Measured,  however,  by  the  demands 
themselves  it  was  meagre  enough.  The  request 
that  was  met  most  generously  was  the  financial 
one.  Congress  had  asked  for  a  loan  of  twenty- 
five  millions  livres.  In  return  Louis  gave  out- 
right six  millions  livres,  to  be  spent  in  France 
under  the  direction  of  Franklin,  and  later  con- 
sented to  underwrite  a  loan  of  ten  millions,  to  be 
obtained  in  Holland.  The  request  of  the  Hart- 
ford Conference  for  more  troops,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  denied  almost  in  toto,  and  even  the  con- 
tingent of  Rochambeau's  force  that  had  been 
blockaded  at  Brest  was  kept  back.  As  to  naval 
aid,  Vergennes  expressed  himself  as  follows: 

u  For  the  above,  see  Doniol,  IV.  ch.  VII,  and  Tower,  La  Fayette, 
II.  159-63,  195-200,  270.  La  Luzerne  suspected  that  the  sending 
of  Laurens  to  France  might  represent  an  intention  to  supersede 
Franklin,  Doniol,  IV.  390-1  and  fn.  Laurens'  conduct  in  France, 
characterized  as  it  was  by  youthful  zeal  and  ignorance  of  diplo- 
matic forms,  was  irritating  to  the  French  minister,  but  it  seems 
clear  that  he  should  be  credited  with  the  king's  endorsement  of  the 
Dutch  loan,  ib.,  558-62;  Wharton,  IV.  317-55;  passim,  and  685-8. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  293 

The  Count  de  Grasse,  who  commands  our  fleet  in  the 
Antilles,  has  been  ordered  to  conduct,  sometime  toward 
the  approach  of  next  winter,  a  part  of  his  fleet  to  the 
coast  of  North  America,  or  to  detach  a  portion  of  it 
to  sweep  the  coast  and  to  cooperate  in  any  undertaking 
which  may  be  projected  by  the  French  and  American 
generals,  or  to  form  a  part  of  it  if  they  are  unable  to 
cooperate.  The  number  of  ships  to  be  sent  to  the  North 
will  depend  upon  the  need  which  the  Spanish  have  of  our 
assistance.  ...  If  they  have  made  preparations  for 
some  great  enterprise,  we  shall  have  to  lend  them  a 
hand;  for  if  a  serious  blow  is  struck  at  the  common 
enemy  and  it  is  successful,  the  advantage  will  be  equally 
great  for  all  the  allies.  The  important  point  is  to 
weaken  the  enemy,  to  crush  him  if  possible ;  the  locality 
is  of  little  importance. 

In  short,  the  rendition  of  naval  aid  to  the  United 
States  was  subordinated  to  the  project  of  assist- 
ing Spain  in  the  West  Indies,  and,  it  may  be 
added,  before  Gibraltar.13 

Why  was  Spain  thus  preferred  to  the  United 
States?  The  question  is  easily  answered.  If 
France  was  under  obligation  to  secure  American 
independence  before  she  could  honorably  make 
peace,  not  less  was  she  under  obligation,  now  that 
Spain  was  ready  once  more  to  take  an  active  part 

18Doniol,  IV.  ch.  XI;  Tower,  op.  tit.,  II.  ch.  XXIV.  In  the 
interest  of  accuracy,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  government's 
decision  not  to  send  more  troops  to  America  was  receded  from 
at  the  time  of  Grasse's  sailing  for  the  West  Indies  to  the  extent  of 
sending  with  him  a  reinforcement  of  six  hundred  and  sixty  men 
for  Rochambeau's  force.  On  Apr.  5,  Grasse  detached  the  Sagit- 
taire  from  his  fleet  to  carry  this  force  to  Newport,  where  it  ar- 
rived on  June  10th.  Tower,  pp.  283,  392-3. 


294  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

in  the  war,  to  obtain  something  valuable  for  that 
power  too.  But  more  than  that,  the  Spanish 
marine  was  now  in  better  fighting  trim  than  it 
had  been  at  any  earlier  period  of  the  war.  As  be- 
tween an  ally  able  to  contribute  something  to  the 
common  cause  and  one  needing  constant  bolster- 
ing, good  sense  dictated  that  the  real  work  of  the 
campaign  should  be  undertaken  in  cooperation 
with  the  former.  On  the  other  hand,  this  does  not 
mean  that  Vergennes'  effort  to  minimize  the  im- 
portance of  the  matter  of  locality  is  necessarily 
sound.  Were  England  to  be  really  crushed,  then, 
of  course,  the  way  would  lie  open  for  France  to 
satisfy  both  her  allies  to  the  completest  extent, 
but  of  this  there  was,  after  all,  little  likelihood. 
Such  being  the  case,  however,  it  was  altogether 
probable  that,  at  the  close  of  hostilities,  England 
would  be  more  strongly  lodged  in  certain  locali- 
ties than  in  others ;  and  this  fact  might  very  con- 
ceivably work  to  the  detriment  of  one  ally  as 
against  the  other.  In  point  of  fact,  at  the  very 
moment  he  wrote  the  above  quoted  words,  Ver- 
gennes already  had  in  mind  the  possibility  of 
France's  acquiescing  in  a  very  substantial  cur- 
tailment, from  the  American  point  of  view  cer- 
tainly, of  American  independence,  if  an  otherwise 
available  opportunity  for  peace  should  offer 
itself. 

Vergennes  communicated  to  La  Luzerne  his 
government's  decision  with  reference  to  the  de- 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  295 

mands  of  Congress  and  the  Hartford  Conference 
in  a  despatch  dated  March  9th.  In  the  same 
despatch  and  two  later  ones,  dated  respectively 
April  19th  and  June  30th,  he  further  instructed 
the  envoy  as  to  the  course  of  action  that  France 
expected  on  the  part  of  Congress  touching  the 
diplomatic  interests  of  the  alliance:14  Congress 
was  to  be  frankly  informed  that,  in  view  of  threat- 
ened developments  on  the  Continent,  peace  might 
at  any  time  become  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
France,  and  was,  therefore,  to  be  urged  to  accept 
the  proposed  mediation  without  delay.  By  the 
same  token,  it  also  behooved  Congress  to  en- 
deavor to  win  the  good  will  of  the  mediating 
powers  by  the  moderation  of  its  pretensions, 
"save  in  the  matter  of  independence,  which  ad- 
mitted of  no  modification."15  The  American 
envoy  at  the  mediation,  on  whose  right  to  enter 
it  on  a  proper  footing  France  would  unremit- 
tingly insist,  would  be  John  Adams.  On  account 
of  Adams'  unfortunate  personal  qualities  which 
would  "give  rise  to  a  thousand  unfortunate 
episodes  calculated  to  exasperate  his  fellow  nego- 
tiators," Congress  ought  to  empower  His  Ma- 
jesty's ministers  to  interpose  to  curb  him 

"Doniol,  IV.  553-6,  588-91,  601-3;  Journals  of  the  Continental 
Congress,  XX.  562-9,  669-74,  XXI.  986-93.  The  extracts  in  Doniol 
are  incomplete,  but  it  is  possible  to  supplement  them  from  La 
Luzerne's  reports  to  Congress. 

15  Doniol,  IV.  555. 


296  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

whenever  necessary.16  Finally,  Congress  ought 
to  be  brought,  albeit  by  the  most  delicate  means, 
to  realize  the  possibility  that,  in  view  of  Eng- 
land's settled  opposition  to  an  outright  recogni- 
tion of  independence  and  of  the  existing  state  of 
the  war,  the  mediating  powers  might  propose  a 
truce  based  on  the  status  quo.17  That  the  United 

19  76.,  551  fn.,  589. 

"76.,  552-3,  601-3;  Journals,  XX.  672.  The  first  hint  that 
France  might  consent  to  the  status  quo  for  the  United  States  is 
contained  in  Vergennes'  despatch  of  Sept.  25,  1780,  to  La  Lu- 
zerne,  written  at  the  moment  when,  as  we  have  seen,  the  continu- 
ance of  the  war  was  in  the  balance.  "Au  surplus,  M.,"  Ver- 
gennes wrote  on  this  occasion,  "je  presume  que  le  veritable  objet 
des  inquietudes  que  Ton  vous  a  marquees  c'est  le  statu  quo;  il 
seroit  effectivement  on  ne  peut  pas  plus  facheux  pour  l'Ame>ique 
dans  1'etat  actiiel  des  choses,  et  nous  sommes  bien  determines  a  ne 
le  point  stipuler  pour  les  Americains;  ce  sera  a  eux  a  juger, 
lorsqu'il  sera  question  de  cet  objet,  de  la  perseverance  ou  des 
sacrifices  que  les  conjonctures  exigeront  de  leur  part.  Au  reste, 
M.,  je  desire  que  vous  vous  absteniez  de  traiter  cette  matiere  deli- 
cate dans  ce  moment  cy  .  .  .  ."  Doniol,  IV.  536  fn.  France,  then, 
would  not  stipulate  the  status  quo,  but  would  leave  the  question 
of  its  acceptability  to  Congress.  However,  Vergennes  was  very 
fearful  that  Spain,  still  in  negotiation  with  Cumberland,  would 
stipulate  it,  as  she  had  in  1778.  In  his  despatch  of  Nov.  27,  1780, 
he  roundly  denounced  Florida  Blanca's  policy  as  grounded  in 
passion,  prejudice  and  selfishness,  ib.}  506-8.  In  his  despatch  of 
Jail.  22,  1781,  he  declared  that  if  the  king  of  Spain  should  stipu- 
late the  status  quo  in  regard  to  the  United  States  he  would  put 
them  at  the  mercy  of  England  and  would  give  the  Americans 
good  reason  to  abandon  the  alliance.  "Spain,"  said  he,  "will  put 
her  interests  before  everything  else  .  .  .  and  she  looks  upon  inde- 
pendence with  regret,"  ib.,  510-11.  Vergennes'  later  attitude  on 
this  question  was  formulated  in  a  memoir  in  the  hand  of  Rayneval, 
his  secretary,  on  which  is  based  in  part  his  despatch  of  Mar.  9. 
This  memoir  comprises  the  following  points:  "1.  It  is  for  the 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  297 

States  were  profoundly  interested  in  maintaining 
the  integrity  of  their  union  was,  of  course,  alto- 
gether indisputable.  Indeed,  the  king  himself 
was  of  the  same  way  of  thinking,  both  because  of 
his  plighted  word  and  also  because  of  his  own 
interests,  wherefore  he  would  alter  his  present 

king  of  England,  author  of  the  war,  to  make  some  sacrifices  for 
peace.  2.  The  first  of  the  sacrifices  to  be  made  is  independence 
for  North  America.  3.  This  independence  may  be  assured  either 
by  a  definitive  treaty  or  a  truce.  4.  The  king  of  England,  which- 
ever method  is  adopted,  will  be  able  to  treat  directly  with  the 
Americans,  through  the  intervention  of  the  mediating  powers.  5. 
The  truce  will  run  for  20,  25,  or  30  years,  etc.  The  United  States 
will  be  treated  as  independent  in  fact,  and  no  restriction  shall 
be  imposed  upon  them  in  the  exercise  of  the  rights  of  sovereignty. 
6.  It  would  be  desirable  to  avoid  the  status  quo  if  possible;  but 
in  case  that  could  not  be,  it  will  be  advantageous  to  limit  it  to 
South  Carolina  and  Georgia  and  to  stipulate  for  the  evacuation 
of  New  York.  7.  The  proposition  of  the  truce  cannot  be  made  by 
the  king  to  Congress,  if  it  should  be  united  with  the  status  quo, 
but  if  the  two  propositions  are  isolated,  His  Majesty  will  en- 
gage to  procure  Congress'  sanction  of  the  truce,  if  he  has  the 
secret  assurance  that  New  York  will  be  accepted  [excepted?]. 
8.  In  case  of  a  truce  the  king  will  propose  to  the  Americans,  if  it 
is  necessary  to  do  so,  a  new  convention  the  object  of  which  will 
be  to  guarantee  the  Americans  against  attack  by  England  after 
the  expiration  of  the  truce."  In  a  word,  while  the  king  would 
leave  the  unpleasant  business  of  proposing  the  status  quo  to  the 
mediating  powers,  he  would  accept  it  and  bring  Congress  to  do 
so,  if  it  were  confined  to  South  Carolina  and  Georgia.  There  was 
a  rumor  in  Boston  that  the  status  quo  had  been  accepted  for  the 
United  States,  to  apply  to  Georgia,  South  Carolina,  and  Maine, 
as  early  as  April,  1780,  Continental  Journal  and  Weekly  Ad- 
vertiser, April  13,  1780.  It  may  be  that  the  uneasiness  to  which 
Vergennes  refers  in  his  despatch  of  Sept.  25  (supra) ,  was  caused 
by  this  rumor. 


898  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

resolution  only  when  he  saw  "the  absolute  impos- 
sibility of  obtaining  peace  without  such  a  sacri- 
fice." None  the  less,  the  sacrifice  was  one  that 
lay  "in  the  order  of  possibilities" ;  and,  if  it  should 
become  necessary,  it  would  have  to  be  accepted 
with  resignation.  "The  greater  part  of  the  Bel- 
gian provinces  had  thrown  off  the  Spanish  yoke 
originally,  but  only  seven  had  finally  maintained 
their  independence" ;  and  "it  frequently  happens 
that  circumstances  give  the  law  to  the  most 
powerful  sovereigns,  forcing  them  to  modify 
plans  the  best  conceived."18 

In  short,  Vergennes  plainly  indicated,  that  if 
an  otherwise  available  peace  offered  itself,  he 
would  not  resist  the  status  quo  for  the  United 
States  indefinitely,  though  he  had  declaimed 
against  it  so  bitterly  a  few  months  before;  and 
further,  that  while  to  Congress  would  be  reserved 
the  formal  decision  in  the  matter,  it  would  be  ex- 
pected ultimately  to  take  the  same  position  with 
as  good  grace  as  possible,  and  so  save  the  king's 
face. 

The    passages    above    paraphrased,    however, 

MDoniol,  IV.  601-3.  Vergennes  continues:  "Mais  vous  aurez 
la  j)lus  grande  attention  de  ne  parler  que  comme  de  vous-meme 
et  de  ne  point  laisser  apercevoir  que  vous  y  etes  autorise",  parce- 
que  dans  ce  dernier  cas  les  Amdricains  supposeroient  que  le  Roi  a 
d'avance  pris  le  parti  de  les  abandonner  et  ils  croient  tout  perdu; 
Sa  M't6  est  re"solue  de  ne  leur  proposer  aucun  sacrifice,  elle  croit 
devoir  laisser  ce  soin  f&cheux  aux  deux  cours  mediatrices,  si 
jamais  il  devient  necessaire,"  ib.,  603. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  299 

touching  the  status  quo,  are  from  the  despatch 
of  June  30th  and  were  never  brought  to  Con- 
gress' attention.  The  conference  which  La  Lu- 
zerne  held  with  a  committee  of  Congress  on  May 
28th,19  and  which  led  to  the  voting  of  the  famous 
Instructions  of  June  15th,  was  based  upon  the 
despatch  of  March  9th,  in  which,  while  the  possi- 
bility of  the  status  quo  is  suggested,  the  French 
government's  attitude  toward  such  a  proposition 
is  left  somewhat  vague.  Even  so,  La  Luzerne 
evidently  thought  it  more  in  accord  with  the 
"delicacy"  required  by  the  situation  not  to  bring 
forward  this  part  of  the  despatch  of  March  9th 
till  after  Congress  had  defined  the  terms  on  which 
it  would  make  peace,  nor  did  he  do  so  till  June 
18th.20  At  the  earlier  conference  the  envoy's  dis- 
course was  all  of  mediation,  moderation,  Mr. 
Adams'  deficiencies,  and  the  necessity  of  confi- 
dence in  France.  "If,"  said  he,  "Congress  put 
any  confidence  in  the  king's  friendship  and 
benevolence;  if  they  were  persuaded  of  his  firm 
resolution  constantly  to  support  the  cause  of  the 
United  States,"  they  would  order  their  plenipo- 
tentiary "to  manifest  a  perfect  and  open  confi- 
dence in  the  French  ministers"  and  "to  take  no 
steps  without  the  approbation  of  His  Majesty." 
In  other  words,  he  invited  Congress  to  surrender 
to  France  the  diplomatic  autonomy  of  the  United 

19  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,  XX.  562-9. 

20  Ib.,  672. 


300  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

States  during  the  approaching  peace  negotia- 
tions. Far  from  spurning  the  invitation,  Con- 
gress accepted  it  without  stipulating  a  condition 
or  registering  a  scruple. 

By  the  opening  paragraph  of  its  Instructions 
of  June  15th,  1781,  Congress  accepted  mediation 
at  the  hands  of  Their  Imperial  Majesties;  by  the 
second,  it  made  independence  "by  peace  or  truce" 
and  the  maintenance  of  the  alliance  with  France 
sine  qua  non  conditions  of  a  treaty ;  by  the  third 
and  fourth,  it  indicated  its  confidence  in  His  Most 
Christian  Majesty  and  his  ministers  in  the  follow- 
ing terms: 

As  to  disputed  boundaries  and  other  particulars  we 
refer  you  to  the  instructions  formerly  given  to  Mr. 
Adams,  dated  August  14,  1779,  and  October  18,  1780, 
from  which  you  will  easily  perceive  the  desires  and  expec- 
tations of  Congress ;  but  we  think  it  unsafe  at  this  dis- 
tance to  tie  you  up  by  absolute  and  peremptory 
directions  upon  any  other  subject  than  the  two  essential 
articles  above  mentioned.  You  are  therefore  at  liberty 
to  securing  the  interests  of  the  United  States  in  such 
manner  as  circumstances  may  direct  and  as  the  state  of 
the  belligerent  and  disposition  of  the  mediating  powers 
may  require. 

For  these  purposes  you  are  to  make  the  most  candid 
and  confidential  communications  upon  all  subjects  to  the 
ministers  of  our  generous  ally,  the  king  of  France;  to 
undertake  nothing  in  the  negotiations  for  peace  or  truce 
without  their  knowledge  and  concurrence,  and  ultimately 
to  govern  yourselves  by  their  advice  and  opinion,  en- 
deavoring in  your  whole  conduct  to  make  them  sensible 
how  much  we  rely  on  His  Majesty's  influence  for  effec- 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  301 

tual  support  in  everything  that  may  be  necessary  to  the 
present  security  or  future  prosperity  of  the  United 
States  of  America.21 

Little  wonder  that  the  critics  of  the  instructions 
declared  that  "never  before  had  one  state  put 
itself  at  the  mercy  of  another  so  completely  and 
imprudently"  !22  Little  wonder  that  La  Luzerne 
boasted  that  "the  negotiation  was  placed  actually 
in  the  hands  of  the  king  save  on  the  question  of 
independence  and  the  treaties"  !23  Let  us  see  what 
were  the  considerations  that  moved  Congress  to 
make  so  extraordinary  a  concession. 

The  instructions  were  asked  for,  as  we  have 
just  seen,  as  a  means  of  curbing  John  Adams. 
But  no  sooner  were  they  voted  than  Adams  was 
superseded  by  a  commission  consisting  of  him- 
self, Jay,  Franklin,  Jefferson,  and  the  elder 
Laurens.24  Delegates  who  had  opposed  La  Lu- 

21 76.,  651-2.     For  the  complete  proceedings,  see  ib.,  605-50. 

22  See  La  Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  June  23,  1781,  Doniol,  IV. 
623-4.  Other  objections  were,  "that  when  the  people  became  in- 
formed of  the  circumstances,  the  malicious  would  not  fail  to  say 
that  Congress  had  sold  out  to  France;  that  the  plenipotentiaries 
would  fill  a  sorry  role  at  the  conferences;  that  five  important 
persons  were  being  sent  abroad  to  be  the  passive  witnesses  of  our 
[France's]  conduct;  that  we  [the  French]  had  very  confused,  even 
false,  ideas  touching  the  fisheries,  the  boundaries,  the  confisca- 
tions, etc.";  that  the  instructions  were  an  affront  to  the  dignity  of 
the  thirteen  states,  had  been  adopted  with  precipitation,  and  had 
finally  been  rendered  useless  by  the  action  of  Congress  in  sup- 
planting Adams  with  a  commission,  ib. 

33  Same  to  same,  June  11,  ib.,  604. 

*  The  "ultimately  to  govern"  clause  was  adopted  by  Congress 
on  June  11,  Journals,  XX.  626.  Immediately  thereafter  a  motion 


302  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

zerne's  demands  in  the  first  instance  now  renewed 
their  attack,  insisting  that  in  addition  to  being 

that  had  been  previously  defeated,  was  reconsidered  and  carried 
to  join  two  persons  to  Mr.  Adams  in  negotiating  the  peace,  ib., 
628.  Jay  was  elected  on  June  13,  ib.,  638.  Franklin,  Laurens,  and 
Jefferson  were  added  to  the  commission  on  June  14,  ib.,  648.  The 
reason  for  a  commission  of  five  is  suggested  by  Witherspoon  thus: 
"They  added  more  members  to  Mr.  Adams  and  those  from  differ- 
ent parts  of  the  continent.  This  removed  every  suspicion  or  fear 
that  the  interests  of  one  part  would  be  sacrificed  to  secure  that  of 
another,"  Thomson  Papers,  100  (Debate  of  Aug.  8,  1782).  Madi- 
son explains  why  Franklin  and  Jay  alone  were  unsatisfactory 
thus:  "The  former  being  interested  as  one  of  the  land  companies 
in  territorial  claims,  which  had  less  chance  of  being  made  good  in 
any  other  way  than  by  a  repossession  of  the  vacant  country  by  the 
British  crown;  the  latter  belonging  to  a  state  interested  in  such 
arrangements  as  would  deprive  the  United  States  of  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  Mississippi  and  turn  the  western  trade  through  New 
York;  and  neither  of  them  being  connected  with  the  Southern 
States."  Writings  of  James  Madison,  I.  299  (Debate  of  Dec.  30, 
1782).  La  Luzerne  also  thought  that  Franklin  might  be  influ- 
enced through  his  interest  in  lands  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ohio 
to  oppose  Virginia's  claim  in  favor  of  Great  Britain,  and  so  ad- 
vised Vergennes,  Report  of  June  30,  1781,  Doniol,  IV.  622.  The 
events  of  the  negotiations  of  1782  show  that  distrust  of  either 
Jay  or  Franklin  was  entirely  misplaced.  Neither  Laurens  nor 
Jefferson  participated  in  the  peace  negotiations.  The  former, 
while  on  the  way  to  fulfil  a  mission  to  Holland,  in  Sept.,  1780,  was 
captured  by  the  British  and  later  lodged  in  the  Tower  of  London 
under  a  commitment  for  treason.  He  was  still  in  the  Tower  when 
he  was  appointed  peace  commissioner,  but  was  released  Dec.  31, 
1781,  on  the  expectation  that  Cornwallis  would  be  exchanged  for 
him.  However,  he  lingered  on  in  England  for  another  year.  His 
conduct  was  made  the  subject  of  much  contemporary  criticism, 
which  his  biographer  succeeds  in  answering,  at  least  in  part.  D.  D. 
Wallace,  Life  of  Henry  Laurens  (N.  Y.,  1915),  354-419.  Jef- 
ferson, who  was  governor  of  Virginia  at  the  time,  declined  a 
place  on  the  commission. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  303 

mischievous  the  resolutions  were  also  superflu- 
ous.25 The  attack  failed,  however,  even  to  induce 
a  reconsideration  of  the  question;26  and  if  the 
testimony  of  Madison  is  to  be  relied  upon,  the 
instructions  were  finally  adopted  in  the  form 
given  above  without  dissent.27 

La  Luzerne  credited  what — and  not  without 
justification — he  regarded  as  a  triumph  for  him- 
self no  less  than  for  France,  largely  to  personal 
factors.  Early  in  May,  he  tells  us,  he  had 
"opened  his  purse"  to  General  Sullivan  "the  hero 
of  Newport,"  a  coup  which  had  broken  the  back- 
bone of  the  so-called  "New  England  League"  and 
secured  New  Hampshire's  vote  for  the  instruc- 
tions from  the  outset.28  Also,  as  it  happened,  the 
"landless"  state  party,  which  was  comparatively 
indifferent  even  when  not  hostile  to  American 
pretensions  to  a  boundary  at  the  Mississippi,  had 

"See  note  22,  above. 

"Journals,  XX.  650. 

"Thomson  Papers,  65  (Debate  of  July  24,  1782).  In  meeting 
the  attacks  of  members  on  the  instructions,  La  Luzerne  took  the 
position  that,  "if  we  [the  French]  consulted  our  own  interests 
rather  than  those  of  our  allies,  we  ought  to  desire  that  the  Ameri- 
can plenipotentiaries  had  all  the  powers  that  certain  people  wished 
to  reserve  to  them."  Also,  he  professed  to  be  very  reluctant  to 
accept  for  France  a  trust  that  did  not  represent  the  deliberate 
will  of  Congress.  "L'effet  de  ce  langage,  Monseigneur,"  he  con- 
tinues, "a  £t6  de  faire  reconsid6rer  ces  resolutions  et  de  les  con- 
firmer,  ainsi  que  je  l'espe>ois  permament.  Le  president  du  Con- 
gres  m'a  dit  qu'elles  £toient  expedites  par  VAnna."  Doniol,  IV. 
624-5. 

KIb.,  IV.  608  and  fn. 


304  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

at  this  moment  its  two  most  influential  spokes- 
men in  Congress,  Witherspoon  of  New  Jersey 
and  Jenifer  of  Maryland.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Adams  and  Lee  families,  champions  respec- 
tively of  the  New  England  fishing  interest  and 
the  Western  land  interest,  both  lacked  their  usual 
member.  Certainly,  La  Luzerne  himself  could 
hardly  have  chosen  a  Congress  more  to  his  liking. 

But  while  the  personal  factor  may  account  for 
the  votes  cast  by  New  Hampshire,  Maryland,  and 
New  Jersey  for  the  Instructions  of  June  15th  it 
does  not  account  for  the  votes  of  Pennsylvania, 
Virginia,  the  Carolinas,  and  Georgia.  How,  then, 
we  may  ask,  did  the  men  from  these  states,  men 
like  Madison  and  Jones  of  Virginia,  for  instance, 
reconcile  such  a  remarkable  abdication  of  power 
by  Congress  to  a  foreign,  albeit  allied,  govern- 
ment with  sound  public  policy? 

La  Luzerne' s  finesse  in  the  matter  of  the 
status  quo  has  just  been  mentioned.  Nor  was  this, 
by  any  means,  an  isolated  circumstance.  To  the 
same  general  category  belongs  also  the  fact  that 
Congress,  being  ignorant  of  the  terms  on  which 
Spain  had  entered  the  war,  was  in  no  position  to 
previse  the  complicated  tangle  of  obligations  in 
which  France  would  find  herself  if  the  war  turned 
out  to  be  only  partially  successful.29  There  was, 

*In  this  connection  the  following  passage  from  a  speech  made 
by  Arthur  Lee  in  the  course  of  the  Congressional  debate  of  Aug. 
8,  1782,  in  favor  of  reconsidering  the  Instructions  of  June  15,  is 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  305 

in  other  words,  so  far  as  Congress  knew,  no  com- 
pelling reason  why  France  should  not  be  trusted : 
on  the  contrary,  there  were  excellent  reasons  why 
she  should  be.  Months  before  this  her  envoy  had 
ceased  championing  Spanish  interests  where  these 
conflicted  with  American.  More  recently,  aban- 
doning the  no  longer  applicable  views  of  his  court 
as  to  the  establishment  of  a  balance  of  power  in 
America,  he  had  given  his  assent  to  an  invasion 
of  Canada  and  had  followed  this  up  by  urging 

instructive:  "It  is  not  sufficient  that  the  independence  of  these 
states  is  secured.  But  he  doubts  whether  even  that  is  secured 
by  the  instructions.  He  is  afraid  of  the  accompaniment.  That 
we  shall  be  so  circumscribed  in  our  boundaries  that  our  indepen- 
dence will  be  a  nugatory  independence.  France  in  making  a 
treaty  will  be  governed  by  her  own  interest  and  from  her  long 
and  close  connection  with  Spain  and  prefer  it  to  ours.  Is  it  wise, 
is  it  proper  to  give  a  nation  the  absolute  disposal  of  our  affairs 
that  is  under  the  influence  of  two  interests  which  she  is  bound  to 
consult  in  preference  to  that  of  these  states?  This  unlimited  con- 
fidence will  render  us  despicable  in  the  eyes  of  France  and  less 
attentive  to  our  rights.  We  have  been  informed  by  a  minister  of 
France  that  Spain  has  large  claims  on  the  lands  beyond  the 
Mountains.  Her  conduct  shews  that  she  means  to  support  her 
claim  to  that  country.  She  wishes  to  confine  us  to  the  lands  lying 
below  the  heads  of  the  waters  falling  into  the  Atlantic.  We  are 
told  that  she  thinks  she  has  a  right  to  possess  herself  of  all  to 
the  westward.  And  shall  we  submit  it  to  France,  her  old  friend 
and  ally,  whether  her  claims  shall  be  confirmed,  and  we  be  ex- 
cluded from  the  possession  of  that  country?"  Thomson  Papers, 
95-6.  Lee  was  the  strongest  critic  of  the  Instructions  of  June  15. 
Yet  it  will  be  noted  that  even  he  does  not  suspect  that  France  is 
under  any  special  obligations  to  Spain  in  connection  with  the 
then  existing  war.  Also,  it  will  be  noted  that  he  does  not  charge 
France  with  having  championed  Spain's  claims  to  the  western 
country. 


306  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

renewed  efforts  in  the  Northwest.30  Rising  above 
all  other  considerations,  however,  were  these  two : 
the  state  of  the  war  and  the  source  from  which 
peace  offered  itself.  The  generality  of  Ameri- 
cans had  long  felt  in  June,  1781,  that  the  fate  of 
the  United  States  rested  almost  entirely  with 
France,  whence  it  followed  that  Congress  could 
not  do  better  than  to  vest  France  outright  with 
the  trusteeship  of  American  interests.  The  devel- 
opment at  this  moment  of  a  prospect  of  peace 
through  the  mediation  of  powers  that  had  never 
yet  recognized  American  independence  naturally 
confirmed  this  logic,  and  the  more  so  since  it  was 
not  known  what  degree  of  pressure  these  powers 
were  prepared  to  bring  in  order  to  end  the  war.31 

80  Phillips,  The  West  in  the  Diplomacy  of  the  American  Revolu- 
tion, 190-1  and  194,  and  notes.  It  was  not  La  Luzerne's  idea  that 
the  United  States  should  retain  the  Western  country  necessarily 
(vd.  Doniol,  IV.  622),  but  "he  recognized  that  the  possession  of 
the  Great  Lakes  would  place  the  Americans  in  a  much  better  posi- 
tion to  negotiate  with  Great  Britain,"  Phillips,  loc.  cit. 

31  "In  opposing  the  motion  [for  reconsideration  of  the  Instruc- 
tions of  June  15],  many  considerations  were  suggested,  and  the 
original  expediency  of  submitting  the  commission  for  peace  to  the 
counsels  of  France  descanted  upon.  The  reasons  assigned  for  this 
expediency  were,  that  at  that  juncture  when  the  measure  took 
place  the  American  affairs  were  in  the  most  deplorable  situa- 
tion, the  Southern  states  being  overrun  and  exhausted  by  the 
enemy  .  .  .;  that  the  old  paper  currency  had  failed  ....  In  the 
midst  of  these  distresses,  the  mediation  of  the  two  Imperial 
Courts  was  announced.  The  general  idea  was  that  the  two  most 
respectable  powers  of  Europe  would  not  interpose  without  a  ser- 
ious desire  of  peace  and  without  the  energy  requisite  to  effect  it. 
The  hope  of  peace  was,  therefore,  mingled  with  an  apprehension 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  307 

Upon  the  Instructions  of  June  15th  there  is 
impressed  a  twofold  character.  On  the  one 
hand,  they  constitute  a  real  tribute  to  the  essen- 
tial magnanimity  of  the  French  design  in  inter- 
vening in  the  Revolution,  to  that  quality  of  large- 
ness about  Vergennes'  project  that  forbade 
an  abandonment  of  American  independence  save 
in  the  face  of  conditions  that  meant  recognizable 
defeat  for  France  herself.  On  the  other  hand, 
this  tribute  was  no  merely  sentimental  one :  it  was 
conditioned  by  the  deliberate  calculation  that,  in 
view  of  the  actual  status  of  the  belligerent  parties 
in  America  and  of  the  auspices  under  which 
peace  was  to  be  negotiated — a  peace  which  Amer- 
ica needed  no  less  than  France, — the  United 
States  could  not  act  more  prudently  than  to  be- 
stow the  most  ungrudging  and  unstinted  confi- 
dence upon  their  ally.32 

It  thus  becomes  pertinent  to  inquire  further, 

that  considerable  concessions  might  be  exacted  from  America  by 
the  mediators  as  a  compensation  for  the  essential  one  which  Great 
Britain  was  to  submit  to.  Congress,  on  a  trial,  found  it  impossi- 
ble, from  the  diversity  of  opinions  and  interests,  to  define  any 
other  claims  than  those  of  independence  and  the  alliance.  A  dis- 
cretionary power,  therefore,  was  to  be  delegated  with  regard  to  all 
other  claims."  Debate  of  Dec.  30,  1782,  Writings  of  James  Madi- 
son, I.  298-9.  Madison,  however,  rather  exaggerates  the  possi- 
bility of  a  coercive  intention  on  the  part  of  the  mediators.  Cf. 
La  Luzerne's  conference  with  the  committee  of  Congress,  of  May 
28,  1781,  Journals,  XX.  562-9.  See  also  Thomson  Papers,  p.  65. 
32  "At  worst,"  the  apologists  of  the  instructions  urged,  they 
"could  only  be  considered  as  a  sacrifice  of  our  pride  to  our  in- 
terest," Writings  of  Madison,  I.  300. 


308  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

what — British  recognition  of  independence  aside 
— were  the  expectations  that  underlay  these  in- 
structions ?    The  instructions  themselves  referred 
the  American  commissioners  back  to  the  instruc- 
tions of  August  14th,  1779,  but  this  reference 
leaves  us  still  in  the  dark  as  to  the  degree  of  con- 
fidence felt  by  Congress  that  the  objectives  so 
defined  would  be  achieved.     A  much  more  in- 
forming document  is  the  report  of  La  Luzerne  of 
June  13th,  1781,  which,  on  the  basis  of  a  careful 
canvass  of  all  varieties  of  opinion  in  Congress  at 
this  date,  arrived  at  the  following  conclusions: 
'that  if  the  Ohio  formed  their  boundary  the  Thir- 
teen States  would  not  complain;  that,  indeed, 
they  would  believe  themselves  under  obligations 
to  the  king  for  all  that  they  obtained  more  than 
this;  that  they  would  not  reject  the  peace  if  cir- 
cumstances necessitated  some  greater  concessions ; 
that  the  peace  would  be  less  agreeable  in  pro- 
portion as  this  line  were  hewn  away  from';  'that 
if  circumstances  forced  them  to  adopt  as  boun- 
daries the  mountains  which  divide  the  rivers  that 
flow  into  the  Atlantic  from  those  that  flow  to  the 
west,  the  peace  would  be  accepted  and  ratified, 
but  would  meet  with  general  criticism  and  would 
cool  the  ardor  of  French  partisans,  and  it  would 
be  difficult  to  persuade  the  Americans  that  their 
interests  had  not  been  sacrificed';  that  a  treaty 
whereby  any  State  were  cut  off  from  the  Con- 
federation could  not  be  ratified;  that  they  would 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  309 

prefer  "to  continue  the  war,  however  difficult  it 
might  be,  to  allowing  England  a  single  post  in 
Georgia  or  in  any  other  part  of  the  Thirteen 
States";  that  if  it  were  necessary  to  depart  from 
the  ultimatum  of  1779,  it  was  to  be  desired  that 
the  concession  should  be  made,  "not  in  favor  of 
the  English,  but  that  the  right  of  the  Indians 
should  be  reserved  to  the  intervening  lands."53 
The  recorded  votes  on  various  amendments  of- 
fered to  the  instructions  while  they  were  under 
discussion  and  on  the  secret  instructions  which 
it  was  at  first  proposed  should  accompany  them 
confirm  these  conclusions  to  a  striking  degree.34 

But  as  even-  one  knows,  the  Instructions  of 
June  15th  had  no  influence  on  the  negotiations 
leading  to  the  Peace  of  1783.  Directly  this  was 
due  to  the  initiative  of  John  Jay,  whose  course 

"DonioJ,  IV.  617-31. 

"See  especially  J&mmaLt.  XX.  60&-15.  The  two  articles  of  secret 
instructions  adopted  on  June  7,  ordered  the  commissioners  to 
use  their  "utmost  endeavors  to  secure  the  limits  fixed  exactly 
according  to  the  description  in  roar  [their]  former  instructions,** 
and  if  they  failed  in  that,  to  make  peace  -without  fixing  northern 
and  western  limits,**  16.,  60S.  The  day  following,  however,  Virginia 
having  failed  to  secure  an  amendment  to  the  instructions  asked 
for  by  the  committee  that  would  have  prevented  any  cession  south 
of  the  Ohio,  the  secret  articles  were  reconsidered  and  lost,  *&.,  615, 
La  Luseme,  however,  was  somewhat  suspicious  test  some  such  in- 
structions had  been  forwarded.  *J"ai  soupconne  qu'il  pouvoit  y 
avoir  des  instructions  qulls  [the  plenipotentiaries]  auroient  ordre 
de  nous  cacher,  mais  rien  n*a  encore  oonfirme  ce  soupcon,  et  la 
confiance  me  paroit  illimitee,"  La  Luxerne  to  Vergennes,  June  IS, 
17S1.  Dooiol,  IV.  619. 


310  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

will  be  considered  in  the  following  chapter  as 
furnishing  the  best  pragmatic  test  of  the  policy 
of  the  Foreign  Office  at  that  juncture.  Back  of 
Jay's  decision,  however,  and  making  it  possible 
was  the  Yorktown  campaign,  to  which,  accord- 
ingly, a  few  words  must  be  devoted. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  Vergennes  had  set  the 
approach  of  winter  as  the  time  for  the  Count  de 
Grasse's  visit  to  American  waters.  The  admiral 
himself,  however,  evidently  held  quite  different 
views  on  this  matter,  for  in  a  letter  to  Rocham- 
beau  dated  March  29th,  one  week  after  he  had 
left  Brest,  he  announced  that  he  would  reach 
Santo  Domingo  by  the  end  of  June,  and  con- 
tinued thus : 

It  will  be  toward  the  15th  of  July  at  the  earliest  that 
I  shall  be  able  to  reach  the  coast  of  North  America. 
But  it  is  necessary,  in  view  of  the  short  time  I  shall  have 
to  remain  there — for  the  season  will  force  me  to  leave 
in  any  event — that  every  preparation  likely  to  aid  in 
the  success  of  your  projects  shall  be  completed,  so  that 
nothing  may  delay  us  an  instant  in  beginning  our 
operations.35 

This  letter  reached  Rochambeau  at  Providence 
on  June  10th.  Already  this  gallant  friend  of 
America,  who  had  been  deeply  disappointed  by 
the  king's  rejection  of  the  plan  of  the  Hartford 
Conference,  had  conceived  the  idea  that  the 
Count  de  Grasse  might  yet  "save  the  country." 

35  Tower,  op.  tit.,  II.  398. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  311 

Thus  writing  the  admiral  from  Newport  on  May 
28th  he  had  urged  "the  gravity  of  the  crisis  in 
America,  especially  the  Southern  states,  at  this 
moment,"  and  that,  "without  the  naval  superior- 
ity which  he  [the  Count  de  Grasse]  can  bring," 
"none  of  the  means  within  our  control  can  be 
made  available."36  Then  in  a  postscript,  added 
three  days  later,  he  had  further  proposed  that 
Grasse  bring  with  him  from  the  West  Indies  a 
corps  of  five  or  six  thousand  men  and  twelve  hun- 
dred thousand  livres  in  specie,  since  this  could  be 
obtained  at  par  in  the  Antilles,  while  in  the 
United  States  it  was  at  a  premium  of  from 
twenty-five  to  thirty  per  cent.37  Now,  on  June 
llth,  he  wrote  Grasse  a  second  time,  including 
duplicates  of  the  earlier  letter  and  postscript  and 
repeating  their  recommendations  with  renewed 
urgency.38 

Grasse's  reply,  which  was  dated  at  Cape  Santo 
Domingo  on  the  28th  of  July,  reached  Newport 
on  August  12th,  and  was  favorable  beyond  rea- 
sonable expectation.  The  admiral  announced 
that  he  would  sail  for  Chesapeake  Bay  on  Au- 


390. 

*Ib.,  391. 

38  76.,  39&-400.  Note  also  these  expressions  from  a  letter  of  June 
16:  "General  Washington  has  but  a  handful  of  men  ....  This 
country  has  been  driven  to  bay,  and  all  its  resources  are  giving  out 
at  once.  The  Continental  money  has  been  annihilated,"  ib.,  397. 
These  letters  are  published  in  full  in  Donial's  fifth  volume  and 
the  originals  are  now  in  the  Library  of  Congress. 


312  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

gust  13th,  as,  he  continued,  this  is  "the  point  which 
appears  to  me  to  have  been  indicated  by  you,  .  .  . 
Messrs.  Washington,  La  Luzerne,  and  Barras,  as 
the  one  from  which  the  advantage  which  you  pro- 
pose may  be  most  certainly  attained."  He  would 
bring  with  him,  he  proceeded,  three  thousand 
men,  from  twenty-five  to  twenty-nine  war- vessels, 
a  quantity  of  siege  artillery,  and  the  sum  of 
1,200,000  livres  in  specie.  The  one  disappointing 
feature  of  the  reply  was  the  time  limit  it  set  for 
the  projected  operations.  That  he  was  able  to 
come  at  all  to  the  coast  of  North  America,  Grasse 
indicated,  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Spanish 
commander,  Admiral  de  Solano,  was  not  yet 
ready  for  active  operations;  but  this  condition 
would  cease  with  the  approach  of  the  winter 
months,  for  which  reason  the  French  fleet  and  the 
troops  it  brought  with  it  would  have  to  leave  the 
continent  by  October  15th. 

As  the  whole  expedition  [the  admiral  wrote]  has  been 
undertaken  at  your  request  and  without  consulting  the 
ministers  of  France  or  of  Spain,  although  I  have  felt 
myself  authorized  to  assume  certain  responsibilities  in 
the  interest  of  the  common  cause,  I  should  not  venture 
to  change  the  entire  arrangement  of  their  projects  by 
transferring  so  important  a  body  of  troops.  You  will 
perfectly  understand,  my  dear  Count,  how  necessary 
it  will  be  to  make  the  best  use  of  this  precious  time.39 

Thus  the  Yorktown  campaign  was  due  to  the 
fortunate — not  to  say,  fortuitous — coincidence  of 

"Tower,  op.  cit.,  II.  401-4. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

three  circumstances:  Rochambeau's  friendly 
solicitude  for  the  American  cause,  Grasse's  patri- 
otic willingness  to  stretch  a  point  in  his  instruc- 
tions for  the  general  good,  Solano's  unreadiness, 
so  characteristically  Spanish,  for  the  enterprise  for 
which  Grasse's  expedition  had  been  planned.  In 
other  words,  Cornwallis'  surrender  owed  little  or 
nothing  to  the  intention  of  the  French  government 
itself.  And  by  the  same  token,  the  results  of  the 
campaign  of  1781  were  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  French  Foreign  Office,  somewhat  disappoint- 
ing. It  had  been  hoped  to  hasten  peace  by  striking 
a  decisive  blow  the  immediate  fruits  of  which  were 
to  go  to  Spain  and  furnish  her  sufficient  induce- 
ment to  quit  the  war.  The  decisive  blow  had  been 
struck,  true  enough,  but  its  direct  beneficiary  was 
America.  The  result — which  was  confirmed  by 
Grasse's  later  defeat  in  the  West  Indies — was 
twofold :  With  Gibraltar  and  Jamaica  both  still 
safely  British  a  new  campaign  had  to  be  planned 
for  the  behoof  of  Spain.  With  the  British  forces 
abandoning  all  their  inland  conquests  in  the 
South,  the  application  of  the  status  quo  to  the 
United  States  became  impossible.40 

40  See  in  this  connection  the  secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs'  com- 
munication to  Congress  on  November  23,  1781,  of  the  result  of  a 
recent  conference  with  La  Luzerne  based  on  a  despatch  from 
Vergennes  dated  September  7.  As  presented  by  the  envoy, 
this  despatch  emphasizes  France's  championship  of  American  in- 
terests, her  refusal  to  accede  to  the  terms  of  the  mediation  of 
the  imperial  courts  until  they  should  agree  to  acknowledge  the 


314  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Nor  may  the  reaction  of  patriotic  American 
sentiment  to  the  event  at  Yorktown  be  altogether 
ignored.  Spontaneous  as  were  popular  jubi- 
lation at  the  triumph  of  the  allied  forces  and 
gratitude  to  the  French  for  their  assistance,  they 
did  not  blind  Americans  at  all  to  the  strength- 
ened diplomatic  position  of  the  United  States. 
Within  a  little  over  a  week  from  Cornwallis'  sur- 
render the  Massachusetts  legislature  passed  reso- 
lutions ordering  its  delegates  in  Congress  to  press 
for  instructions  to  the  American  peace  commis- 
sioners to  obtain  British  recognition  of  the  right 
of  Americans  to  share  in  the  Newfoundland 
fisheries.41  With  the  introduction  of  these  reso- 
lutions into  Congress  a  fortnight  later  debate 
began  afresh  on  the  merits  of  the  Instructions 
of  June  15th,  to  be  renewed  from  time  to  time 
till  the  very  end  of  the  war.42  All  efforts,  how- 
ever, to  procure  the  outright  repeal  of  these  in- 
structions crumbled  before  the  argument  that 

American  plenipotentiaries  "in  the  manner  most  conformable  to  the 
dignity  of  the  United  States,"  and  her  rejection  of  a  "plan  of 
negotiation  proposed  by  the  mediating  powers"  which  had  "held 
up  the  idea"  of  the  status  quo  for  America,  Journals,  XXI.  1138- 
9.  Cf.  Doniol,  V.  39-43.  Doubtless,  La  Luzerne's  report  of 
June  13  had  demonstrated  to  Vergennes  the  unfeasibility  of  ac- 
cepting the  status  quo  for  the  United  States  except  as  a  very 
desperate  measure. 

"Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,  XXI.   1122   fn. 

"See  ib.,  XXII.  44-5,  429,  458-60,  XXIII.  870-5;  Doniol,  IV.  625- 
6  and  696-701;  Thomson  Papers,  63-5  and  93-108;  and  Writings  of 
James  Madison,  I.  226  and  294-301. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  315 

such  action,  by  the  offense  it  would  cause  France, 
would  do  more  harm  than  good,  that  while  the 
instructions  were  doubtless  a  sacrifice  of  pride, 
they  were  a  sacrifice  of  pride  to  more  substantial 
interests.43  Furthermore,  Congress  had  before 
it  the  explicit  assurance  of  Vergennes,  who  was 
now  chief -minister,  that  the  king  "would  use  his 
influence  and  credit  for  the  advantage  of  his  allies 
whenever  a  negotiation  should  render  their  inter- 
ests a  subject  of  discussion."44 

This  assurance  suggested  to  Congress  a  way 
out  of  its  difficulty.  By  the  resolutions  of  Jan- 
uary 22nd,  1782,  the  Instructions  of  June  15th 
were  still  left  standing,  but  the  American  commis- 
sioners were  ordered  to  contend  "with  an  earnest- 
ness becoming  the  importance  of  an  object  on 
which  a  great  part  of  the  United  States  abso- 
lutely depend"  both  for  commerce  and  subsis- 
tence, "for  an  explicit  acknowledgment  of  the 
common  right  of  these  United  States  to  take  fish 
in  the  North  American  seas  and  in  particular  on 
the  banks  of  Newfoundland,"  and  "with  equal 
earnestness,"  "for  the  boundaries  of  the  United 
States  as  described  in  the  instructions"  of  Aug- 
ust 14th,  1779,  and  further,  "to  represent  to  His 

43  Above  references.     See  also  notes  22,  24,  27,  29,  31,  and  32, 
above. 

44  Journals,  XX.  1138.    Livingston  makes  the  quite  positive  state- 
ment that  this  assurance  was  what  decided  Congress  to  continue 
the  Instructions  of  June  15  in  effect  after  Yorktown,  Livingston 
to  Jay,  Jan.  4,  1783,  Wharton,  VI.  178-9  fn. 


316  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Most  Christian  Majesty"  "the  most  sanguine 
expectations"  of  Congress  that  "His  Majesty's 
friendship  and  influence  will  obtain  for  his  faith- 
ful allies"  both  these  objects.45 

In  other  words,  Congress  solved  the  dilemma 
created  by  Yorktown — the  dilemma,  to  wit,  of 
American  expectations  on  the  one  hand  and 
French  sensibilities  on  the  other — by  shifting  the 
responsibility  to  the  shoulders  of  the  American 
commissioners.  Ten  weeks  later  Grasse's  fleet 
encountered  Rodney's  in  the  Bahama  Channel 
and  was  utterly  defeated,  Grasse  himself  being 
taken  prisoner.  Yet, — and  it  is  a  striking  com- 
ment on  the  complex  diplomatic  situation  in 
which  the  United  States  and  France  were  mutu- 
ally involved — the  former  derived  distinct  ad- 

45  Ib.,  XXII.  44-5.  Livingston  communicated  the  resolutions  to 
La  Luzerne,  Jan.  24,  Wharton  V.  126-7.  The  resolutions  were 
preceded  by  Livingston's  elaborate  letter  to  Franklin  of  Jan.  7, 
1782,  in  support  of  the  claims  of  the  United  States  to  a  boundary 
at  the  Mississippi,  to  the  navigation  of  that  river,  and  to  a  share 
in  the  Newfoundland  fisheries,  Wharton,  V.  87-94.  They  were 
followed  by  the  resolution  of  Apr.  30,  in  which  Congress  expressed 
approval  of  Jay's  course  as  detailed  in  his  report  of  the  preceding 
Oct.  3  (see  next  chapter) ;  and  by  a  second  resolution,  adopted 
Aug.  6,  1782,  ordering  him  to  decline  any  propositions  from  Spain 
before  transmitting  them  to  Congress,  unless  his  accession  thereto 
"was  necessary  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  stipulation  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States  contained  in  the  separate  and  secret  article"  of 
the  treaty  with  France.  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress, 
XXII.  219-20  and  449-51.  Whether  these  resolutions  reached  Jay 
in  time  to  influence  his  conduct  at  the  peace  negotiations,  I  do 
not  know,  but  conceivably  they  did. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  317 

vantage  from  this  defeat  of  their  ally,  perhaps 
indeed,  greater  advantage  than  they  would  have 
from  her  victory.  For  it  was  Rodney's  triumph, 
the  news  of  which  reached  London  on  the  eve- 
ning of  May  18th,  that  encouraged  the  British 
government  in  the  idea  of  attempting  to  separate 
America  from  her  allies  in  the  peace  negotiations 
that  were  just  to  begin,  the  theory  being  that  if 
the  wastage  of  the  American  war  could  be 
brought  to  an  end,  England  could  afford  to  con- 
tinue the  war  on  the  sea  with  the  Bourbon 
powers.46  That  this  assault  upon  their  loyalty 
contributed  materially  to  the  success  with  which 
the  American  envoys  met  in  the  negotiations  is 
altogether  unquestionable.  In  short,  America 
at  this  period  was  the  lucky  banker  at  the  wheel 
of  fortune:  she  ventured  little,  leaving  that  to 
others  but  whoever  won,  she  won. 

46  See  Fitzmaurice's  Life  of  Shelburne,  III.  194-5  and  203.  For 
the  consolatory  memoir  which  Vergennes  presented  the  king  on 
Grasse's  defeat,  see  Doniol,  V.  118-20.  The  moral  he  draws  is  that 
France  must  give  the  lie  to  Lord  North's  statement  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war,  "que  la  France  debute  toujours  avec  sup£riorite, 
mais  qu'elle  se  relache  dans  ses  efforts,  autant  que  1'Angleterre 
multiplie  et  acroit  les  siens." 


CHAPTER  XIV 

JAY'S  MISSION  TO  SPAIN 

The  story  of  Jay's  part  in  the  negotiations  of 
1782  is  one  that  has  never  ceased  to  interest 
American  students.  In  relating  this  well-known 
episode,  I  have  not  sought  to  avoid  the  problems 
of  casuistry  that,  thanks  to  the  opposed  labors  of 
the  pious  and  the  critical  it  has  come  to  involve. 
At  the  same  time,  I  have  endeavored  to  organize 
my  treatment  of  these  problems  in  conformity 
with  my  main  theme,  wherefore  I  treat  Jay's 
action  primarily  as  a  foil  to  French  policy  touch- 
ing the  negotiations.  But  as  French  policy  at 
this  point  leaned  heavily  on  Spanish  policy,  and 
as  Jay  imbibed  at  Madrid  the  point  of  view 
from  which  his  course  at  the  negotiations  took  its 
departure,  I  feel  that  a  brief  review  of  his  mis- 
sion to  the  latter  country  will  not  be  inap- 
posite.1 

1  The  following  account  of  Jay's  Spanish  mission  is  drawn  from 
his  long  reports  to  the  President  of  Congress,  of  May  26  and  Nov. 
6,  1780,  Oct.  3,  1781,  and  Apr.  28,  1782,  which  are  to  be  found  in 
Wharton,  III.  707-34,  IV.  112-50  and  738-65,  and  V.  336-77.  The 
constituent  documents  of  these  reports  will  also  be  found  in  the 
Correspondence  and  Public  Papers  of  John  Jay  (H.  P.  Johnston, 
ed.,  New  York,  1890,  4  vols.),  vols.  I  and  II,  passim. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  319 

Jay  set  out  for  his  post  October  20th,  1779,  and 
arrived  at  Cadiz  January  22nd,  1780.  Never  re- 
ceived officially  in  the  entire  course  of  thirty 
month's  sojourn  at  the  court  of  His  Catholic  Ma- 
jesty, snubbed  personally  by  nobility  and  officials, 
often  without  funds  from  the  failure  of  his  salary 
to  reach  him,  put  constantly  to  great  expense  in 
following  the  migratory  court  from  pillar  to  post, 
embarrassed  by  the  remarkable  course  of  Con- 
gress in  drawing  on  him  when  he  had  not  a  sou  in 
prospect,  put  off  again  and  again  with  the  most 
transparent  excuses,  his  correspondence  sub- 
jected to  official  espionage  and  molestation — he 
underwent,  without  doubt,  one  of  the  most  trying 
experiences  that  has  ever  fallen  to  the  lot  of  an 
envoy  clothed  with  the  dignity  of  his  govern- 
ment's commission. 

Yet  at  the  outset,  Jay's  mission  was  not  with- 
out signs  of  promise.  He  was  received  by  Flor- 
ida Blanca  with  great  promptitude  and  given 
strong  hopes  of  considerable  financial  aid  before 
the  end  of  the  year,  as  well  as  of  a  treaty  which, 
at  no  remote  date,  would  establish  the  long  sought 
via  media  between  the  legitimate  interests  of  both 
Spain  and  America  respecting  the  Mississippi 
question.2  But  early  in  July,  1780,  came  the 
news  of  the  loss  of  Charleston.  "The  effect  of 
it,"  wrote  Jay,  "was  as  visible  the  next  day  as 
that  of  a  hard  night's  frost  on  young  leaves. 

2  Wharton,  III.  709-11,  732-5. 
8  Op.  tit.,  IV.  123. 


"3 


320  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Meantime,  Congress  was  constantly  drawing  on 
its  envoy,  and  bills  of  exchange  were  constantly 
accumulating  against  him  in  the  hands  of  the 
brokers,  with  the  result  that  his  financial  difficul- 
ties were  soon  appalling.4  On  July  5th,  he  had 
a  long  conference  with  the  minister  as  to  ways 
and  means  of  meeting  these  bills,  but,  in  his  own 
expressive  phrase,  "not  a  single  nail  would 
drive."5  Nor  was  he  more  successful  in  his  ef- 
forts at  correspondence.  Four  successive  notes 
remained  unanswered,  and  an  attempt  to  see  the 
minister  proved  equally  unavailing.6  Finally,  on 
September  3rd,  Don  Diego  Gardoqui,  one  of  the 
friendly  house  of  Bilboa  merchants  that  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war  had  been  carrying  on  a  con- 
siderable trade  in  contraband  with  the  United 
States,  presented  himself  to  Jay  with  Florida 
Blanca's  compliments,  and  proceeded  to  propose 
point-blank  that,  in  return  for  financial  assist- 
ance, the  United  States  should  surrender  their 
claims  to  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  Jay 
rejected  the  offer  indignantly  and  was  shortly 
after  informed  that  even  the  limited  credit 
which  His  Majesty  had  thus  far  extended  was, 
for  "reasons  of  state,"  withdrawn.7 

4  76.,  III.  722;  IV.  122  ff. 

8  76.,  125. 

•76.,  127-8. 

T  76.,  133-5.  There  was  much  talk  at  this  time  and  for  some 
months  later  of  sending  Gardoqui  to  America  to  take  the  place 
filled  by  Rendon,  as  Miralles'  successor,  »6.,  741-2,  764.  As  a 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE 

At  this  moment,  fortunately,  "some  glorious 
reports  from  America  arrived,"  and  the  Spanish 
government  reconsidered  its  harsh  decision.  On 
September  15th  Gardoqui  informed  Jay  that  if 
he  could  find  credit  for  that  sum,  His  Majesty 
would  be  answerable  for  as  much  as  one  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  dollars,8  and  eight  days  later 
the  minister  himself  conferred  with  Jay  a  second 
time  on  the  subject  of  a  treaty.  The  conference 
revealed,  however,  that  a  treaty  was  probably 
far  distant.  Actually,  as  Florida  Blanca  inad- 
vertently admitted,  the  Spanish  monarch  was 
determined  not  to  recognize  the  United  States 
before  England  did.9  Primarily  this  was  because 

matter  of  fact  Gardoqui  did  not  arrive  in  the  United  States  till 
May,  1785.  For  the  negotiations  then  undertaken  between  him 
and  Jay,  who  was  now  secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  see  Ban- 
croft, VI.  421-2. 

8Wharton,  IV.  139. 

9  "After  a  variety  of  other  remarks  of  little  importance  he 
made  a  very  interesting  observation,  which  will  help  us  to  ac- 
count for  the  delays  of  the  court,  viz.:  That  all  these  affairs 
could  with  more  facility  be  adjusted  at  a  general  peace  than 
now,  for  that  such  a  particular  and  even  secret  treaty  with  us 
might  then  be  made  as  would  be  very  convenient  to  both.  .  .  . 
Throughout  the  whole  conversation  [May  23,  1781]  the  count 
appeared  much  less  cordial  than  in  the  preceding  one;  he  seemed 
to  want  self-possession,  and  to  that  cause  I  ascribe  his  incautiously 
mentioning  the  general  peace  as  the  most  proper  season  for  com- 
pleting our  political  connections.  I  had,  nevertheless,  no  reason 
to  suspect  that  this  change  in  his  behavior  arose  from  any  cause 
more  important  than  those  variations  in  temper  and  feelings  which 
they  who  are  unaccustomed  to  govern  themselves  often  experience 
from  changes  in  the  weather,  in  their  health,  from  fatigue  of  busi- 
ness, or  other  such  like  accidental  causes."  Ib.,  746. 


322  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

he  feared  the  example  and  effect  of  American 
independence  on  his  own  dominions;  but  con- 
nected with  this  fear  was  Spain's  desire,  which 
Florida  Blanca  constantly  stressed,  to  maintain 
her  monopoly  of  commerce  in  the  Gulf  of  Mex- 
ico. The  Count,  wrote  Jay, 

made  several  observations  tending  to  show  the  impor- 
tance of  this  object  to  Spain  and  its  determination  to 
adhere  to  it,  saying  with  some  degree  of  warmth  that, 
unless  Spain  could  exclude  all  nations  from  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  they  might  as  well  admit  all;  that  the  king 
would  never  relinquish  it;  that  the  minister  regarded  it 
as  the  principal  object  to  be  obtained  by  the  war,  and 
that  obtained,  he  should  be  perfectly  easy  whether  or 
no  Spain  procured  any  other  cession ;  that  he  con- 
sidered it  far  more  important  than  the  acquisition  of 
Gibraltar,  and  that  if  they  did  not  get  it,  it  was  a  matter 
of  indifference  to  him  whether  the  English  possessed 
Mobile  or  not.10 

Late  in  October  Jay  received  word  that  Gates 
had  been  defeated  at  Camden  and  that  the  elder 
Laurens  was  in  the  Tower.  "Our  sky  in  this 
quarter,"  he  wrote,  "is  again  darkened  with 
clouds  not  in  my  power  to  dispel."11  Further- 
more, this  was  the  period  of  the  Spanish  gov- 
ernment's negotiations  with  the  Englishman 
Cumberland,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  menaced  the 
United  States  with  the  status  quo.  Not  until 
March,  1781,  did  Cumberland  leave  Madrid,  that 

w/6.,  145-6. 
11  Ib.,  149. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  323 


is,    several   weeks    after    Spain   had    ostensibly 
agreed  to  a  fresh  campaign.12 

Meantime,  by  the  resolution  of  February  15th, 
Congress  had  instructed  Jay  to  recede  from 
his  previous  instructions  so  far  as  they  insisted 
on  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  below 
the  31st  degree,  "provided  such  cession  shall  be 
unalterably  insisted  on  by  Spain";  and  on  May 
18th  Jay  received  advices  to  this  effect  from  the 
secretary  of  Congress.13  He  greatly  regretted 
the  step,  arguing  that,  inasmuch  as  Spain  was 
herself  now  "at  war  with  Great  Britain  to  gain 
her  own  objects,"  she  would  be  apt  to  "prosecute 
it  full  as  vigorously  as  if  she  fought  for"  ours.14 
Also,  as  certain  papers  that  should  have  accom- 
panied Lovell's  letter  did  not  arrive  and  the  letter 
itself  had  passed  through  the  post-office,  he 
suspected  that  Florida  Blanca  knew  as  much 
about  Congress'  change  of  front  as  he  did;  and  he 

u  "If  they  have  rejected  all  the  overtures  of  Britain,"  wrote  Jay 
in  Nov.,  1780,  "why  is  Mr.  Cumberland  still  here?  And  why  are 
expresses  passing  between  Madrid  and  London  through  Portugal?" 
Ib.,  148.  Jay  records  Cumberland's  departure  in  his  report  of 
Apr.  25,  1781:  "Mr.  Cumberland  is  on  the  road  home.  I  much 
suspect  that  he  was  sent  and  received  from  mutual  views  in  the 
two  courts  of  deceiving  each  other.  Which  of  them  has  been  most 
successful  is  hard  to  determine.  ...  As  to  the  assurances  of  the 
minister  on  this  subject,  they  are  all  of  little  consequence,  be- 
cause on  such  occasions  courts  only  say  what  may  be  convenient, 
and  therefore  may  or  may  not  merit  confidence.  Time  and  cir- 
cumstances will  cast  more  light  on  this  subject."  Ib.,  388. 

13  76.,  738-40. 

"76.,  743. 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

wrote:  "The  moment  they  saw  that  the  cession 
of  this  navigation  was  made  to  depend  upon  their 
persevering  to  insist  upon  it,  it  became  absurd  to 
suppose  that  they  would  cease  to  persevere."15 

Finally  on  July  2,  taking  the  bull  by  the  horns, 
Jay  informed  Florida  Blanca  outright  that  the 
great  obstacle  to  a  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  Spain  had  been  removed  by  the  action 
of  Congress  itself,  and  expressed  the  hope  that 
His  Majesty  would  "now  be  pleased  to  become 
the  ally  of  the  United  States."16  Ten  days  went 
by  and  the  communication  still  remained  un- 
noticed by  the  Spanish  minister.  Jay  then  called 
at  the  Pardo  and  was  informed  that  the  reason 
for  the  seeming  neglect  was  the  press  of  business 
consequent  upon  the  court's  intention  to  remove 
shortly  to  San  Ildefonso.  On  August  4th  Jay 
himself  repaired  to  the  new  capital  and  something 
over  a  month  later  was  able  to  secure  an  inter- 
view with  the  minister,  who  had  filled  up  the  in- 
terval with  alternating  pleas  of  illness  and  busi- 
ness.17 The  conference  was  resultless,  but  a 
second  one  a  fortnight  later  produced  a  request 
on  Florida  Blanca's  part  that  "Mr.  Jay  .  .  . 
would  offer  him  such  a  set  of  propositions  as 
might  become  the  basis  of  future  conferences 
between  him  and  the  person  whom  he  expected 

15  Ib.,  744. 
1-/6V747. 
11  76.,  750-4. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  325 

His  Majesty  would  appoint."18  The  request  was 
complied  with  four  days  later.  By  the  sixth  arti- 
cle of  the  proposed  agreement,  the  United 
States  relinquished  to  His  Catholic  Majesty  "the 
navigation  of  the  river  Mississippi  from  the  31st 
degree  of  north  latitude  .  .  .  down  to  the 
ocean."  Accompanying  the  article,  however,  was 
the  explanation  that  "the  offer  of  this  proposi- 
tion, being  dictated"  by  the  circumstances  of  the 
war,  "must  necessarily  be  limited  by  the  duration 
of  them  and  consequently  that  if  the  acceptance 
of  it  should,  together  with  the  proposed  alliance, 
be  postponed  to  a  general  peace,  the  United 
States  will  cease  to  consider  themselves  bound  by 
any  propositions"  now  made  in  their  behalf.19 

Of  course  the  offer  came  to  nothing,  and  on 
November  21st  we  find  Jay  writing  Franklin  that 
"this  court  continues  to  observe  the  most  pro- 
found silence  respecting  our  propositions."20 
Three  weeks  later  Jay  secured  another  interview 
with  the  minister,  who  informed  him  that  a  cer- 
tain M.  del  Campo  "had  been  appointed  nearly 
three  months  ago  to  treat  and  confer"  with  him, 
but  that  "shortly  after  the  court  removed  from 
San  Ildefonso  that  gentleman's  health  began  to 
decline"  and  that  it  had  only  insufficiently 
checked  its  deplorable  tendency  very  recently. 

18  76.,  758. 

19  Ib.,  760-2. 
MIb.,  V.,  346. 
21  Ib.,  348. 


21 


326  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

However,  Jay  now  began  to  pay  court  to  M.  del 
Campo,  with  whom  he  finally  obtained  an  inter- 
view some  six  weeks  later. 

I  found  M.  del  Campo  [he  writes]  surrounded  by 
suitors.  He  received  me  with  great  and  unusual  civility 
and  carried  me  into  his  private  apartment.  I  told  him 
that,  as  he  was  evidently  very  busy,  I  could  not  think 
of  sitting  down  and  wished  only  to  detain  him  a  few 
moments.  He  said  that  he  was  indeed  much  engaged 
but  that  we  might,  nevertheless,  take  a  cup  of  chocolate 
together.22 

A  few  weeks  later  Franklin  wrote  Jay  from 
Paris  requesting  that  he  "render  himself"  there 
for  the  approaching  peace  negotiations  as  soon  as 
possible.  "You  would,"  said  the  venerable  doc- 
tor, "be  of  infinite  service.  Spain  has  taken  four 
years  to  consider  whether  she  should  treat  with 
us  or  not.  Give  her  forty,  and  let  us  in  the  mean- 
time mind  our  own  business."23  The  middle  of 
June  Jay  left  for  Paris,  expectant  of  renewing 
negotiations  there  with  Aranda.  But  these  ex- 
pectations proved  as  footless  as  preceding  ones 
had  been.  Aranda  refused  to  show  Jay  his  pow- 
ers to  treat — for  the  good  reason  that  he  had 

23  Ib.,  356-7.  For  a  good  summary  of  the  delays  Jay  had  met 
with  in  Spain,  see  La  Fayette  to  Vergennes,  Mar.  20,  1782,  »&., 
266.  For  the  episode  of  the  invitation  that  was  sent  to  Jay  by 
mistake,  to  dine  with  the  Spanish  minister,  and  was  declined  when 
renewed  to  him  in  his  quality  as  "a  private  gentleman  of  dis- 
tinction," see  ib.,  373-7. 

23  Letter  of  Apr.  22,  1782,  ib.,  321. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  327 

none — and  Jay  refused  to  proceed  without  this 
preliminary.24 

Writers  have  implied  that  Jay  went  up  to 
Paris  in  1782  in  a  rather  suspicious  frame  of 
mind,  and  it  is  certain  that  if  he  had  ever  been 
inclined  to  regard  diplomatic  questions  in  a  senti- 
mental light  he  had  been  pretty  well  cured  of  the 
tendency  by  the  time  he  left  Madrid.  "In  poli- 
tics," he  wrote  Franklin  at  the  close  of  this  period, 
"I  depend  upon  nothing  but  facts,  and  therefore 
never  risk  deceiving  myself  or  others  by  a  reli- 
ance on  professions,  which  may  or  may  not  be 
sincere."25  He,  accordingly,  warned  Congress 
of  the  futility  of  attempting  to  form  alliances  "on 
principles  of  equality  in  forma  pauperis"'?* 
that  the  United  States,  to  be  "respectable  any- 
where," must  be  "formidable  at  home"  ;27  that  we 
but  deceived  ourselves  if  we  believed  "that  any  na- 
tion in  the  world  has  or  will  have  a  disinterested 
regard  for  us."28  France,  he  acknowledged  un- 
grudgingly, was  doing  a  vast  deal  for  America 
and  often  in  a  handsome  and  generous  spirit  that 
added  greatly  to  the  value  of  the  favors  she  ren- 
dered; and  he  held,  that,  "so  long  as"  she  was 
faithful  to  us,  we  were  in  honor  bound  to  continue 

24  Jay  to  Livingston,  Nov.  17,  1782,  ib.,  VI.  21-5,  28;  same  to 
same,  Dec.  12,  ib.,  130. 

28  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  II.   63. 
20  Ib.,  20. 

"Wharton,   IV.   147. 
28  76.,  148. 


328  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

in  the  war  for  her  objects  as  well  as  our  own.29 
At  the  same  time,  he  was  under  no  illusions  as  to 
the  obligations  of  France  to  Spain.  The  latter 
power,  he  perceived,  had  been  brought  into  the  ex- 
isting war  only  by  special  inducements,  and  he 
did  not  hesitate  to  inform  Montmorin  of  his  be- 
lief that  one  of  these  was  "the  exclusive  naviga- 
tion of  the  Mississippi  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico."30 
It  is  not  remarkable,  then,  that  he  remonstrated 
strongly  against  the  Instructions  of  June  15th. 
They  had,  he  conceded,  "an  appearance  of  pol- 
icy," but,  he  protested,  they  forced  the  American 
envoys  to 

receive  and  obey  (under  the  name  of  opinions)  the  direc- 
tions of  those  on  whom  ...  no  American  minister 
ought  to  be  dependent  and  to  whom,  in  love  for  our 
country  and  zeal  for  her  service,  I  am  sure  that  my 
colleagues  and  myself  are  at  least  their  equal. 

Indeed,  he  preferred  to  resign  his  commission  as 
peace  negotiator  rather  than  submit  to  such  a 
control.  But  he  did  not  resign;  and  as  events 
were  to  prove,  he  had  underestimated  his  own 
hardihood  of  purpose.31 

29  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  II.  283. 

"Wharton,  IV.  137.  This  belief  Montmorin  challenged,  but 
he  later  admitted  that  Spain  was  desirous  of  modifying  American 
independence,  Jay  to  Livingston,  Apr.  28,  1782,  t'6.,  V.  368. 

*  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  II.   71-2. 


CHAPTER  XV 

JAY  AND  THE  NEGOTIATIONS  OF   1782 

The  story  of  the  American  negotiations  for 
peace,  which  it  was  understood  from  the  outset 
were  to  be  carried  on  separately  between  the 
American  envoys  and  such  representatives  as 
Great  Britain  should  accredit  for  the  purpose,1 

1Vergennes  to  La  Luzerne,  Apr.  9,  1782:  "Au  reste,  M., 
quoique  nous  d6sirons  que  le  Congres  n'entame  aucune  n6gociation 
directe  et  qu'il  ne  fasse  point  une  paix  s6par6e,  .  .  .  nous  sommes 
et  serons  toujours  disposes  a  consentir  que  les  p!6nipotentiaires 
Am^ricains  en  Europe  traitent  conformement  a  leurs  instructions, 
directement  et  sans  notre  intervention,  avec  ceux  de  la  cour  de 
Londres,  tandis  que  nous  traiterons  de  meme  de  notre  cdte, 
a  condition  que  les  deux  negotiations  chemineront  d'un  pas 
£gal,  et  que  les  deux  trait£s  seront  signed  en  meme  terns  et 
ne  vaudront  point  1'un  sans  1'autre,"  Doniol  V.  78-9.  See 
also  Oswald  to  Shelburne,  June  9,  1782:  "Dr.  Franklin  then 
said  he  thought  the  best  way  to  come  at  a  general  peace 
was  to  treat  separately  with  each  party,  and  under  distinct 
commissions  to  one  and  the  same,  or  different  persons.  By  this 
method  many  difficulties  .  .  .  would  be  in  a  great  measure  avoided. 
And  then  at  last  there  would  only  remain  to  consolidate  these 
several  settlements  into  one  genuine  and  conclusive  treaty  of 
pacification  ....  He  explained  as  to  the  commissions,  that  there 
might  be  one  to  treat  with  France,  one  for  the  Colonies,  one  for 
Spain,  and,  he  added,  one  for  Holland,  if  it  should  be  thought 
proper."  At  the  same  time  Franklin  put  in  a  bid  for  Oswald  as 
the  American  negotiator.  Lord  Edmond  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of 


330  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

begins  to  all  practical  intents  with  Franklin's 
communication  of  July  9th  to  the  British  agent 
Oswald,  wherein  was  laid  down  the  basis  for  a 
treaty  of  peace  between  the  two  countries.  The 
first  four  items  of  this  basis,  labelled  "necessary," 
were  as  follows: 

1.  Independence  full  and  complete  in  every  sense,  and 
all  troops  to  be  withdrawn ;  2.  A  settlement  of  the 
boundaries  of  the  Thirteen  States ;  3.  A  confinement  of 
the  boundaries  of  Canada  to  at  least  what  they  were 
before  the  Quebec  Act,  if  not  to  still  narrower  limits; 
4.  A  freedom  of  fishing  on  the  Banks  of  Newfoundland 
and  elsewhere,  as  well  for  fish  as  whales.33 

William,  Earl  of  Shelburne  (London,  1876,  3  vols.),  III.  207-8. 
The  only  effort  made  by  the  British  government  for  a  separate 
negotiation  in  the  United  States  was  through  Sir  Guy  Carleton 
who  arrived  in  New  York  on  May  5,  with  a  commission  to  make 
"peace  or  war  in  North  America."  Later  Carleton  was  author- 
ized to  make  peace  either  with  Congress  or  "through  General 
Washington"  on  the  basis  of  "unconditional  independence."  See 
Wharton,  V.  405-6,  413,  417,  and  652,  and  VI.  15-6.  The  arrival 
of  Carleton  evoked  the  Congressional  resolutions  of  May  31,  1782, 
assuring  His  Most  Christian  Majesty  of  Congress'  determination 
"to  hearken  to  no  propositions  for  peace  which  are  not  perfectly 
conformable"  to  the  Alliance,  and  in  case  such  propositions  were 
made  by  the  court  of  London,  not  to  depart  from  the  measures 
which  they  have  heretofore  taken  for  preventing  delay,  and  for 
conducting  the  discussions  of  them  [such  propositions]  in  confi- 
dence and  in  concert  with  His  Most  Christian  Majesty,"  Journals 
of  the  Continental  Congress,  XXII.  312-3.  See  also  to  same  effect, 
the  Resolutions  of  Oct.  4,  1782,  ib.,  XXIII.  637-9. 

2  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  III.  243-4.  Early  in  the  year 
a  correspondence  had  arisen  between  Hartley  and  Franklin  touch- 
ing peace.  The  former  had  hinted  at  a  separate  peace  between 
England  and  America,  which  suggestion  the  American  had 
spurned.  Wharton,  V.  80-4  and  112-4.  See  also  Franklin  to 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  331 

Jay's  participation  in  the  negotiations  began 
on  August  10th,  when  he  and  Franklin  conferred 
with  Vergennes  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  Oswald's 

Rayneval,  Mar.  22,  transmitting  this  correspondence,  B.  F.  Stevens, 
Peace  Transcripts  (Library  of  Congress).  Meanwhile  the 
crumbling  North  cabinet  had  sent  Forth  to  Paris  to  make  some 
bungling  efforts  to  draw  France  off  from  her  alliance  with  the 
United  States.  Forth  offered  France  her  conquests  in  the  West 
Indies,  the  suppression  of  the  commissionership  at  Dunkirk,  and 
certain  advantages  in  the  East  Indies.  Of  course,  he  failed, 
Revue  d'Histoire  diplomatique,  XIV.  161  ff.;  Wharton,  V.  298, 
303-5;  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,  XXII.  302-3.  Over- 
lapping this  episode,  and  so  antedating  the  formation  of  the  Rock- 
ingham  cabinet,  a  correspondence  had  also  sprung  up  between 
Franklin  and  Shelburne  regarding  peace.  In  consequence  of  this, 
as  early  as  April  12,  Oswald  was  sent  to  Paris  by  Shelburne,  who 
was  now  secretary  for  Home  and  Colonial  Affairs  under  Rocking- 
ham,  to  sound  him  on  the  question  of  peace.  Franklin  informed 
Oswald  "that  America  was  ready  to  treat,  but  only  in  concert  with 
France,  and  that  as  Mr.  Jay,  Mr.  Adams,  and  Mr.  Laurens  were 
all  absent  from  Paris,  nothing  of  importance  could  be  done  in  the 
affair."  At  the  same  time  Franklin  urged  the  cession  of  Canada  in 
the  interest  of  a  durable  peace  and  gave  Oswald  a  minute  of  his 
views  on  the  subject.  This  proposal  Franklin  afterward  renewed 
in  his  communication  of  July  9,  cited  above,  but  without  result. 
On  Apr.  23,  the  Rockingham  cabinet  agreed  to  a  minute  requesting 
that  His  Majesty  have  Oswald  return  to  Paris  in  order  to  set  on 
foot  a  negotiation  with  Franklin  looking  to  a  general  peace  and 
"the  allowance  of  independence  to  America,"  and  that  Fox,  the 
secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  suggest  a  proper  person  to  the  king 
to  begin  a  like  negotiation  with  France.  In  consequence  of  this 
minute  Oswald  was  sent  again  to  Paris  to  treat  with  Franklin, 
while  Thomas  Grenville  was  sent  by  Fox  to  treat  with  the  French 
minister.  On  May  18,  the  cabinet  asked  the  king  to  direct  Fox  to 
empower  Grenville  "to  treat  and  conclude  at  Paris"  "on  the  basis 
of  independence  to  the  Thirteen  Colonies  in  North  America";  and 
five  days  late  instructed  the  latter  in  negotiating  with  France,  to 
propose  the  acknowledgment  by  England  of  the  independence  of 


332  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

commission,  which  empowered  that  amiable  gen- 
tleman to  treat,  not  with  the  United  States  of 
America,  but  with  "the  said  colonies  and  planta- 
tions."3 Jay  urged  that  "it  would  be  descending 
from  the  ground  of  independence"  to  treat  under 
such  a  description.  Vergennes,  however,  urged 

that  names  signified  little;  that  the  king  of  Great  Bri- 
tain's styling  himself  the  king  of  France  was  no  obstacle 
to  ...  France's  treating  with  him;  that  an  acknowl- 
edgment of  our  independence,  instead  of  preceding,  must 
in  the  natural  course  of  things  be  the  effect  of  the  treaty. 

America  "in  the  first  instance."  Fox,  interpreting  these  minutes 
as  establishing  a  single  negotiation,  that  with  France,  who,  ac- 
cordingly, was  to  be  assured  at  the  outset  of  England's  intention 
to  recognize  American  independence,  now  authorized  Grenville  to 
take  over  the  whole  business  of  peace-making.  At  first  his  plan 
was  checked  by  the  refusal  of  Vergennes  to  treat  with  regard  to 
American  interests,  both  because  His  Majesty  had  no  power  to  do 
so  and  also  because  "the  dignity  of  the  king  of  England  and  of 
the  United  States  required  the  establishment  of  a  direct  negotia- 
tion between  the  two,"  Vergennes  to  La  Luzerne,  June  28,  1782, 
Doniol,  V.  88.  In  order  to  meet  this  objection  Fox  now  em- 
powered Grenville  to  treat  with  the  king  of  France  "and  any 
other  Prince  or  State,"  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  III.  214-7.  Mean- 
time, however,  Shelburne  had  protested  against  the  American 
negotiation  being  removed  from  his  department  and  the  king  had 
sided  with  him.  From  the  confusion  thus  resulting  the  situation 
was  relieved  by  the  death  of  Rockingham  on  July  1st,  and  the 
accession  of  Shelburne  the  day  following  to  the  Prime  Minister- 
ship.  Fox  now  left  the  cabinet  and  Grenville  threw  up  his  com- 
mission as  envoy.  Meantime,  the  Parliamentary  Enabling  Act 
had  been  passed,  and  on  July  25  Oswald  received  his  first  com- 
mission, while,  a  fortnight  earlier,  Fitzherbert,  the  British  minister 
at  Brussels,  had  been  appointed  to  take  the  Grenville's  place.  Fitz- 
maurice, op.  cit.,  III.  chs.  IV  and  V;  Doniol,  V.  ch.  III. 
'  Wharton,  V.  613-4. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  333 

Upon  leaving  Vergennes'  presence  Franklin  im- 
puted the  minister's  attitude  to  a  desire  to  remove 
"every  obstacle  to  a  speedy  negotiation."  But 
Jay,  who  had  been  led  to  believe  by  the  mystify- 
ing conduct  and  language  of  another  British 
agent,  Grenville,  that  there  was  still  some  doubt 
about  the  British  government's  according  inde- 
pendence, drew  the  conclusion  that  Vergennes 
was  prepared  to  profit  by  this  uncertainty  by 
getting  Spain  out  of  the  war  before  England  and 
America  could  come  to  terms.  They  wish,  said 
he  to  Franklin,  "to  make  their  uses  of  us":  the 
Count  foresaw  "difficulties  in  bringing  Spain  into 
peace  on  moderate  terms,  and  that  if  we  once 
found  ourselves  standing  on  our  own  legs  .  .  . 
we  might  not  think  it  our  duty  to  continue  in  the 
war  for  the  attainment  of  Spanish  objects."4 

*  Jay  to  Livingston,  Wharton,  VI.  12-9.  This  letter,  «6.,  11-51,  is 
Jay's  apology  for  the  course  described  in  the  text.  It  is  also  to 
be  found  in  the  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  II.  366-452. 
The  statement  by  Grenville  that  is  referred  to  is  his  assertion, 
upon  leaving  Paris,  that  Shelburne  had  no  intention  of  granting 
America  her  independence,  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  III.  246.  This  en- 
tirely unwarranted  assertion  was  the  source  of  the  whole  mis- 
understanding between  Jay  and  Vergennes  on  the  matter  of 
independence.  As  is  clear  from  his  course  with  both  Grenville 
and  Fitzherbert,  Vergennes  was  determined  not  to  begin  negotia- 
tions till  he  was  definitely  assured  that  the  British  government  was 
ready  to  recognize  American  independence,  Doniol,  V.  ch.  Ill, 
passim;  Fitzmaurice  op.  cit.,  III.  251-2.  Journals  of  the  Conti- 
nental Congress,  Sept.  24,  1782,  XXIII.  596-604.  Jay,  on  the  other 
hand,  felt  that  Grenville's  declaration  was  sufficient  to  call  into 
question  any  mere  statement  by  the  British  government  henceforth 


334  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Jay  was,  of  course,  quite  right  in  suspecting 
that  the  great  difficulty  in  the  way  of  peace  was 
the  necessity  France  was  under  of  satisfying 
Spain,  and  from  this  it  was  a  reasonable  deduc- 
tion that  the  French  Foreign  Office  might  be 
tempted  to  resort  to  underhand  expedients  to 
prolong  the  negotiations  between  the  United 
States  and  England.5  On  the  other  hand,  it  does 

of  its  intentions  as  to  independence,  and  that  nothing  could  now  re- 
move uncertainty  save  the  act  of  recognition  itself,  or  what  would 
be  equivalent  to  an  act  of  recognition  if  peace  succeeded.  To  his 
view,  therefore,  Vergennes'  willingness  to  forego  the  actual  recogni- 
tion of  independence  by  England  till  the  treaty  of  peace  was  tanta- 
mount to  willingness  to  postpone,  till  the  end  of  the  negotiations 
perhaps,  the  question  whether  there  should  be  such  a  recognition 
at  all.  Herein,  he  was  wrong.  "We  may  judge  of  the  intentions  of 
the  court  of  London,"  Vergennes  wrote  La  Luzerne,  Aug.  14,  "by 
their  first  propositions.  If  they  have  independence  for  their  basis 
we  may  proceed;  if  not,  we  must  break  off,"  Doniol,  V.  110. 

*  "When  once  independence  has  been  definitely  offered  to  the 
United  States,  if  it  is  not  followed  immediately  by  peace  it  will 
not  be  difficult  to  persuade  them  that  the  continuation  of  the 
war  has  an  entirely  different  object  from  their  interests,"  Mont- 
morin  to  Vergennes,  Aug.  12,  1782,  Stevens,  Peace  Transcripts.  It 
should  be  noted  in  passing  that,  in  an  effort  to  reassure  the  Amer- 
icans of  his  good  faith,  Shelburne  had  furnished  Franklin  with  a 
copy  of  his  letter  to  Sir  Guy  Carleton  of  June  25.  This  letter  men- 
tions that  Grenville  had  been  instructed  to  propose  American  inde- 
pendence "in  the  first  instance,  instead  of  making  it  the  condition 
of  a  general  peace."  At  the  same  time,  however,  this  letter  also 
brought  forward  the  point,  "that  if  the  negotiation  is  broken  off 
it  will  undoubtedly  be  for  the  sake  of  France  and  Spain  and 
not  America,  and  that  any  delay  in  obtaining  peace  would  be 
attributable  to  the  same  cause,  Wharton,  VI.  15-6.  While,  there- 
fore, this  document  was  reassuring  in  one  way,  in  another  it  con- 
firmed Jay's  suspicions.  These  suspicions  were  in  formation  be- 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  335 

not  appear  how  the  postponement,  to  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace,  of  British  recognition  of  American 
independence — a  matter  which,  Vergennes  had 
informed  himself  was  a  foregone  result — would 
have  delayed  proceedings.  The  truth  is  that,  owing 
to  his  misapprehension  of  Shelburne's  good- 
faith,  Jay  was  playing  the  very  game  that,  by  his 
assumption,  Vergennes  wished  to  have  played, 
that  is,  he  was  creating  delay.  Nevertheless,  in  so 
doing  he  forwarded  American  interests.  For  in 
an  effort  to  meet  his  demands  and  to  bring  to  an 
end  the  delay  they  were  causing,  Townshend,  act- 
ing for  Shelburne,  authorized  Oswald  on  Sep- 
tember 1st  "to  agree  to  the  plan  of  pacification" 
that  had  been  proposed  by  Franklin,  "to  the  full 
extent"  of  the  "necessary"  articles  and,  further, 
"to  waive  any  stipulation"  in  behalf  either  of 
British  creditors  or  of  the  American  loyalists.6 
But  even  this  concession  did  not  abate  Jay's 
determination  to  treat  on  no  other  footing  than 
as  the  representative  of  independent  states;  and 
there  now  followed  a  succession  of  events  which 
galvanized  his  obstinacy  to  swift  and  positive 

fore  he  left  Spain.  "France,"  he  wrote  Livingston,  in  his  report 
of  Apr.  28,  "is  ready  for  a  peace,  but  not  Spain.  The  king's  eyes 
are  fixed  on  Gibraltar  ....  If  England  should  offer  us  peace 
on  the  terms  of  our  treaty  with  France,  the  French  court  would 
be  very  much  embarrassed  by  their  alliance  with  Spain,  and  as  yet 
we  are  under  no  obligations  to  persist  in  the  war  to  gratify  this 
court"  (the  emphasis  is  mine),  ib.,  373. 
«  Fitzmaurice,  op.  tit.,  III.  254-6;  Bancroft,  History,  V.  563-4. 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

action.  It  should  be  mentioned  that,  on  the  same 
occasion  when  Oswald's  commission  had  been  first 
discussed  with  Vergennes,  the  conflicting  claims 
of  Spain  and  the  United  States  in  the  region  west 
of  the  Mountains  had  also  been  brought  into  the 
conversation.  The  minister  himself,  Jay  records, 
"was  very  reserved  and  cautious;  but  M.  Rayne- 
val,  his  principal  secretary,  who  was  present, 
thought  that  we  claimed  more  than  we  had  a  right 
to."7  This  tone  on  Rayneval's  part,  it  is  prob- 
able, was  somewhat  material  in  forming  Jay's 
unfavorable  opinion  of  the  minister's  argument 
on  the  question  of  Oswald's  commission.  Be  that 
as  it  may,  Rayneval  next  proceeded  to  develop 
his  views  to  Jay  more  at  length,  and  on  Septem- 
ber 7th  sent  him  an  elaborate  memorandum  in 
support  of  them  and  proposing  that  the  lands 
south  of  the  Ohio  be  divided  into  two  Indian  pro- 
tectorates, the  one  toward  the  Mississippi  to  be 
under  Spain,  the  one  toward  the  Mountains  to  be 
under  the  United  States,  and  that  the  lands  north 
of  the  Ohio  be  left  to  England.8  Then  on  Sep- 
tember 9th  Jay  "received  certain  information  that 
on  September  7th  M.  Rayneval  had  left  Versailles 
and  was  gone  to  England,  that  it  was  pretended 
he  was  gone  into  the  country,  and  that  several 
precautions  had  been  taken  to  keep  his  real  des- 
tination a  secret."9  Finally,  on  September  10th 

'Wharton,  VI.  23. 
*Cf.  p.  309  supra. 
9  Wharton,  VI.,  28. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  337 

"a  copy  of  a  translation  of  a  letter  from  M.  Mar- 
bois to  the  Count  de  Vergennes  against  our  shar- 
ing in  the  fishery"  was  put  into  the  American's 
hands.10 

10  76.,  V.  740  and  VI.  29.  Jay  states  that  he  is  "not  at  liberty 
to  mention  the  manner  in  which  this  paper  came"  to  his  hands, 
but  Fitzmaurice  says  that  it  was  communicated  "by  means  of  one 
of  the  secret  agents  in  the  employment  of  the  English  government," 
op.  cit.,  III.  257.  Writers  have  attempted  to  cast  doubts  on  the 
authenticity  of  this  document,  but  these  doubts  are  adequately  met 
by  the  following  passage  from  Vergennes'  despatch  of  Aug.  12, 
1782,  to  La  Luzerne:  "Le  Sr.  de  Marbois  propose  un  expedient 
pour  arre"ter  les  esp£rances  des  Am^ricains  et  les  men6es  de  M. 
Samuel  Adams;  mais  le  Conseil  du  Roi  juge  que  comme  nous  ne 
sommes  lie's  par  aucun  engagement,  nous  n'avons  aucune  mesure 
a  prendre  pour  preVenir  les  clameurs  et  les  reproches,  et  toute 
demarche  de  notre  part  tendante  a  ce  but  seroit  au  moins  pr6- 
mature"e;  d'ailleurs,  nous  avons  du  terns  de  reste  pour  nous  expli- 
quer  lorsque  la  matiere  des  pe"cheries  sera  s^rieusement  discut6e 
entre  les  pl£nip'res  Ame>icains  et  le  commissaire  de  la  cour  de 
Londres."  Doniol,  V.  157.  In  his  despatch  of  Jan.  4,  1783,  to 
Jay,  Livingston,  Congress'  secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  belittles 
the  significance  of  Marbois'  communication.  He  is  not,  he  says, 
surprised  by  it,  "since  he  [Marbois]  always  endeavored  to  per- 
suade us  that  our  claim  to  the  fisheries  was  not  well  founded." 
Then  he  continues:  "Yet  one  thing  is  very  remarkable,  and  I 
hope  evinces  the  determination  of  France  to  serve  us  on  this  point: 
The  advice  given  to  discourage  the  hope  is  certainly  judicious,  and 
yet  we  find  no  steps  taken  in  consequence  of  it.  On  the  contrary, 
we  have  been  repeatedly  told  in  formal  communications  since 
that  period,  'that  the  king  would  do  everything  for  us  that  cir- 
cumstances will  admit.'  .  .  .  This  communication  was  made  on 
the  21st  of  last  November  from  letters  of  the  7th  of  Septem- 
ber ....  Congress,  relying  upon  it,  have  made  no  alteration  in 
their  instructions  since  the  change  in  their  affairs  by  the  blow 
the  enemy  received  at  Yorktown.  This  letter  of  Marbois,  and  the 
conduct  of  the  court  of  France,  evince  the  difference  between  a 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Jay  was  now  thoroughly  aroused  and  thor- 
oughly alarmed,  especially  for  American  interests 
in  the  West.  France  stood  ready,  he  now  felt 

great  politician  and  a  little  one  ....  Our  exclusion  from  the 
fishery  would  only  be  beneficial  to  England."  Wharton,  VI. 
177-80  fn.  This  argument  would  be  more  persuasive  if  the  letters 
of  September  7th,  relied  upon  by  Livingston,  had  not  been  fol- 
lowed by  such  expressions  as  that  quoted  above,  from  the  despatch 
of  August  12,  1782,  where  Vergennes  clearly  contemplates  the 
possibility  of  intervening  in  the  discussion  of  the  fisheries  question 
between  the  British  and  American  negotiations,  against  the  Amer- 
ican pretensions.  And  to  the  same  effect  is  the  following  passage 
from  the  French  minister's  despatch  of  June  28:  "Je  preVois,  M., 
qu'il  y  aura  encore  de  grands  de"bats  au  Congres  au  sujet  des 
limites  de  quelques  e"tats.  Si  le  Congres  ne  se  laisse  pas  en- 
trainer  par  I'intdre't  personnel  et  les  clameurs  des  provinces  du 
Nord,  il  envisagera  la  paix  comme  le  plus  grand  des  bienfaits 
qu'il  puisse  desirer;  il  se  gardera  bien  d'exiger  la  moindre  faveur, 
a  titre  de  droit,  d'un  puissance  a  laquelle  une  portion  6norme  de 
son  domaine  va  6chapper;  il  se  bornera  a  demander  ce  que  le 
droit  commun  assure  aux  Ame>icains,  et  il  se  re"servera  de  de- 
mander une  plus  grande  extension  lorsque  1'Angleterre  lui  pro- 
posera  des  arrangements  de  commerce.  Je  me  flatte  surtout,  M., 
que  les  Am6ricains  ne  pr^tendront  pas  que  le  Roi  se  fasse  fort 
de  leur  procurer  1'extension  de  p£che  qu'ils  convoitent,  et  encore 
moins  qu'il  fasse  le  sacrifice  de  ses  propres  p£cheries  pour  les 
dedommager  du  refus  de  la  Grande-Bretagne.  Sa  M'te"  ne  consen- 
tira  ni  a  1'un  ni  a  1'autre ;  tout  ce  qu'elle  pourra  f aire  sera  d'accorder 
ses  bons  offices  selon  que  les  circonstances  le  lui  permettront;  mais 
elle  est  invariablement  resoliie  de  ne  point  sacrifier  le  r6tablisse- 
ment  de  la  paix  a  une  pretention  mal  fondle."  Doniol,  V.  90-1. 
To  like  effect  are  Vergennes'  despatches  of  Oct.  14  and  Nov.  23 
to  La  Luzerne,  Stevens,  Peace  Transcripts;  Doniol  V.  176-9.  Also, 
we  should  not  ignore  the  testimony  of  Lord  St.  Helens  (formerly 
Fitzherbert,  the  British  negotiator  with  France),  in  his  letter  to 
Judge  William  Jay,  in  1838,  that  Vergennes  had  argued  strongly, 
in  1782,  against  the  Americans  being  admitted  to  the  fisheries, 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  339 

convinced,  in  case  the  United  States  would  not 
give  Spain  the  territory  she  wanted  in  that  re- 
gion, to  aid  the  latter  in  negotiating  with  Eng- 
land for  it;  and  Rayneval,  he  believed,  had  gone 
to  England  to  sound  Shelburne  on  the  American 
claims,  to  impress  upon  him  France's  disapproval 
of  them,  and  "to  hint  the  propriety  of  such  a  line 
as  would  on  the  one  hand  satisfy  Spain  and  on 
the  other  leave  to  Britain  all  the  country  north  of 
the  Ohio."11  He  at  once  determined  on  aggres- 
sive measures.  Without  consulting  Franklin,  he 
sent  Benjamin  Vaughan,  a  friend  of  both  Frank- 
lin and  Shelburne,  to  London  to  combat  Rayne- 
val's  reasoning  and  to  urge  a  new  commission  for 
Oswald  authorizing  him  to  treat  with  "the  United 
States  of  America."12  Vaughan's  mission  proved 
successful,  and  upon  the  new  basis  the  negotia- 
tions proceeded  till  November  30th,  when  "provi- 
sional articles"  were  signed,  embodying  the 
conditions  of  a  treaty  to  be  concluded  when  terms 
of  peace  should  "be  agreed  upon  between  Great 

on  the  ground  that  it  would  be  dangerous  to  accord  them  so 
great  a  nursery  of  sea-power.  Henry  Flanders,  Lives  and  Times 
of  the  Chief  Justices  (Phila.,  1858),  I.  343.  Then,  there  is  the  point 
made  by  Adams,  "that,  aiming  at  excluding  us  from  fishing  upon 
the  north  side  of  Newfoundland,  it  was  natural  for  them  [the 
French]  to  wish  that  the  English  would  exclude  us  from  the  south 
side,"  Wharton,  VI.  93.  For  an  estimate  of  the  fisheries  as 
a  nursery  of  seamen,  see  ib.,  III.  789. 

11  Wharton,  VI.  29. 

12  Ib.,  29-32,  45-7. 


340  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Britain  and  France,"  which  did  not  occur  till 
some  six  weeks  later.13 

Was  Jay's  conduct,  which  by  their  ratification 
of  it  became  that  of  his  fellow  commissioners  also, 
justifiable?  The  severest  criticism  meted  out 
to  the  commissioners  was  that  of  Vergennes  in  his 
heated  letter  to  Franklin  of  December  15th, 
which  was  called  forth  by  the  latter' s  announce- 
ment that  he  was  about  to  forward  the  Provi- 
sional Articles  to  Congress  by  a  vessel  for  which 
a  passport  had  been  secured  from  the  king  of 
England.14 

I  am  at  a  loss,  sir,  [wrote  the  irate  minister]  to  explain 
your  conduct  and  that  of  your  colleagues  on  this  occa- 
sion. You  have  concluded  your  preliminary  articles 

"The  Provisional  Articles  are  given  in  Appendix  V.  A  ques- 
tion raised  in  Parliament  with  reference  to  them  was  whether 
"American  independence  was  to  take  effect  absolutely  at  any 
period,  near  or  remote,  whenever  a  treaty  of  peace  was  concluded 
with  the  court  of  France,  or  was  contingent  merely,  so  that  if  the 
particular  treaty  now  negotiating  with  France  should  not  ter- 
minate in  a  peace,  the  offer  was  to  be  considered  revoked  and  the 
independence  left  to  be  determined  by  events,"  Parliamentary 
History,  XXIII.  col.  306.  Shelburne  denounced  the  question  as 
"unwise"  and  "unprecedented"  and  refused  to  answer  it:  "he  was 
bound  to  keep  the  secrets  of  the  king  .  .  .  the  thing  was  done, 
the  treaty  signed  and  sealed,  and  whether  good  or  bad,  its  pro- 
duction could  not  vary  it,"  ib.  What  was  the  character  of  the 
contract  in  the  provisional  articles?  This  question  was  dis- 
cussed in  Congress,  and  the  opinion  arrived  at  by  Wilson  of  Penn- 
sylvania was  that  it  was  "contingently  definitive,"  Writings  of 
Madison,  I.  448-50.  See  also  a  question  raised  as  to  the  interpre- 
tation of  the  preamble,  ib.,  410. 

"Wharton,  VI.  137-8. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  341 

without  any  communication  between  us,  although  the 
instructions  from  Congress  prescribe  that  nothing  shall 
be  done  without  the  participation  of  the  king.  You  are 
about  to  hold  out  a  certain  hope  of  peace  to  America 
without  even  informing  yourself  on  the  state  of  the 
negotiation  on  our  part.  You  are  wise  and  discreet,  sir ; 
you  perfectly  understand  what  is  due  to  propriety ;  you 
have  all  your  life  performed  your  duties.  I  pray  you  to 
consider  how  you  propose  to  fulfill  those  which  are  due 
to  the  king?15 

Technically,  of  course,  the  violation  by  the 
commissioners  of  their  instructions  was  a  mat- 
ter exclusively  between  them  and  Congress, 
besides  which  these  instructions  had  been  voted 
with  the  mediation  of  the  Imperial  courts  in 
view,  while  the  negotiations  of  1782  pro- 
ceeded along  quite  different  lines.  Nor  again, 
did  the  action  of  the  commissioners  technically 
violate  the  pledge  given  in  the  Treaty  of  Alliance, 
that  the  United  States  would  conclude  neither 
truce  nor  peace  with  Great  Britain  without  first 
obtaining  the  formal  consent  of  France.  The 

w  Ib.,  140.  Franklin's  soothing  answer  is  given  ib.,  143-4.  Frank- 
lin admitted  that  the  Americans  had  "been  guilty  of  neglecting  a 
point  of  bienseance''  But  he  urged  that  "this  little  misunderstand- 
ing ...  be  kept  a  secret,"  as  "the  English,  I  just  now  learn, 
flatter  themselves  they  have  already  divided  us"  (the  emphasis  is 
Franklin's).  At  the  same  time,  Franklin  insisted  that  the  articles 
ought  to  be  sent  to  America,  arguing  that  it  would  be  better  for 
Congress  to  have  the  commissioners'  account  of  them  than  the 
British  account.  On  the  24th,  the  articles  were  sent  off,  ib.,  153 
fn.  For  a  further  expression  of  the  attitude  of  the  Foreign 
Office  toward  the  conduct  of  the  commissioners,  see  Vergennes 
to  La  Luzerne,  Dec.  19,  ib.,  150-2. 


FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Provisional  Articles  were  not  a  separate  peace 
nor  did  they  "hold  out  a  certain  hope  of  peace." 
It  may  be  admitted,  however,  that  they  were  in- 
tended to  convey  a  warning  that  the  United 
States  reserved  the  right  to  make  a  separate 
peace,  if  a  final  peace  should  be  obstructed  by 
France  for  reasons  not  covered  by  the  Treaty  of 
Alliance.  In  other  words,  the  articles  reclaimed 
for  the  United  States  that  right  to  construe  their 
treaty  obligations  which,  when  exercised  in  good 
faith,  belongs  to  all  sovereignties,  and  which  Con- 
gress had  surrendered  by  its  instructions/ 


16 


"There  is,  therefore,  no  necessary  contradiction  between  Jay's 
language  to  Oswald  and  to  La  Fayette.  "Upon  my  saying,"  Os- 
wald wrote  Townshend,  Oct.  2,  "how  hard  it  was  that  France 
should  pretend  to  saddle  us  with  all  their  private  engagements 
with  Spain,  he  [Jay]  replied:  'We  will  allow  no  such  thing.  For 
we  shall  say  to  France:  The  agreement  we  made  with  you  we 
shall  faithfully  perform;  but  if  you  have  entered  into  any  separate 
measures  with  other  people  not  included  in  that  agreement,  and 
will  load  the  negotiation  with  their  demands,  we  shall  give  our- 
selves no  concern  about  them.' "  Stevens,  Peace  Transcripts.  On 
Jan.  19,  1783,  Jay  wrote  La  Fayette,  with  reference  to  the  Pro- 
visional Articles,  thus:  "It  appears  to  me  singular  that  any  doubts 
should  be  entertained  of  American  good  faith.  .  .  .  America  has  so 
often  repeated  and  reiterated  her  professions  and  assurances  of 
regard  to  the  treaty  alluded  to  [the  Treaty  of  Alliance],  that  I 
hope  she  will  not  impair  her  dignity  by  making  any  more  of  them.'* 
Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  III.  25.  But  see  also  Edward 
Channing,  History  of  the  United  States,  III.  384-5,  for  proof  of 
the  fact  that  Jay  urged  Oswald  to  press  his  government  to  under- 
take the  reconquest  of  West  Florida  from  the  Spaniards,  and  even 
suggested  to  that  end  that  some  of  the  British  troops  at  New  York 
and  Charleston  be  used  for  the  purpose.  In  this  way  the  British 
forces  in  the  United  States  would  have  been  weakened;  the  Brit- 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  343 

The  question  that  at  once  prompts  itself  is 
whether  the  United  States,  having  regard  to  the 
kinds  and  scope  of  the  assistance  they  had  had 
from  France,  were  altogether  free  to  claim  the 
prerogatives  of  sovereignty  in  relation  to  their 
engagements  with  that  country.  No  doubt,  in 
theory  the  United  States  were  "sovereign  and  in- 
dependent" allies  of  France;  but  more  imposing 
than  any  theory  is  the  fact  that,  at  the  very  mo- 
ment of  communicating  the  Provisional  Articles 
to  Vergennes,  Franklin  was  obliged  by  instruc- 
tions from  Congress  to  solicit  a  fresh  loan  from 
His  Most  Christian  Majesty.17  And  the  circum- 
stance is  indicative  of  what  had  been  the  actual 
situation  from  the  very  outset  of  the  alliance. 
But  such  being  the  case,  was  not  the  Foreign 
Office  at  liberty,  within  reasonable  limits,  to  make 

ish  concession  to  the  United  States  of  the  right  to  navigate  the 
Mississippi  would  have  been  rendered  effective;  and  Spain  would 
have  been  humiliated. 

"Congress  wanted  a  loan  of  twenty  millions,  and  on  Dec.  21  a 
loan  of  six  millions  was  extended,  Wharton,  VI.  152  fn.  Some 
writers  have  attributed  this  concession  to  the  pleasing  effects  of 
Franklin's  note  of  Dec.  17,  quoted  above.  It  is  much  more  prob- 
able that  the  concession  was  instigated  by  the  consideration 
suggested  in  the  text,  that  so  long  as  Congress  was  the  recipient 
of  such  favors  from  France  it  was  not  likely  to  cut  loose  from 
the  French  leading-strings.  In  justice  to  the  commissioners,  how- 
ever, one  should  recall  the  principle  invoked  by  Jay  in  Spain,  that 
the  United  States,  being  a  sovereign  nation,  were  free  to  borrow 
money  "on  the  same  consideration  that  other  nations  did,"  namely, 
"the  repayment  of  the  principal  with  interest,"  and  accordingly, 
without  putting  their  more  permanent  interests  in  pawn.  See 
Wharton,  IV.  134-6. 


344  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

the  best  arrangements  it  could  in  the  interest  of  a 
cause  which  was  certainly  not  less  that  of  Amer- 
ica than  of  France;  and  granting  the  measures  so 
taken  to  have  been  taken  in  good  faith,  were  not 
the  United  States  in  honor  bound  to  shoulder 
their  legitimate  consequences?  Jay  himself  had 
owned  that  it  was  farcical  to  seek  an  equal  alliance 
in  forma  pauperis.  It  was,  perhaps,  a  little  less 
than  honest  to  pretend  to  maintain  one  on  that 
footing. 

"The  separate  and  secret  manner  in  which  our 
ministers  had  proceeded  with  respect  to  France 
and  the  confidential  manner  with  respect  to  the 
British  ministers,"  Madison  records,  "affected 
different  members  of  Congress  very  differ- 
ently."18 Madison  himself  thought  the  conduct 
of  the  commissioners  censurable,  taking  substan- 
tially the  point  of  view  just  expounded.  He  ad- 
mitted that  France  had  mingled  too  much  artifice 
in  her  dealings  with  America,  and  that  her  truest 
policy  would  have  been  a  more  straightforward 
course.  He  also  conceded  that  the  ties  of  France 
with  Spain,  "whom  she  had  drawn  into  the  war, 
required  her  to  favor  Spain,  at  least  to  a  certain 
degree,  at  the  expense  of  America."19  None  the 
less,  he  contended  that,  "instead  of  cooperating 
with  Great  Britain"  to  take  advantage  of  "the 
embarrassment  in  which  France  was  placed  by 

18  Writings,  I.  404. 

19  Ib.,  296. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  345 

the  interfering  claims  of  Spain  and  the  United 
States,"  the  envoys  "ought  to  have  made  every 
allowance  and  given  every  facility  to  it  consistent 
with  a  regard  to  the  rights  of  their  constituents." 
The  facts  alleged  by  the  envoys,  he  continued, 
showed  no  "hostile  or  ambitious  designs"  against 
our  claims  on  France's  part,  nor  any  other  design 
"than  that  of  reconciling  them  with  those  of 
Spain";  wherefore,  an  impartial  world  must  re- 
gard the  action  of  the  commissioners  as  striking 
"a  dishonorable  alliance  with  our  enemies  as 
against  our  friends."  Indeed,  a  measure  of  con- 
sideration had  been  due  Spain  herself,  for  not- 
withstanding the  disappointments  and  indignities 
which  the  United  States  had  received  from  her, 
"it  could  neither  be  denied  nor  concealed  that  the 
former  had  derived  many  substantial  advantages 
from  her  taking  part  in  the  war,  and  had  even 
obtained  some  pecuniary  aids."20 

Rightly  or  wrongly,  the  commissioners  mod- 
elled their  course  upon  more  robust  principles. 
Jay,  a  quick  and  sensitive  temperament,  who  had 
in  Congress  shown  himself  not  a  little  compliant 
with  French  views,  had  been  cast  by  his  experi- 
ences in  Spain  into  an  attitude  of  patriotic  self- 
assertiveness,  an  attitude  to  which  the  Congres- 
sional instructions  added  fresh  fuel.  Adams' 
hardy  provincialism  needed  no  special  incentive  to 
patriotic  self-assertion,  though  it  had  this  in  his 

»  Ib.,  418. 


346  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

intense  interest  in  seeing  Massachusetts  restored 
to  her  fishing  privileges  off  the  Grand  Banks. 
Franklin,  burdened  with  years,  was  perhaps  over- 
borne to  some  extent  by  his  more  vigorous  col- 
leagues but  he  also  felt,  and  had  from  the  first, 
a  keen  desire  to  see  the  United  States  reach  to 
the  Mississippi.21  All  these  men,  moreover,  had 
been  of  the  pioneers  of  American  independence, 
among  the  first  to  conceive  a  national  destiny  for 
the  American  Provinces. 

But  the  immediately  provoking  cause,  of 
course,  of  the  independent  policy  adopted  by  the 
commissioners  was  Jay's  suspicions,  and  these, 
it  has  been  frequently  urged  by  writers,  were  not 
altogether  well-placed.  Nevertheless,  I  think  it 
has  to  be  conceded  that  most  of  Jay's  errors  were 
rather  as  to  the  motives  represented  by  certain 
facts  than  as  to  the  facts  themselves  or  their 
natural  tendency;  and  even  such  mistakes  as 
he  made  were  compensated  for  to  a  singular  de- 
gree by  facts  that  he  did  not  know.  Today,  how- 
ever, the  essential  elements  of  the  situation  that 
confronted  the  commissioners  are  plain ;  they  may 
be  summarized  thus :  First,  the  necessity  France 
was  under  to  obtain  peace  as  speedily  as  possible ; 
second,  the  positive  obligation  she  was  under  not 

31  See  Jay's  testimony  on  this  point,  Correspondence  and  Public 
Papers,  II.  390.  See  also  the  commissioners'  letter  to  Livingston, 
Dec.  14,  in  which  Franklin  assents  to  the  statement,  "We  knew 
this  court  and  Spain  to  be  against  our  claims  to  the  Western 
country,"  Wharton,  VI.  132. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  347 

to  accept  peace  until  Spain  was  satisfied;22  third, 
British  resistance,  ever  becoming  stiffer,  to 
Spain's  principal  demand,  the  surrender  of  Gi- 
braltar;23 fourth,  Spain's  scarcely  secondary 
interest  in  thrusting  the  Americans  back  from  the 
Mississippi;  fifth,  Vergennes'  denial  that  the 
reciprocal  guaranty  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance 
was  yet  operative  except  as  to  American  inde- 
pendence; sixth,  his  entire  disbelief  that  there 
was  any  likelihood  of  England's  conceding  the 
American  claims,  either  as  to  the  fisheries  or  the 
Western  lands,  and  his  repeatedly  announced 
intention  of  bringing  the  Americans  to  reason  if 
they  persisted  in  untenable  claims  ;24  seventh  and 

"Peace,  Vergennes  had  written  in  August,  1779,  could  be  con- 
cluded only  on  two  conditions:  "la  satisfaction  pleniere  du  roi 
d'Espagne  et  la  reconnaissance  des  Etats-Unis  dans  leur  e"tat  de 
Iibert6  et  d'independance,"  Donjol,  IV.  339-40. 

18  Even  on  his  first  mission  to  London  Rayneval  had  reported  the 
British  reluctance  to  the  cession  of  Gibraltar  as  almost  insuperable. 
"My  lord  Shelburne  s'est  apesanti  sur  Gibraltar;  il  s'est  aplique" 
avec  chaleur  a  me  prouver  que  la  cession  en  est  impossible,  il  m'a 
par!6  de  la  resistance  que  cet  article  6prouveroit  au  Conseil;  que 
le  lord  Keppel,  lorsqu'il  lui  en  a  par!6,  lui  dit  nettement  qui  si 
on  parloit  de  c6der  Gibraltar,  il  prendroit  son  chapeau  et  s'en 
iroit,"  ib.,  V.  616.  See  also  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  III.  262,  275,  289, 
305,  312. 

24  See  note  10  supra.  See  also  Vergennes  to  La  Luzerne  under 
dates  of  Oct.  14  and  Nov.  23,  1782,  Stevens,  Peace  Transcripts; 
Doniol,  V.  176-8.  Note  the  following  expressions  from  the  latter 
document:  "Le  Roi  ne  sera  moins  exact  a  les  tenir  de  son  cdt6  [cer- 
tain conditions],  mais  il  n'en  existe  aucune  [condition]  dans  nos 
trait6s  qui  Poblige  a  prolonge>  la  guerre  pour  soutenir  les  pr6ten- 
tions  ambitieuses  que  les  Etats-Unis  peuvent  former  soit  par  rapport 


348  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

last,  the  procedure  governing  the  negotiations, 
whereby  the  Americans  were  left  to  shift  for 
themselves,  while  the  Foreign  Office  took  the 
Spanish  interest  under  its  wing  from  the  begin- 
ning. No  one  of  these  facts  was  necessarily  of 
fatal  import  for  American  interests,  but  the  en- 
semble is  somewhat  impressive.  To  it,  moreover, 
may  be  quite  legitimately  lent  the  coloration  of 
one  or  two  other  circumstances.  The  first  of 
these  is  Rayneval's  early  mission  to  England. 
True,  the  primary  purpose  of  this  had  to  do  with 
Gibraltar,  but  the  young  secretary  took  what  op- 
portunity the  occasion  offered,  none  the  less,  to 
disparage  the  American  claims  with  the  British 
ministers,  if  quietly  yet  not  ineffectively.25 

a  la  peche,  soit  par  rapport  a  1'etendue  des  limites  ....  Malgr6 
toutes  les  cajolleries  que  les  ministres  anglois  prodiguent  aux 
Am£ricains,  je  ne  me  promets  qu'ils  se  montrent  facils  ni  sur 
les  peches  ni  sur  les  limits  .  .  .  ,"  ib.,  177.  The  earlier  docu- 
ment is  even  more  positive  in  tone.  It  is  interesting  to 
compare  this  tone  with  that  taken  by  Rayneval  with  reference  to 
Gibraltar:  "le  Roi,  s'il  en  £toit  besoin,  se  feroit  un  devoir  d'exhorter 
le  roi  d'Espagne  a  etre  moder£  dans  ses  pretensions,  mais  Sa 
Majest6  ne  pourroit  aucunement  parler  de  1' abandon  de  Gibraltar," 
ib.,  618. 

35  The  following  extracts  from  Rayneval's  report  of  his  con- 
ferences with  Shelburne  are  the  significant  ones:  "Mais  mylord 
craint  les  Americains  et  les  Hollandois;  j'ai  encore  dit  qu'il  y 
auroit  moien  de  les  d6router,  principalement  en  leur  laissant  ig- 
norer  Petat  de  la  negotiation  entre  la  France,  1'Espagne,  et 
PAngleterre.  Cet  article  tient  infiniment  a  coeur  a  mylord  Shel- 
burne," Doniol,  V.  614.  (It  is  interesting  to  compare  this  sug- 
gestion with  Vergennes'  later  complaint  to  Franklin,  that  the 
Americans  had  not  tried  to  inform  themselves  as  to  the  state  of 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  349 

Again,  one  should,  perhaps,  not  altogether  ignore 
this  further  consideration:  "The  French  are 
interested  in  separating  us  from  Great  Bri- 

the  Anglo-French  negotiation,  note  15,  supra).  "Est  venu  le 
tour  de  I'Amlrique;  mylord  Shelburne  a  pre"vu  qu'ils  auroient 
beaucoup  de  difficult^  avec  les  Ame"ricains,  tant  par  rapport  aux 
limites  que  par  rapport  a  la  peehe  de  Terre-Neuve,  mais  il  espere 
que  le  Roi  ne  les  soutiendra  pas  dans  leurs  demandes.  J'ai  r6- 
pondu  que  je  ne  doutois  pas  de  1'empressement  du  Roi  a  faire  ce 
qui  d^pendra  de  lui  pour  contenir  les  Ame>icains  dans  les  bornes 
de  la  justice  et  de  la  raison;  et  mylord  ayant  desire"  savoir  ce  que 
je  pensois  de  leurs  preventions,  j'ai  r6pondu  que  j'ignorois  celles 
relatives  a  la  peche,  mais  que  telles  qu'elles  puissent  etre  il  me 
sembloit  qu'il  y  avoit  un  principe  sur  a  suivre  sur  cette  matiere, 
savoir,  que  le  peche  en  haute-mer  est  res  nullius  et  que  la  peche  sur 
les  cdtes  apartenoit  de  droit  au  proprieVaire  des  c6tes,  a  moins  de 
derogations  fondles  sur  des  conventions.  Quant  a  I'eVendue  des 
limites  j'ai  supos^  que  les  Ame"ricains  la  puiseroient  dans  leur 
chartres,  c'est  a  dire  qu'ils  voudront  aller  de  1'Ocean  a  la  mer  du 
Sud.  Mylord  Shelburne  a  traite  les  chartres  de  sottises,  et  la 
discution  n'a  pas  6t6  pouss^e  plus  loin  parceque  je  n'ai  voulu, 
ni  soutenir  la  prevention  Ame>icaine,  ne  l'ane"antir.  J'ai  seule- 
ment  dit  que  le  ministre  Anglois  devoit  trouver  dans  les  n6gocia- 
tions  de  1754  relatives  a  1'Ohio  les  limites  que  PAngleterre,  alors 
souveraine  des  13  Etats-unis  croyoit  devoir  leur  assigner,"  ib.,  618- 
9.  The  reference  to  the  negotiations  of  1754  is  explained  by  the 
following  passage  from  the  memoir  which  Rayneval  had  only  a 
few  days  before  this  presented  to  Jay  on  the  Mississippi  ques- 
tion: "It  is  known  that,  before  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  France 
possessed  Louisiana  and  Canada,  and  that  she  considered  the 
savage  people  situated  to  the  east  of  the  Mississippi  as  either  inde- 
pendent or  as  under  her  protection.  This  pretension  caused  no 
dispute;  England  never  thought  of  making  any  [pretension?] 
except  as  to  the  lands  situated  towards  the  source  of  the  Ohio,  in 
that  part  where  she  had  given  the  name  Allegheny  to  that 
river."  Wharton,  VI.  25.  The  reaction  of  the  English  ministers  to 
what  Rayneval  had  to  say  about  the  American  claims  is  recorded 


350  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

tain  .  .  .  but  it  is  not  their  interest  that  we 
should  become  a  great  and  formidable  people."26 
The  words  are  Jay's,  but  Vergennes  himself  had 
said  as  much  time  and  again. 

In  short,  the  commissioners  were  confronted 
with  an  appreciable  danger,  in  meeting  which 
they  displayed  sagacity  and  spirit.  However,  it 
may  still  be  a  question  whether  their  policy  really 
netted  the  United  States  a  profit  or  a  loss;  and 
in  fact,  it  has  been  argued  that  it  did  the  latter. 
The  pivotal  fact  upon  which  this  contention 
hinges  is  the  rejection  by  Shelburne  on  October 
20th  of  a  draft  treaty  which  had  been  agreed  to 
by  Oswald,  and  which,  in  addition  to  granting 
the  Americans  everything  they  had  asked  for 
with  reference  to  the  fisheries  and  the  West,  ac- 
corded the  United  States  a  northern  boundary 
that  included  much  that  is  today  Canada  and 
maintained  complete  silence  as  to  the  claims  of 
British  creditors  and  of  the  loyalists,  whereas  the 

by  Shelburne's  biographer,  thus:  "They  then  proceeded  to  speak 
about  America.  Here  Rayneval  played  into  the  hands  of  English 
ministers  by  expressing  a  strong  opinion  against  the  American 
claims  to  the  Newfoundland  fishery  and  to  the  Valley  of  the 
Mississippi  and  the  Ohio.  These  opinions  were  carefully  noted 
by  Shelburne  and  Grantham,"  op.  tit.,  III.  263.  When  the  Pro- 
visional Articles  arrived  in  London,  Rayneval  was  there  on  a  second 
mission.  Being  shown  them  he  remarked  upon  the  embarrassment 
that  the  article  according  the  United  States  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi  would  cause  Spain,  but  elicited  a  very  unfeeling 
response  from  Shelburne,  Doniol,  V.  229. 
*Wharton,  VI.  48. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  351 

Provisional  Articles  of  November  30th  made 
certain  concessions  on  the  two  latter  points  and 
drew  a  much  more  restrictive  northern  boundary. 
Now,  it  is  urged  that  the  rejected  draft  treaty 
was  in  entire  accord  with  Townshend's  letter  of 
September  1st  to  Oswald,  that  the  motive  of  the 
British  minister  in  authorizing  such  extensive 
concessions  to  the  Americans  was  the  hope 
of  separating  them  from  the  French,  that 
Vaughan's  mission,  by  revealing  to  Shelburne 
that  this  end  had  already  been  accomplished,  in- 
stigated him  to  retract  in  a  measure  his  policy  of 
concession,  and  that,  therefore,  the  unfavorable 
differential  between  the  draft  treaty  and  the  later 
Provisional  Articles  must  be  charged  against 
Jay's  headiness  and  precipitancy.27 

The  argument  is  ingenious  but  not  convincing. 
To  begin  with,  it  will  be  recalled  that,  whatever 
the  ulterior  motive  of  Townshend's  letter,  it  was 
called  out  immediately  by  Jay's  demand  that  the 
British  government  should  recognize  American 
independence  preliminary  to  treating.  Again, 
while  this  letter  empowered  Oswald  to  agree  to 
"a  settlement  of  the  boundaries,"  there  is  plainly 
some  difference  between  an  adjustment  of  boun- 
daries and  such  a  cession  of  territory  as  that  made 
by  the  draft  treaty  of  lands  to  the  west  of  the 

"Phillips,  The  West  in  the  Diplomacy  of  the  American  Revolu- 
tion, pp.  220-1.  See  also  to  same  effect  Works  of  Benjamin  Frank- 
lin (ed.  Bigelow),  VIII,  164  fn. 


352  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Mountains  and  later  repeated  by  the  Provisional 
Articles.  But  again,  it  was  not  Vaughan's  mis- 
sion that  first  informed  Shelburne  and  his  asso- 
ciates that  there  was  a  rift  in  the  French- Ameri- 
can lute,  it  was  Rayneval's  mission  and  his  attack 
on  American  pretensions.  Finally,  the  assertion 
that  Vaughan's  mission  persuaded  Shelburne  that 
the  objective  of  his  policy  had  been  realized  and 
that,  consequently,  he  might  abandon  the  policy, 
is  mere  conjecture,  and  not  very  plausible  conjec- 
ture at  that.  Unquestionably,  it  was  Shelburne's 
purpose  to  divide  France  and  America  but  it  was 
also  his  purpose  to  keep  them  divided  till  peace 
was  obtained,  and  peace  had  not  yet  been  obtained 
when,  on  October  20th,  he  rejected  the  draft 
treaty  "as  in  no  way  adapted  to  our  present  cir- 
cumstances."28 Indeed,  it  seems  to  me  that  a 
more  plausible  conjecture  would  be,  that  it  was 
not  so  much  the  success  of  his  policy  as  its  com- 
parative failure  that  may  have  influenced  Shel- 
burne to  some  extent  at  this  moment.  For  the 
draft  treaty,  like  the  later  Provisional  Articles, 
was  to  go  into  effect  only  when  France  had  also 
arrived  at  terms  with  England.  However,  the 
circumstance  that  really  determined  the  fate  of 
the  draft  treaty  is  no  mystery.  It  was  the  arrival 
at  this  moment  of  the  news  that  Howe  had  lifted 
the  siege  of  Gibraltar ;  and  the  day  following  his 
letter  to  Oswald,  Shelburne  also  wrote  Rayneval 

28  Shelburne  to  Oswald,  Oct.  20,  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  III.  283. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  353 

that  England  would  not  yield  Gibraltar  to  Spain 
nor  St.  Lucia  and  Dominica  to  France.29 

Naturally,  it  would  be  impossible  to  determine 
with  minute  exactitude  the  extent  to  which  the 
United  States  profited  by  the  action  of  the  com- 
missioners in  ignoring  their  instructions ;  and  yet 
it  is  a  matter  that  admits,  I  think,  of  rather  con- 
fident speculation  when  the  two  controlling  fac- 
tors of  the  situation  are  clearly  set  forth.  The 
first  and  more  important  of  these  is  the  hope  that 
was  held  out  to  the  British  cabinet  by  the  inde- 
pendent attitude  of  the  Americans  that  if  the 
United  States  were  satisfied  with  the  terms  they 
received  from  England,  they  would  refuse  to 
continue  in  the  war  in  the  interest  of  Spain.  It 
was  because  of  this  hope  that  the  cabinet  yielded 
the  Americans  their  demands  as  to  the  boundar- 
ies and  the  fisheries,  and  it  is  almost  inconceivable 
that  they  would  otherwise  have  done  so.  But  in 
the  second  place,  once  this  concession  was  ratified, 
the  hands  of  the  British  government  were  tied, 
and  it  could  neither  offer  nor  demand  equivalents 
within  the  field  of  American  pretensions.30  At 
one  point,  however,  this  statement  demands 
qualification,  but  only  with  the  result  of  reinf  orc- 

"Ib.,  280. 

30  It  must  be  recognized  in  this  connection  that  it  was  not  only 
the  possibility  that  England  would  deny  Gibraltar  to  Spain  that 
was  dangerous  to  American  interests.  For  if  England  had  given 
up  Gibraltar,  she  would  have  demanded  equivalents,  and  these 
might  very  well  have  lain  within  the  field  of  the  American  preten- 
sions. See  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  210  and  Doniol,  V.  617. 


354  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

ing  the  principal  argument.  By  the  separate  and 
secret  article  of  the  Provisional  Articles,  Eng- 
land retained  the  right  for  herself  to  a  northern 
boundary  to  West  Florida  at  the  line  running  due 
eastward  from  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  river,  but 
not  the  right  to  accord  Spain  a  boundary  to  the 
same  province  north  of  the  thirty-first  degree. 

The  contemporary  estimate  of  the  achievement 
of  the  commissioners  confirms  this  analysis  most 
strikingly.  The  commissioners  themselves  in 
communicating  the  articles  to  Congress,  though 
somewhat  apologetic  for  the  concessions  that  had 
finally  been  made  in  the  interest  of  the  loyalists 
and  the  British  creditors,  used  the  quiet  terms  of 
profound  satisfaction:  "We  can  not  but  flatter 
ourselves  that  they  [the  articles]  will  appear  to 
Congress  as  they  do  to  all  of  us,  to  be  consistent 
with  the  honor  and  interest  of  the  United 
States."31  Congress'  estimate  of  the  terms  was 
governed  in  part  by  the  jealousies  of  sections  and 
factions,  but  it  is  to  be  noted  that  those  who  had 
expected  most  were  most  gratified.  "Mr.  Wol- 
cott,"  Madison  records,  "conceived  it  unnecessary 
to  waste  time  on  the  subject" —  a  proposition  to 
communicate  the  separate  article  to  the  French 
envoy — "as  he  presumed  Congress  would  never 
so  far  censure  the  ministers  who  had  obtained 
such  terms  for  this  country  as  to  disavow  their 

81  See  their  letter  to  Livingston,  Dec.  14,  Wharton,  VI.  131-3. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  355 

conduct."32  The  event  proved  that  Wolcott  had 
judged  rightly,  for  the  proposition  referred  to 
never  came  to  a  vote.  The  directest  testimony, 
however,  is  that  afforded  by  the  comments  of  the 
Foreign  Office  on  the  articles : 

You  will  notice  [Vergennes  wrote  Rayneval]  that  the 
English  buy  peace  rather  than  make  it.  Their  conces- 
sions indeed,  as  well  in  the  matter  of  the  boundaries  as 
in  that  of  the  fisheries  and  the  loyalists,  exceed  all  that 
I  could  have  thought  possible.33 

Rayneval  agreed :  'the  treaty  'with  America  ap- 
peared to  him  a  dream,  and  the  English  ministers 
in  according  it  had  had  in  view  ultimately  the 
defection  of  the  Americans.'34 

However,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  Pro- 
visional Articles  were  provisional.  Indeed,  their 
immediate  effect  was  to  diminish  the  likelihood  of 
peace,  by  encouraging  the  British  cabinet  to  set 
an  impossible  price  upon  Gibraltar.35  And,  of 
course,  had  the  war  been  renewed,  the  Americans 

33  Writings,  I.  411.  Note  also  his  statement:  "The  terms  granted 
to  America  appeared  to  Congress  on  the  whole  extremely  liberal," 
to.,  403. 

83  Dec.  3,  Wharton,  V.  293-4;  Doniol,  V.  188.  See  also  his  letter 
of  July  21,  1783,  to  La  Luzerne  where  he  says:  "The  boundaries 
in  the  Mississippi  region  must  have  astounded  the  Americans. 
Surely  they  did  not  flatter  themselves  that  the  English  ministry 
would  go  beyond  the  mountains  that  hem  in  the  United  States 
from  the  Ohio  to  Georgia,"  to.,  293-4. 

*/&.,  270. 

36  Ib.,  228-30  and  251-6.  The  equivalent  first  demanded  by  Eng- 
land for  Gibraltar  was  the  French  islands,  Guadaloupe  and 
Dominica,  to.,  220.  After  the  arrival  of  the  news  of  the  American 
signature  St.  Lucia  was  added  to  the  list;  or  in  its  place,  Trinity; 


356  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

would  have  had  either  to  part  with  their  winnings 
or  with  the  French  alliance.  Aid  came  from  an 
unexpected  quarter.  Early  in  December  the 
Spanish  ambassador  received  a  despatch  from 
Madrid,  dated  November  23rd,  in  which  inquiry 
was  made  as  to  "what  considerable  advantage 
Spain  could  expect  from  the  treaty,  if,  for  any 
reason,"  His  Catholic  Majesty  "made  the  sacri- 
fice of  withdrawing  from"  the  engagement  cre- 
ated by  the  Treaty  of  Aranjuez.  On  December 
5th  Aranda  placed  this  despatch  before  Ver- 
gennes,  who  at  once  wrote  Rayneval,  now  in 
London  a  second  time,  to  offer  the  abandonment 
of  Gibraltar  if  Spain  were  given  Minorca  and  the 
two  Floridas.  Ten  days  later  came  an  affirma- 
tive response  from  Rayneval,  and  Aranda, 
though  without  instructions  from  Madrid,  gave 
his  approval.  Florida  Blanca's  wrath  when  he 
learned  the  bold  course  of  his  envoy  was  tremen- 
dous, and  even  Char  less  Ill's  chagrin  is  badly 
concealed  in  his  letter  of  January  2nd  to  Louis 
sanctioning  peace.  Vergennes'  delight,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  boundless.  "I  bow  before  the 
Sovereign  Being,"  he  exclaimed  to  Aranda,  "and 
return  him  my  heartfelt  thanks  for  His  infinite 

or  for  all  three,  Porto  Rico,  ib.,  256.  It  seems  to  me  unlikely, 
however,  that  Parliament  would  have  accepted  peace  if  Gibraltar 
had  been  included  among  the  concessions  made  to  England's  ene- 
mies. As  it  was,  though  the  peace  was  accepted,  a  vote  of  censure 
was  passed  against  it  in  the  House  of  Commons,  Parliamentary 
History,  XXIII.  cc.  514  and  571. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  357 

wisdom,  which  has  disposed  the  heart  and  mind 
of  the  Catholic  king  to  give  up  the  cession  of 
Gibraltar."  To  Montmorin  he  expressed  him- 
self to  like  effect:  While  he  would  not  like  to 
see  such  diplomatic  usage  established  as  that  fol- 
lowed on  this  occasion  by  the  Spanish  ambassa- 
dor, "it  is  none  the  less  true  that  we  owe  peace 
to  his  courageous  resolution."36 

On  January  20th  preliminary  articles  were 
signed  by  the  representatives  of  France  and 
Spain  on  the  one  hand  and  of  Great  Britain  on 
the  other.37  The  same  day  Adams  and  Frank- 
lin —  Jay  being  absent  from  Paris  —  signed  a 
declaration  asserting  that  the  Provisional  Arti- 
cles were  not  designed  to  "alter  the  relation  of 
the  United  States  toward  England  so  long  as 
peace  should  not  be  concluded  between  His  Most 


Rousseau,  "Participation  de  1'Espagne  £  la  Guerre 
d'Am6rique,"  Revue  des  Questions  historiques,  LXXII.  484-9. 
See  also  Doniol,  V.  237-41,  and  ch.  VIII  passim.  Even  after 
the  Gibraltar  question  was  settled,  the  negotiations  were  nearly 
wrecked  by  England's  demand  that  Dominica  be  given  her.  At 
the  same  time  there  was  a  strong  war  party  at  the  French  court 
as  well  as  the  British,  among  the  opponents  of  Vergennes'  policy 
being  his  own  minister  of  the  Marine,  Castries,  ib.,  270.  Accord- 
ing to  Florida  Blanca,  at  the  moment  peace  was  signed  a  joint 
French-Spanish  expedition  consisting  of  seventy  ships  of  the  line 
and  40,000  men  was  ready  to  sail  for  the  West  Indies,  Coxe's 
Memoirs  of  the  Kings  of  Spain,  III.  344-6.  The  negotiations  were 
finally  saved  by  England's  proffer  of  Tobago  and  certain  conces- 
sions in  Pondicherry  to  France  in  return  for  Dominica,  Doniol, 
V.  ch.  VIII. 

37  They   will  be    found   in   the   Parliamentary   History,   XXIII. 
346-54. 


358  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

Christian  Majesty  and  His  Britannic  Majesty" 
and  "repudiating  any  interpretation  of  them  con- 
trary to  this  assertion."  Thus,  says  M.  Doniol, 
was  "the  alliance  in  some  sort  renewed."38 

In  reality,  the  one  entangling  alliance  of  our 
history,  the  indispensable  instrument  of  our 
deliverance  as  a  nation,  was  now  at  an  end.  Ten 
years  and  one  day  from  the  promulgation  of  this 
declaration  Louis  XVI  mounted  the  guillotine. 
One  month  after  that  war  began  between  France 
and  England.  Two  months  later  Washington 
proclaimed  American  neutrality.  His  action 
represented  the  deliberate  decision  that  the  most 
vital  interests  of  the  United  States  would  not 
admit  of  its  adhering  to  the  pledges  given  in 
1778.  But  indeed,  France  had  long  since  be- 
come reconciled  to  the  idea  that  America  was 
not  an  available  ally.  Some  six  years  before 
Washington  and  his  cabinet  determined  to  cast 
aside  the  Treaty  of  Alliance,  the  French  repre- 
sentative at  Philadelphia  was  urging  his  govern- 
ment to  seize  New  York  and  Newport  to  prevent 
their  falling  into  the  hands  of  Great  Britain  in 
the  event  of  war.  The  Foreign  Office  replied 
that  it  had  anticipated  just  such  developments, 
but  that  it  consoled  itself  that  France  had 
"never  pretended  to  make  America  a  useful 
ally,"  that  she  had  had  "no  other  end  in  view  than 
to  deprive  Great  Britain  of  that  vast  continent."39 

38  Doniol,  V.  277  and  fn. 

39  The  Cabinet  of  Versailles  to  Otto,  the  French  charg£  at  Phila- 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  359 

delphia,  Aug.  30,  1787,  Bancroft,  History  of  the  Formation  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  (N.  Y.,  1882,  2  vols),  II.  438. 
The  attitude  of  France  toward  her  American  alliance  after  the  War 
of  Independence  looked  primarily  toward  preventing  the  restora- 
tion of  English  influence.  In  this  connection  the  following  pas- 
sages from  the  Instructions  of  Montmorin,  Vergennes'  successor,  to 
the  Count  de  Moustier,  who  became  the  French  envoy  at  Philadel- 
phia in  the  fall  of  1787,  are  interesting:  Le  Comte  de  Moustier 
jugera  par  la  qu'il  devra  s'attacher  a  fortifier  les  Ame>icains  dans 
les  principes  qui  les  ont  engage  a  s'unir  a  la  France:  il  leur 
fera  sentir  pour  cet  effet,  qu'ils  ne  sauroient  avoir  d'Allie  plus 
naturel  que  le  Roi,  tandis  qu'ils  peuvent  etre  certains  que  1'Angle- 
terre  jalouse  leur  prosperity  et  qu'elle  y  nuira  autant  qu'elle  en 
trouvera  F  occasion.  .  .  .  Ce  seroit  se  tromper  volontairement  que 
de  supposer  que  cette  puissance  [England]  ne  cherche  pas  a 
diminuer  les  sentiments  qui  doivent  attacher  les  Etats-Unis  a  la 
France,  et  a  ope>er  insensiblement  leur  raprochement  de  leur 
ancienne  Mere-patrie.  II  sera  utile  que  le  Ministre  du  Roi  suive 
la  marche  des  agens  anglais,  et  qu'il  fasse  ce  qui  d£pendra  de  lui, 
mais  sans  affectation,  pour  rendre  nulles  leurs  insinuations."  "Me- 
moire  pour  servir  d'Instructions  au  Sieur  Comte  de  Moustier," 
Oct.  10,  1787,  American  Historical  Review,  VIII.  710-1.  Mont- 
morin expected  that  if  war  broke  out  between  France  and  Great 
Britain  "the  Americans  would  wish  to  remain  neutral,"  and  in- 
dicated the  probability  that  France  would  favor  this  disposition. 
However,  he  continued,  "circumstances  may  counteract  our  prin- 
ciples," Bancroft,  op.  tit.,  II.  444.  A  few  months  later  Moustier 
reported  an  argument  by  Jay  to  the  effect  that  the  Treaty  of 
Alliance  no  longer  subsisted,  to  which  proposition  Montmorin 
demurred  strongly:  "Le  Roi  et  son  conseil,  M.,  ont  et6  singu- 
lierement  etonnes  de  1'opinion  6u  est  M.  Jay  que  FAlliance  entre 
le  Roi  et  les  Etats-Unis  ne  subsiste  plus.  Ce  ministre  a  done 
oubli6  les  termes  dans  lesquels  cette  Alliance  a  6tfe  concue:  s'il 
veut  bien  relire  le  traitS  du  6.  fevrier  1778  et  se  convaincre  qu'elle 
est  perpetuelle.  ...  II  convient,  M,  que  vous  rectifiez  les  ide>s  de 
M.  Jay  sur  ces  diff6rents  objets:  vous  1'assurerez  que  le  Roi  regarde 
son  alliance  avec  les  Etats-Unis  comme  inalterable;  que  Sa.  M'te.  a 
toujours  pris  et  qu'elle  ne  cessera  de  prendre  un  int6ret  veritable 
&  leur  prosperite,  et  que  Sa.  M'te.  continue  a  a  y  contribuer  autant 
qu'elle  le  pourra  sans  prejudice  a  ses  propres  int6rets.  Viola,  M., 


360  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

la  doctrine  que  vous  devez  faire  germer  et  que  le  Conseil  du  Roi 
a  £t6  surpris  de  voir  si  mal  6tablie."  Montmorin  to  Moustier, 
June  23,  1788,  American  Historical  Review,  loc.  cit.,  728.  Four 
years  later  the  monarchy  gave  place  to  the  republic  and  Genet 
came  to  the  United  States.  His  "Instructions  d'ArriveV'  contained 
an  interesting  attack  on  the  "Machiavellism"  of  Vergennes'  policy 
toward  America,  the  basis  of  the  charge  being  the  former  minister's 
opposition  to  American  acquisition  of  Canada;  and  the  implication 
was  that  the  new  government  would  be  controlled  by  much  more 
liberal  principles.  Annual  Report  of  the  American  Historical 
Association  for  1903,  II.  202-3.  At  the  same  time  Genet  was  in- 
structed to  get  a  new  treaty  with  the  United  States  extending  the 
articles  with  reference  to  commerce  and  navigation,  "as  the  just 
price  of  the  independence  which  France  won  for  the  United  States," 
and  renewing  the  guaranty  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  of  French 
possessions  in  the  West  Indies.  76.,  207-11.  Both  the  Treaty  of 
Amity  and  Commerce  and  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  were  declared 
"void"  by  the  Senate  on  June  25,  1798,  and  by  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives on  July  7.  This  action  of  the  Houses  was  posited  on 
the  right  of  Congress  to  judge  of  infractions  of  the  Law  of  Na- 
tions, Annals  of  Congress,  5th  Congress,  I.  586-8,  II.  2116-28. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

PROFIT  AND  LOSS 

In  the  ensuing  chapter  I  shall  discuss  the  out- 
come of  French  intervention  in  the  War  of  Inde- 
pendence from  the  point  of  view  of  the  objective 
of  that  enterprise.  The  treaty  of  peace  between 
France  and  England  throws  little  light  on  the 
subject,  albeit  France  obtained  some  minor  ad- 
vantages by  it,  an  island  in  the  West  Indies  which 
she  had  lost  in  1763,  a  strip  of  land  on  the  West 
African  coast,  an  enlargement  of  her  fishing 
rights  in  Newfoundland,  the  suppression  of  the 
articles  relative  to  Dunkirk.  The  treaty  is  signi- 
ficant rather  as  a  symbol.  England,  exhausted 
by  the  war,  "had  not  blushed  to  be  the  first  to 
petition  for  peace,"  and  the  treaty  itself  had 
"erased  the  stain"  of  1763.  Thus  Vergennes 
writes  in  his  Memoire  to  the  King,  of  March  29th, 
1784,  where,  moreover,  he  presents  the  treaty  as 
the  consummation  of  a  period  of  conspicuous  tri- 
umph for  his  entire  system.1 

Louis,  the  minister  records,  had  ruled  but  a 
decade,  yet  within  that  brief  period  he  had  re- 

1S^gur,  Politique  de  Tous  Us  Cabinets,  III.  196-219. 


362  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

stored  peace  to  Europe  no  fewer  than  four  times. 
In  Germany  by  the  Treaties  of  Teschen  he  had 
vindicated  afresh  France's  prerogative  as  guar- 
antor of  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia.  Twice  in  the 
Southeast  he  had  rescued  Turkey,  at  the  cost 
to  that  power  of  some  small  subtractions  of  terri- 
tory, from  the  clutch  of  its  enemies.  Meanwhile, 
the  transparent  disinterestedness  of  His  Majes- 
ty's principles  had  won  the  confidence  of  Europe, 
so  that  all  nations  had  been  content  to  see  him 
"lower  the  pride  of  England  and  labor  for  her 
enfeeblement."2  In  brief,  France  was  once  more 
what  she  had  been,  "the  moderator  and  arbiter" 
of  Europe,  the  power  that  "gave  the  tone"  to  the 
European  concert.  "Placed  in  the  center  of 
Europe,  strong  by  virtue  of  the  contiguity  and 
unity  of  her  provinces,  and  by  the  wealth  and 
population  of  her  soil,"  girt  round  by  protecting 
fortresses  and  by  neighbors  mutually  isolated, 
she  was  free  to  forego  aggrandizement  and  to 
devote  all  her  influence  "to  the  preservation  of 
the  established  order  and  to  preventing  the  differ- 
ent states  which  compose  the  European  balance 
from  being  destroyed."3 

Over  against  this  chant  of  victory  and  accentu- 
ating its  triumphal  note,  stand  the  contemporary 
lamentations  of  Englishmen  at  the  downfall  of 
Britain  through  the  loss  of  her  American  empire. 

'76.,  201. 

*Loc.  cit.     See  also  p.  218. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  363 

"The  greatest  statesmen  whom  England  had  pro- 
duced," writes  Wraxall  of  this  period,  "though 
they  concurred  in  scarcely  any  other  political 
opinion,  yet  agreed  on  the  point  that,  with  the 
defalcation  of  the  Thirteen  Colonies  from  the 
crown,  the  glory  and  greatness  of  Britain  were 
permanently  extinguished."4  The  Parliamen- 
tary debates  support  his  assertion.  "Are  we," 
Burke  caustically  inquired  in  his  speech  on  the 
address  from  the  throne  following  the  receipt  of 
the  news  of  Yorktown, 

are  we  to  be  told  of  the  rights  for  which  we  went  to  war  ? 
Oh,  excellent  rights !  Oh,  valuable  rights  .  .  .  that 
have  cost  England  thirteen  provinces,  four  islands, 
100,000  men,  and  seventy  millions  of  money !  Oh,  won- 
derful rights,  that  have  lost  to  Great  Britain  her  em- 
pire on  the  ocean,  her  boasted,  grand,  and  substantial 
superiority  which  made  the  world  bend  before  her!  Oh, 
inestimable  rights,  that  have  taken  from  us  our  rank 
among  nations,  our  importance  abroad,  and  our  happi- 
ness at  home ;  and  that  have  taken  from  us  our  trade, 
our  manufactures,  and  our  commerce ;  that  have  reduced 
us  from  the  most  flourishing  empire  in  the  world  to 
one  of  the  most  unenviable  powers  on  the  face  of  the 
globe!5 

The  same  sentiment  was  voiced  on  one  occa- 
sion or  other  by  men  of  all  parties,  by  Lord 
George  Germaine,  North's  minister  of  War, 
who  maintained  that  "from  the  instant  when 

4  Historical  Memoirs  (Phila.,  1845),  366. 
8  Parliamentary  History,  XXII.  col.  721. 


364  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

American  independence  should  be  acknowledged 
the  British  empire  was  ruined";6  by  Sir  John 
Cavendish  of  the  Whig  opposition,  who  declared 
that  "the  great  and  splendid  empire  of  Britain 
was  nearly  overturned";7  by  Shelburne,  who  as- 
serted that  "whenever  the  British  Parliament 
should  recognize  the  sovereignty  of  the  Thirteen 
Colonies,  the  sun  of  England's  glory  was  forever 
set."8  A  writer  in  the  Gentleman's  Magazine, 
commenting  on  Great  Britain's  "astonishing  de- 
cline" "from  being  the  first  maritime  power  in  the 
world,"  accounted  for  it  in  the  following  strain 
of  philosophic  resignation: 

In  these  vicissitudes  the  hand  of  Providence,  by 
which  the  government  of  the  world  is  directed,  is  most 
manifest.  Nations  and  peoples  are  permitted  to  arrive 
at  a  certain  pitch  of  greatness,  and  when  at  the  height 
are  doomed  to  fall  to  decay.  None  of  the  great  mon- 
archies of  ancient  time,  so  celebrated  in  history,  nor 
even  the  Republic  of  Rome  itself,  were  ever  in  posses- 
sion of  half  the  territory  which  Great  Britain  could 
boast  at  the  commencement  of  the  reign  of  George  III. 
By  its  so  suddenly  crumbling  to  pieces,  part  after  part, 
does  it  not  seem  that  this  is  a  devoted  Empire?9 

•Wraxall,  op.  tit.,  367. 

''Parliamentary  History,  XXII.  col.   1114. 

8  Same  as  note  6.  And  see  generally  the  debates  on  the  treaties, 
Parliamentary  History,  XXIII.  cols.  373-571. 

•Vol.  LII.  123.  See  also  John  Adams  to  Vergennes,  July  13, 
1780:  "Breaking  off  such  a  nation  as  this  [America]  from  the 
English  so  suddenly  and  uniting  it  so  closely  with  France  is  one 
of  the  most  extraordinary  events  that  ever  happened  among 
mankind,"  Wharton,  III.  855. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  365 

And  not  only  had  Britain  declined :  by  the  same 
token  France  had  become  predominant  once 
more.  The  dominion  of  America,  a  Tory  writer 
had  urged  shortly  before  Cornwallis'  surrender, 
gave  dominion  of  the  seas,  and  France's  calcula- 
tions had  proceeded  from  this  postulate:  "The 
balance  of  power  which  has  from  the  beginning 
of  the  reign  of  Charles  V  been  so  diligently 
studied  in  every  part  of  Europe  as  a  science,  and 
which  is  now  brought  to  a  degree  of  improvement 
unknown  to  the  rusticity  of  former  ages,  could 
not  but  obtrude  itself  in  her  councils."10  "What," 
inquired  the  learned  Dr.  Fothergill,  in  an  "Ad- 
dress" to  his  countrymen,  some  months  later,  "can 
France  gain  by  all  these  expenses  if  she  seeks 
not  for  territorial  possessions  in  America?"  and 
answered  his  own  question  thus : 

Why,  the  uncontrolled  superiority  in  Europe.  For, 
where  is  the  power,  when  America  is  divided  from  us, 
that  can  withstand  her?  Whilst  we  had  America 
France  knew,  and  all  Europe  felt,  that  every  distant 
possession  they  had  were  so  many  obligations  for  her 
peaceable  behaviour.  They  saw  America  growing  so 
populous  and  so  powerful,  her  commerce  increasing  and 
increasing  the  power  of  Great  Britain,  that  nothing  was 
secure  from  us.11 

10  Rivington's  Royal  Gazette  (New  York),  Sept.  29  and  Oct.  3, 
1781. 

"Quoted  in  the  Boston  Evening  Post  and  General  Advertiser 
of  Feb.  23,  1782.  The  learned  doctor  continued  that,  "by  the 
people  of  New  England  only  New  Spain  would  have  been  added 
to  the  British  Empire  in  a  few  years  with  the  succour  of  the 


366  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

"Happy  would  it  be  for  us,"  exclaimed  another 
writer, 

if  the  loss  of  America  was  the  only  evil  we  have  this  day 
to  deplore.  The  independence  of  that  country  is  so 
great  an  object  with  the  different  nations  of  Europe 
that  we  have  armed  nearly  one-half  of  them  in  its  fa- 
vor. .  .  .  The  influence  of  France  in  the  course  of  this 
war  has  risen  to  such  a  pitch  that  renders  it  almost  a 
degree  of  vanity  in  us  to  call  her  any  longer  the  rival  of 
this  country.  She  has  occupied  its  place  in  foreign 
courts  and  has  become  in  a  few  years  the  arbiter  of 
Europe.12 

Even  as  late  as  the  end  of  1782,  we  find  a  writer 
declaring  in  the  London  Chronicle,  that  the  peo- 
ple of  Great  Britain  were 

ready  to  part  with  an  eighth  or  a  quarter  of  all  they 
are  worth  rather  than  accede  to  the  independence  of 
America  and  suffer  so  disgraceful  and  ruinous  a  dismem- 
berment of  the  empire,  which  must  in  its  consequences 
give  to  France  the  dominion  and  commerce  of  the  Euro- 
pean seas  and  render  Great  Britain  the  least  significant 
among  nations.13 


British  fleet,  and  France  knew  that  her  West  Indian  islands  were 
held  by  them  at  our  courtesy  should  a  war  break  out." 

11  Quoted  ib.,  in  issue  of  Mar.  9,  1782.  See  also  the  London  Gen- 
eral Advertiser  of  Mar.  6,  1782,  where  the  following  sentiments 
appear:  "To  how  infamous  and  degraded  a  situation  are  we 
reduced!  .  .  .  What  a  contrast  is  the  king  of  France!  He  is 
without  doubt,  not  only  the  first  monarch  of  his  time,  but  the 
wisest,  greatest,  and  best  of  monarchs  that  ever  sat  upon  any 
throne !" 

"London  Morning  Chronicle,  Nov.  30  and  Dec.  5  and  11,  1782. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  367 

The  common  sense  of  mankind  has  pilloried  in 
numerous  disdainful  maxims  that  odious  species 
of  wisdom  which  parades  itself  after  the  event. 
And  yet  if  the  historian  is  to  be  wise,  qua  histo- 
rian, it  must  be  after  the  event.  The  testimony 
we  have  just  reviewed  goes  far  to  stamp  Ver- 
gennes'  policy  with  the  sanction  of  the  statesman- 
ship of  that  generation.  Indeed,  the  very 
stubbornness  with  which  England  had  resisted 
American  independence  implies  the  same  thing. 
We  of  today,  however,  easily  see  that  the  French 
program,  precisely  as  it  was  deduced  from  cer- 
tain premises,  rested  upon  too  restricted  a  founda- 
tion of  fact,  that  its  results  were  neither  solid  nor 
durable,  and  that,  trifling  as  they  were,  they  were 
obtained  at  suicidal  cost.  Nor  is  this  altogether 
the  wisdom  of  the  autopsy.  Vergennes  himself 
betrayed  no  little  disappointment  in  the  outcome 
of  his  labors. 

The  first  respect  in  which  the  course  of  events 
cheated  the  calculations  underlying  French  in- 
tervention in  the  War  of  Independence  was  the 
swift  recuperation  of  England  from  her  losses. 
For  this  phenomenon,  which,  he  asserts,  had  "no 
parallel  in  the  history  of  the  world,"  Wraxall  ad- 
duces three  causes :  "the  preservation  of  the  Brit- 
ish Constitution";  the  institution  of  the  sinking 
fund  by  Pitt;  and  the  extension  of  British  acqui- 
sitions in  India,  whence  an  annual  revenue  of 
fifteen  millions  sterling,  payable  in  specie,  was 


368  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

soon  drawn.14  The  last  two  causes  were  no  doubt 
potent,  but  they  cooperated  with  still  more 
powerful  ones,  the  rise  of  the  factory  system  at 
this  same  period  and  the  opening  up  of  Eng- 
land's mineral  resources.  In  these  circumstances, 
the  fact  upon  which  perhaps  more  than  any  other 
England's  enemies  had  counted  to  produce  her 
downfall,  became  a  blessing  in  disguise,  the  public 
debt.  Stabilized  by  Pitt's  measures,  the  famous 
"consols"  rendered  British  resources  fluid  and 
turned  them  into  the  channels  of  trade  and  in- 
dustry as  nothing  else  could  have  done. 

Still  it  may  be  urged  that  these  developments 
would  have  occurred  anyway  and  that  the  loss  of 
America  contributed  to  offset  them.  Is  this  so? 
Vergennes'  purpose  was  to  break  down  both  the 
political  and  the  commercial  connection  between 
England  and  America,  and  so  far  as  the  former 
was  concerned  his  success  was  unquestionable. 
Not  only  was  the  aid  which  France  lent  America 
the  efficient  cause  of  the  outcome  of  the  war, 
but  the  sentiment  of  gratitude  which  this  aid 
engendered  among  the  American  people  at  large 
was  a  factor  of  no  little  importance  in  weaning 
the  country  from  its  natural  predilection  for  the 
former  mother-land.15  As  we  have  seen,  the  al- 

"  Op.  tit.,  367-71. 

"For  a  very  pessimistic  account,  from  the  French  point  of 
view,  of  the  American  propension  for  things  English  and  the 
English  themselves,  despite  the  war,  see  a  letter  from  Kalb  to 
Broglie,  quoted  in  Doniol,  IV.  19  fn.  This  letter  was  probably 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  369 

liance  with  France  was  soon  discarded,  but  the 
motive  back  of  the  act  was  not  sympathy  for 
England  but  a  real  vision  of  national  destiny 
which  would  be  foiled  and  frustrated  were  the 
nation  to  be  drawn  into  "the  European  vortex."16 
But  the  more  important  objective  with  the  For- 
eign Office  had  been  the  termination  of  America's 
commercial  dependence  on  England,  to  which, 
indeed,  the  severance  of  the  political  bond  stood 
somewhat  in  the  relation  of  means  to  end.  Yet 

known  to  Vergennes,  as  it  is  among  the  archives  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  chief  reason  for  Vergennes' 
dismay  at  Jay's  behavior  was  the  idea  that  it  sprang  from  a 
pro-English  inclination.  "If,"  he  wrote  La  Luzerne,  "we  may 
judge  of  the  future  from  what  has  passed  here  under  our  eyes, 
we  shall  be  but  poorly  repaid  for  all  we  have  done  for  the  United 
States  and  for  securing  to  them  a  national  existence,"  Wharton, 
VI.  152.  On  this  score,  however,  he  was  reassured  by  La  Luzerne: 
"I  do  not  credit  him  [Jay],"  the  envoy  wrote,  "with  gratitude  to  us, 
but  he  is  incapable  of  preferring  England  to  us ;  he  glories  in  being 
independent,"  etc.,  La  Luzerne  to  Vergennes,  Sept.  26,  1783, 
Steven,  Peace  Transcripts.  On  American  gratitude  to  France,  see 
the  opening  paragraph  of  Pickering's  despatch  of  July  15,  1797,  to 
Pickney,  Marshall,  and  Gerry,  American  State  Papers,  "Foreign 
Relations,"  II.  153.  Cf.  Hamilton's  estimate  of  the  motive  of 
French  aid  and  of  French  policy  following  the  War  of  Indepen- 
dence, Works  of  Alexander  Hamilton  (Constitutional  ed.),  VI. 
206-14. 

"Hence,  of  course,  the  American  policy  of  isolation,  the  first 
and  main  pillar  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  the  same  connec- 
tion see  the  lengthy  letter  (probably  by  Samuel  Adams)  addressed 
"To  the  Public,"  in  the  Boston  Continental  Journal  and  Weekly 
Advertiser  of  May,  1783,  warning  against  suffering  "ourselves, 
either  from  gratitude  or  any  other  principle,  to  engage  in  any 
future  controversies  or  quarrels  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic, 
if  we  mean  to  keep  our  independence,  independent  of  all  the 
world."  See  also  letter  of  John  Adams  in  Wharton,  III.  621  ff. 


370  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

it  is  at  this  point  exactly  that  Vergennes'  reck- 
oning, which,  like  that  of  his  alarmed  English 
contemporaries,  was  based  on  the  teachings  of 
Mercantilism,  went  most  awry.  The  peace  ne- 
gotiations had  not  yet  begun  when  his  auxiliary, 
Dupont,  wrote  Hutton,  early  in  1782,  that  "if 
the  war  is  not  too  long  continued,  the  Americans 
will  be  more  to  England  than  to  us,  since  the 
language  they  speak  and  their  former  relations 
will  naturally  lead  them  to  carry  on  trade  with  the 
English  rather  than  with  France."17  To  be  sure, 
it  does  not  appear  whether  Dupont,  who  was  a 

:T  Doniol,  V.  36-7  fn.  It  would  seem  that  there  was  considerable 
trade  between  England  and  America  even  while  the  war  was  still 
in  progress.  "This,"  writes  Adams  to  the  President  of  Congress, 
June  26,  1781,  "is  a  subject  which  deserves  the  serious  considera- 
tion of  every  American.  British  manufactures  are  going  in  vast 
quantities  to  America  from  Holland,  the  Austrian  Flanders, 
France,  and  Sweden,  as  well  as  by  the  way  of  New  York  and 
Charleston,  etc.,"  Wharton,  IV.  521.  For  a  Congressional  ordi- 
nance designed  to  check  this  trade,  see  Journals  of  Congress,  Dec. 
4,  1781,  XXI.  1152.  For  some  evidence  of  England's  rapid  re- 
covery of  her  American  trade  after  the  Revolution,  see  Moustier 
to  Montmorin,  Feb.  8,  1788,  American  Historical  Review,  VIII.  716, 
where  the  writer  complains  that  the  Americans  use  the  monetary 
proceeds  of  their  trade  with  the  French  islands  to  pay  for  the  mer- 
chandise which  they  import  from  England;  also  Baring's 
Inquiry  into  the  Causes  and  Consequences  of  the  Orders  in 
Council  (London,  1808),  pp.  19  ff.  As  to  French  commerce  with 
the  United  States,  see  a  pamphlet  in  the  Pennsylvania  Historical 
Society's  library  entitled  Causes  qui  se  sont  opposes  au  Progres  du 
Commerce  entre  la  France  et  les  Etats-Unis  (Paris,  1790). 
Franklin's  hope  was  to  see  the  United  States  become  commercially 
independent  of  Europe,  Lee's  Lee,  I.  354. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  371 

disciple  of  Quesnay,  expressed  in  the  passage 
just  quoted  the  views  of  his  superior.  But  the 
commercial  treaty  which  he  negotiated  with  Eng- 
land early  in  1786  affords  unmistakable  evidence 
that  Vergennes'  own  economic  creed  had  under- 
gone considerable  change  since  the  date  of  the 
Expose  Succinct.™  Even  earlier,  moreover,  he 
had  recorded  his  recognition  of  the  fact  that 
American  independence  had  not  touched  the  vital 
sources  of  British  sea-power.  In  the  memoir  of 
March  29th,  1784,  while  asserting  that  France 
had  recovered  her  influence  on  the  Continent,  he 
warned  the  king  that  the  English  fleet  would  soon 
be  "more  numerous  and  more  powerful  than  it 
was  at  the  moment  of  peace,"  and  that  the  only 
guaranty  of  continued  good  relations  with  that 
country  was  the  maintenance  of  the  French  mar- 
ine on  a  respectable  footing.19 

At  this  point,  however,  it  behooves  us  to  re- 
member that  in  Vergennes'  thinking  the  crippling 
of  English  sea-power  was  to  be  contributory  to  a 
far  more  important  end,  the  restoration  of  French 
leadership  on  the  Continent  and  the  establishment 

"This  treaty  abolished  or  lowered  many  protective  duties  be- 
tween the  two  countries,  French  wines  thus  obtaining  entry  to  the 
English  market  in  competition  with  Portuguese,  and  English  man- 
ufactures being  admitted  to  the  French  market.  The  treaty  was 
a  distinct  triumph  for  the  views  of  Adam  Smith  and  the  French 
Physiocrats.  For  contemporary  discussion  of  its  provisions,  see 
Annual  Register,  XXIX.  65  ff. 

18S£gur,  III.  217-8. 


372  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

there  of  a  reign  of  peace.  Unhappily,  this  dream 
— for  it  was  little  more — was  based  on  the  tra- 
dition of  a  Europe  that  no  longer  existed,  of  a 
Europe  in  which  Poland,  Sweden,  and  Turkey 
were  still  effective  units  of  the  balance  of  power ; 
in  which  Prussia  was  still  dependent  on  France; 
in  which  the  House  of  Austria  was  definitely  sec- 
ondary to  the  House  of  Bourbon ;  in  which  Russia 
had  no  voice.  Once  again,  in  other  words,  had 
the  minister  premitted  the  conventional  creed  of 
his  office  to  blind  him  to  the  actual  facts;  and 
once  again,  in  consequence,  is  he  forced  to  record 
his  own  disillusionment.  "What  had  rendered 
peace  so  necessary"  the  year  before,  he  informs  us 
in  the  document  just  cited,  was  "the  swift  rap- 
prochement" of  "the  courts  of  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburg,  which  for  twenty  years  had  dwelt  in 
open  enmity."  It  was,  he  continues,  a  develop- 
ment "calculated  to  arouse  disquiet  and  alarm"; 
and  indeed,  his  whole  tone  reveals  his  own  most 
serious  concern.20  Yet  it  is  difficult  to  see  how, 
even  if  the  outcome  of  the  war  had  been  the  total 
annihilation  of  British  sea-power,  France  would 
have  been  in  any  better  position  to  deal  with  this 
formidable  and  unprecedented  combination  in  the 
Southeast.21 

»/&.,  203  ff. 

nln  this  connection  it  should  be  recalled  that  in  1774  Ver- 
gennes  had  considered  the  feasibility  of  an  Anglo-French  rap- 
prochement directed  against  Russia,  See  chapter  III,  supra. 
After  the  war  Shelburne  propounded  the  same  idea  to  Rayneval. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  373 

In  a  word,  the  restoration  of  French  prestige 
had  altered  the  actual  balance  of  forces  on  the 
Continent  very  little,  if  at  all;  and  by  the  same 
sign,  it  had  gone  but  little  way  toward  guarantee- 
ing the  status  quo  or  a  lasting  peace.  Vergennes' 
own  recognition  of  this  unpleasant  truth  was  as 
frank  as  possible:  'It  was  difficult  to  flatter 
one's  self  of  a  long  peace  or  even  to  regard  the 
existing  one  as  more  than  precarious,  unless  the 
power  to  which  alone  it  belonged  to  give  the  tone 
found  itself  in  position  to  make  itself  respected.' 
This  was  France's  "superb  prerogative";  but 
'good  example  would  not  of  itself  suffice,  were 
it  not  backed  up  by  imposing  means.'  'Of  all 
human  passions,  ambition  was  the  most  active, 
the  one  held  in  leash  with  greatest  difficulty. 
Defect  of  power  alone  could  render  it  passive; 
and  this  could  exist  only  if  His  Majesty  was 
ready  and  willing  to  repell  all  designs  on  the 

Not  only,  said  the  former,  were  France  and  England  not  natural 
enemies  but  they  had  many  interests  in  common  which  ought  to 
cause  them  to  come  to  an  understanding.  There  had  been  a  time 
when  no  one  dared  set  off  a  cannon  in  Europe  without  the  consent 
of  England  and  France,  while  today  the  powers  of  the  North 
assumed  to  stand  by  themselves.  "Let  us  unite  and  we  shall  give 
the  law  to  Europe."  Certainly,  they  were  too  clear-sighted  in 
France  not  to  be  convinced  that  the  system  of  the  German  em- 
pire was  an  unnatural  one,  and  that  Russia  wished  to  enjoy  a 
rdle  and  had  views  which  were  not  harmonious  with  the  interests 
of  France  and  England.  "If  we  are  in  accord  we  shall  take  our 
old  place  once  more  and  shall  be  able  to  arrest  all  revolutions  in 
Europe,"  etc.  RaynevaTs  Report  of  his  Second  Mission  to  Eng- 
land, Doniol,  V.  619-20. 


374  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

public  security  and  tranquility.'  "Force  is  the 
surest  measure  of  respect,  particularly  when  it 
is  exercised  with  wisdom  and  employed  with 
justice."22 

In  1785  Vergennes  scored  his  last  great  diplo- 
matic triumph,  a  settlement  of  difficulties  between 
the  emperor  and  Holland  and  a  close  offensive 
and  defensive  alliance  between  the  latter  power 
and  France.  "The  Count  de  Vergennes,"  com- 
mented the  writer  in  the  Annual  Register,  this 
year 

acquired  the  honor  to  his  country  and  the  glorious  dis- 
tinction to  himself  of  being  the  pacificator  general  of 
the  universe.  It  could  not  but  be  a  grevious  considera- 
tion to  Englishmen  that,  while  France,  through  the 
happiness  of  great  ministers  at  home  and  their  choice 
of  able  negotiators  abroad,  was  spreading  her  conse- 
quence and  extending  her  influence  through  the  nations 
of  the  earth,  Great  Britain  through  some  unaccountable 
fatality  seemed  to  be  fallen  from  that  high  seat  in  which 
she  had  so  long  and  so  gloriously  presided  and  to  be  no 
longer  considered  ...  in  the  general  politics  and  sys- 
tem of  Europe.23 

In  fact,  the  triumph,  resting  as  it  did  on  the 
unstable  basis  of  the  temporary  preponderance 
of  the  Dutch  Republican  party,  was  for  France 
an  empty  one.  Within  a  few  months  the  House 
of  Orange,  actively  backed  by  Pitt,  was  again  in 
control,  and  France  was  signing  a  declaration 

22  Segur,  III.  216-8. 

23  Ib.,  XXVII.   137. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  375 

"agreeing  to  a  general  disarmament  and  asserting 
that  the  king  of  France  had  never  any  intention 
of  interfering  in  the  affairs  of  the  Dutch  Repub- 
lic." "France,"  said  the  emperor  maliciously, 
"has  just  fallen.  I  doubt  if  she  will  ever 


recover."24 


The  words  were  prophetic,  more  prophetic  than 
their  author  could  willingly  have  intended  them 
to  be.  There  were  others,  however,  who  had  al- 
ready begun  to  perceive  how  unreal  France's 
triumph  over  England  had  been  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  how  terribly  real  its  cost  was  like  to  prove. 
One  of  these  was  Burke,  who  in  the  Annual 
Register  for  1787  wrote  as  follows: 

It  seemed  a  grand  stroke  of  policy  to  reduce  the 
power  and  humble  the  pride  of  a  great  and  haughty 
rival.  .  .  .  Nor  was  this  all;  for  as  it  was  universally 
supposed  that  the  loss  of  America  would  prove  an  in- 
curable, if  not  a  mortal  wound  to  England,  so  it  was 
equally  expected  that  the  power  of  the  Gallic  throne 
would  thereby  be  fixed  on  such  a  permanent  founda- 
tions as  never  again  to  be  shaken  by  any  stroke  of  for- 
tune. .  .  .  This  speculation,  like  many  others,  when 
tried  by  the  test  of  dear-bought  experience,  came  to 
nothing,  and  their  fond  hopes  have  already  vanished  in 
smoke.  .  .  .  But  though  the  American  war  failed  in 
producing  its  wished  for  effects  in  respect  to  France,  it 
left  behind  it  other  relics  of  a  less  pleasing  nature.  An 
immense  new  debt,  being  laid  upon  the  back  of  the  old, 

^Hassall,  The  Balance  of  Power,  p.  379,  citing  Marquis  de 
Barral-Montferrat,  Dior  Ans  de  Paix  armde  entre  la  France  et 
I'Angleterre,  178S-9S,  I.  54. 


376  FRENCH  POLICY  AND 

already  too  great,  the  accumulation  became  so  vast  .  .  . 
as  to  exceed  all  inquiry."  "And  as  the  minds  of  men  grow 
attached  to  those  principles  which  they  are  embarked  in 
require  them  to  maintain  .  .  .  ,  the  French  nation,  re- 
sorting more  to  provision  and  principle  by  which  the 
abuses  of  power  are  corrected  than  those  by  which  its 
energy  is  maintained,  have  imbibed  a  love  of  freedom 
nearly  incompatible  with  royalty.25 

Seldom  indeed  has  the  course  of  events  dis- 
played a  more  ironical,  yet  juster  logic,  than  that 
whereby  the  last  considerable  achievement  of  the 
Classical  diplomacy — an  achievement  that  had 
been  planned  to  secure  Europe  peace  and  repose 
for  many  years — had  within  a  decade  become  the 
funeral  pyre  of  the  Old  Regime  and  the  starting- 
point  of  a  conflagration  more  than  Continental. 

Early  this  same  year  Vergennes  died,  just  as 
the  Assembly  of  Notables  was  convening  to  make 
a  last  effort  to  rescue  the  monarchy  from  bank- 
ruptcy without  at  the  same  time  invading  pre- 
scriptive rights.  So  his  passing  was  synchronous 
with  the  passing  of  the  order  on  whose  outworn 
ideals  and  outlook  he  had  reared  his  whole  ambi- 
tious and  mistaken  structure.  Yet  the  temper  of 
his  purpose  was  something  more  permanent;  for 
the  cold  sophistry  of  the  diplomat  enwrapped  the 
ardor  of  the  patriot,  as  witness  the  words  in  which 
he  shaped,  for  the  last  time  as  it  seems,  an  apol- 
ogy for  his  American  venture : 

"Annual  Register,  XXIX.  174-8. 


THE  AMERICAN  ALLIANCE  377 

A  nation  [he  wrote]  can  experience  reverses,  and  it 
ought  to  yield  to  the  imperious  law  of  necessity  and  its 
own  preservation ;  but  when  such  reverses  and  the  humili- 
ation they  entail  are  unjust,  when  they  have  for  their 
end  the  gratification  of  the  pride  of  a  powerful  rival, 
then  the  nation  owes  it  to  its  own  honor,  dignity,  and 
self  respect,  to  retrieve  itself  when  occasion  offers.  If 
it  neglects  to  do  so,  if  fear  holds  it  back  from  duty,  it 
adds  abasement  to  humiliation  and  becomes  the  object 
of  contempt  of  its  own  age  and  of  ages  to  come.  These 
important  truths,  Sire,  have  never  been  absent  from  my 
thoughts.  They  were  already  deeply  graven  on  my 
heart  when  Your  Majesty  called  me  to  His  Council,  and 
I  awaited  with  lively  impatience  the  opportunity  of  fol- 
lowing their  lead.  These  are  the  thoughts  that  fixed 
my  attention  on  the  Americans,  that  made  me  watch  for 
and  seize  the  moment  when  Your  Majesty  could  assist 
that  oppressed  people  with  a  well-founded  hope  of 
effectuating  their  deliverance.  If  I  had  had  other  senti- 
ments, other  principles,  other  views,  I  should  have  be- 
trayed your  confidence  and  the  interests  of  the  State; 
I  should  regard  myself  as  unworthy  of  serving  Your 
Majesty,  I  should  regard  myself  as  unworthy  the  name 
of  Frenchman.26 

28  Doniol,  I.  3-4. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

My  principal  source  has  been  the  material 
from  the  Archives  of  the  French  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs  to  be  found  in  Henri  Doniol's 
Histoire  de  la  Participation  de  la  France  a 
rEtablissement  des  Etats-Unis  d'Amerique, 
Correspondance  Diplomatique  et  Documents,  a 
work  in  five  large  quarto  volumes,  containing 
some  four  thousand  pages,  and  in  process  of  pub- 
lication for  fifteen  years  (1884-99).  The  work 
embodies  four  sorts  of  text:  first,  the  author's 
narrative,  which  is  in  large  type  and  is  frequently 
a  running  paraphrase  of  documentary  material; 
secondly,  documentary  material  in  small  type  set 
in  the  narrative;  thirdly,  footnotes  in  fine  type 
containing  further  documentary  material  and  the 
references  to  the  Archives;  fourthly,  documen- 
tary appendices  to  the  individual  chapters  in 
small  type.  The  proportion  of  purely  docu- 
mentary material  to  the  author's  narrative  may 
be  illustrated  from  volume  II,  which  is  fairly 
illustrative  of  the  set.  This  volume  contains  864 
pages,  of  which  the  extracts  from  documents  fill 
better  than  580  pages,  printed  in  small  and  fine 
type.  Making  the  proper  allowance  for  the  dif- 
ferent sizes  of  type,  I  calculate  that  nearly,  if 
not  quite,  four-fifths  of  the  material  in  these 

379 


380  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

volumes  is  source  material.  Nor  can  there  be 
any  doubt  as  to  the  thoroughly  representative 
character  of  this  material;  indeed,  its  essential 
completeness.  Primarily,  of  course,  I  base  this 
conclusion  upon  my  perusal  of  the  work,  but  I 
am  confirmed  in  it  by  the  examination  of  such 
works  as  the  Stevens  Facsimiles,,  Circourt's  His- 
toire  de  V Action  Commune,  and  Mr.  Phillips' 
scholarly  essay  on  The  West  in  the  Diplomacy 
of  the  American  Revolution.  It  may  be  confi- 
dently asserted  that  conclusions  which  are  se- 
curely based  on  the  material  in  Doniol  can  only 
be  confirmed  by  further  research  in  the  Archives. 
Conversely,  for  an  American  student,  with 
limited  time  at  his  disposal,  to  attempt  an  in- 
vestigation of  the  Archives  without  a  thorough 
acquaintance  with  Doniol  to  begin  with,  would 
be  deliberately  to  incur  the  risk  of  one-sided  and 
ill-considered,  however  surprising,  results. 

But,  of  course,  there  are  certain  phases  of  the 
subject  of  French  intervention  in  the  War  of 
Independence  with  which  Doniol  does  not  pre- 
tend to  deal,  while  on  the  phases  with  which  he 
does  deal  he  throws,  for  the  most  part,  only  the 
light  shed  by  the  French  correspondence.  Thus 
he  ignores  altogether  the  background  afforded 
the  subject  by  the  history  of  eighteenth  century 
French  diplomacy,  and  by  Choiseul's  attitude 
toward  the  initial  phases  of  the  British- Ameri- 
can dispute.  To  sketch  in  this  background  is, 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  381 

accordingly,  the  purpose  of  the  first  two  chapters 
of  the  present  volume,  with  which  should  also  be 
grouped  the  last  chapter.  The  material  there 
used,  of  which  the  most  important  items  are  the 
voluminous  Recueil  des  Instructions,  the  elder 
Segur's  Politique  de  Tons  les  Cabinets,  De 
Witt's  Thomas  Jefferson,  Soulange-Bodin's 
Pacte  de  Famille,  Bourguet's  Due  de  Choiseul  et 
r Alliance  Espagnole,  Flassan's  Histoire  Gen- 
erale  et  Raisonnee  de  la  Diplomatic  Francaise, 
and  various  memoirs,  is  cited  in  the  footnotes 
with  full  bibliographical  data,  which  need  not  be 
repeated  here. 

It  is  also  valuable,  particularly  in  connection 
with  the  dealings  of  the  French  envoys  with  the 
Continental  Congress  and  with  the  final  Peace 
Negotiations,  to  supplement  the  French  material 
from  the  American  sources.  These  are  to  be 
found  principally  in  Wharton's  great  work  and 
the  Journals  of  the  Continental  Congress,  both 
of  which  have  been  thoroughly  utilized  in  the 
present  volume.  In  the  same  connection,  I  had 
also  previously  gone  through  a  large  mass  of 
newspaper  material,  but  my  gleanings  from  this 
have  turned  out  to  be  of  use  only  to  illustrate 
public  opinion  at  times.  Finally,  of  the  writings 
of  American  public  men  of  the  period,  those  of 
Jay,  Madison,  Charles  Thomson,  the  secretary 
of  Congress,  and  Deane  have  proved  to  be  of 
most  value. 


382  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Hardly  less  important,  however,  than  the 
American  aspect  of  French  intervention  is  the 
Spanish  phase,  and  for  that  I  have  had  to  rely 
again  principally  on  Doniol;  but  for  a  reason 
stated  in  the  text,  this  is  hardly  matter  for  regret, 
for  as  I  point  out,  the  Spanish  ambassador  at 
Paris  throughout  the  Revolution,  the  Count 
d'Aranda,  did  not  enjoy  the  confidence  of  his 
government,  with  the  result  that  the  French- 
Spanish  negotiations  were  conducted  almost  ex- 
clusively through  the  French  ambassador  at 
Madrid,  the  despatches  to  whom  and  the  reports 
from  whom  are  given  by  Doniol  with  his  usual 
thoroughness.  Only  at  two  points,  and  those 
bearing  only  remotely  on  the  subject  of  this 
volume,  is  it  possible  that  the  Spanish  archives 
might  prove  of  material  value.  Thus,  in  con- 
nection with  the  Spanish  mediation  of  1778  it 
would  be  interesting  to  have  the  correspondence 
between  Florida  Blanca  and  Almodovar,  the 
Spanish  ambassador  at  London;  while  in  con- 
nection with  Cumberland's  secret  mission  to 
Spain  in  1780,  there  may  be  Spanish  material 
that  would  clarify  Florida  Blanca's  rather  am- 
biguous attitude  at  this  period.  But  for  the  most 
part,  it  is  clear,  that  the  Spanish  material  touch- 
ing the  subject  of  French  intervention  is  of 
negligible  worth,  a  conclusion  which  is  well  borne 
out  by  such  portions  of  this  material  as  are  to  be 
found  in  the  Sparks  Mss.  in  the  Harvard  Uni- 
versity Library. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  383 

Lastly,  there  are  points  at  which  the  English 
point  of  view  is  of  importance  in  connection  with 
the  theme  of  this  volume.  In  such  cases,  for  the 
Parliamentary  debates  I  have  used  the  Parlia- 
mentary History;  as  a  record  of  English  public 
opinion  and  a  repository  of  public  documents, 
the  Annual  Register;  for  the  correspondence  of 
the  British  government  with  its  ambassador  at 
Paris  and  the  reports  of  British  spies,  the  Ste- 
vens Facsimiles;  and  for  material  bearing  on  the 
final  Peace  negotiations,  the  Peace  Transcripts, 
also  compiled  by  Stevens  and  now  in  the  Library 
of  Congress. 

For  further  data  bearing  on  the  works  just 
mentioned,  as  well  as  on  the  numerous  lesser 
works,  pamphlets,  articles  in  periodicals,  etc., 
that  were  also  used  in  the  preparation  of  the 
present  volume,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the 
footnotes. 


APPENDICES 


(a) 

TREATY    OF    ALLIANCE,1 

concluded  at  Paris,  February  6,  1778 ;  ratiBed  by  Con- 
gress May  4,  1778. 

ARTICLES 

I.  Alliance  against  Great  Britain. 

II.  Independence  of  the  United  States. 

III.  Efforts  to  be  made  against  Great  Britain. 

IV.  Concurrent  operations. 

V.   Conquests  to  belong  to  United  States. 
VI.  Relinquishment  of  territory  by  France. 
VII.   Conquests  to  belong  to  France. 
VIII.  Islands  in  Gulf  of  Mexico. 
IX.  Renunciation  of  Claims. 
X.  Powers  invited  to  accede  to  alliance. 
XI.  Proprietary  rights. 
XII.  Duration. 
XIII.  Ratification. 

The  Most  Christian  King  and  the  United  States  of 
North  America,  to  wit:  New  Hampshire,  Massachus- 
etts Bay,  Rhode  Island,  Connecticut,  New  York,  New 
Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware,  Maryland,  Virginia, 
North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and  Georgia,  having 
this  day  concluded  a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce,  for 
the  reciprocal  advantage  of  their  subjects  and  citizens, 

*Text  from  Wm.  Malloy,  Treaties,  Conventions,  etc.  (Washing- 
ton, 1910). 


386  APPENDICES 

have  thought  it  necessary  to  take  into  consideration  the 
means  of  strengthening  those  engagements,  and  of  ren- 
dering them  useful  to  the  safety  and  tranquility  of  the 
two  parties ;  particularly  in  case  Great  Britain,  in  re- 
sentment of  that  connection  and  of  the  good  corre- 
spondence which  is  the  object  of  the  said  treaty,  should 
break  the  peace  with  France,  either  by  direct  hostilities 
or  by  hindering  her  commerce  and  navigation  in  a  man- 
ner contrary  to  the  rights  of  nations,  and  the  peace 
subsisting  between  the  two  Crowns.  And  His  Majesty 
and  the  said  United  States,  having  resolved  in  that  case 
to  join  their  councils  and  efforts  against  the  enterprises 
of  their  common  enemy,  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries 
impowered  to  concert  the  clauses  and  conditions  proper 
to  fulfil  the  said  intentions,  have,  after  the  most  mature 
deliberation,  concluded  and  determined  on  the  follow- 
ing articles : 

ARTICLE  I 

If  war  should  break  out  between  France  and  Great 
Britain  during  the  continuance  of  the  present  war  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  England,  His  Majesty  and 
the  said  United  States  shall  make  it  a  common  cause 
and  aid  each  other  mutually  with  their  good  offices, 
their  counsels  and  their  forces,  according  to  the  exi- 
gence of  conjunctures,  as  becomes  good  and  faithful 
allies. 

ARTICLE  II 

The  essential  and  direct  end  of  the  present  defensive 
alliance  is  to  maintain  effectually  the  liberty,  sover- 
eignty, and  independence  absolute  and  unlimited,  of  the 
said  United  States,  as  well  in  matters  of  government  as 
of  commerce. 

ARTICLE  III 

The  two  contracting  parties  shall  each  on  its  own 
part,  and  in  the  manner  it  may  judge  most  proper, 


APPENDICES  387 

make  all  the  efforts  in  its  power  against  their  common 
enemy,  in  order  to  attain  the  end  proposed. 

ARTICLE  IV 

The  contracting  parties  agree  that  in  case  either  of 
them  should  form  any  particular  enterprise  in  which 
the  concurrence  of  the  other  may  be  desired,  the  party 
whose  concurrence  is  desired,  shall  readily,  and  with 
good  faith,  join  to  act  in  concert  for  that  purpose,  as 
far  as  circumstances  and  its  own  particular  situation 
will  permit;  and  in  that  case,  they  shall  regulate,  by  a 
particular  convention,  the  quantity  and  kind  of  succor 
to  be  furnished,  and  the  time  and  manner  of  its  being 
brought  into  action,  as  well  as  the  advantages  which 
are  to  be  its  compensation. 

ARTICLE  V 

If  the  United  States  should  think  fit  to  attempt  the 
reduction  of  the  British  power,  remaining  in  the  nor- 
thern parts  of  America,  or  the  islands  of  Bermudas, 
those  countries  or  islands,  in  case  of  success,  shall  be 
confederated  with  or  dependant  upon  the  said  United 
States. 

ARTICLE  VI 

The  Most  Christian  King  renounces  forever  the  pos- 
session of  the  islands  of  Bermudas,  as  well  as  of  any 
part  of  the  continent  of  North  America,  which  before 
the  treaty  of  Paris  in  1763,  or  in  virtue  of  that  treaty, 
were  acknowledged  to  belong  to  the  Crown  of  Great 
Britain,  or  to  the  United  States,  heretofore  called 
British  Colonies,  or  which  are  at  this  time,  or  have 
lately  been  under  the  power  of  the  King  and  Crown  of 
Great  Britain. 

ARTICLE  VII 
If  His  Most  Christian  Majesty  shall  think  proper  to 


388  APPENDICES 

attack  any  of  the  islands  situated  in  the  Gulph  of 
Mexico,  or  near  that  Gulph,  which  are  at  present  under 
the  power  of  Great  Britain,  all  the  said  isles,  in  case 
of  success,  shall  appertain  to  the  Crown  of  France. 

ARTICLE  VIII 

Neither  of  the  two  parties  shall  conclude  either  truce 
or  peace  with  Great  Britain  without  the  formal  consent 
of  the  other  first  obtained;  and  they  mutually  engage 
not  to  lay  down  their  arms  until  the  independence  of  the 
United  States  shall  have  been  formally  or  tacitly  as- 
sured by  the  treaty  or  treaties  that  shall  terminate  the 
war. 

ARTICLE  IX 

The  contracting  parties  declare,  that  being  resolved 
to  fulfil  each  on  its  own  part  the  clauses  and  conditions 
of  the  present  treaty  of  alliance,  according  to  its  own 
power  and  circumstances,  there  shall  be  no  after  claim 
of  compensation  on  one  side  or  the  other,  whatever  may 
be  the  event  of  the  war. 

ARTICLE  X 

The  Most  Christian  King  and  the  United  States 
agree  to  invite  or  admit  other  powers  who  may  have 
received  injuries  from  England,  to  make  common  cause 
with  them,  and  to  accede  to  the  present  alliance,  under 
such  conditions  as  shall  be  freely  agreed  to  and  settled 
between  all  the  parties. 

ARTICLE  XI 

The  two  parties  guarantee  mutually  from  the  pres- 
ent time  and  forever  against  all  other  powers,  to  wit: 
The  United  States  to  His  Most  Christian  Majesty,  the 
present  possessions  of  the  Crown  of  France  in  America, 
as  well  as  those  which  it  may  acquire  by  the  future 


APPENDICES  389 

treaty  of  peace:  And  His  Most  Christian  Majesty 
guarantees  on  his  part  to  the  United  States  their  lib- 
erty, sovereignty  and  independence,  absolute  and  un- 
limited, as  well  in  matters  of  government  as  commerce, 
and  also  their  possessions,  and  the  additions  or  con- 
quests that  their  confederation  may  obtain  during  the 
war,  from  any  of  the  dominions  now,  or  heretofore  pos- 
sessed by  Great  Britain  in  North  America,  conformable 
to  the  5th  and  6th  articles  above  written,  the  whole  as 
their  possessions  shall  be  fixed  and  assured  to  the  said 
States,  at  the  moment  of  the  cessation  of  their  present 
war  with  England. 

ARTICLE  XII 

In  order  to  fix  more  precisely  the  sense  and  applica- 
tion of  the  preceding  article,  the  contracting  parties  de- 
clare, that  in  case  of  a  rupture  between  France  and 
England  the  reciprocal  guarantee  declared  in  the  said 
article  shall  have  its  full  force  and  effect  the  moment 
such  war  shall  break  out ;  and  if  such  rupture  shall  not 
take  place,  the  mutual  obligations  of  the  said  guarantee 
shall  not  commence  until  the  moment  of  the  cessation 
of  the  present  war  between  the  United  States  and  Eng- 
land shall  have  ascertained  their  possessions. 

ARTICLE  XIII 

The  present  treaty  shall  be  ratified  on  both  sides,  and 
the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  in  the  space  of  six 
months,  or  sooner  if  possible. 

In  faith  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries,  to 
wit:  On  the  part  of  the  Most  Christian  King,  Conrad 
Alexander  Gerard,  Royal  Syndic  of  the  city  of  Stras- 
bourgh,  and  Secretary  of  His  Majesty's  Council  of 
State;  and  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  Benjamin 
Franklin,  Deputy  to  the  General  Congress  from  the 
State  of  Pennsylvania,  and  President  of  the  Convention 


390  APPENDICES 

of  the  same  State,  Silas  Deane,  heretofore  Deputy  from 
the  State  of  Connecticut,  and  Arthur  Lee,  Councellor 
at  Law,  have  signed  the  above  articles  both  in  the 
French  and  English  languages,  declaring,  nevertheless, 
that  the  present  treaty  was  originally  composed  and 
concluded  in  the  French  language,  and  they  have  here- 
unto affixed  their  seals. 

Done  at  Paris,  this  sixth  day  of  February,  one  thou- 
sand seven  hundred  and  seventy-eight. 

(Seal.)  C.  A.  GERARD. 

(Seal.)  B.  FRANKLIN. 

(Seal.)  SILAS  DEANE. 

(Seal.)  ARTHUR  LEE. 


Act  Separate  and  Secret  Reserving  Right  of  King  of 

Spain  to  Agree  to  the  Foregoing  Treaties, 

concluded  February  6,  1778;  ratified  by  the  Continental 

Congress  May  4,  1778,  ratifications  exchanges  at 

Paris  July  17,  1778. 

The  most  Christian  King  declared  in  consequence  of 
the  intimate  union  which  subsists  between  him  and  the 
King  of  Spain,  that  in  concluding  with  the  United 
States  of  America  this  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce, 
and  that  of  eventual  and  defensive  alliance,  his  Majesty 
hath  intended,  and  intends,  to  reserve  expressly,  as  he 
reserves  by  this  present  separate  and  secret  act,  to  his 
said  Catholick  Majesty  the  power  of  acceding  to  the 
said  treatys,  and  to  participate  in  their  stipulations  at 
such  time  as  he  shall  judge  proper.  It  being  well  un- 
derstood, nevertheless,  that  if  any  of  the  stipulations 
of  the  said  treatys  are  not  agreeable  to  the  King  of 
Spain,  His  Catholick  Majesty  may  propose  other  con- 
ditions analogous  to  the  principal  aim  of  the  alliance 


APPENDICES  391 

and  conformable  to  the  rules  of  equality,  reciprocity 
and  friendship. 

The  Deputies  of  the  United  States,  in  the  name  of 
their  constituents,  accept  the  present  declaration  in 
its  full  extent,  and  the  Deputy  of  the  said  States  who 
is  fully  impowered  to  treat  with  Spain  promises  to  sign, 
on  the  first  requisition  of  His  Catholic  Majesty,  the  act 
or  acts  necessary  to  communicate  to  him  the  stipula- 
tions of  the  treaties  above  written ;  and  the  said  Deputy 
shall  endeavor,  in  good  faith,  the  adjustment  of  the 
points  in  which  the  King  of  Spain  may  propose  any 
alteration  conformable  to  the  principles  of  equality, 
reciprocity,  and  the  most  sincere  and  perfect  amity,  he, 
the  said  Deputy,  not  doubting  but  that  the  person  or 
persons  impower'd  by  His  Catholic  Majesty  to  treat 
with  the  United  States  will  do  the  same  with  regard  to 
any  alterations  of  the  same  kind  that  may  be  thought 
necessary  by  the  said  Plenipotentiary  of  the  United 
States.  * 

In  faith  whereof  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have 
signed  the  present  separate  and  secret  article,  and  af- 
fixed to  the  same  their  seals. 

Done  at  Paris  this  sixth  day  of  February,  one  thou- 
sand seven  hundred  and  seventy-eight. 

(Seal.)  C.  A.   GERARD. 

(Seal.)  B.  FRANKLIN. 

(Seal.)  SILAS  DEANE. 

(Seal.)  ARTHUR  LEE. 

Deputy,  Plenipotentiary  for  France  and  Spain. 


392  APPENDICES 

II 

REFLEXIONS  WHICH  MAY  PERHAPS  PRESENT  SOME  NEW 
IDEAS  UPON  THE  GREAT  AND  IMPORTANT  AFFAIRS  OF 

AMERICA.1 

7  January  1777. 

The  arrival  of  Mr.  Franklin  in  France  has  given  rise 
to  reflections  which  may  perhaps,  present  some  new  ideas 
upon  the  great  and  important  affairs  of  America. 

The  present  state  of  those  affairs  and  the  role  which 
Mr.  Franklin  plays  therein  does  not  allow  an  observant 
person  to  doubt  that  this  American  is  deputed  to  come 
with  certain  propositions  to  France  in  the  critical  po- 
sition in  which  his  country  finds  herself  of  having  to 
achieve  absolute  independence  or  of  falling  again  under 
the  rule  of  England,  and  even  of  seeing  her  position  ag- 
gravated, if  the  fortune  of  war  is  against  her. 

If  we  turn  our  attention  more  closely  to  the  true  in- 
terests of  America,  of  France  and  of  England  with  re- 
gard to  this  important  object,  we  easily  recognize  that, 
in  the  actual  position  of  things,  America  has  proposi- 
tions so  absolute,  so  urgent,  to  make  to  France,  that  it 
is  as  difficult  for  her  not  to  come  to  a  decision,  as  it  is 
essential  and  pressing  for  her  to  determine  wisely. 

It  is  not  for  us,  (the  writer)  supposing  that  such 
propositions  existed,  to  go  so  far  as  to  pronounce  upon 
what  it  is  expedient  to  do.  That  point  exceeds  our 
province.  But  one  may  be  justified,  as  a  good  subject 
of  the  King,  and  without  overstepping  the  zeal  with 
which  one  is  animated  for  his  service  in  considering 
what  may  be  the  consequences  of  the  course  for  or 
against,  to  be  taken  in  the  circumstances. 

One  may  suppose  then  that  America  has  at  the  pres- 
ent time  a  twofold  plan  of  action  demanding  equal 


no.  619.     Though  the  work  of  a  "private  citizen,"  this 
memoir  was  probably  prepared  for  the  Council,  Doniol  II.  118. 


APPENDICES  396 

urgency:  either  to  obtain  with  the  aid  of  France  and 
Spain,  her  complete  independence  or  to  extort  an  ac- 
knowledgment of  it  from  England  itself. 

The  argument  which  the  United  Colonies  of  North 
America  may  use  to  France  is  to  say  to  her:  "Assist 
us  to  win  our  complete  liberty  and  you  will  derive  there- 
from honour  and  advantage  by  the  Treaty  Offensive  and 
Defensive  and  that  of  Commerce  which  we  offer  you, 
or  leave  us  to  treat  with  England  at  your  peril  and  risk 
if  it  is  achieved." 

On  the  other  hand  the  proposition  which  America,  to 
arrive  equally  at  the  goal  of  her  independence,  may 
make  to  England  is  the  following: 

"We  have  been  fighting,"  she  may  say,  "for  two  years 
past  for  a  rightful  liberty.  The  probabilities  for  and 
against,  so  to  speak,  are  at  the  present  time  equal;  the 
issue  will  become  a  certainty  if  we  join  with  France 
and  Spain.  Grant  us  generously  what  we  are  in  a  po- 
sition to  wrest  from  you,  and  here  is  the  price  we  put 
upon  the  just  independence  which  we  desire.  A 
treaty,  as  glorious  for  the  mother  country  as  for  her 
colony,  being  signed,  take  twenty,  thirty  thousand 
men  of  our  troops  which  are  all  ready,  you  have  your 
vessels  on  our  coasts,  go  possess  yourselves  therewith  of 
St.  Domingo,  Martinique,  Guadaloupe,  drive  the  French 
entirely  out  of  America  and  you  will  have  in  the  new 
possessions  which  you  acquire  an  ample  equivalent  for 
what  you  cede  to  us;  an  equivalent  more  productive, 
better  suited  to  the  nature  of  your  territories,  and  one 
henceforward  impregnable  in  your  hands  because  we 
will  be  its  guardians,  its  defenders,  as  well  as  the  nurses 
of  its  prosperity,  and,  being  already  your  brothers  by 
blood  and  becoming  bound  to  you  by  a  memorable  treaty 
we  shall  thus  be  doubly  your  allies  and  much  more  sure 
allies  than  if  we  remained  subordinate  and  discontented 
subjects." 


394  APPENDICES 

(•••••  • 

If  it  were  permitted  to  a  private  citizen  to  extend  his 
reflections  further  upon  the  question  of  the  justice  of 
a  war  with  England  in  the  present  conjuncture  it  might 
be  observed  that  the  war  which  we  may  have  with  that 
crown,  as  things  stand,  would  not  exactly  possess  the 
characteristics  of  which  we  have  been  speaking.  It 
would  indeed  be  rather  a  war  of  self-defense,  if  the 
propositions  of  which  we  have  spoken  above  existed. 
Indeed,  France  having  the  safety  of  her  own  possessions 
compromised  has  thenceforth  only  to  choose  between  the 
course  of  furnishing  America  with  the  aid  she  asks  for 
or  of  seeing  an  oppressed  colony  or  (and)  an  ambitious 
mother  country  treating  on  their  own  account  and  of 
taking  upon  herself  the  consequence  of  their  agreement. 
If  that  danger  has  any  foundation  in  fact,  then  it  is 
a  league  prejudicial  to  her  own  repose,  prejudicial  to 
her  possessions,  which  she  breaks.  It  is  a  peril  which 
she  provides  against  and  averts,  and  that  peril  well 
defined,  which  politically  speaking  is  most  certain,  is 
perhaps  a  sufficient  reason,  of  justice  as  much  as  of 
state,  to  warrant  a  determination  of  that  kind. 

Basing  our  conclusion  upon  all  these  reflections  as 
well  as  upon  justice,  it  remains  for  us  to  give  our  idea 
of  the  extent  and  consequences  of  the  revolution  which 
is  preparing,  the  main  object  of  this  writing. 

If  it  is  accomplished  by  our  means,  it  ought  while 
lowering  England  to  raise  France  in  a  corresponding 
degree  and  restore  her  to  her  rank.  It  may  even  offer 
the  most  fortunate  opportunities  for  making  a  sure 
work,  seeing  that  England,  with  her  resources  already 
wasted,  is  almost  unguarded  at  home,  and  that  she  pre- 
sents there  and  elsewhere  opportunities  to  strike  a 
nearly  certain  and  absolutely  decisive  blow.  Lastly 
the  present  conjuncture,  a  conjuncture  which  the  revo- 


APPENDICES  395 

lutions  of  time  so  rarely  offer,  is  such  that  it  may  have 
an  influence  upon  the  state  of  France  and  upon  that  of 
Europe,  always  to  the  advantage  of  this  kingdom,  which 
the  longest  ages  will  not  be  able  to  disturb. 

If  America  is  severed  from  England  with  our  aid, 
thenceforward  all  the  possessions  of  that  country  in 
that  part  of  the  world  fall,  and  ours  establish  them- 
selves there  upon  the  firmest  foundations.  Since  the 
two  great  sources  of  England's  commerce,  the  sole  basis 
of  her  fortune,  are  in  America  and  in  Asia,  one  of  the 
great  sinews  of  that  power  is  thenceforth  cut;  and  if 
we  hasten  promptly  and  effectually  to  provide  for  the 
safety  of  the  Isle  of  France  (a  post  which  can  alone 
preserve  India  entire  and  give  security  to  our  future 
projects  there)  we  shall  at  leisure  and  at  opportunity 
provide  suitably  against  the  excessive  power  which 
England  is  tending  to  usurp  there :  in  which  we  shall  be 
the  more  assisted  as  the  finances  of  England  must  needs 
be  thrown  completely  out  of  gear  by  the  ill-success  of 
this  war;  and  her  public  wealth  being  nothing  but  an 
exaggerated  and  almost  artificial  credit,  she  ought  to 
be  doubly  overthrown  both  by  the  expenses  of  this  war 
and  by  the  loss  of  her  possessions,  the  only  pledge  for 
the  truly  imaginary  credit  which  has  grown  up  in  that 
nation,  and  which  her  constitution,  aided  by  successes, 
has  much  favoured. 

The  consequences  of  this  revolution  ought,  as  we 
think,  to  be  still  more  widespread.  Such  an  event  in 
our  opinion,  changes  forthwith,  to  the  advantage  of 
France,  the  political  state  of  Europe  and  even  repairs 
the  bad  effects  of  the  fatal  war  of  Poland  which  has 
destroyed  the  balance  of  the  Germanic  body  established 
with  so  much  difficulty  by  a  war  of  forty  years  and  the 
celebrated  treaty  of  Westphalia. 

England,  who  weighed  too  heavily  in  the  contrary 
balance  which  produced  this  change,  reduced  to  her 


396  APPENDICES 

natural  state,  could  no  longer  be  of  any  assistance  to 
Russia  and  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  who  as  yet  have 
only  a  forced  extension  of  power  the  unconsolidated 
fortune  of  which  depends  much  on  the  rare  qualities  of 
the  rulers,  who,  in  spite  of  their  success,  have  only  suc- 
ceeded in  disturbing  the  equilibrium  of  Germany  with- 
out having  given  it  another  fixed  constitution,  since 
there  are  two  rival  monarchies  seeking  to  establish 
themselves  upon  the  ruin  of  that  aristocracy  and  a 
third  monarchy,  Russia,  strives  to  force  a  way  into  it, 
a  state  of  things  which  substitutes  a  conflict  or  a  new 
war  for  the  old  condition  of  things,  the  decaying  con- 
dition of  the  Germanic  body. 

It  is  true  that  the  new  house  of  Austria,  by  this 
revolution  regains  the  preponderance  in  Germany 
which  we  had  taken  away  and  that  naturally  she  also 
ought  to  find  in  the  weakening  of  England  means  of  in- 
creasing her  power.  But  in  what  respect  may  France 
find  her  interests  injured  thereby?  In  their  common 
elevation  the  point  is  so  strongly  in  her  favour  that 
she  has  nothing  to  wish  for  in  that  respect.  If  the 
maritime  power  of  England  falls,  France  naturally  and 
invincibly  takes  her  place  whether  by  the  advancement 
of  her  distant  acquisitions  or  by  the  favourable  position 
of  her  territories.  Her  pre-eminence  in  this  respect, 
too,  will  be  so  constant,  so  certain;  besides,  the  new 
kind  of  power  which  she  will  acquire  is  in  itself  so  im- 
portant, so  decisive,  considering  the  present  customs 
of  Europe,  that  it  is  much  rather  to  be  feared  this  ex- 
cessive pre-eminence  may  be  noticed  and  may  excite 
resistance.  Consequently,  looking  at  this  double  in- 
crease, the  desire  of  the  houses  of  Bourbon  and  Austria 
for  union  would  be  better  fulfilled  by  these  circum- 
stances than  by  any  others  which  could  ever  arise,  for, 
lastly,  firm  treaties  are  not  formed  nor  maintained  ex- 
cept by  mutual  advantages.  In  short  nothing  can  hap- 


APPENDICES  397 

pen  more  essential  for  France,  in  her  real  and  in  her 
relative  power,  than  the  absolute  consummation  of  this 
revolution.  By  her  position  alone  she  inherits  all  that 
England  loses;  and  without  even  going  so  far  as  to 
pluck  them,  she  sees  drop  from  the  hands  of  her  rival 
the  chief  branches  of  that  rival's  fortune ;  all  this  debris 
comes  of  itself  to  increase  her  own,  and  time  alone  as- 
sures her  without  any  effort,  a  two-fold  power,  on  sea 
and  on  land,  which  she  has  never  been  able  to  unite  and 
which  strengthening  each  other  will  put  her  above 
attack. 

Taking  now  a  collective  view  of  this  statement  of 
facts  all  the  importance  of  the  resolution  which  France 
is  called  upon  to  make  presents  itself  to  the  mind.  The 
question  is,  according  to  the  laws  of  nature,  as  to  the 
liberty  of  one  of  the  four  quarters  of  the  world  held 
captive  by  one  of  the  European  powers :  in  two  words,  it 
is  a  question  of  giving  America  to  the  whole  world; 
politically,  it  is  a  question  of  putting  right  the  state  of 
Europe  and  chiefly  that  of  France.  Finally,  if  it  is 
permissible  in  a  political  memoir  to  consider  the  sub- 
ject philosophically,  one  can  see  with  some  interest  a 
people  forming  itself  into  a  national  body,  creating 
itself  a  civil  state  embodying  a  mixture  of  the  manners 
of  a  state  of  nature  and  of  the  wisdom  of  an  age  most 
fruitful  of  knowledge,  a  people  which  is  about  to  give 
laws  to  itself,  having  before  its  eyes  the  laws  of  all 
civilized  peoples.  This  is  not  a  collection  of  savages 
gradually  emerging  from  barbarism,  and  which  rather 
receives  than  gives  to  itself  the  constitution  which  cir- 
cumstances impose  upon  it.  This  is  a  people  already' 
civilized  by  its  understanding  and  which,  after  having 
acquired  its  political  independence,  is  about  to  choose 
for  itself  the  legislation  that  is  to  establish  its  destiny 
for  all  time.  The  history  of  the  world  perhaps  shows 
no  spectacle  more  interesting,  and  the  political  stage 


398  APPENDICES 

has  never  perhaps  presented  an  event  the  consequences 
of  which  are  more  important  and  more  widespread  in  the 
general  condition  of  this  globe. 

Summarizing  what  has  been  said  in  this  memoir,  the 
result  is  that  finance  must  dictate  the  course  to  take  in 
the  present  state  of  things  always  after  justice  shall 
have  spoken.  The  impression  with  which  one  is  filled  in 
writing  this  is  such  that  it  cannot  too  often  be  repeated 
that  it  is  a  question  of  taking  from  England,  our  nat- 
ural and  actual  enemy,  more  than  half  her  power,  and 
that  for  ever,  and  of  giving  it  to  France;  or  of  seeing 
England  make  an  agreement  which  will  give  her  more 
strength  and  cover  her  with  glory,  will  change  into 
good  fortune  an  occasion  of  disaster,  and  all  that  at 
our  expense;  and  the  course  to  be  taken  ought  to  be 
taken  actively  and  without  delay  or  it  is  very  possible 
that  the  other  part  of  the  dilemma  just  spoken  of  may 
be  accomplished  before  our  eyes. 

The  writer  here  closes  the  reflections  which  the  ful- 
ness of  his  zeal  for  the  King's  service  may  render 
acceptable. 

in 

CONSIDERATIONS  UPON  THE  NECESSITY  OF  FRANCE  DE- 
CLARING AT  ONCE  FOR  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES,  EVEN 
WITHOUT  THE  CONCURRENCE  OF  SPAIN.1 

13  January  1778. 

The  quarrel  which  exists  between  England  and  the 
Colonies  of  North  America  is  as  important  to  France 
as  to  Great  Britain,  and  its  issue  will  have  equal  in- 

1Smss.  no.  1835.  Though  unsigned  this  document  contains  ex- 
pressions from  earlier  papers  from  Vergennes'  pen.  Cf.  for 
example,  Doniol,  II.  144  and  733  ff.  Besides  the  points  for  which 
it  is  cited  in  the  text,  the  memoir  is  interesting  as  an  omnium 
gatherum  of  all  the  arguments  for  French  intervention. 


APPENDICES  399 

fluence  on  the  reputation  and  power  of  those  two 
Crowns.  It  is,  therefore,  essential  that  France  should 
decide  upon  and  fix  the  policy  it  is  advisable  she  should 
adopt  in  such  a  conjuncture. 

The  Americans  have  been  struggling  for  the  last 
three  years  against  the  efforts  of  Great  Britain,  and 
they  have  up  to  the  present  maintained  a  sort  of  superi- 
ority; but  the  war  which  they  wage  fatigues  and  ex- 
hausts them,  and  must  necessarily  weary  the  people 
and  awaken  in  them  a  desire  for  repose. 

England,  for  her  part,  crushed  by  the  expenditure 
occasioned  by  this  same  war,  and  convinced  of  the  im- 
possibility of  reducing  the  Colonies,  is  occupied  with 
the  means  of  re-establishing  peace.  With  this  view  she 
is  taking  the  most  urgent  and  animated  steps  with  the 
Deputies  from  Congress,  and  it  is  natural  that  the 
United  States  should  at  last  decide  to  listen  to  their 
proposals. 

In  this  state  of  affairs  it  is  desirable  to  examine  what 
course  it  is  proper  for  France  to  take. 

There  exist  two  courses  only, — that  of  abandoning 
the  Colonies,  and  that  of  supporting  them. 

If  we  abandon  them,  England  will  take  advantage  of 
it  by  making  a  reconciliation,  and  in  that  case  she  will 
either  preserve  her  supremacy  wholly  or  partially,  or 
she  will  gain  an  ally.  Now  it  is  known  that  she  is  dis- 
posed to  sacrifice  that  supremacy  'and  to  propose  simply 
a  sort  of  family  compact,  that  is  to  say,  a  league 
against  the  House  of  Bourbon. 

The  result  of  this  will  be  that  the  Americans  will  be- 
come our  perpetual  enemies,  and  we  must  expect  to  see 
them  turn  all  their  efforts  against  our  possessions,  and 
against  those  of  Spain.  This  is  all  the  more  probable 
as  the  Colonies,  require  a  direct  trade  with  the  sugar 
islands.  England  will  offer  them  that  of  our  islands 
after  having  conquered  them,  which  will  be  easy  for  her. 


400  APPENDICES 

Thus  the  coalition  of  the  English  and  the  Americans 
will  draw  after  it  our  expulsion,  and  probably  that  of 
the  Spaniards,  from  the  whole  of  America ;  it  will  limit 
our  shipping  and  our  commerce  to  the  European  seas 
only,  and  even  this  trade  will  be  at  the  mercy  of  English 
insolence  and  greed. 

It  would  be  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  United 
States  will  not  lend  themselves  to  the  proposals  of  the 
Court  of  St.  James's.  Those  States  took  up  arms  only 
in  order  to  establish  and  defend  their  independence  and 
the  freedom  of  their  commerce;  if,  therefore,  England 
offers  them  both,  what  reason  will  they  have  for  refus- 
ing? Their  treaty  with  that  Power  will  give  them  more 
safety  than  the  engagements  which  they  might  make 
with  other  Powers,  or  than  all  the  guarantees  which  we 
might  offer  them.  Indeed,  what  opinion  can  they  have 
of  our  means,  and  even  of  our  good-will,  since  we  have 
not  dared  to  co-operate  in  securing  an  independence  of 
which  we  would  afterwards  propose  the  empty  guaran- 
tee? Their  surest  guarantee  will  be  in  the  community 
of  interests  and  views  which  will  be  established  between 
them  and  their  former  mother-country ;  we  have  nothing 
to  offer  which  can  counterbalance  that. 

Such  will  be  the  effects  of  the  independence  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  if  it  is  established  without 
our  concurrence. 

It  follows  from  this  that  the  glory,  the  dignity  and 
the  essential  interest  of  France  demand  that  she  should 
stretch  out  her  hand  to  those  States,  and  that  their 
independence  should  be  her  work. 

The  advantages  which  will  result  are  innumerable ;  we 
shall  humiliate  our  natural  enemy,  a  perfidious  enemy 
who  never  knows  how  to  respect  either  treaties  or  the 
right  of  nations;  we  shall  divert  to  our  profit  one  of 
the  principal  sources  of  her  opulence;  we  shall  shake 
her  power,  and  reduce  her  to  her  real  value;  we  shall 


APPENDICES  401 

extend  our  commerce,  our  shipping,  our  fisheries;  we 
shall  ensure  the  possession  of  our  islands,  and  finally, 
we  shall  re-establish  our  reputation,  and  shall  resume 
amongst  the  Powers  of  Europe  the  place  which  belongs 
to  us.  There  would  be  no  end  if  we  wished  to  detail  all 
these  points ;  it  is  sufficient  to  indicate  them  in  order  to 
make  their  importance  felt. 

In  presupposing  that  the  independence  of  the  Ameri- 
cans is  to  be  the  work  of  France,  it  is  necessary  to 
examine  what  line  of  conduct  it  is  desirable  for  us  to 
observe  in  order  to  attain  that  end ;  there  is  but  one, — 
to  assist  the  Colonies. 

But  in  order  to  determine  the  sort  of  assistance  to  be 
given,  it  is  essential  not  to  deviate  from  the  two  follow- 
ing truths:  1st,  that  whatever  sort  of  assistance  we 
give  the  Americans,  it  will  be  equivalent  to  a  declara- 
tion of  war  against  Great  Britain:  2nd  that  when  war 
is  inevitable,  it  is  better  to  be  beforehand  with  one's 
enemy  than  to  be  anticipated  by  him. 

Starting  with  these  two  principles,  it  appears  that 
France  cannot  be  too  quick  in  making  with  the  Ameri- 
cans a  treaty  of  which  recognised  independence  will  be 
the  basis,  and  that  she  should  take  her  measures  for 
acting  before  England  can  anticipate  her. 

It  is  all  the  more  urgent  to  hasten  the  arrangements 
to  be  made  with  the  Americans,  as  the  Deputies  are 
hard  pressed  by  emissaries  of  the  English  Ministry,  and 
as,  if  we  are  not  the  first  to  bind  them,  they  will  give 
the  Court  of  London  a  foundation  for  proposing  a 
plan  of  reconciliation  at  the  re-assembly  of  Parliament, 
which  will  take  place  on  the  20th  instant,  and  then  all 
will  be  over  with  us,  and  it  will  only  remain  for  us  to 
prepare  to  undertake  war  against  the  English  and 
against  the  insurgents,  whereas  we  could  and  ought  to 
have  begun  it  in  concert  with  the  latter. 


402  APPENDICES 

In  all  that  has  just  been  said,  the  co-operation  of 
Spain  has  been  presupposed. 

But  in  the  event  of  that  Power  not  adopting  the 
principles  and  plan  of  France,  or  of  her  judging  the 
moment  of  putting  it  into  execution  not  yet  arrived, 
what  course  will  France,  thus  isolated,  have  to  follow? 

The  independence  of  the  Colonies  is  so  important  a 
matter  for  France,  that  no  other  should  weaken  it,  and 
France  must  do  her  utmost  to  establish  it,  even  if  it 
should  cost  her  some  sacrifices ;  I  mean  that  France 
must  undertake  the  war  for  the  maintenance  of  Ameri- 
can independence,  even  if  that  war  should  be  in  other 
respects  disadvantageous.  In  order  to  be  convinced  of 
this  truth,  it  is  only  necessary  to  picture  to  ourselves 
what  England  will  be,  when  she  no  longer  has  America. 

Thus  France  must  espouse  the  American  cause,  and 
use  for  that  purpose  all  her  power,  even  if  Spain  should 
refuse  to  join  her.  From  this  one  of  two  things  will 
happen;  either  that  Power  will  still  remain  neutral,  or 
she  will  decide  to  join  France.  In  the  first  case,  al- 
though she  will  be  passive,  she  will  nevertheless  favour 
our  operations,  because  she  will  be  armed,  and  England 
will  see  her  constantly  placed  behind  us,  and  ready,  if 
need  be,  to  assist  us :  but  in  order  to  maintain  this  opin- 
ion, we  must  also  maintain  that  of  a  good  understanding 
between  the  two  Courts.  The  second  case  has  no  need 
of  development. 

But  Spain  is  awaiting  a  rich  fleet  from  Vera  Cruz, 
and  that  fleet  will  not  arrive  until  about  next  spring. 
Its  arrival  must  unquestionably  be  ensured,  and  that 
may  be  done  in  two  ways ;  1st  by  prolonging  the  period 
of  our  operations,  or  else,  2nd,  by  sending  a  squadron  to 
meet  the  fleet.  Spain  has  vessels  at  Cadiz  and  Ferrol; 
they  are  armed  and  ready  to  put  to  sea.  A  cruise  might 
be  given  as  a  pretext  in  order  to  mask  their  real 
destination. 


APPENDICES  403 

If  the  King  adopts  the  course  of  going  forward  with- 
out the  participation  of  Spain,  he  will  take  away  from 
that  Power  all  just  reason  for  complaint,  by  stipulating 
for  her  eventually  all  the  advantages  which  she  would 
have  claimed,  had  she  been  a  contracting  party.  These 
advantages  will  be  the  same  as  those  which  His  Majesty 
will  ask  for  himself. 

IV 

EXTRACTS  FROM  THE  "OBSERVATIONS  ON  THE  JUSTICA- 
TIVE  MEMORIAL  OF  THE  COURT  OF  LONDON."1 

While  the  ambassador  of  England  put  the  King's 
patience  to  the  strongest  proofs  ...  an  event  came 
to  pass  in  America  which  essentially  changed  the  face 
of  things  in  that  quarter  of  the  world.  This  event  was 
the  defeat  of  the  army  under  General  Burgoyne.  The 
news  of  this  unexpected  disaster  .  .  .  astonished  the 
British  ministers,  and  must  have  the  more  sensibly  af- 
fected them,  as  it  overthrew  the  plan  they  had  laid 
for  the  reduction  of  the  Colonies.  We  shall  be  con- 
vinced of  this  truth  by  reading  the  speeches  occasioned 
by  it  in  Parliament.  The  first  result  of  the  tumultuous 
debates  of  both  Houses  was  the  naming  of  commissioners 
of  peace,  to  carry  to  America  conciliatory  bills;  and 

1The  original  (though  quite  different)  form  of  this  document 
is  to  be  found  in  Beaumarchais'  Oeuvres  completes  (Paris,  1835), 
530-42.  The  present  document  was  published  in  Paris  in  1779 
over  Beaumarchais'  name,  but  the  edition  of  1780,  which  is  un- 
changed, is  anonymous,  though  it  is  attributed  in  the  catalogue  of 
the  Biblioteque  Nationale  to  J.  M.  Gerard  de  Rayneval,  Vergen- 
nes'  Secretary.  The  English- American  translation  (Philadelphia 
and  London,  1780),  from  which  the  above  extracts  are  made,  is 
also  anonymous.  There  are  four  copies  of  this  translation  in  the 
Pennsylvania  Historical  Society's  library  at  Philadelphia,  and  one 
of  the  French  edition  of  1779. 


404  APPENDICES 

that  of  the  secret  deliberations  of  the  council  at  St. 
James'  was  to  make  advances  and  to  sound  the  American 
commissioners  residing  at  Paris,  and  to  propose  to  them 
peace  and  a  coalition  against  the  Crown  of  France. 

This  last  proposition  was  the  consequence  of  the  im- 
putations which  the  ministry  of  London  had  incessantly 
made  against  that  of  Versailles :  They  have  affected  to 
consider  France  as  the  cause,  the  support,  in  a  word 
as  the  author,  of  the  revolution  of  which  America  pre- 
sented them  a  view;  and  this  opinion  would  naturally 
inspire  them  with  the  desire  of  vengeance.  .  .  .  This 
prospect  was  so  much  the  more  proper  to  console,  and 
even  to  dazzle  the  British  ministers,  as  it  perfectly  cor- 
responded with  their  most  dear  and  most  constant  wish, 
a  wish  which  for  a  long  time  had  been  the  very  essence 
of  British  policy,  that  of  humbling  France ;  and  as  the 
presumptuous  confidence  of  that  nation  must  have  still 
grown  greater,  when  they  beheld  the  extraordinary 
armaments  they  had  got  ready,  with  a  despatch  which 
surprised  all  Europe  [the  armaments  referred  to  are 
stated  to  be  those  prepared  in  January,  1777]. 

The  British  ministry,  led  astray  by  this  brilliant 
phantom,  delayed  not  putting  in  motion  all  the  secret 
springs  by  means  of  which  they  would  be  able  to  realize 
it.  Emissaries  came  one  after  another  and  watched  the 
American  commissioners :  Their  discourse  to  every  one 
of  them  was,  that  they  should  no  longer  continue  the 
dupes  of  France,  but  must  unite  with  the  court  of  Lon- 
don, and  fall  upon  that  power,  etc. 

The  court  of  London  denies  the  facts  and  represents 
them  as  a  supposition  destitute  of  truth  and  even  of 
probability,  and  calls  upon  France  to  produce  the 
proof  of  it.  But  can  a  subterfuge  like  this  possibly 
impose  on  any  one?  Who  will  suspect  the  British  min- 
istry to  have  carried  their  want  of  address  or  impru- 
dence so  far  as  to  leave  direct  marks  of  a  darksome 


APPENDICES  405 

manouvre,  and  of  not  having  on  the  other  hand,  taken 
the  most  effectual  measures  that,  in  case  of  discovery, 
it  might  not  be  imputed  to  them !  .  .  .  True  it  is,  that 
according  to  the  British  ministry,  the  King  of  Great 
Britain  could  not  be  suspected  of  not  bemg  offered 
peace  to  his  subjects,  after  a  long  and  hard  contest,  but 
with  design  of  entering  into  a  new  war  against  a  re- 
spectable power;  [this  is  a  mistranslation  of  the 
French:  the  second  not  and  the  but  should  be  omitted]. 
But  some  very  plain  reflections  will  make  it  clear  how 
illusory  this  affected  language  is,  and  how  little  it  de- 
serves belief. 

If  the  court  of  London  .  .  .  either  sincerely,  or  in 
order  to  impose  upon  the  English  nation  or  even  on  its 
king  .  .  .  has  experienced  unpardonable  injuries  from 
France,  if  it  has  reason  for  reproaching  her  with  the  de- 
fection of  the  Colonies,  they  must  consider  her  dignity 
and  most  essential  interests  as  wounded,  and  from  that 
time  must  feel  the  most  ardent  desire,  not  only  of  tak- 
ing vengeance,  but  also  of  recovering  from  France  what 
the  crown  of  England  lost  in  America.  In  consequence 
of  this  plan,  it  was  natural  for  the  British  ministry, 
unable  to  subdue  her  Colonies,  to  seek  to  be  reconciled 
to  them  and  to  engage  them  to  espouse  her  resentment : 
They  might  so  much  the  more  flatter  themselves  that 
they  should  succeed  herein  as  the  proceedings  of  France 
with  regard  to  American  privateers  .  .  .  and  especially 
the  dislike  the  king  had  at  .all  times  manifested  to  any 
engagement  with  the  Congress,  must  have  given  disgust 
and  dissatisfaction  to  their  deputies,  and  induce  them, 
notwithstanding  (their  well  known  aversion,  to  seek 
even  in  England  the  safety  of  their  country  when  they 
failed  to  find  it  in  France.  .  .  . 

In  this  situation  ought  it  not  to  be  supposed  that,  the 
moment  the  British  ministry  perceived  the  necessity  of 
yielding  to  the  efforts  of  the  Colonies,  they  perceived  the 


406  APPENDICES 

project  and  the  hope  of  punishing  France  for  the 
wrongs  they  had  imputed  to  her?  Such  have,  indeed, 
been  the  intention  and  conduct  of  the  ministers  of  the 
king  of  Great  Britain.  We  have  already  affirmed,  in 
the  Expose  de  Motifs  and  we  repeat  it  here,  with  that 
assurance  which  nothing  but  truth  can  give;  and  the 
King  dares  flatter  himself  that  the  opinion  which  all 
Europe  has  of  his  rectitude  and  probity  will  have 
more  weight  than  a  denial  merely  hazarded  and  which 
they  have  not  even  had  the  address  to  render  probable. 

Moreover,  although  the  king  had  not  had  certain 
proof  of  the  hostile  views  of  the  court  of  London,  it 
would  'have  been  sufficient  for  him  to  have  had  probable 
grounds  to  suspect  that  they  existed;  now,  what  must 
His  Majesty  have  thought  of  the  sight  of  the  immense 
and  hasty  warlike  preparations  of  the  court  of  London ! 
her  arbitrary  proceedings,  her  denials  of  justice,  her 
arrogant  pretensions!  What  must  he  have  allowed  to 
the  last  words  of  the  idol  and  oracle  of  the  British 
nation,  Lord  Chatham,  who  dragged  himself  to  Parlia- 
ment, there  to  expire  exclaiming,  Peace  with  America, 
and  war  with  the  House  of  Bourbon!  The  court  of 
London  herself  had  justified  the  suspicion  and  fore- 
sight of  the  king,  by  the  hostile  orders  sent  to  India 
before  the  declaration  of  the  Marquis  de  Noailles,  and 
even  before  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  February 
6,  1778.  .  .  . 

The  King  well  informed  of  the  plan  of  the  court  of 
London  and  of  the  preparations  which  were  the  conse- 
quence of  it,  perceived  that  no  more  time  was  to  be 
lost  if  he  would  prevent  the  designs  of  his  enemies :  His 
Majesty  determined,  therefore,  to  take  into  consider- 
ation, at  length,  the  overtures  of  the  Congress  [pp. 
60-6] 


APPENDICES  407 

Whilst  the  British  ambassador  renewed  without  in- 
termission complaints  unjust  in  their  object  .  .  .  the 
British  ministry,  convinced  that  notwithstanding  their 
formidable  armaments  any  subjugation  whatever  of  the 
Colonies  was  in  future  impossible,  proposed  to  Parlia- 
ment the  means  of  conciliation ;  they  endeavored  at  the 
same  time  to  open  a  secret  negotiation  with  the  com- 
missioners of  Congress  at  Paris;  they  were  disposed  to 
yield  everything,  even  independence  in  fact,  provided 
they  could  retain  a  nominal  dependence.  But  war 
against  France  was  to  be  the  price  of  so  great  a  sacri- 
fice. The  king  apprised  on  the  one  side  of  the  offers 
and  hostile  views  of  the  court  of  London,  and  on  the 
other  side  of  the  unshaken  resolution  of  Congress  not 
to  suffer  the  least  trace  of  its  former  subjection  to  re- 
main: The  king,  I  say,  did  not  hesitate  to  take  a 
part.  .  .  . 

To  deceive  the  other  nations  with  regard  to  the  real 
motives  which  have  directed  the  conduct  of  the  king, 
the  British  ministry  maintain  that  he  entered  into 
treaty  with  the  Americans,  not  because  he  feared  the 
secret  views  of  Great  Britain,  but  because  he  foresaw 
that  the  Americans  defeated,  discouraged  without  sup- 
port and  without  resources,  were  about  to  return  to 
their  mother-country.  ...  It  was  without  doubt  for 
the  sake  of  this  assertion  that  the  British  ministry 
have  thought  it  beneath  the  dignity  of  their  sovereign 
to  search  for  the  period  at  which  France  formed  con- 
nections with  the  United  States.  .  .  .  The  king  is  will- 
ing to  spare  the  British  ministry  a  task  so  disagreeable 
and  so  embarrassing,  by  observing  for  them  that  the 
conversations  which  led  to  the  Treaties  of  the  6th  of 
February,  1778,  were  considerably  posterior  to  the 
capitulation  of  General  Burgoyne.  Now  it  is  notorious 
that  this  event  elevated  the  courage  and  the  hopes  of 
the  Americans  as  much  as  it  dejected  the  British  na- 


408  APPENDICES 

tion,  and  principally  the  court  of  London.  If  then  the 
king  has  listened  to  the  propositions  of  Congress  after 
this  period  so  disastrous  to  the  British,  it  has  not  been, 
and  could  not  have  been  for  any  other  reason,  but  be- 
cause the  thought  with  the  United  States  that  their  in- 
dependence was  thenceforward  irrevocable;  England 
herself  thought  as  the  Americans  did"  [93-6]. 

V 

PROVISIONAL  ARTICLES1 

agreed  upon,  by  and  between  Richard  Oswald,  Esquire, 
The  Commissioner  of  His  Britannic  Majesty,  for  Treat- 
ing of  Peace  with  the  Commissioners  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  in  behalf  of  His  Said  Majesty  on  the 
One  Part,  and  John  Adams,  Benjamin  Franklin,  John 
Jay,  and  Henry  Laurens,  Four  of  the  Commissioners  of 
the  Said  United  States  for  Treating  of  Peace  with  the 
Commissioners  of  His  Said  Majesty,  on  Their  Behalf,  on 
the  Other  Part.  To  be  Inserted  in,  and  to  Constitute 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  Proposed  to  be  Concluded  Between 
the  Crown  of  Great  Britain  and  the  Said  United  States ; 
but  which  Treaty  is  not  to  be  Concluded  until  Terms  of 
a  Peace  Shall  Be  Agreed  Upon  Between  Great  Britain 
and  France,  and  His  Britannic  Majesty  Shall  Be  Ready 
to  Conclude  Such  Treaty  Accordingly. 
Concluded  November  30,  1782.  Proclamation  ordered 
by  the  Continental  Congress  April  11,  1783. 

ARTICLES 

I.  Independence  acknowledged. 
II.  Boundaries. 

III.  Fishery  rights. 

IV.  Recovery  of  Debts. 

V.  Restitution  of  estates. 
VI.   Confiscations  and  prosecutions  to  cease. 
VII.  Withdrawal  of  British  armies, 
from  Malloy. 


APPENDICES  409 

VIII.  Navigation  of  the  Mississippi  River. 

IX.  Restoration  of  territory. 
Separate  Article.     Boundary  of  West  Florida. 

Whereas  reciprocal  advantages  and  mutual  conven- 
ience are  found  by  experience  to  form  the  only  perma- 
nent foundation  of  peace  and  friendship  between  States, 
it  is  agreed  to  form  the  articles  of  the  proposed  treaty 
on  such  principles  of  liberal  equity  and  reciprocity,  as 
that  partial  advantages  (those  seeds  of  discord)  being 
excluded,  such  a  beneficial  and  satisfactory  intercourse 
between  the  two  countries  may  be  established  as  to 
promise  and  secure  to  both  perpetual  peace  and 
harmony. 

ARTICLE  I 

His  Britannic  Majesty  acknowledges  the  said  United 
States,  viz.,  New  Hampshire,  Massachusett's  Bay, 
Rhode  Island  and  Providence  Plantations,  Connecticut, 
New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware,  Mary- 
land, Virginia,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  and 
Georgia,  to  be  free,  sovereign  and  independent  States ; 
that  he  treats  with  them  as  such,  and  for  himself,  his 
heirs  and  successors,  relinquishes  all  claims  to  the  Gov- 
ernment, propriety  and  territorial  rights  of  the  same, 
and  every  part  thereof;  and  that  all  disputes  which 
might  arise  in  future  on  the  subject  of  the  boundaries 
of  the  said  United  States  may  be  prevented,  it  is  hereby 
agreed  and  declared  that  the  following  are  and  shall  be 
their  boundaries,  viz. : 

ARTICLE  II 

From  the  northwest  angle  of  Nova  Scotia,  viz.,  that 
angle  which  is  formed  by  a  line  drawn  due  north  from 
the  source  of  St.  Croix  River  to  the  Highlands;  along 
the  Highlands  which  divide  those  rivers  that  empty 
themselves  into  the  river  St.  Lawrence,  from  those  which 


410  APPENDICES 

fall  into  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  to  the  northwesternmost 
head  of  Connecticut  River;  thence  down  along  the  mid- 
dle of  that  river  to  the  45th  degree  of  north  latitude; 
from  thence,  by  a  line  due  west  on  said  latitude  until  it 
strikes  the  river  Iroquois  or  Cataraquy;  thence  along 
the  middle  of  said  river  into  Lake  Ontario,  through  the 
middle  of  said  lake  until  it  strikes  the  communication 
by  water  between  the  lake  and  Lake  Erie;  thence 
along  the  middle  of  said  communication  into  Lake  Erie, 
through  the  middle  of  said  lake  untill  it  arrives  at  the 
water  communication  between  that  lake  and  Lake 
Huron ;  thence  along  the  middle  of  said  water  communi- 
cation into  the  Lake  Huron;  thence  through  the  mid- 
dle of  said  lake  to  the  water  communication  between 
that  lake  and  Lake  Superior;  thence  through  Lake  Su- 
perior northward  to  the  isles  Royal  and  Phelippeaux, 
to  the  Long  Lake;  thence  through  the  middle  of  said 
Long  Lake,  and  the  water  communication  between  it 
and  the  Lake  of  the  Woods,  to  the  said  Lake  of  the 
Woods ;  thence  through  the  said  lake  to  the  most  north- 
western point  thereof,  and  from  thence  on  a  due  west 
course  to  the  river  Mississippi;  thence  by  a  line  to  be 
drawn  along  the  middle  of  the  said  river  Mississippi 
untill  it  shall  intersect  the  northermost  part  of  the 
31st  degree  of  north  latitude.  South,  by  a  line  to  be 
drawn  due  east  from  the  determination  of  the  line  last 
mentioned,  in  the  latitude  of  31  degrees  north  of  the 
equator,  to  the  middle  of  the  river  Apalachicola  or 
Catahouche;  thence  along  the  middle  thereof  to  its 
junction  with  the  Flint  River;  then  strait  to  the  head 
of  St.  Mary's  River;  and  thence  down  along  the  mid- 
dle of  St.  Mary's  River  to  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  East, 
by  a  line  to  be  drawn  along  the  middle  of  the  river  St. 
Croix,  from  its  mouth  in  the  bay  of  Fundy  to  its  source, 
and  from  its  source  directly  north  to  the  aforesaid 
highlands  which  divide  the  rivers  that  fall  into  the  At- 


APPENDICES  411 

lantic  Ocean,  from  those  which  fall  into  the  river  St. 
Laurence;  .comprehending  all  islands  within  twenty 
leagues  of  any  part  of  the  shores  of  the  United  States, 
and  lying  between  lines  to  be  drawn  due  east  from  the 
points  where  the  aforesaid  boundaries  between  Nova 
Scotia  on  the  one  part,  and  East  Florida  on  the  other, 
shall  respectively  touch  the  bay  of  Fundy  and  the 
Atlantic  Ocean;  excepting  such  islands  as  now  are,  or 
heretofore  have  been,  within  the  limits  of  the  said 
province  of  Nova  Scotia. 

ARTICLE  III 

It  is  agreed  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  shall 
continue  to  enjoy  unmolested  the  right  to  take  fish  of 
every  kind  on  the  Grand  Bank,  and  on  all  the  other 
banks  of  Newfoundland ;  also  in  the  Gulph  of  St.  Law- 
rence, and  at  all  other  places  in  the  sea,  where  the  in- 
habitants of  both  countries  used  at  any  time  hereto- 
fore to  fish ;  and  also  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  United 
States  shall  have  liberty  to  take  fish  of  every  kind  on 
such  part  of  the  coast  of  Newfoundland  as  British 
fishermen  shall  use,  (but  not  to  dry  or  cure  the  same  on 
that  island;)  and  also  on  the  coasts,  bays  and  creeks  of 
aH  othier  of  his  Britannic  Majesty's  dominions  in 
America;  and  that  the  American  fishermen  shall  have 
liberty  to  dry  and  cure  fish  in  any  of  the  unsettled 
bays,  harbours  and  creeks  of  Nova  Scotia,  Magdalen 
Islands,  and  Labrador,  so  long  as  the  same  shall  remain 
unsettled;  but  as  soon  as  the  same  or  either  of  them 
shall  be  settled,  it  shall  not  be  lawful  for  the  said  fisher- 
men to  dry  or  cure  fish  at  such  settlement,  without  a 
previous  agreement  for  that  purpose  with  the  inhabi- 
tants, proprietors  or  possessors  of  the  ground. 

AETICLE  IV 

It  is  agreed  that  creditors  on  either  side  shall  meet 
with  no  lawful  impediment  to  the  recovery  of  the  full 


APPENDICES 

value  in  sterling  money  of  all  bona  fide  debts  heretofore 
contracted. 

ARTICLE  V 

It  is  agreed  that  the  Congress  shall  earnestly  recom- 
mend it  to  the  legislatures  of  the  respective  States  to 
provide  for  the  restitution  of  all  estates,  rights  and 
properties  which  have  been  confiscated,  belonging  to 
real  British  subjects,  and  also  of  the  estates,  rights  and 
properties  of  persons  resident  in  districts  in  the  pos- 
session of  His  Majesty's  arms,  and  who  have  not  borne 
arms  against  the  said  United  States :  And  that  per- 
sons of  any  other  description  shall  have  free  liberty  to 
go  to  any  part  or  parts  of  any  of  the  thirteen  United 
States,  and  therein  to  remain  twelve  months  unmolested 
in  their  endeavours  to  obtain  the  restitution  of  such  of 
their  estates,  rights  and  properties  as  may  have  been 
confiscated :  And  that  Congress  shall  also  earnestly 
recommend  to  the  several  States  a  reconsideration  and 
revision  of  all  acts  or  laws  regarding  the  premises,  so 
as  to  render  the  said  laws  or  acts  perfectly  consistent, 
not  only  with  justice  and  equity,  but  with  the  spirit  of 
conciliation  which,  on  the  return  of  the  blessings  of 
peace,  should  universally  prevail:  And  that  Congress 
shall  also  earnestly  recommend  to  the  several  States 
that  the  estates,  rights  and  properties  of  such  last- 
mentioned  persons  shall  be  restored  to  them,  they  re- 
funding to  any  persons  who  may  be  now  in  possession 
the  bona  fide  price  (where  any  has  been  given)  which 
such  persons  may  have  paid  on  purchasing  any  of  the 
said  lands,  rights  and  properties  since  the  confiscation. 
And  it  is  agreed  that  all  persons  who  have  any  interest 
in  confiscated  lands,  either  by  debts,  marriage  settle- 
ments or  otherwise,  shall  meet  with  no  lawful  impedi- 
ments in  the  prosecution  of  their  just  rights. 


APPENDICES  413 

ARTICLE  VI 

That  there  shall  be  no  future  confiscations  made, 
nor  any  prosecutions  commenced  against  any  persons 
for  or  by  reason  of  the  part  which  he  or  they  may  have 
taken  in  the  present  war,  and  that  no  person  shall,  on 
that  account,  suffer  any  future  loss  or  damage,  either 
in  his  person,  liberty  or  property;  and  that  those  who 
may  be  in  confinement  on  such  charges,  at  the  time  of 
the  ratification  of  the  treaty  in  America,  shall  be  im- 
mediately set  at  liberty,  and  the  prosecutions  so  com- 
menced be  discontinued. 

ARTICLE  VII 

There  shall  be  a  firm  and  perpetual  peace  between 
His  Britannic  Majesty  and  the  said  States,  and  be- 
tween the  subjects  of  the  one  and  the  citizens  of  the 
other,  wherefore  all  hostilities,  both  by  sea  and  land, 
shall  then  immediately  cease:  All  prisoners,  on  both 
sides,  shall  be  set  at  liberty;  and  His  Britannic  Majesty 
shall,  with  all  convenient  speed,  and  without  causing 
any  destruction,  or  carrying  away  any  negroes  or  other 
property  of  the  American  inhabitants,  withdraw  all  his 
armies,  garrisons  and  fleets  from  the  said  United  States, 
and  from  every  port,  place  and  harbour  within  the 
same,  leaving  in  all  fortifications  the  American  artillery 
that  may  be  therein;  and  shall  also  order  and  cause  all 
archives,  records,  deeds  and  papers  belonging  to  any 
of  the  said  States  or  their  citizens,  which  in  the  course 
of  the  war  may  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  his  offi- 
cers to  whom  they  belong. 

ARTICLE  VIII 

The  navigation  of  the  river  Mississippi,  from  its 
source  to  the  ocean,  shall  forever  remain  free  and  open 
to  the  subjects  of  Great  Britain  and  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States. 


APPENDICES 

ARTICLE  IX 

In  case  it  should  so  happen  that  any  place  or  terri- 
tory belonging  to  Great  Britain  or  to  the  United  States 
should  be  conquered  by  the  arms  of  either  from  the 
other,  before  the  arrival  of  these  articles  in  America, 
it  is  agreed  that  the  same  shall  be  restored  without  diffi- 
culty and  without  requiring  any  compensation. 

Done  at  Paris  the  thirtieth  day  of  November,  in  the 
year  one  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty-two. 
(Seal.)  RICHARD  OSWALD. 

(Seal.)  JOHN  ADAMS. 

(Seal.)  B.  FRANKLIN. 

(Seal.)  JOHN  JAY. 

(Seal.)  HENRY  LAURENS. 

Witness:     CALEB  WHITEFOORD, 

Sec'y  to  the  British  Commission. 
W.  T.  FRANKLIN, 

Sec'y  to  the  American  Commission. 

SEPARATE  ARTICLE 

It  is  hereby  understood  and  agreed  that  in  case 
Great  Britain,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  present  war, 
shall  recover,  or  be  put  in  possession  of  West  Florida, 
the  line  of  north  boundary  between  the  said  province 
and  the  United  States  shall  be  a  line  drawn  from  the 
mouth  of  the  river  Yassous,  where  it  unites  with  the 
Mississippi,  due  east,  to  the  river  Apalachicola. 

Done  at  Paris  the  thirtieth  day  of  November,  in  the 
year  one  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty-two. 
(Seal.)  RICHARD   OSWALD. 

(Seal.)  JOHN  ADAMS. 

(Seal.)  B.  FRANKLIN. 

(Seal.)  JOHN  JAY. 

(Seal.)  HENRY  LAURENS. 

Witness:    CALEB  WHITEFOORD, 

Sec'y  to  the  British  Commission. 
W.  T.  FRANKLIN, 

Sec'y  to  the  American  Commission. 


INDEX 


Adams,  John:  Suggests  French 
intervention,  52-3  fn.;  op- 
posed to  a  military  connec- 
tion with  France,  ib.;  prophe- 
sies American  greatness,  218; 
appointed  envoy  to  negotiate 
peace,  (Oct.  4,  1779),  261; 
wishes  to  communicate  Ihis 
powers  to  treat  to  the  Eng- 
lish government,  273-5;  de- 
fends the  "40  to  1"  act,  275- 
6;  endeavors  to  demonstrate 
France's  indebtedness  to  the 
United  States,  ib.;  thinks 
France  should  aid  America 
more  positively,  276-7;  is 
snubbed  by  Vergennes  and 
goes  to  Holland,  278;  Con- 
gress asked  to  curb,  295,  299 ; 
superseded  by  a  commission, 
301;  participation  of,  in  the 
peace  negotiations,  340,  345 
-6;  signs  a  declaration  (Jan. 
20,  1783)  explaining  the  Pro- 
visional Articles,  357. 

Almodovar:  Spanish  ambassa- 
dor at  London,  182. 

Aranda,  Count  d':  Spanish  am- 
bassador at  Paris  and  bitter 
enemy  of  England,  82;  en- 
thusiastic for  an  American 
alliance,  97,  107-8,  179-80  fn.; 
not  a  real  ambassador,  108; 
recognizes  the  extension  of 
the  United  States  to  the  Mis- 
sissippi, 241  fn. ;  action  of,  in 
facilitating  peace,  356-7. 

Argenson,  Marquis  d':  Diplo- 
matic policy  of,  26-7. 

Austria:       Value     of     alliance 


with,  to  France,  39,  51,  59. 

Balance  of  Power,  Doctrine  of: 
Connected  with  the  balance 
of  trade  idea,  15-6,  33-4;  logic 
of  connected  with  French 
policy  in  the  Revolution,  17- 
22;  stated  by  Vergennes  as 
an  argument  for  French  in- 
tervention in  America,  86-9, 
101,  137  ff.;  to  be  applied  to 
North  America,  21-2, 176, 184. 

Bancroft:  An  agent  of  the 
American  commissioners,  127 
and  fn. 

Bancroft  the  Historian:  Ex- 
planation of  French  interven- 
tion in  the  Revolution,  2. 

Bavarian  Succession,  War  of: 
Cause  and  settlement  of,  169- 
70. 

Beaumarchais:  Alarmist  re- 
port on  situation  in  England 
(1775),  65;  proselytes  the 
king  in  behalf  of  secret  aid, 
72-3;  his  La  Paix  ou  la  Guer- 
re, 79;  activities  as  Hortalez 
et  cie,  ib.;  alarmism  after 
Saratoga,  121  fn.,  129-30; 
memoir  of,  urging  immediate 
American  recognition  (Jan., 
1778),  155  footnote;  author 
of  the  original  form  of  the 
Observations  sur  le  Mdmoire, 
etc.,  145  and  appendix  IV; 
charges  Arthur  Lee  with 
treachery  to  France,  166  fn.; 
controversy  over  claims  of, 
207-8;  witty  comment  of,  on 
Spain's  entry  into  the  war, 
216  fn. 


415 


416 


INDEX 


Belligerency:  A  status  un- 
known to  the  Law  of  Nations 
in  1776,  81  and  fn. 

Berkeley,  Bishop:  Predicts 
greatness  of  America,  217  fn. 

Bernis,  Cardinal:  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  (1756),  32. 

Bonvouloir:  Mission  of,  to 
America  (1775),  73-4;  re- 
ports favorably  on  American 
prospects  (Mar.,  1776),  ib. 

Boston:  Siege  of,  impresses 
French  opinion,  68. 

Broglie,  Count  de:  His  Con- 
jectures raisonne'es,  46  ff. ; 
plan  for  invasion  of  England 
preserved  at  request  of  Ver- 
gennes,  61-2;  plans  to  become 
temporary  "Statholder"  of 
the  United  States,  90-2 ;  mem- 
oir on  England's  enfeeble- 
ment  (Jan.,  1778),  154-5  fn. 

Burgoyne:  British  general 
captures  Ticonderoga,  117; 
surrenders  at  Saratoga,  120. 

Burke:  Predicts  French  inter- 
vention in  America,  52  fn.; 
assesses  the  cost  to  France  of 
her  intervention  in  America, 
375-6. 

Canada:  Lost  to  France  by 
the  Treaty  of  Paris  (1763), 
37;  significance  of  English  re- 
tention of,  in  preference  to 
Guadaloupe  and  Martinique, 
19-20;  not  a  French  objective 
in  the  Revolution,  9-11,  70, 
74,  200-1  and  fn.;  French 
withdrawal  from,  assists 
French  intervention,  51,  65, 
74;  wish  of  France  and  Spain 
to  leave,  in  the  hands  of  Eng- 
land, 12  fn.,  Ill,  176,  201-4 
and  fns.;  Vergennes'  idea  of 
making  a  free  state  of,  under 
French  protection,  201-2  and 
fn. ;  Washington  opposes  a 
French  expedition  into,  204. 

Carleton,  Sir  Guy:    Authorized 


to  negotiate  peace  in  Ameri- 
ca, 330  fn. 

Carmichael:  Memoir  of,  to 
Vergennes  cited,  118  and  fn. 

Cartography:  Evidence  of,  on 
the  Western  Land  question, 
222  fn. 

Caste jon,  Marquis  de:  Member 
of  the  Spanish  royal  council, 
and  opposed  to  American 
recognition,  109. 

Castries:  Becomes  secretary 
of  state  for  the  Marine,  285; 
opposes  peace  (1782),  357  fn. 

Catherine  II:  Assists  in  parti- 
tion of  Poland,  45;  forms  the 
First  League  of  Neutrals 
(1780),  172;  joins  with  Jos- 
eph II  in  offering  to  mediate 
between  Great  Britain  and 
her  foes  (1781),  286. 

Charles  III,  of  Spain:  A  loyal 
Bourbon,  34;  concern  at 
French  -  American  alliance, 
161-2;  deep  resentment  at  in- 
dependent course  of  France, 
176-8;  character  of,  sketched 
by  Florida  Blanca,  176-7  fn.; 
pleased  with  the  idea  of  med- 
iating between  France  and 
England,  184;  urges  upon 
Louis  the  acceptance  of  a 
qualified  recognition  by  Eng- 
land of  American  independ- 
ence, 185-6;  will  not  recognize 
American  independence  be- 
fore England,  195;  disap- 
pointment of,  at  not  obtaining 
Gibraltar,  356. 

Chatelet:  Correspondence  with 
Choiseul  regarding  American 
affairs,  42;  joins  Choiseul  in 
opposing  Vergennes'  policy, 
287. 

Chatham :  Attitude  toward 
France  and  French  view  of, 
3,  35  fn. ;  lament  on  Saratoga, 
18-9;  rumors  of  prospective 
return  to  power,  64-5;  in 


INDEX 


417 


eclipse,  66;  no  likelihood  of 
his  being  called  to  power 
after  Saratoga,  124  fn.; 
rumors  respecting,  130,  155; 
opposed  to  recognizing  Amer- 
ican independence  after  Sara- 
toga, 133  fn.;  also,  after  the 
announcement  of  the  French- 
American  treaty,  168  fn. 

Chaumont:  A  secret  agent  of 
the  French  Foreign  Office, 
126,  129. 

Choiseul,  Duke  de:  Succeeds 
Bernis  (1758),  33;  his  Mer- 
cantilism, 33-4;  obtains  the 
second  Family  Compact,  35- 
6;  cedes  Louisiana  to  Spain, 
36;  Memoir  e  of  (1765),  39- 
40;  considers  intervening  in 
England's  dispute  with  her 
Colonies  (1766-8),  40  ff.; 
sends  Kalb  to  America,  43; 
disliked  by  Louis  XVI,  54; 
attacks  of,  on  Vergennes' 
foreign  policy,  78,  287. 

Clark,  George  Rogers:  Expe- 
dition of,  against  British 
posts  in  the  Northwest,  269. 

Commissioners,  The  American: 
Agree  to  transcend  their 
original  instructions,  96-7 ; 
would  like  to  involve  France 
with  England,  114;  endeavor 
to  force  the  French  govern- 
ment's hand,  118;  abandon 
these  tactics  after  Ticonde- 
roga,  118-9  and  fn.;  prefer  a 
coalition  with  France,  125 
fn.;  not  citable  in  support  of 
Vergennes'  alarmism  after 
Saratoga,  143-4;  negotiations 
with  the  Foreign  Office,  ch. 
VII;  propose  a  treaty  of 
amity  and  commerce,  149; 
state  their  terms,  152-4;  fail 
in  their  effort  to  procure  im- 
mediately effective  guaranties 
from  France,  ib.;  presented 
at  court,  168.  See  "Deane," 
"Lee,"  and  "Franklin." 


Congress,  The  Continental: 
Sends  an  agent  to  France, 
84;  authorizes  a  treaty  of 
amity  and  commerce  with 
France,  96;  enlarges  its  in- 
structions to  the  American 
commissioners,  97;  effect  of 
British  gold  on,  feared  by 
Vergennes,  163-4;  declares 
against  the  idea  of  a  separ- 
ate peace,  209;  debates  in,  of 
the  Western  Land  question, 
220  fn.,  231-2  fn.;  parties  in, 
247-8  and  fns.;  relations  of, 
with  the  French  envoys,  chs. 
XI-XIII;  developes  aggres- 
sive views  respecting  Ameri- 
can claims  in  the  West  and 
to  the  Newfoundland  fisher- 
ies (1779),  256  ff.;  adopts 
instructions  of  Aug.  14,  1779, 
260;  instructions  of,  to  Jay, 
respecting  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi,  see  "Jay." 
See  further  "Instructions  of 
June  15,  1781"  and  "Provi- 
sional Articles." 

"Corsairs":  The  question  of, 
99-101. 

Courier  de  I' Europe:  Sensa- 
tionalism of,  132  and  fn. 

Deane,  Silas:  First  American 
agent  to  France,  arrives  in 
Paris,  84;  approves  Broglie's 
scheme  to  become  "Stat- 
holder"  of  the  United  States, 
90;  presents  Vergennes  a 
plan  of  alliance  between 
France,  Spain,  and  the 
United  States  (Mar.  1777), 
97;  negotiations  of,  with  the 
English  spy,  Wentworth,  127; 
famous  controversy  of,  with 
Arthur  Lee,  207-9;  holds 
lands  west  of  the  Mountains 
to  be  at  Congress'  disposal, 
219;  endeavors  to  raise  money 
in  France  on  the  Western 
lands  as  security,  238-9  and 
fn. 


418 


INDEX 


Deslandes :  Urges  importance 
of  naval  power  to  France,  29- 
30. 

Diplomatic  Revolution,  The: 
motive  for,  23;  consummation 
of,  31-2. 

Dunkirk:  Treaty  provisions 
regarding,  38;  stipulation  of 
Convention  of  Aranjuez  with 
reference  to,  193-4;  articles 
concerning,  suppressed 
(1783),  361. 

Durand:  Correspondence  of, 
as  ambassador  at  St.  James' 
with  Choiseul  regarding 
American  affairs,  41. 

England:  Begins  Seven  Years' 
War  without  warning,  3,  73; 
offers  France  and  Spain  a 
guaranty  of  their  American 
possessions  (1776-7)  6-7,  115- 
6;  re-assesses  colonial  empire 
in  consequence  of  Seven 
Years'  War,  19-20;  colonies, 
commerce,  and  marine  the 
basis  of  the  power  of,  18-21, 
29,  31,  41,  44,  48,  50,  87,  154- 
5;  hereditary  rival  of  France 
and  enfeeblement  of,  sought 
by  France,  18  ff.,  40,  47-50, 
69-70,  86,  89,  101,  137,  139- 
40;  overbearing  naval  policy 
of,  47,  51,  73,  102-3;  plays  a 
waiting  game  with  Spain 
(1778),  181-2;  rejects  proffer 
of  Spanish  mediation  (Mar., 
1779),  214-5;  supposed  to  be 
enfeebled  by  the  loss  of 
America,  362-4 ;  subordination 
of,  to  France  resented,  365-6; 
causes  of  swift  recuperation 
of,  367-8;  recovery  by,  of 
American  trade,  369-71  and 
fn.;  rapid  restoration  of  fleet 
of,  371 ;  regains  the  pre- 
dominance in  Holland,  374-5. 
Estaing,  Count  d':  Sent  with  a 
fleet  to  North  America,  169; 
address  of,  to  French-Cana- 
dians (Oct.,  1778),  209  fn. 


Family  Compact  (1761):  For- 
mation and  provisions  of,  35- 
6;  maintenance  of,  urged  by 
Choiseul,  40;  called  by  Ver- 
gennes  "the  corner-stone"  of 
French  policy,  t59;  loyalty  to, 
pledged  by  Florida  Blanca, 
106;  put  in  jeopardy  by  Ver- 
gennes'  American  policy,  135; 
appeal  to,  by  France  feared 
by  Florida  Blanca  (1778), 
175;  supplemented  by  the 
Convention  of  Aranjuez,  ch. 
VIII. 

Favier:  Associated         with 

Broglie  in  the  preparation  of 
the  Conjectures  raisonnees, 
46;  influence  of  his  work, 
48-9. 

Fitzherbert:  British  peace  ne- 
gotiator, 332  fn. 
Fleury,  Cardinal:  His  Systems 
de  Conservation  and  its  great 
success,  23-5;  defect  of  the 
Systeme,  28. 

Florida  Blanca,  Don  Jos6  Mo- 
nino  Oount  de:  Succeeds 
Grimaldi  as  prime-minister 
of  Spain  (1777),  105;  char- 
acteristics of  policy  of,  to- 
ward America,  ch.  V,  passim; 
his  idea  of  intervention,  112 
ff. ;  opposes  a  pledge  of  finan- 
cial aid  to  the  Americans, 
119;  favors  financial  aid  after 
Saratoga,  but  opposes  an  al- 
liance with  the  colonies,  157; 
extreme  anger  at  intelligence 
of  French-American  negotia- 
tions, 158-60;  calculates  on 
leisurely  negotiations  between 
France  and  Spain,  160-1;  de- 
clines French  offer  of  naval 
protection  for  Mexican  treas- 
ure fleet,  164;  fears  an  appeal 
by  France  to  the  Family 
Compact,  175;  com/pared  with 
Aranda,  175  fn. ;  crystalliza- 
tion of  views  of,  respecting 
the  American  peril,  176-78; 


INDEX 


419 


angry  correspondence  with 
Aranda,  179-80  fn.;  efforts  of, 
to  make  Spain  mediator  re- 
buffed by  England,  181;  bet- 
ter success  of,  182;  wishes  to 
see  American  independence 
neutralized,  184-5 ;  discloses 
his  intention  to  make  Spanish 
objectives  the  sine  qud  non 
of  peace,  185,  189;  definite  ob- 
jectives sought  by,  for  Spain, 
190;  shapes  the  Convention  of 
Aranjuez,  191-2;  offers  Eng- 
land Spanish  mediation  on 
the  basis  of  the  status  quo  in 
America,  214-5 ;  recognizes 
the  extension  of  the  United 
States  to  the  Mississippi,  240, 
242;  urges  the  status  quo  for 
the  United  States  (1780), 
271-2;  eccentric  conduct  of, 
with  Jay,  319  ff.;  admits 
that  Spain  will  not  recognize 
American  independence  be- 
fore England,  321-2;  lack  of 
self-possession  of,  ib.  fn.;  em- 
phasizes Spain's  interest  in 
her  monopoly  of  commerce  in 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  322; 
solicits  terms  of  a  treaty 
from  Jay,  324-5;  anger  of, 
with  Aranda  in  consequence 
of  Spain's  failure  to  obtain 
Gibraltar  by  the  peace,  356. 

Floridas,  The:  Holker's  in- 
structions with  reference  to 
(Nov.  25,  1777),  12  fn.;  ex- 
changed by  Spain  for  Ha- 
vana, 36;  recovery  of,  sought 
by  Spain,  112,  161,  190-1, 
197-8.  See  also  Appendix  V. 

Forth:  British  emissary  to 
France  (1777),  presents  In- 
formally English  demands 
with  reference  to  American 
privateers,  115;  offers  France 
a  guaranty  of  her  West  In- 
dian possessions,  ib.;  repre- 
sentations of,  go  unsup- 


ported, 116-7;  offers  France 
a  separate  peace,  331  fn. 
Fox,  Charles:  Quarrel  of,  with 
Shelburne  over  the  control  of 
the  peace  negotiations,  331-2 
fn. 

France:     Motives   for   entering 
the  Revolution,  chs.  I  and  II, 
especially  pp.   49-53,   ch.   VI, 
and   appendices   II    and   III; 
diplomatic   object   of,   in   the 
18th  century,  23  ff.,  50;  guar- 
antor of  the  Treaty  of  West- 
phalia,   28,    59,    169-70;    ne- 
glects her  navy,  28-30;  losses 
by  the  Seven  Years'  War,  37- 
8;   humiliated  by  the  Treaty 
of  Paris,  38;  also,  by  the  par- 
tition of  Poland,  45-6;  inter- 
vention of,  in  the  Revolution 
foretold,     ch.     II,     note     52; 
weak  navy  of  (1776),  87  fn.; 
hazardous    position    of,    early 
in    1777,    99;    apology    of,    to 
Europe      for      entering      the 
Revolution,  144-5  fn.;  breaks 
with    England,    168-9;    cham- 
pion  of   neutral    rights,    170- 
2;   attitude   of,   on   the   Wes- 
tern  Land   question,  232    If.; 
benefits  received  by,  from  the 
Treaty    of    Peace,    ch.    XVI; 
prestige   of,   restored   on    the 
Continent,  361-2;  position  of, 
arouses  English  jealousy,  365- 
6;  failure  of,  to  secure  Amer- 
ican   trade,    369-71    and    fn.; 
influence  of,  threatened  by  an 
Austro-Russian       rapproche- 
ment,    372;     temporary     tri- 
umph   of,    in    Holland,    374; 
terrible  cost  to,  of  her  inter- 
vention   in    America,    375-6; 
see   also   "Spain"   and    "Ver- 
gennes." 

Franklin:  Foresees  French  in- 
tervention in  the  British- 
American  dispute,  44  fn.  38, 
52  fn. ;  arrives  in  France 


420 


INDEX 


(Dec.,  1776),  93;  immense 
reputation  of,  and  its  effect 
on  the  American  cause,  93-4; 
first  audience  with  Vergennes 
and  demands  of,  95;  joins 
with  Deane  and  Lee  in  trans- 
cending the  Congressional  in- 
structions, 96-7;  proposes  a 
plan  of  alliance  to  Aranda, 
97;  intervenes  in  behalf  of 
American  privateers,  100 ; 
prepares  memoir  to  the 
French  government  with 
Deane  and  Abb6  Niccoli,  118 
fn.;  acquiesces  in  the  idea  of 
a  truce,  186;  holds  lands 
west  of  the  Mountains  to  be 
at  Congress'  disposal,  219 
and  fn.;  personal  interests 
of,  in  an  English  grant  west 
of  the  Mountains,  226,  302 
fn.;  treats  the  Mississippi  as 
the  western  boundary  of  the 
United  States  (Dec.,  1775), 
241  fn.;  appointed  peace  ne- 
gotiator, 301;  views  of,  on 
method  of  negotiating  peace, 
329  fn.;  articles  proposed  by, 
to  Oswald  as  "necessary," 
330;  confidence  of,  in  good 
faith  of  Vergennes,  333;  joins 
with  Jay  and  Adams  in  ne- 
gotiating without  regarding 
the  Instructions  of  June  15, 
1781,  340;  returns  a  soothing 
answer  to  Vergennes'  re- 
proaches, 341  fn.;  signs  a1 
declaration  (Jan.  20,  1783) 
explanatory  of  the  Provision- 
al Articles,  357-8. 

Frederick  II:  Makes  treaty  of 
Westminster  with  England 
(1756),  31;  participates  in 
partition  of  Poland,  45. 

Gardoqui,  Don  Diego:  Inter- 
est of,  in  American  trade, 
320;  negotiations  of,  with 
Jay  concerning  the  naviga- 


tion   of    the    Mississippi,    ib. 
and   fn. 

Gamier:  Char g 6  d'affaires  at 
London,  64;  reports  of,  on 
the  English  situation,  64-6; 
communicates  news  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence, 
84;  sends  news  of  the  Ameri- 
can defeat  at  Long  Island,  85. 

George  III:  Control  of  Parlia- 
ment, 4;  calls  the  Americans 
"rebels"  (Aug.,  1775);  dis- 
like of,  for  Chatham,  64-5, 
124  fn.;  obstinacy  in  matter 
of  American  independence, 
121-2;  slow  to  recognize  that 
France  intends  war,  163  fn. 

Gerard  (Conrad  Gerard  de 
Rayneval) :  Secretary  to  Ver- 
gennes, 69;  Reflexions  of 
(Nov.,  1775),  69-72;  denies 
that  the  Americans  will  be- 
come a  conquering  nation, 
110;  interview  of,  with  the 
three  American  Commissioners 
(Dec.  17,  1777),  150-1;  com- 
municates to  the  commission- 
ers the  king's  decision  to 
make  an  alliance  with  the 
United  States  (Jan.  8,  1778), 
152-3;  sent  as  first  French 
envoy  to  America,  169;  in- 
structed to  prepare  Congress 
for  a  truce  and  indirect  rec- 
ognition, 187;  fails  to  obtain 
a  favorable  declaration  from 
Congress  on  this  subject,  195; 
fails  to  obtain  concessions 
from  Congress  for  Spain  re- 
specting the  Floridas,  197-8; 
participation  of,  in  Deane- 
Lee  controversy,  208;  obtains 
declaration  from  Congress 
against  a  separate  peace; 
(Jan.,  1779),  209;  negotia- 
tions of,  with  Congress  re- 
specting the  Western  Land 
and  Fisheries  questions,  ch. 


INDEX 


XI;  characterization  of,  247 
fn.;  leaves  America  in  broken 
health,  261-2;  influence  of, 
seen  in  La  Luzerne's  instruc- 
tions, 265-7. 

Gibbon  the  Historian:  Author 
of  the  M&moire  justicatif, 
etc.,  144. 

Gibraltar:  Vergennes'  willing- 
ness to  exchange  French 
possessions  to  secure,  for 
Spain  (1782),  6;  recovery  of, 
desired  by  Spain,  178,  190, 
347;  pledge  of  Convention  of 
Aranjuez,  with  reference  to, 
193-4;  struggle  for  (1781-2), 
287,  293,  313,  352;  question 
of,  delays  peace,  347  fn.,  348, 
353,  356-7  and  fn. 

Grand:  A  secret  agent  of  the 
French  Foreign  Office,  129. 

Grasse,  Count  de:  Commander 
of  French  fleet  in  American 
waters,  293;  correspondence 
of,  with  Rochambeau,  310-2; 
credit  due,  for  Yorktown, 
313 

Grenville,  Thomas:  British 
peace  envoy,  331-2  fn.;  mys- 
tifying assertions  of,  333  and 
fn. 

Grimaldi,  Marquis  de:  Prime 
minister  of  Spain,  86,  98;  is 
succeeded  by  Florida  Blanca, 
105;  cautions  Aranda  against 
the  dangers  of  the  American 
example,  108;  meets  Lee  at 
the  Spanish  frontier  and 
turns  him  back,  ib. 

Guines,  Count  de:  Ambassa- 
dor to  England,  sends  Bon- 
vouloir  to  America,  73-4; 
favors  an  understanding  with 
England  and  is  superseded 
by  Noailles,  78. 

Hartford  Conference:  Pro- 
ceedings of,  291-2. 

Hartley:  An  English  friend  of 
Franklin,  186,  330  fn. 


Holker:  First  emissary  sent  to 
America  after  Saratoga  and 
first  French  consul  at  Phila- 
delphia, 120  and  fn. 

Holland:  Relations  of,  to 
France  under  Treaty  of  Ver- 
vins,  184,  186-7;  the  Republi- 
can party  of,  and  France, 
83;  breaks  with  England 
(1781),  285;  enters  into  close 
alliance  with  France  (1785), 
374;  French  influence  in, 
overthrown  by  England,  375. 

Howes,  The:  British  comman- 
ders in  America,  and  rumor- 
ed to  be  in  negotiation  with 
the  Americans,  129-30  and 
fn.;  victory  of  Lord  Howe 
before  Gibraltar,  352. 

Hutton:  An  English  friend  of 
Franklin,  126. 

Independence:  Scope  of  the 
French  guaranty  of,  176,  183 
fn.,  193.  See  also  "Treaty  of 
Alliance,"  "Truce,"  "Status 
Quo." 

Instructions  of  June  15,  1781: 
Terms  of,  300-1;  Congres- 
sional debates  on,  301  ff.  pas- 
sim; explanation  of  Congress' 
action  in  voting,  ib.;  instruc- 
tions supplementing,  315-7 ; 
criticized  by  Jay,  328;  broken 
by  Jay  and  his  associates, 
338  ff. 

Jamaica:  Vacillating  attitude 
of  Spain  toward  proposition 
to  conquer,  178,  190,  287. 

Jay,  John:  President  of  Con- 
gress, 249-50;  confers  with 
Gerard  on  the  Western  Land 
and  Fisheries  questions,  250- 
2,  259;  appointed  envoy  to 
Madrid,  261;  instructions  of 
Congress  to,  respecting  the 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi, 
261,  270  fn.,  280  and  fn.,  323; 
appointed  peace  negotiator, 
301;  mission  of,  to  Spain,  ch. 


INDEX 


XIV;  submits  scheme  of 
treaty  with  Spain,  325;  re- 
quested by  Franklin  to  come 
to  Paris,  326;  fruitless  at- 
tempts at  negotiation  with 
Aranda,  ib.;  effect  upon,  of 
his  Spanish  experiences,  327- 
8;  part  of,  in  the  negotiations 
of  1782,  ch.  XV;  is  opposed 
to  Oswald's  first  commission, 
331-3;  suspicions  of,  and 
their  validity,  333-9,  346-9 
and  notes;  sends  Vaughan  to 
England,  339;  insists  on 
America's  fidelity  to  France, 
342  fn.;  willing  to  see  Great 
Britain  reconquer  West  Flor- 
ida, ib.;  beneficial  results  of 
conduct  of,  350-5. 
Jefferson,  Thomas:  Governor 
of  Virginia,  appointed  peace 
negotiator,  301-2  and  fn. 
Jenifer:  Member  of  Congress 
from  Maryland,  a  leader  of 
the  "landless"  state  party, 
280  fn.,  304. 

Kalb,  John  (later  Baron  de) : 
Sent  to  America  by  Choiseul 
(1767),  42-3;  report  of,  un- 
favorable to  French  interven- 
tion, ib.;  acts  as  agent  of 
Broglie,  90. 

La  Fayette,  Marquis  de:  Comes 
to  America  (1777),  90;  plans 
joint  French- American  cam- 
paign in  Canada,  203;  visits 
France  and  secures  the  des- 
patch to  America  of  forces 
under  Rochambeau  and  Ter- 
nay,  287-8. 

La  Luzerne,  Chevalier  de:  Sec- 
ond plenipotentiary  to  the 
United  States,  characteriza- 
tion of,  263-4  and  fn.;  Ver- 
gennes'  first  instructions  to, 
256-6;  negotiations  of,  with 
Congress  respecting  Spain's 
interests,  267  ff.;  Vergennes' 
later  instructions  to,  touch- 


ing this  matter,  278-9,  281; 
negotiations  of,  with  Con- 
gress leading  to  the  Instruc- 
tions of  June  15,  1781,  297 
if. ;  assents  to  an  American 
invasion  of  Canada  (1781) 
305;  details  American  expec- 
tations from  the  treaty  of 
peace,  308-9  and  fn. 

Laurens,  Henry:  Appointed 
peace  negotiator,  301 ;  is  cap- 
tured by  the  British  and 
lodged  in  the  Tower  of  Lon- 
don, 302  fn. 

Laurens,  Col.  John:  Is  sent  to 
France  by  Congress  to  obtain 
a  loan  (Feb.,  1781),  292  and 
fn. 

Lee,  Arthur:  In  London 
(1775),  66;  goes  to  Spain  and 
is  turned  back  (Mar.,  1T77), 
98;  accused  of  communicating 
the  French-American  Treaty 
to  the  British  government, 
166-7  fn.;  controversy  with 
Deane,  207-8;  is  prevented 
by  La  Luzerne  from  becom- 
ing secretary  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, 265;  criticism  of,  on  the 
Instructions  of  June  15,  1781, 
305  fn. 

Lee,  Richard  Henry:  Attitude 
of,  on  question  of  a  separate 
peace,  208  and  fn. 

Livingston,  Robert  R.:  Elec- 
tion of,  to  secretaryship  of 
Foreign  Affairs  is  promoted 
by  La  Luzerne,  265;  letter  of, 
to  Franklin  (Jan.,  1782)  in 
support  of  American  claims 
in  the  West,  316  fn.  See 
"Marbois." 

Long  Island,  Battle  of:  Bad 
effect  of,  on  American  pros- 
pects in  France,  85-8. 
Louis  XV:  His  Secret  du  Rot, 
45;  unpopular  at  death  on 
account  of  France's  humilia- 
tions abroad,  51  fn. 


INDEX 


423 


Louis  XVI:  Pledges  re- 
forms, 7,  60  and  fn.;  dislikes 
idea  of  aiding  rebels,  8  fn. 
and  appendix  IV;  chooses 
cabinet,  54;  ratifies  the  policy 
of  secret  aid,  79;  extends  fi- 
nancial aid  to  the  Colonies, 
95-6,  120;  agrees  to  war  with 
England  and  an  alliance  with 
the  United  States  if  Spain  is 
favorable,  103-4;  decides  to 
make  new  gift  to  America, 
120;  convinced  of  "the  moral 
certainty  of  peril,"  129  and 
fn.,  142-3;  point  of  view  of, 
to  be  distinguished  from  that 
of  the  Foreign  Office,  148; 
authorizes  the  declaration  of 
the  Treaty  of  Amity  and 
Commerce  (Mar.  7,  1778), 
166-7;  sends  letters  to  Con- 
gress, 168-9;  on  the  point  of 
stopping  the  war  for  finan- 
cial reasons  (1780),  284-5; 
goes  to  the  guillotine,  358. 

Louisiana:  Not  a  French  ob- 
jective in  the  Revolution,  9- 
11;  transferred  by  France  to 
Spain  (1762),  36.  See  "Mis- 
sissippi and  Western  Land 
Question." 

Madison,  James:  Argument  of 
(Oct.,  1780),  against  Spain's 
claim  of  a  right  to  conquer 
British  possessions  along  the 
Mississippi,  270-1  fn.;  criti- 
cizes the  conduct  of  the 
American  peace  negotiators, 
344-5. 

"Manifest  Destiny":  Origins 
of  the  idea,  217-19  fn. 

Marbois:  Secretary  to  La 
Luzerne,  urges  Spam's  claims 
upon  Congress,  280-1;  letter 
of,  opposing  the  American 
claims  to  the  fisheries,  337-8 
and  fn. 

Maria  Theresa:  Assists  in  the 
partition  of  Poland  (1772), 


45;  desires  peace  (1778),  170. 

Maryland:  Opposes  the  claims 
of  the  "landed"  states,  220 
fn.,  232. 

Maurepas,  Count  de:  Urges 
restoration  of  French  Ma- 
rine (1730-40),  28-9;  urges  a 
belligerent  policy  toward 
England,  78-9  and  fn. 

Mercantile  System:  Leading 
ideas  of,  15-7  and  fn.,  28-9, 
33-4;  connection  with  French 
intervention,  18-9,  41-2,  44. 

Miralles,  Juan  de:  Spanish, 
agent,  arrives  in  America, 
243-4;  views  of,  on  the  con- 
flicting interests  of  Spain  and 
the  United  States,  244-5  and 
fn. ;  determines  views  of  Ger- 
ard, 245  ff. ;  proposes  pur- 
chase of  American  claims  in 
the  West,  251-2;  spreads 
false  reports  respecting 
•Spain's  attitude,  255;  admits 
lack  of  powers  or  instruc- 
tions from  Madrid,  269;  dies, 
280. 

Mississippi  and  Western  Land 
Question,  The:  See  chs.  X- 
XII;  also  chs.  XIV-XV  pas- 
sim. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  The:  Some 
antecedents  of,  201  fn.,  369  fn. 

Montmorin,  Count  de:  Friend 
of  Louis  and  Vergennes,  be- 
comes ambassador  at  Madrid, 
156;  urged  by  Vergennes  to 
arouse  the  Spanish  govern- 
ment to  an  appreciation  of 
the  opportunity  presented  by 
the  Revolution,  156-7;  en- 
counters Florida  Blanca's 
wrath  at  the  action  of  France 
in  negotiating  with  the 
Americans,  158-60;  says  that 
Spain  wants  "shining  ob- 
jects," 161;  is  sceptical  of 
value  of  Spanish  aid,  180; 
signs  the  Convention  of  Aran- 


424. 


INDEX 


juez  (Apr.  12,  1779),  192; 
warns  Vergennes  of  Spain's 
hostility  toward  America,  216. 

Morris,  Gouverneur:  Views  of, 
on  the  Western  Land  ques- 
tion, 248-9. 

Nentrals,  Rights  of:  French  gov- 
ernment champions,  against 
English  sea-power,  21,  80-1 
and  fn.,  170-2.  See  "Cather- 
ine II." 

Newfoundland  Fisheries,  The: 
An  enlargement  of  rights  in 
connection  with,  offered 
France  by  England  (1778),  7 
fn.;  a  share  in,  desired  by 
Spain,  161,  178;  French 

§  ledge  with  reference  to,  to 
pain,  191,  197-9  and  fn.; 
Congressional  views  respect- 
ing American  rights  in,  257 
ff.;  final  instructions  of  Con- 
gress concerning,  314-6.  See 
appendix  V. 

Noailles,  Duke  de:  Opposes 
France's  entrance  into  the 
War  of  the  Austrian  Succes- 
sion, 29;  succeeds  the  Count 
de  Guines  as  ambassador  to 
England  (1776),  78;  reliabil- 
ity of  reports  of,  from  Lon- 
don, 131;  points  of  disagree- 
ment of,  with  Vergennes,  131- 
2;  communicates  the  Treaty 
of  Amity  and  Commerce  to 
the  British  government,  168; 
leaves  England,  ib.  and  fn. 

North,  Lord:  Sentiments  at- 
tributed to,  by  Vergennes, 
131,  133;  introduces  plan  of 
conciliation  into  Parliament, 
165  and  fn.;  fall  of,  from 
power,  331  fn. 

Ossun,  Marquis  d':  Ambassa- 
dor at  Madrid,  103;  sup- 
planted by  the  Count  de 
Montmorin,  156. 

Oswald,  Richard:  British  peace 
negotiator,  330  ff.  passim. 


Parliament:  Debates  in,  after 
Saratoga,  133  fn. 

Peace  Negotiations  of  1782: 
Early  stages  of,  329-32  fns. 
See  "Jay." 

Phillips,  Dr.  P.  C.:  Views  of, 
respecting  the  results  of 
Jay's  conduct  of  the  peace 
negotiations  considered,  350 
ff. 

Poland,  First  Partition  of:  in 
relation  to  French  diplomacy, 
45;  denounced  by  Vergennes, 
57. 

Pontleroy:  Early  French  agent 
to  America,  40-1. 

Price,  Dr.  Richard:  Predicts 
American  greatness,  218  fn. 

Proclamation  of  1763,  The: 
considered  in  connection  with 
the  Western  Land  question, 
224-7  and  notes. 

Provisional  Articles,  The:  Pro- 
visions of,  see  appendix  V; 
the  signing  of,  339^-0;  ques- 
tions respecting  the  interpre- 
tation of,  340  fn.;  real  im- 
port of,  342;  reception  of,  by 
Congress,  344-5,  354-5;  esti- 
mate of,  by  the  French  For- 
eign Office,  355  and  fn. 

Quebec  Act,  The:  Bearing  of, 
on  the  Western  Land  ques- 
tion, 226-7  and  fn. 

Raynal,  Abb6:  His  Histoire 
des  Indes  on  the  importance 
of  naval  power,  48-9;  influ- 
ence of  his  work,  ib. 

Rayneval,  J.  M.  Gerard  de: 
Secretary  to  Vergennes,  on 
the  status  quo,  296-7  fn. ;  rep- 
resentations of,  to  Jay  on  the 
Mississippi  question,  336 ; 
mystery  surrounding  journey 
of,  to  England,  ib.;  Jay's  sus- 
picions regarding,  339;  finds 
Shelburne  stiff  on  the  ques- 
tion of  Gibraltar,  347  fn.; 
conversations  of,  with  Shel- 


INDEX 


425 


burne  respecting  American 
interests,  348  ff.  and  fn.; 
marvels  at  the  success  of  the 
Americans,  355. 

Rendon:  Successor  to  Miralles, 
280. 

Richmond,  Lord:  Advocates 
American  independence,  133. 

Rochambeau,  Count  de:  Brings 
a  military  force  to  the  United 
States  (1780),  276-7,  288-9; 
deep  concern  of,  on  account 
of  American  conditions,  292, 
310-1;  credit  due,  for  York- 
town,  31 1«,  313. 

Rochford,  Lord:  Scheme  for 
joint  guaranty  of  French, 
Spanish  and  English  posses- 
sions in  America,  6-7;  friend 
of  Beaumarchais,  65. 

Rockingham,  Lord:  Rumored 
hostile  intentions  of,  toward 
France,  65;  advocates  un- 
qualified independence  for  the 
Americans,  133  fn.,  168  fn.; 
succeeds  North,  331  fn.;  dies, 
332  fn. 

Rodney:  British  admiral,  de- 
feats Grasse  in  the  West  In- 
dies (Apr.,  1782),  316-7. 

Rouille:  Minister  of  the 
Marine,  (1749),  31. 

Saint-Contest:  Secretary  of 
state  (1751),  30. 

St.  Germain:  Secretary  of 
state  for  War,  and  favorable 
to  an  aggressive  diplomatic 
policy,  78;  sends  Steuben  to 
America,  90;  is  supplanted- 
by  S6gur,  285. 

Sandwich,  Lord:  Member  of 
the  British  ministry,  not 
author  of  sentiment  attributed 
to  him,  132;  estimates  Brit- 
ish naval  strength,  134. 

Santo  Domingo:  Question  of 
defense  of,  6  fn.,  89-90  fn. 

Saratoga,  Battle  of:  Brings 
about  the  French-American 


alliance,  120,  121  and  fn.,  141. 

Sartines:  Secretary  of  state 
for  the  Marine,  favorable  to 
an  aggressive  diplomatic 
policy,  78;  is  displaced  by 
Castries,  285. 

S6gur,  The  Elder:  Becomes 
secretary  of  state  for  War 
(1781),  285. 

"Sea-to-Sea"  Charters,  The:  As 
basis  of  the  claims  of  the 
United  States  in  the  West, 
220  ff. 

Secret  Aid,  Policy  of:  See 
"Vergennes"  and  "Beaumar- 
chais"; kept  a  secret  even 
from  the  Americans  at  first, 
80;  raises  diplomatic  ques- 
tions, 80-1;  the  secret  of, 
known  to  the  British  govern- 
ment, 93  and  fn. 

"Secret  Article":  Of  the 
Treaty  of  Alliance,  see  ap- 
pendix I;  of  the  Provisional 
Articles,  see  appendix  V. 

"Secret  du  Roi,"  The:  See 
"Louis  XV". 

Separate  Peace:  Origin  of  the 
idea  of,  between  England  and 
America,  206;  notion  corn- 
batted  by  Vergennes,  ib.;  dis- 
avowed by  Congress,  209 
and  fn. 

Seven  Years  War:  Begun  by 
England  without  warning,  3; 
auspicious  opening  of,  for 
France,  31;  calamities  of 
later  stages  of,  32  8. 

Shelburne,  Lord:  Part  of,  in 
instituting  the  peace  negoti- 
ations of  1782,  331-2  fn.;  good 
faith  of,  doubted  by  Jay,  333- 
5  and  notes;  authorizes  Os- 
wald's second  commission, 
339;  conferences  of,  with 
Rayneval,  339,  347  fn.,  348- 
50  fn.;  refuses  to  take  Parli- 
ament into  his  confidence  re- 
specting the  Provisional  Arti- 


426 


INDEX 


cles,  340  fn.;  effect  on,  of 
Howe's  victory  before  Gib- 
raltar, 352-3 ;  urges  a  French- 
English  rapprochement 
against  the  northern  powers, 
372-3  fn. 

Spain:  Dispute  of,  with 
Portugal  over  interests  in 
South  America  (1774-7),  61, 
81-3,  104;  is  alarmed  at  the 
prospect  of  American  inde- 
pendence, chs.  V  and  VIII 
passim;  temporizing  attitude 
of,  178-9  and  fn.;  question  of 
the  value  of  aid  of,  to  France, 
180,  211-2  and  fn.;  seeks  rdle 
of  mediator  180  ff.;  self- 
seeking  policy  of,  106,  161, 
178,  180,  192;  desires  a  mo- 
nopoly of  trade  in  the  Carib- 
bean, 178,  190,  322;  desires  to 
recover  the  Floridas  and  a 
share  in  the  Newfoundland 
fisheries,  see  under  those 
headings;  final  terms  of 
mediation  of,  214-5;  enters 
the  war  (June,  1779),  216; 
grant  by,  of  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi  to  British  sub- 
jects (1763),  227-8  fn.;  op- 
poses American  extension  to 
the  Mississippi,  227-30;  at- 
tempts of,  to  make  conquests 
along  the  Mississippi  arouse 
American  opposition,  268-9 
and  fn. ;  secret  negotiations 
of,  with  England  (1780),  271- 
2;  re-enters  the  war  (1781), 
287;  interests  of,  preferred 
by  France  to  those  of  the 
United  States,  293-4;  ambi- 
tions of,  a  bar  to  peace,  333- 
4,  346-7,  353,  355-7;  American 
gratitude  claimed  for,  345. 
See  "Florida  Blanca,"  "Ray- 
neval,"  "Vergennes." 

Spies:  Numerous  in  Paris  in 
1777,  98. 

Status    Quo,   The:      Opposition 


of  Vergennes  to,  for  the 
United  States,  215,  271-2;  ac- 
ceptance of,  by  France  for 
the  United  States  admitted 
by  Vergennes  to  be  possible 
(1781),  296-8  and  notes;  re- 
jected by  Vergennes  for  the 
United  States,  314  fn. 

Steuben,  Baron  von:  Sent  to 
America  by  St.  Germain,  to 
train  the  American  army 
(1777),  90. 

Stormont,  Lord:  British  am- 
bassador at  Paris  (1774  ff.), 
67;  discusses,  the  American 
situation  with  Vergennes 
(Sept.,  1775),  «'&.;  remon- 
strates against  secret  aid,  93 
and  fn. ;  remonstrates  against 
the  admission  of  American 
privateers  to  French  harbors, 
100;  charges  Vergennes  with 
negotiating  with  the  Ameri- 
cans, 163-5;  avoids  a  cate- 
gorical answer  from  the 
French  government,  i&.; 
leaves  France,  168  and  fn. 

Sullivan,  General:  "Hero  of 
Newport,"  sells  out  to  the 
French  envoy,  303. 

Sweden:  Coup  d'etat  in,  effect- 
ed by  Vergennes  (1771),  55. 

Ternay:  French  naval  com- 
mander, see  "Rochambeau." 

Ticonderoga:  British  capture 
of,  injures  American  pros- 
pects in  France,  117. 

Treaty  of  Alliance  (Feb.  6, 
1778) :  Principal  features  of, 
authorized  by  the  royal  coun- 
cil (Jan.  7,  1778) ;  final  draft 
of,  signed,  154;  text  of,  ap- 
pendix I;  existence  of,  sus- 
pected in  England  from  an 
early  date,  163  fn.,  165-6  and 
fn.;  meaning  of  the  word 
"continent"  in  article  VI  of, 
199  and  fn.;  interpretation 
of  articles  XI  and  XII  of, 


INDEX 


233  ff.;  after  the  Revolution, 
358-60    and    fn. 

Treaty  of  Amity  and  Commerce 
(Feb.  6,  1778):  Difficulty 
respecting  articles  XI  and 
XII  of,  155  fn.;  articles 
XXIII-XXVIII  summarized, 
171;  declaration  of,  urged  by 
Vergennes  (Jan.  22,  1778), 
and  authorized  by  Louis 
(Mar.  7),  166-8. 

Treaty  of  Aranjuez  (Apr.  12, 
1779):  Signed,  192;  provi- 
sions of,  193-4;  compared  with 
the  French- American  treaty, 
ch.  IX. 

Treaty  of  Kutchuk-Kainardji: 
Turkey  menaced  by,  60-1. 

Treaty  of  Paris  (1763):  Pro- 
visions of,  36-7. 

Treaty  of  Teschen:  A  triumph 
for  Vergennes'  policy,  170. 

Truce:  Suggestion  of,  in  lieu 
of  a  final  peace,  183-4,  186-7, 
195-6. 

Turgot:  As  Louis  XVI's  con- 
troller-General contends  for 
economy  and  domestic  reform 
as  against  an  aggressive  dip- 
lomatic policy,  1,  72;  an- 
swers Vergennes'  Mtmoire  de 
Considerations,  76-7;  fights  a 
losing  fight  and  retires,  77-9. 

Turner,  Professor  F.  J. :  Theory 
that  France  sought  American 
territory  in  the  Revolution, 
9-11  and  fn. 

United  States:  Commerce  with, 
as  an  inducement  to  French 
intervention,  12-4  and  fn. ; 
naval  capacity  of,  predicted 
by  Vergennes,  67-8;  not 
likely  to  become  a  conquering 
state,  111;  permanent  separa- 
tion of,  from  England  Ver- 
gennes' principal  objective, 
137  ff.  and  notes;  a  disap- 
pointing ally,  177  footnote, 
188;  basis  of  claims  of,  to 


the  West,  ch.  X;  argued  to  be 
a  sovereign  entity,  230-2  and 
notes;  struggle  of,  for  inde- 
pendence near  collapse  (1780- 
81),  288-9;  French  views  of, 
290  fn.;  significance  for,  of 
the  Provisional  Articles,  see 
under  that  title.  See  also 
"Commissioners,"  "Congress," 
"Manifest  Destiny,"  "Monroe 
Doctrine." 

Van  Tyne,  Prof.  C.  H.:  Views 
of,  respecting  French  motives 
considered,  146-8  note. 

Vaughan,  Benjamin:  Friend  of 
Franklin  and  Shelburne,  sent 
by  Jay  to  London,  339,  352. 

Vergennes:  Argument  to  show 
that  French  intervention  in 
the  Revolution  was  a  defen- 
sive measure,  3-9,  and  ch.  VI ; 
little  interested  in  French 
colonies,  6  fn.  4;  alleged 
Mtmoire  of,  published  in 
1802,  10-3  and  fn.;  on  com- 
merce with  the  United  States, 
13-4;  becomes  secretary  of 
state  for  Foreign  Affairs 
(1774),  54;  early  career  of, 
54-5;  characteristics  and  dip- 
lomatic creed  of,  56-60;  ini- 
tial attitude  toward  England 
and  the  American  Revolution, 
60-2;  denunciation  of  Eng- 
land, 62-3;  alarmed  at  pros- 
pect of  return  of  Chatham 
to  power,  64-5;  takes  a  more 
positive  interest  in  the  Amer- 
ican situation,  66  ff.;  M6- 
moire  de  Considerations  of 
(Mar.,  1776),  74-6;  claims 
right  for  France  to  trade 
with  the  American  rebels  and 
receive  their  merchantmen  in 
her  harbors,  80-1;  opposes 
Spanish  conquest  of  Portugal, 
82,  85,  104;  urges  war  with 
England  (July-August,  1776), 
83-5;  receives  Deane  and 


428 


INDEX 


learns  of  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence, 84  and  fn.; 
draws  back  after  the  news 
of  Long  Island,  85-6;  con- 
gratulates Stormont  on  Brit- 
ish successes,  86;  pursues  a 
policy  of  "watchful  waiting" 
(Jan.-July,  1 777),  87  ff.;  urges 
the  preeminent  interest  of 
France  and  Spain  in  procur- 
ing the  separation  of  Eng- 
land and  North  America,  86- 
9;  delivers  a  homily  on  peace, 
88,  opposes  a  general  dis- 
armament and  an  under- 
standing with  England,  89 
and  fn.;  question  of  attitude 
of,  toward  Broglie's  Stat- 
holderate  idea,  91-2;  receives 
Franklin  but  evades  a  formal 
audience,  95;  promises  finan- 
cial aid  to  the  Colonies  (Jan. 
1777),  95-6;  precautions  in 
behalf  of  secrecy,  ib.  fn.; 
is  sceptical  of  the  substance 
of  the  American  revolt  (Mar., 
1777),  97;  is  sceptical  of 
rumors  of  an  hostile  English- 
American  coalition  (early 
1777),  99;  policy  of  toward 
American  privateers,  99  ff.; 
again  urges  war  with  Eng- 
land (July,  1777),  101-4;  en- 
deavors to  allay  Spanish  ap- 
prehensions regarding  Amer- 
ican independence,  111,  177 
fn.;  consents  to  follow  Mad- 
rid's lead  (Aug.,  1777),  113- 
4;  urges  that  Forth's  de- 
mand that  American  priva- 
teers be  excluded  from 
French  ports  be  rejected, 
115-6;  anticipates  the  early 
outbreak  of  war  with  Eng- 
land (Sept.,  1777),  116; 
again  retreats  after  the  ar- 
rival of  the  news  of  Ticon- 
deroga,  117;  proposes  a 
pledge  of  financial  aid  to  the 


Americans,  119-20;  renews 
in  a  new  form  after  Sara- 
toga the  idea  that  French 
possessions  in  the  West  In- 
dies are  in  danger  of  being 
attacked  by  an  English- 
American  coalition,  121-5 ; 
evidence  brought  forward  by, 
to  support  this  notion,  126- 
34;  instances  of  disingenuous- 
ness  of,  in  this  connection, 
132-4;  contradictions  and  in- 
consistencies of,  135-8;  de- 
clares enfeeblement  of  Eng- 
land to  be  France's  principal 
objective,  139-40  and  fns.; 
urges  defensive  aspect  of  his 
program,  140,  167,  fns.;  real 
concern  of,  after  Saratoga, 
141;  reason  for  alarmism  of, 
142  ff.;  initial  advances  to  the 
American  commissioners  af- 
ter Saratoga,  149-50;  offers  a 
defensive  alliance,  151-3;  re- 
sists American  demand  for 
an  offensive  alliance,  154; 
urges  his  policy  on  the 
Spanish  government,  155-7 ; 
finesse  of,  in  delaying  trans- 
mission to  Spain  of  news  of 
the  French- American  negotia- 
tions, 159;  significant  inter- 
view with  Stormont  (Jan.  22, 
1778),  161;  presses  for  an 
open  breach  with  England, 
161  ff.;  distrust  of  Arthur 
Lee,  166-7  fn.,  187;  policy  of, 
in  War  of  Bavarian  Succes- 
sion, 169-70;  adopts  liberal 
policy  toward  neutral  rights, 
170-2;  impatience  of,  to  bring 
Spain  into  the  war,  173,  178, 
180,  188;  willing  to  support 
Spanish  mediation,  182;  care- 
ful of  American  rights,  183 
fn.;  attitude  of,  toward  idea 
of  a  truce  instead  of  a  peace 
for  America,  186-7;  gives 
Montmorin  carte-blanche  in 


INDEX 


429 


negotiating  with  Spain,  189; 
sends  Montmorin  a  draft  of 
treaty  with  Spain,  190;  aims 
to  safeguard  France's  honor 
with  respect  to  American  in- 
terests, 192-3;  instructions  of, 
to  Gerard  with  reference  to 
a  truce,  196;  same,  with  ref- 
erence to  the  Floridas  and 
Canada,  197  ff.,  254;  plans 
a  free  state  in  Canada  under 
French  protection,  201-2 ; 
combats  the  idea  that  Ameri- 
ca may  make  a  separate 
peace  with  England,  206;  bit- 
terly criticizes  Florida 
Blanca's  terms  of  mediation 
(Apr.,  1779),  215;  recognizes 
the  extension  of  the  United 
States  to  the  Mississippi,  240- 
2  and  notes ;  favors  American 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi, 
254-5;  adopts  the  Spanish 
point  of  view  in  his  Instruc- 
tions d'Arrivte  to  La  Lu- 
zerne,  265-6;  fears  that  Spain 
seeks  to  impose  the  status 
quo  on  the  United  States 
(1780),  271-2  and  fn.;  alter- 
cations of,  with  John  Adams, 
273-8;  instructs  La  Luzerne 
not  to  take  sides  in  matters 
at  issue  between  Spain  and 
America,  278-81;  review  of 
attitude  of,  on  the  Mississip- 
pi question,  281-3;  intercedes 
with  the  king  to  continue  the 
war  (Sept.,  1780),  284-5;  re- 
organizes the  Departments  of 
War  and  Marine,  ib.;  favors 
the  offer  of  mediation  by  the 
imperial  powers  and  a  vigo- 
rous campaign,  286-7;  disap- 
pointed in  the  Americans  as 
allies,  289;  response  of,  to 
the  demands  of  the  Hartford 
Conference,  292-3;  consider- 
ations governing,  at  this  time, 
293-4;  demands  of,  upon 


Congress  in  respect  to  peace- 
making, 295-6;  admission  of, 
that  France  may  accept  the 
status  quo  for  the  United 
States,  295-8  and  notes; 
broad  scope  of  the  program 
of,  in  intervening  in  the  Rev- 
olution, 307;  not  directly  re- 
sponsible for  the  Yorktown 
campaign,  313;  recognizes  the 
unfeasibility  of  the  status 
quo  for  America,  313-4  fn.; 
views  of,  as  to  the  method  to 
be  pursued  in  peace-making, 
329  fn.;  refuses  to  treat  with 
Grenville  respecting  Ameri- 
can interests,  332  fn.;  urges 
the  American  commissioners, 
to  accept  Oswald's  first  com- 
mission, 332-3 ;  announces  that 
France  will  not  proceed  with 
England  unless  she  is  ready 
to  recognize  American  inde- 
pendence, 334  fn.;  is  non- 
committal as  to  the  conflict- 
ing claims  of  Spain  and  the 
United  States,  336;  comment 
of,  on  Marbois'  letter  re- 
specting the  fisheries,  337  f n. ; 
announces  that  France  will 
not  continue  the  war  to  se- 
cure American  demands  re- 
specting the  fisheries  and 
Western  territory,  337-9  fn., 
347-8  fn.;  letter  of  (Dec.  15, 
1782),  to  Franklin  protesting 
against  the  course  taken  by 
the  American  commissioners, 
340-2;  states  the  two  essen- 
tial conditions  of  peace,  347 
fn.;  expresses  surprise  at  the 
favorable  terms  secured  by 
the  Americans,  355  and  fn. 
presses  the  negotiations  in 
Spain's  behalf,  355-6;  delight 
of,  at  the  conclusion  of  peace, 
356-7;  opposed  by  a  war 
party  at  court,  357  fn.;  re- 
views the  success  of  his  policy 


430 


INDEX 


(Mar.,  1784),  361-2.  desires 
the  gratitude  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  for  France,  368-9 
and  fn. ;  negotiates  a  com- 
mercial treaty  with  England 
(1786),  371;  urges  a  strong 
fleet  for  France,  ib.;  is  dis- 
mayed by  the  rapprochement 
of  Austria  and  Russia,  372; 
admits  that  Continental  peace 
is  precarious,  373;  wins  his 
last  diplomatic  triumph,  374; 
death  of,  376;  final  apology 
of,  for  his  American  venture, 
376-7. 

Virginia:  Claims  of,  in  the 
West,  221,  222-4  fn. 

Washington,  General:  Opposes 
French  participation  in  a 
campaign  in  Canada,  204; 
views  of,  on  the  Western 
Land  question,  251  fn.; 
growth  of  French  regard  for, 
291  and  fn.;  attends  Hart- 
ford Conference  (Sept., 
1780),  16. 

Wentworth,  Paul:  Activities 
as  British  spy,  118  fn.  127 
and  fn.,  130  fn.,  163.  fn. 

West  Indies,  The  French:  and 
the  Treaty  of  Paris,  19-20, 


37;  value  of,  after  1763,  5-6 
and  fn.,  44,  63,  75-6,  136-7; 
independence  of,  proposed  by 
Choiseul's  secretary-general 
of  Commerce,  44;  asserted  to 
be  in  danger  from  a  joint 
English-American  attack,  3, 
75,  98-9,  121  ff.;  English  of- 
fers to  guarantee,  6-7  and 
fn.,  115-16;  American  offers 
to  guarantee,  21,  95,  97; 
chosen  for  the  scene  of 
French-Spanish  naval  efforts 
(1781),  287,  293;  Grasse's  de- 
feat in,  by  Rodney,  313,  316; 
equivalents  demanded  in,  by 
England  in  return  for  Gib- 
raltar, 355-6  fn.,  357  fn.; 
great  French-Spanish  expedi- 
tion prepared  for  (1783),  ib.; 
French  gains  in,  by  the 
Peace  of  1783  insignificant, 
361. 

Witherspoon:  Member  of  Con- 
gress from  New  Jersey,  a 
leader  of  the  "landless"  state 
party,  304. 

Wolfe,  General  James:  Pro- 
phecy by,  of  America's  des- 
tiny, 218  fn. 


THE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  SANTA  CRUZ 


his  book  is  due  on  the  last  DATE  stamped  below. 


1968 


:ii  lT77_r: 

"B    1RECT) 

GVI577  - 

,  o  vi  1971 


r(H2523s8)2373 


3  2106  00059  36£ 


